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ABSTRACT 
When, why and how does India get involved when one of its neighbors faces a regime 
crisis? And why does India in some cases engage authoritarian governments, while in 
others it undermines them and forces their democratization? To explain such variation, 
the dissertation examines Indian response to different regime crises in the three 
neighboring countries of Nepal, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and Myanmar (Burma), across three 
time periods (1950s-60s, 1980s, 2000s).  
By reconstructing policy debates in the government, based on declassified materials and 
interviews with decision-makers, the nine case studies suggest that India’s posture, degree 
and direction of involvement in each regional crisis was determined by 1) The relative 
strength and attitude towards India of the neighboring regime and of any credible 
alternative (dispensation), 2) The risk of the neighboring state’s crisis or internal conflict 
spilling over into India, affecting its domestic security (order); and 3) The neighboring 
regime’s foreign policy and security alignment, and the consequent risk of involvement by 
extra-regional powers at the expense of India (geopolitics).  
Beyond such strategic assessments, however, this dissertation goes on to demonstrate that 
India’s strategic culture of crisis response and involvement in the region is also shaped by 
its liberal democratic identity. Indian decision-makers recognize that different regime 
types bring specific dividends and disadvantages. When Indians express their principled 
support for democracy abroad, they do so for causal reasons, associating liberal regimes 
with greater stability and security, based on India’s own experience since 1947. This 
translates into a cost-benefit dilemma in Indian strategic assessments: 1) In the short term, 
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liberal regimes will traverse a risky infant phase of instability that can be detrimental to 
India, but then gradually increase their beneficial effects as they mature, in the long term; 
and 2) Conversely, in the short term, infant illiberal (and especially autocratic) regimes 
will often reinstitute order and state cohesion that benefits India, but are then bound to 
gradually increase their detrimental impact on India, especially as they face growing 
internal dissent and instability, in the long term.  
India’s strategic culture of crisis response and involvement can thus be characterized as a 
manifestation of realpolitik at its best, seeking to preserve and maximize democratic India’s 
security in the region. The “Indian way” of foreign policy is an expression of a distinct 
Indian realism, which is based on the particular colonial history, democratic identity, 
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Those who treat politics and morals apart will never understand anything of either.1 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile (1762) 
  
                                                
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or, On education (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 235. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When, why and how does India get involved when one of its neighbors faces a regime 
crisis? And why does India in some cases engage authoritarian governments, while in 
others it undermines them and force their democratization? The dissertation is driven by 
these central questions and seeks to explain the puzzling variation in India’s crises 
responses, which fluctuate between inaction and intervention, on the one hand, and 
between engagement and coercion, on the other hand.  
This introduction is divided in five sections. First, it sets out the dissertation’s research 
puzzle and addresses the insufficiencies in existing explanations. The second section 
proceeds to present the methodology, case selection, questions and hypotheses, as well as 
the sources employed. The third section then examines the dissertation’s relevance to the 
further study and also practice of Indian foreign policy. The fourth section discusses the 
dissertation’s theoretical context and contribution to the discipline of International 
Relations. The introduction concludes with an overview on the dissertation’s structure. 
 
1. Research puzzle: variation in degree and direction of involvement  
Table 1 below offers an historical overview of all types of regime crises in India’s 
neighboring countries with a brief event summary and a broad description of India’s 
response. The term “regime crisis” is employed in a broad way to encompass a) formal 
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coups, both successful and failed, and b) periods of unusual unrest or conflict. India’s 
response (posture) to each crisis, varies in two significant ways: 
a) Degree of involvement: First, in terms of the depth of its involvement (degree), India’s posture 
varies along a spectrum, from passive inaction up to military intervention. Beyond these 
two extremes, since 1947 the Indian government has also employed a variety of 
intermediary modes of involvement to either engage or coerce sovereign governments. 
For example, India used diplomatic, intelligence and other instruments to coerce Nepal 
into a regime change in 1950; to annex the Kingdom of Sikkim in 1974-5; and to 
facilitate conflict resolution in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. It also used military force to occupy 
Portuguese India in 1961, to invade East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971, and to support 
the Maldivian government in 1988. What explains this variation in intensity and 
instruments of involvement? 
b) Direction of involvement: Second, in terms of the orientation of involvement (direction), 
India’s posture seems to reflect a puzzling attitude of indifference towards different 
systems of government (regime types), as it has variably engaged and coerced both 
democracies and autocracies. For example, in 1948, India offered crucial military 
assistance for the Burmese democratic government to defeat an insurrection, but after the 
Army coup of 1962 it became the first country to recognize the new military regime. 
Since the 1970s, it has variably engaged or coerced different military regimes and 
democratic governments in Bangladesh. In the Maldives, India sided with an autocratic 
regime for several decades, but in 2012-13 flexed its diplomatic muscles after a soft coup 
against the first democratically elected Prime Minister. Does regime type affect India’s 
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These two puzzles above drive the dissertation’s two main research questions:  
1. What factors explain the varying degree and direction of India’s regional 
involvement? In terms of degree, why does India remain passive in some crises, 
refusing to take any action, while in other crises it actively intervenes, for example 
with military force?  
2. And in terms of direction, why does India sometimes engage authoritarian regimes, 












1947' Nepal' Nepalese'democrats' found'the'Nepali'National'Congress'and'execute'protest'and'violent'
actions'against'the'Rana'autocracy.'Nehru'refuses'to'provide'assistance.'
Inaction' (indirect' support' for'
autocracy).'
1948@...' Myanmar' Variety' of' armed' ethnic' and/or' Communist' insurgencies' in' the' Northern' and' Eastern'





Sikkim' Sikkim' State' Congress' agitation' against' King' for' democratization.' Indian' government'
intervenes'with'military'and'takes'over'administration,'blocking'democratization.'Leads'to'
IndiaLSikkim'Treaty'of'Dec1950.'

















1951'(Mar)' Pakistan' Attempted' Army' coup' against' PM' Liaquat' Ali' Khan' by'Maj' Gen' Akbar' Khan'with' Soviet'
support.'Also'known'as'Rawalpindi'Consipracy.'Failed.'
L'
1952'(Jan)' Nepal' A' rebel' faction'of' the'Nepal'Congress' led'by' I' K' Singh,'with' support'of' the'Home'Guard'
(Raksha' Dal),' seeks' to' overthrow' the' government.' Failure,' ends' with' Singh's' exile' into'
Tibet.'
Military' assistance' to' support'
democracy.'
1956' Sri'Lanka' The' SLFP' is' elected' to' government,' under' SWRD'Bandaranaike,' and' institutes' a' "Sinhala'




1958'(Sept)' Myanmar' Coerced' by' the' military,' PM' U' Nu' accedes' to' military' rule' and' caretaker' govt' for' six'
months,' approved' by' parliament' and' subsequently' extended' for' 12' more'months.' Soft'
coup,'signals'weakening/end'of'civilianLled'democratization'period.'
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1960	  (Dec)	   Nepal	   King	   Mahendra	   and	   military	   dismiss	   democratic	   government	   of	   B.	   P.	   Koirala.	   NC	  
persecuted,	  takes	  refuge	  in	  India,	  from	  where	  it	  stages	  an	  armed	  rebellion	  in	  1961-­‐62.	  
Engagement	   of	   new	   autocratic	  
regime.	  
1961	   Goa	  
(Portugal)	  
Military	   occupation	   of	   Portuguese	   colony	   under	   authoritarian	   rule	   of	   A.	   Salazar.	   Goan	  
freedom	  movement	  based	  in	  India.	  
Military	   intervention	   against	  
colonial	  regime.	  
1962	  (Jan)	   Sri	  Lanka	   Attempted	  Army	  coup	  by	  mostly	  "pro-­‐Western"	  Christian	  officers.	   -­‐	  
1962	  (Mar)	   Myanmar	   Military	   coup	   against	   elected	   Prime	   Minister	   U	   Nu.	   End	   of	   democratization	   process,	  
imprisonment	   or	   exile	   of	   government	   and	   other	   party	   member.	   Beginning	   of	   military	  
autocracy.	  
Engagement	   of	   new	   autocratic	  
regime.	  
1971	   Sri	  Lanka	   JVP	  armed	  Maoist	  insurgency	  operations	  against	  government	  and	  limited	  control	  of	  South	  
/	  Central	  provinces.	  
Military	   assistance	   to	   support	  
democracy.	  
1971	   Bangladesh	  
(Pakistan)	  
Bangladesh	   independence	  movement	  and	  partial	   insurgency.	  Massive	  military	   repression	  
and	  millions	  of	  Bengalis	  cross	  border	  to	  take	  refuge	  in	  India.	  
Military	   intervention	   to	   support	  
separatism	  and	  liberalization.	  
1973	  (Apr)	   Sikkim	   Sikkim	  Congress	  Party-­‐led	  protests	  against	  authoritarian	  monarchy,	  assisted	  by	  India	  (1975:	  
integration).	  
Coercion	   against	   autocracy,	  
support	  fro	  democratization.	  
1973	  (Jul)	   Afghanistan	   Daoud	  coup	  against	  King	  Shah,	  ends	  democratization	  process.	   Engagement	   and	   support	   for	  
autocracy.	  
1975	   Bangladesh	   President	   Sheikh	   Mujibur	   Rehman	   assassinated	   and,	   after	   a	   succession	   of	   coups	   and	  
counter-­‐coups,	   Gen.	   Ziaur	   Rahman	   takes	   informal	   charge,	   then	   becoming	   President	   in	  
1976.	  
Engagement	  of	  military	  autocracy.	  
1977	  (Jul)	   Pakistan	   Military	   coup	   against	   Zulfiqar	   Ali	   Bhutto,	   followed	   by	  military	   rule	   under	   Zia	   ul-­‐Haq	   and	  




Bangladesh	   Low-­‐intensity	  Shanti	  Bahini	   insurgency	  by	  non-­‐Muslim	  ethnic	  minorities	   in	  the	  Chittagong	  
Hill	  Tracts	  against	  Bangladesh	  army	  and	  security	  forces.	  End	  with	  Dec1997	  peace	  accord.	  
Indian	   covert	   support	   and	  
mediation.	  
1978-­‐79	   Afghanistan	   PDPA	  coup	  against	  Daoud.	  Beginning	  of	  pro-­‐USSR	  socialist	  government.	   -­‐	  
1979-­‐92	   Afghanistan	   Civil	   war	   with	   Afghan	   mujahedeen	   insurgency	   against	   Soviet-­‐sponsored	   PDPA	   regime.	  
Stymies	   after	   National	   Reconciliation	   attempts	   under	   Najibullah	   and	   beginning	   of	   Soviet	  
withdrawal	  in	  1986.	  
Engagement	  of	  autocracy.	  
1982	  (Mar)	   Bangladesh	   Military	  coup	  against	  elected	  President	  Sattar	  by	  Gen.	  Ershad.	   Engagement	  of	  military	  autocracy.	  
1983-­‐87	  
(Jun)	  
Sri	  Lanka	   After	  anti-­‐Tamil	  "Black	  July"	  riots	  in	  1983,	  Eelam	  War	  1	  between	  Colombo	  and	  LTTE	  Tamil	  
insurgents.	  Culminates	  in	  1987	  with	  Jaffna	  siege,	  Indian	  mediation	  and	  military	  coercion.	  
Coercive	   mediation	   and	   military	  
intervention	   against	   democracy	  
(illiberal)	  
1988	  (Aug)	   Myanmar	   Pro-­‐democracy	   (888	   movement)	   protests	   followed	   by	   military	   coup,	   repression	   and	  
continued	  rule	  after	  the	  1990	  elections	  are	  declared	  invalid.	  
Coercion	   against	   autocracy,	  
support	  fro	  democratization.	  
1988	  (Nov)	   Maldives	   Military	   coup	   (unknown	   intentions,	   failed)	   against	   President	   Gayoom.	   India	   sends	   in	   Military	   intervention	   to	   support	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military	  to	  support	  him.	   autocracy.	  
1989	  (Mar)	   Tibet	  
(China)	  
Tibetan	  protests,	  uprising	  against	  PLA	  and	  PRC	  rule.	  	   -­‐	  
1990	   Bhutan	   Nepalese	  minority	  protests	  against	  ethnic	  discrimination.	  Violent	  crackdown	  by	  monarchy.	   -­‐	  
1990	  (Feb)	   Nepal	   Multi-­‐party	   Jan	  Andolaan	  movement,	   succeeds	   in	   pressuring	   King	   to	   democratic	   reforms	  
and	  of	  absolutist	  rule.	  
Coercive	   support	   for	  
democratization.	  
1990-­‐1995	   Sri	  Lanka	   Eelam	  War	  II	  between	  Colombo	  and	  LTTE	  Tamil	  separatists,	  ends	  with	  negotiation	  round	  in	  
1994	  that	  fails	  in	  early	  1995.	  
-­‐	  
1994-­‐2001	   Afghanistan	   Taliban	  extremist	  expansion,	  fall	  of	  Kabul	  and	  resistance	  by	  Northern	  Alliance.	   Military	   assistance	   for	   rebel	  
faction.	  
1995-­‐2001	   Sri	  Lanka	   Eelam	   War	   III	   between	   Colombo	   and	   LTTE	   Tamil	   separatists.	   Major	   LTTE	   offensive	   and	  
capture	  of	  Elephant	  Pass	  in	  2000.	  Ends	  with	  Norway-­‐mediated	  peace	  talks	  in	  2001-­‐2002.	  
Inaction.	  
1996-­‐2005	   Nepal	   Maoist	  armed	  insurgency	  against	  constitutional	  monarchy.	   Engagement.	  
1999	  (Oct)	   Pakistan	   Military	   coup	   against	   democratic	   government	   of	   PM	  Nawaz	   Sharif.	   Beginning	   of	  military	  
rule	  by	  Gen.	  P.	  Musharraf.	  
-­‐	  
2001-­‐...	   Afghanistan	   Taliban	  insurgency	  against	  democratic	  regime	  backed	  by	  US	  and	  ISAF.	   Support	  for	  democratization.	  
2005	  (Feb)	   Nepal	   After	   King	   suspends	   parliament,	   enforces	   martial	   law,	   pro-­‐democracy	   Jan	   Andolaan	   II	  
protests	  lead	  to	  end	  of	  monarchy	  and	  beginning	  of	  political	  liberalization	  under	  republican	  
regime.	  
Coercion	   against	   autocracy,	  
support	  for	  democratization.	  
2007	  (Jan)	   Bangladesh	   Military	  pressure	  (soft	  coup)	  against	  caretaker	  government,	  which	  is	  forced	  to	  resign.	   	  
2007	  (Sept)	   Myanmar	   “Saffron	  revolution”:	  pro-­‐democracy	  protests,	  violent	  crackdown	  by	  military	  regime.	   Engagement	  of	  military	  autocracy.	  
2008	  (Mar)	   Tibet	  
(China)	  
Protests	  in	  Tibet	  (and	  India),	  Lhasa	  uprising	  against	  PLA/PRC	  rule.	   -­‐	  
2009	   Sri	  Lanka	   Eelam	  War	   IV	   between	   Colombo	   and	   LTTE	   separatist.	   Final	   Army	   offensive	  massive	   and	  
decisive	  military	  victory	  with	  substantial	  civilian	  casualties.	  
Engagement,	  military	  assistance	  of	  
democracy	  (illiberal	  regime).	  
2012	  (Feb)	   Maldives	   Opposition	  coup	  against	  elected	  President	  Nasheed,	   forcing	  him	   to	   resign.	  After	  external	  




Six unsatisfactory explanations 
What factors explain India’s puzzling variation in terms of degree and direction of 
involvement in the neighborhood? Chapter 1 offers a detailed overview of the literature 
on India’s strategic culture in the neighborhood, and sets out the reason for the unusually 
sparse scholarship on the subject. The following five explanations, usually invoked when 
explaining India’s regional policies, are not able to account for the variation. 
1. Liberal values: A value-based explanation would forward that India’s involvement is 
determined by its democratic nature and support for liberal forces and, conversely, by its 
hostility towards authoritarian or illiberal forces. While in several cases, particularly in 
Nepal (1950-51, 1990, 2006), in Sri Lanka (1980s), and in Burma (1948, 1988) India 
supported democratization or liberal reforms, in other cases it engaged authoritarian or 
illiberal regimes, including in Nepal (1960), in Sri Lanka (2009) and in Burma/Myanmar 
(1962, 2007). This exposes the limits of a strictly liberal explanation: the regime type of its 
neighboring states does not determine democratic India’s posture. 
2. Capability: All other factors held constant, including changes in strategic thinking, the 
degree of India’s involvement could be based on its relative power. This would predict a 
gradual rise in coercive diplomacy and military interventionism in the region, according 
to the widely held assumption that India’s capabilities have increased since 1947. The 
scholarship of the early 1990s thus described India’s intense interventionism in the 1980s 
(Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal) as a reflection of its new capabilities and rising power. 
However, this fails to explain India’s recessed posture of the 2000s (engagement in 
Myanmar and Sri Lanka), as it refrained from using military force since withdrawing 
from Sri Lanka, in 1990.  
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3. Global environment: This explanation would posit that India’s intensity of coercive 
involvement in the neighborhood is related to its relative power in the international 
system. Accordingly, India’s coercive postures in the 1970s (Bangladesh 1971, Sikkim 
1974-5) would have been driven by its quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union. Similarly, the 
recessed postures of the 2000s would reflect its relative weakness given American 
unipolarity and the rise of China after the Cold War. Such a structural explanation fails 
to explain, however, why India’s peak intensity of involvement, in the late 1980s, 
coincided with its greatest moment of vulnerability, as the Soviet Union declined. 
4. Non-interference: The principle of non-interference, advocated by India since 
independence and institutionalized by a tripartite agreement with China and Burma, in 
1954, offers the weakest explanation. Officials often articulate this as India’s default 
policy: to reflexively engage and work with all neighboring governments under any 
circumstances and whichever their political system. However, while non-interference may 
be the government’s preferred policy in principle, and possibly also moderate its propensity 
to interfere, India’s rich and long practice of involvement in the internal affairs of its 
sovereign neighbors suggests that this norm does not determine its posture. 
5. Leadership: Does a rise in Indian neighborhood involvement reflect the particular 
approaches and worldviews of its leaders? Personality-based explanations are popular, 
and suggest that “idealist” J. Nehru would have favored non-interference in the 1950s, 
which is contradicted by his practice in Nepal, where he engineered a regime change in 
1950-51 and thereafter micromanaged the democratization of the Himalayan kingdom. 
Similarly, despite his “neighborhood first” policy to engage all neighboring governments, 
	  
	   9	  
in 2015 PM N. Modi supported an informal trade blockade to coerce Nepal’s democratic 
government to amend the country’s new constitution.  
6. Ideology: Does the ideology of different political parties, in particular of the Indian 
National Congress (INC, center-left) or the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, center-right), 
determine the government’s posture, degree and intensity of involvement in the 
neighborhood? Given electoral competition, this explanation is also widely popular, but 
does not hold up to closer scrutiny: despite condemning it during his electoral campaign 
of 1989, PM. V. P. Singh continued the incumbent’s coercive approach to Nepal, in 
1990. Similarly, India’s approaches to Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar reflect continuity 
despite the change in government, from a BJP to an INC coalition, in 2004. In fact, the 
secret channel of dialogue with the Nepalese Maoist insurgents was first established by 
India’s allegedly “Hindu nationalist” government of PM A. B. Vajpayee and his 
supposedly “hawkish” National Security Adviser, B. Mishra.  
The shortcomings of these six explanations indicate that India’s posture, degree and 
intensity of involvement in neighboring states requires a more nuanced approach.  
 
2. Methodology 
To understand the factors that drive India’s posture, degree and intensity of involvement, 
this dissertation adopts a case study approach, reconstructing the decision-making process 
behind a particular response. The focus is, therefore, exclusively on the Indian 
government, both on its political leadership and its various organizations, with particular 
emphasis on the Ministry of External Affairs and its Foreign Service cadre. How do 
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Indian leaders and officials perceive the neighboring regime crises, and what strategic 
assessments influence India’s posture, degree and intensity of involvement?  
 
Case selection  
Returning to Table 1 above, three countries, with three crises events each, are chosen 
across three time periods. Table 2 below lists these cases: 
 
Table	  2:	  Case	  selection	  (country,	  crisis	  type	  and	  period)	  
	   Nepal	   Ceylon/Sri	  Lanka	   Burma/Myanmar	  




1962	  (engagement	  of	  
military	  regime)	  
1980s	   1990	  (coercion	  against	  
royal	  autocracy)	  
1987	  (coercion	  illiberal	  
regime)	  
1988	  (coercion	  against	  
military	  regime)	  




2007	  (engagement	  of	  
military	  regime)	  
 
These cases specifically reflect India’s puzzling variance, for example: 
1. Nepal: Why did India engage the absolutist royal regime after the 1960 coup, but then 
impose a trade blockade and coerce the Kingdom into a democratic regime change, in 
1990?  
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2. Sri Lanka: Why did India engage the Sri Lankan government, in 2009, supporting it to 
defeat the Tamil insurgency, when in the 1980s it had coerced Colombo to stop a 
military offensive and accept its mediation and peacekeeping force?  
3. Myanmar: Why did India come out in full support of the Burmese pro-democracy 
uprising led by A. S. Suu Kyi, in 1988, but then reconciled with the autocratic military 
junta in the 1990s and engaged it when a similar protest bloodied the streets of Rangoon, 
in 2007?  
 
Selection criteria 
To control for time, and also to identify possible lines of continuity and change in 
decision-making processes, four factors were used as criteria in case selection:  
1) Salience: In all three countries, crises affected Indian security stakes, which is expected to 
have drawn the attention of its decision-makers: a) Nepal: Open border, proximity to 
China/Tibet, close political contacts between political party elites, cross-border links 
between Maoist and Naxal insurgents in the 2000s, Chinese presence; b) Sri Lanka: cross-
border Tamil solidarity and domestic politics; risk of spillover insurgency/separatism, 
geopolitical importance in the Indian Ocean, Western/Chinese competition; c) 
Myanmar: cross-border insurgency, illegal migration and trafficking, geopolitical link to 
Southeast Asia, rising Chinese influence. 
2) Type: The nature of the specific crises in each of the three countries is different. a) 
Nepal: Each of the regime crises (1960, 1990, 2006) features a standoff between illiberal 
forces favoring absolutist or authoritarian monarchical rule, and liberal forces favoring a 
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multi-party and more inclusive democracy; b) Sri Lanka: Each of the crises periods (1956, 
1987, 2009) features a standoff between illiberal forces favoring political or military 
enforcement of a unitary and centralized state based on ethnic majoritarianism (whether 
Sinhala or Tamil), and liberal forces favoring peaceful conflict resolution through a 
federal and decentralized state based on ethnic pluralism. c) Myanmar: Each of the 
regime crises (1962, 1988, 2007) features a standoff between illiberal forces favoring 
military autocracy based on centralized or ethno-nationalist Burmese majoritarianism, 
and liberal forces favoring multi-party democratic rule and decentralization. 
3) Location: To control for India’s coercive capacity, these three countries reflect different 
geographic locations and strategic contexts. a) Nepal: landlocked, under-developed and 
small, with closest proximity and highest Indian capacity of involvement; b) Sri Lanka: 
insular, relatively wealthy and small, close proximity but medium capacity for Indian 
involvement; c) Myanmar: inter-regional situation, linking South and Southeast Asia, 
large and mostly disconnected from the subcontinent, with very limited capacity for 
Indian involvement. 
4) Time: Distribution across three specific periods in India’s political and foreign policy 
history: a) Late 1950s/early 1960s: the final phase of PM J. Nehru’s leadership and his 
non-aligned initiatives. Despite an increasingly strained relation with China, India resists 
becoming entangled in early Cold War U.S.-Soviet Union rivalry. Democratic and liberal 
experiments falter across the region, succumbing to military autocracies and ethno-
nationalist majoritarianism; b) 1980s: India’s youngest-ever PM R. Gandhi experiments 
with economic reforms and pursues an assertive foreign policy based on a comfortable 
support base. As the Soviet ally declines, India pursues an interventionist policy in the 
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region, despite rising internal violence and secessionism; c) 2000s: India’s economic 
reforms in full swing with unprecedented growth rates and its nuclear status formally 
recognized, PM M. Singh diversifies the country’s security partnerships, with an 
unprecedented rapprochement to the United States and persistent tensions with China.  
 
Case study questions and hypotheses 
1. Why was India more interventionist and coercive during neighborhood crises in the 1980s than either in 
the 1950s/60s or 2000s? What explains such variation in degree of involvement? 
In the first phase, as liberal experiments in Burma, Nepal and Sri Lanka faltered between 
1956 and 1962, India reacted with concern but focused on engagement: it swiftly 
normalized relations with Burma’s military autocracy after the 1962 coup, with the 
absolutist King of Nepal after his 1960 coup, and refrained from countering Ceylon’s 
creeping discriminatory policies against the Tamil minority. 
This contrasts with the second phase, in the 1980s, when India assumed a far more 
involved and coercive posture: it openly condemned military rule in Burma, in 1988; it 
instituted a trade blockade against landlocked Nepal in 1990; and it coerced and 
militarily enforced a peace agreement in Sri Lanka in 1987.  
Finally, in the 2000s, India seems to have reverted to mixed posture: it engaged 
Myanmar’s military junta during the pro-democracy “saffron revolution” in 2007; it also 
supported the Sri Lankan government in its military offensive against the Tamil 
separatists, in 2009; and in Nepal it switched from engaging to coercing the Nepalese 
King into a democratic regime change, in 2006.  
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The hypothesis explored in this dissertation suggests that the degree of involvement may 
depend on the following strategic assessments: 
a) Preserve political access/influence: assessment of how the crisis outcome or continuation may 
reduce or increase India’s access to and influence over the leadership in the neighboring 
state. Policy question: How may the internal balance of power change and, given 
historical experience and current intelligence, what actor is most likely to establish good 
relations with India? Best-case scenario: influence over a regime with a familiar leadership 
that is cooperative/pliant to Indian concerns. Worst-case scenario: no access to a new 
regime that is uncooperative/hostile, deriving its legitimacy from an anti-India agenda. 
b) Strengthen domestic security: assessment of how the crisis outcome or continuation may lead 
to new security threats (cross-border instability, refugee influx, safe havens for separatist 
or insurgent groups) or conversely to increased territorial control and stability. Policy 
question: Will the new balance of power in the neighboring state increase or decrease 
India’s capability to ensure security, control and stability in its territory, in particular in 
border areas? Best-case scenario: a strong neighboring state that supports India in 
combating security threats. Worst-case scenario: a weak, neighboring state that supports 
organizations that threaten India’s domestic security.  
c) Impede extra-regional presence: the assessed risk that the crisis outcome or continuation leads 
to a stronger political, economic or military presence by an extra-regional or rival power 
in the respective neighboring state (e.g. Pakistan, China, USA). Policy question: Is any 
rival/outside power using the crisis to increase its presence in the crisis state and encroach 
on India’s regional space? Best-case scenario: Rival/outside power has no significant 
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presence or it is reduced. Worst case-scenario: Presence expands and crisis state falls 
under control of rival/outside power.  
 
2. Even if they are not determinant (sufficient), do liberal and democratic concerns about regime type 
influence India’s assessments and posture during regional regime crises? What explains variation in its 
direction of involvement? 
While strategic and security objectives may determine India’s posture during regional 
crises in the 1950s-60s, 1980s and 2000s, as set out above, the country’s exceptional 
democratic regime warrants a closer examination of the link between its liberal domestic 
tradition and its foreign policy. The Nehruvian legacy looms large, if only at the 
rhetorical and global level, with India supporting anti-colonial freedom struggles, 
denouncing racial discrimination and assisting nascent post-colonial democracies. 
Similarly, India’s successful experience as a liberal democracy may have also influenced 
its thinking on relations with neighboring regimes. This is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Condemnation of South Africa’s apartheid during the 1960s may well indicate a liberal 
concern in India’s foreign policy, but this was a low-cost posture in comparison to crises 
in its own regional neighborhood where security stakes and strategic objectives are 
paramount. Crises in neighboring countries therefore offer the best context to examine 
whether decision-makers recognize regime type as a salient factor in their assessments, 
affecting Indian security and interests (e.g. differences between a liberal and decentralized 
democracy, versus a centralized, ethno-majoritarian military autocracy). This possible 
link between regime type and Indian security interests is examined in detail in Part II of 
the dissertation.  
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While the pursuit of strategic objectives may be both a sufficient and necessary condition 
to explain India’s posture, this does not necessarily mean that liberal concerns are 
altogether absent from Indian strategic thought and practice: a) liberal concerns may be 
present even if overridden by superior objectives/exigencies; b) liberal concerns may 
become salient when compatible with strategic objectives; and at the highest level c) 
liberal concerns may shape India’s action and mode of intervention.  
The hypothesis explored in this dissertation suggests that the direction of involvement may 
be influenced by the following strategic assessments: 
a) Moral recognition: at the basic level, do Indian decision-makers recognize the balance of 
power between liberal and illiberal forces? Do they identify, in principle, with any 
conflicting party based on liberal solidarity and familiarity? This concern may often not 
be expressed publically, nor influence India’s final posture, but illuminates India’s 
subjective assessment and self-identification. This would reflect a liberal bond between 
liberal and democratic forces across South Asia. 
b) Causal calculus: at the intermediary level, do Indian decision-makers identify a causal 
link between liberal democracy (including free multiparty elections, political pluralism 
and decentralization or minority rights) and political stability or economic growth? Do 
they evaluate the long-term costs and benefits of supporting either liberal or illiberal 
forces? This is the main hypothesis of Part II, analyzed in this dissertation’s Chapter 6. 
c) Operational execution: at the highest level, when they become salient (in coexistence with 
strategic objectives), how do liberal concerns influence India’s actions? These operational 
modes must be located on a spectrum of interventionism that ranges from quiet 
diplomacy, to public statements, mediation, sanctions, and full military intervention. This 
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dissertation does not analyze this dimension separately, but the analysis of Indian posture 
in the case studies will help understanding how India also promoted democratization and 
liberalization abroad since 1947. 
 
Sources 
Beyond secondary sources, which include several studies on India’s bilateral relations with 
the three countries examined and on its neighborhood policy (reviewed in Chapter 1), this 
dissertation makes use of a variety of primary sources. 
1. Archival sources: Most importantly, for the case studies in the 1950s-60s, I consulted 
newly declassified files from the Ministry of External Affairs at the National Archives of 
India, in New Delhi. These confidential or secret materials monthly and annual political 
reports from diplomatic missions in Kathmandu, Colombo and Rangoon, as well as 
correspondence between PM J. Nehru, and various other officials in the Indian 
government. The files also include some reports by military and other Indian attaches 
posted at the regional missions in Nepal, Ceylon and Burma, as well as triangular 
correspondence with other ministries and agencies, including the Armed Forces and the 
Intelligence Bureau. This allowed me to develop insights into the minds of Indian 
decision-makers at the time, to trace the policy process, and to understand assessments 
from the vantage point of New Delhi and the neighboring countries.  
2. Other primary sources: The selection of papers of PM J. Nehru, published in a series of 
volumes up to 1959, proved very useful to get a broad understanding of the bilateral 
dynamics, domestic constraints, and the international context to each crisis. I have also 
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made use of the collection of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and of 
Wikileaks cables for insights on Indian thinking from an American perspective, with the 
latter proving very useful for the 2000s. The case studies of the 1950s-60 and 1980s make 
detailed used of a superb ten-volume compilation of official documents on India’s 
relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka edited by Avtar S. Bhasin, a former director of the 
Ministry of External Affairs’ historical division.  
Other primary sources include annual reports, foreign affairs records, and other annual 
compilations of selected documents published by the Ministry of External Affairs. The 
monumental collection of the Library of Congress allowed me to access a myriad of useful 
memoirs by retired Indian and other South Asian diplomats, political leaders and 
government officials, which are either out of print or condemned to oblivion in dusty 
libraries across the subcontinent. Through ProQuest I consulted the coverage of main 
international, Indian and South Asian newspapers of the crises in the 1980s.  
3. Interviews: In the absence of declassified materials, research for the more recent case 
studies in the 1980s and 2000s, relies mostly on inferential sources (including public 
statements and parliamentary debates), a variety of secondary sources and, most 
importantly, targeted and semi-structured interviews with Indian decision-makers, which 
were posted either in New Delhi, mostly at the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry 
of External Affairs, or at the respective missions abroad, in Kathmandu, Colombo and 
Yangon. For four months, I travelled across India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar to 
track down and interview almost one hundred officials directly involved in, or had 
privileged information about the nine cases under examination. This also included 
political leaders, and members of India’s intelligence and military organizations. The 
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interviews with officials and political leaders in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar were 
particularly helpful to crosscheck Indian accounts. 
 
3. Relevance to the practice and study of Indian foreign policy 
The scholarly literature and public debate about Indian foreign and security policies is 
deeply affected by the idea that the country suffers from an extraordinary deficiency to 
think and act strategically. As Chapter 1 goes on to show in detail, the myth of India’s 
strategic incapacity has several causes, among which the poverty of historical research has 
had the most pernicious effect. Coupled with the persistent post-colonial rhetoric about 
India’s alleged exceptionalism, the poverty of historiographical and empirical studies on 
strategic practice has created conditions for the proliferation of myths about Indian foreign 
policy, especially that decision-makers are driven by “idealism,” or constrained by 
principles such as “non-interference”.  
Such divergence between rhetoric and practice has had a devastating impact on 
scholarship and the strategic debate in India, and also constrains decision-makers, who 
are often unable to articulate their more coercive policies in public. In a negative 
feedback loop, trained with ossified slogans and myths, whether it is the principle of “non-
alignment,” the idea that India “does not promote democracy,” or that India adheres 
religiously to “non-interference” to engage any system of government in its 
neighborhood, there are indications that Indian officials may also be constrained in 
practice by the poverty of their country’s strategic vocabulary.  
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This was reflected most recently, in late 2015, as the Indian government imposed an 
unofficial trade blockade on landlocked Nepal to coerce Kathmandu to adopt 
constitutional changes to satisfy demands from its Madhesi minority in the Terai 
borderlands. For several weeks thereafter, PM N. Modi and his officials thus took on the 
brunt of domestic and international public opinion for “bullying” a small neighbor. After 
a belated effort of public diplomacy and outreach, the government was finally able to 
articulate its decision to interfere in Nepal as being driven both by Indian security 
concerns and an interests in a more liberal and inclusive democracy in Nepal, and that, in 
the long-term, it saw these concerns as interdependent.2 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to reducing this widening gap between India’s 
regional strategic practice and the public perception and debate about it. By emphasizing 
the strategic nature and extraordinary continuities of India’s neighborhood policy since 
the 1950s, and indeed since the foundation of the modern Indian state as the colonial Raj 
in the 19th century, it further seeks to contribute to the thriving historiographical turn in 
research about the country’s foreign and security policies. 
Former diplomat K. S. Bajpai cautioned that, as India develops greater capabilities, it 
must adapt and “develop both the concepts and the mechanics for using state power for 
state purposes,” and explore the wide “range of instruments available in statecraft,” even 
                                                
2 For an early interpretation: “Understanding Nepal’s Constitutional Crisis: a Conversation with Prashant 
Jha,” The Diplomat, Sept. 9, 2015: http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/understanding-nepals-constitutional-
crisis-a-conversation-with-prashant-jha/. For a critical view: Harish Khare, “How Modi won praise for 
himself but lost Nepal for India,” The Wire, Oct. 9, 2015: http://thewire.in/12765/how-modi-won-praise-
for-himself-but-lost-nepal-for-india/.  
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if this “goes against the whole grain of our national upbringing and hopes of a better 
world.”3 This dissertation seeks to contribute to this task. 
 
Present and future policy relevance 
Against the current policy debate about India’s neighborhood policy, this dissertation’s 
relevance is anchored in three changing contexts. 
First, after reforming its economy in the 1990s, India’s security umbrella expanded with 
exponential internationalization of its trade, investments, and energy requirements. 4 
India today imports more than 70% of its total energy requirements, and 90% of its oil 
through sea lanes. The size of the Indian diaspora doubled in less than two decades, with 
over ten millions of its citizens living abroad, most of which in the Gulf countries. 
Incoming remittances increased from US$2 to 70 billion since 1990. Net foreign direct 
investment rose by US$40 billion in the last 25 years alone.5 
On the subcontinent, the advent of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) after the 1980s marked an unprecedented shift towards regional 
integration. For the first time in more than half a century, New Delhi started to look at 
India’s border as connectors, not dividers, which beyond just benefits also increased the 
risk of further exposure to instability and conflict in its periphery. Such new strategic 
                                                
3 K. Shankar Bajpai, "Engaging the World," in Indian foreign policy: challanges and opportunities, ed. Atish Sinha 
and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), 85. 
4 A study on Indian strategy and economics by the former director of the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industries (FICCI) thus emphasizes that “India should regard the region from Kabul to 
Yangon and Hormuz to Malacca as its strategic economic space,” Rajiv Kumar and Santosh Kumar, In 
the national interest: a strategic foreign policy for India (New Delhi: BS Books, 2010), 21. 
5  “India, 25 years later,” Business Standard, July 25, 2015: http://www.business-
standard.com/article/specials/india-25-years-later-116072500029_1.html. 
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horizons and rising interdependence require India to develop new instruments to defend 
its security in an “extended neighborhood,” which has been variously defined by recent 
Prime Ministers as stretching “from Aden to Malacca,” or “from the Suez to the South 
China Sea.” 6  According to Jayant Prasad, a retired ambassador who served in Nepal and 
now directs the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses: 
India’s natural area of interest extends from Iran and Transoxiana in the West to China in the 
North, Myanmar in the East and the Indian Ocean region all around the subcontinent – from the 
Gulf of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca, or more broadly, from Suez to Singapore 7 
Such a new definition of India’s enlarged security environment has often been derided as 
reflecting India’s delusional obsession to be recognized as a major power. This is based on 
the fallacious assumption that India can transcend security dilemmas and live in 
continued isolation and economic autarky. As India’s diaspora, trade and foreign 
investments expand worldwide, so will the security horizons of its regional environment. 
Second, beyond the changing domestic conditions and rising interdependence, India is 
also compelled to expand its security umbrella by the structural changes in the global 
distribution of power. The continued rise of China and decline of the United States are 
questioning the practicability of India’s exceptionalist discourse, which posits that New 
Delhi can afford to look the other way, stay put in its subcontinental corner, and thus 
simply ignore or magically transcend the logic of balancing and power politics. India will 
                                                
6 C. Raja Mohan, "India’s new role in the Indian Ocean," Seminar 617, no. Sept. (2011). See also David 
Scott, "India's “Extended Neighborhood” Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power," India Review 8, 
no. 2 (2009). Most recently, India’s Defence Minister M. Parrikar emphasizes that “located as we are at the 
centre of the Asian landmass astride the Indian Ocean, any reference to Asia implies its fullest geography 
ranging from the Suez to the shores of the Pacific, ” June 4, 2016, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, in 
Singapore: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=145975.  
7 Jayant Prasad, "India’s neighbours," Seminar 668, no. April (2015). 
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have to, and in fact has always been, playing that geopolitical game. As American 
strategic analyst Ashley Tellis points out: 
…the notion that Indian exceptionalism can survive by sheer force of example in a world of beasts 
could turn out to be excessively optimistic if not simply naive. After all, India’s capacity to lead by 
example will be, in the final analysis, largely a function of its material success, and this 
accomplishment will not come to pass without strong economic, political, and military ties with 
key friendly powers, especially the United States.8 
This does not mean that India must necessarily tilt towards becoming a subservient 
“junior ally” of the United States to contain China, nor does it mean that it must 
necessarily cozy up to China and curtail its regional interests to assuage Beijing. Instead, 
it will have to continue to play a dual game, continuing its sophisticated external 
balancing, variably defined as “omni-alignment” (Kanti Bajpai) or “strategic 
diversification” (Tanvi Madan), even while also concentrating on internal balancing to 
expand its domestic capabilities.9  
Writing in 1981 about American accusations that India was obsessively focused on its 
regional security, strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam cautioned his fellow Indian citizens 
to “be prepared to wait patiently for a very long period when objective facts would 
establish the untenability of western projections about Indian hegemony and 
expansionism.” 10  It would not take that long. Just seven years later, in 1988, 
Subrahmanyam’s American nemesis, Henry Kissinger, presciently noted in an open 
                                                
8 Ashley J. Tellis, Nonalignment redux: the perils of old wine in new skins (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2012), 55. 
9 Kanti Bajpai, "Strategic Culture," in South Asia in 2020: Future strategic balances and alliances, ed. Michael R 
Chambers (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2002); Tanvi Madan, "With an Eye to the East: The China 
Factor and the U.S.-India Relationship, 1949-1979" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 
2012). 
10 K. Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," Strategic Analysis 5, no. 5-6 (1981): 252. 
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memo to the next U.S. President that New Delhi was bound to take on a more important 
role across Asia, in partnership with Washington: 
[India’s] goals are analogous to those of Britain east of Suez in the 19th century – a policy 
essentially shaped by the Viceroy’s office in New Delhi. It will seek to be the strongest country in 
the subcontinent, and will attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian Ocean 
or Southeast Asia. Whatever the day-to-day irritations between New Delhi and Washington, 
India's geopolitical interest will impel it over the next decade to assume some of the security 
functions now exercised by the United States.11 
As the United States’ relative power will naturally decline over the next decades, India 
will sooner or later be forced to develop its own capabilities to shape the regional 
environment and, whenever necessary, also intervene in areas and issues beyond its 
territorial borders. 
The third context reflecting the policy relevance of this dissertation relates to the 
extraordinary asymmetry between the colossal Indian research on global issues (nuclear 
security, relations with other great powers) and the comparatively small insights on its 
relations with its immediate neighbors across South Asia. Referring to this skewed focus, 
PM M. Singh addressed India’s diplomatic trainees in 2008:  
…the most important aspect of our foreign policy is our management of our relations with our 
neighbours … we don’t know adequately enough of what goes on in our neighbourhood. And 
many a times our own thinking about these countries is influenced excessively by Western 
perceptions of what is going on in these countries. I would like our diplomats to develop and 
Indian perspective on what is happening in our neighbourhood and use it as an important 
analytical tool for telling us what are the meaningful foreign policy and domestic policy options 
before us in dealing with the neighbouring countries.12 
Singh’s reference to the excessive influence of “Western perceptions” reflects India’s 
growing interest in developing its own strategic concepts, which will require deeper 
                                                
11 Henry A. Kissinger, "A Memo to the Next President," Newsweek, September 19, 1988, 34. 
12 Address on June 11, in Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2008 (New Delhi: 
Geetika, 2009), 173. 
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historical understanding, in particular in terms of regional involvement. This task is now 
facilitated by a greater confidence to claim both “realism” and “liberalism” as part of 
India’s strategic culture and establish a causal link between security and democracy 
beyond its borders.  
As noted by his media advisor S. Baru, PM M. Singh was therefore “probably the first 
Indian prime minister to unabashedly hold up India’s plural, secular, democratic 
credentials as worthy foreign policy principles”.13 Similarly, such rising self-confidence is 
facilitating the development of new strategic narratives, as testified by PM N. Modi’s 
unprecedented emphasis on India’s massive contribution to the two world wars “for the 
ideals of freedom and democracy.”14 
Strategic analyst C. R. Mohan, who served on India’s National Security Advisory Board, 
has been one of the most ardent proponents of the study of India’s past strategic practice 
to assist in the development of new instruments and concepts to address the country’s 
future challenges, in the region and beyond. He thus notes that: 
An India that stays true to the values of the Enlightenment, deepens its democracy, pursues 
economic modernization and remains open to the external world will inevitably become a power of 
great consequence in the coming decades. It will be a model for the political transformation of the 
volatile Indian Ocean region and a force for peace and progress in Asia and the world.15 
 
                                                
13 Sanjaya Baru, The accidental prime minister: the making and unmaking of Manmohan Singh (Gurgaon: 
Penguin/Viking, 2014), 165-6. 
14 Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit a World War 1 memorial in France (2015) 
and to visit the Arlington National Cemetery in the United States. On June 6, 2016, in his speech to the 
U.S. House of Congress, he said he “honoured their courage and sacrifice for the ideals of freedom and 
democracy … [as] India knows what this means because our soldiers too have fallen in distant battlefields 
for the same ideals,” http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=146076. For two recent accounts 
of Indian contribution to World War II, see Srinath Raghavan, India's war: World War II and the making of 
modern South Asia (New York: Basic Books, 2016); Yasmin Khan, India at war: the subcontinent and the Second 
World War (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
15 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: the shaping of India's new foreign policy (New Delhi: Viking, 2003), 272. 
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4. Disciplinary context and contribution to International Relations 
Was Nehru’s non-alignment a realist or idealist approach to world politics? Was India’s 
1971 military intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) driven by geostrategic interests 
or by humanitarian values? Did India’s intervention in Sri Lanka focus on pragmatic 
security or by benign altruism for the Tamil minority? Such questions reflect both the 
popularity, as well as the limitations of a binary approach to understand India’s foreign 
and security policies.  
This “tyranny of binaries” is not unique to India; it pervades the theoretical field of 
International Relations (IR). Many contemporary debates and university teaching on 
international politics are thus reduced to a tired dichotomy between “realists” and 
“idealists”, or between “interests” and “values,” as reflected in Table 3 below, which 
expands on a summary by American scholar A. M. Slaughter of U.S. President B. 
Obama’s policy towards Libya, in 2011: 
 
Table	  3:	  Binaries	  in	  International	  Relations16	  
Realists	   Idealists	  
Interests	   Values	  
Conservatives	   Liberals	  
Hawks	   Doves	  
Competition	   Cooperation	  
Strategic	   Moral	  
Vital	   Optional	  
Strategic	   Moral	  
War	   Peace	  
Pragmatic	   Principled	  
Ends	   Means	  
Hard	  Power	   Soft	  Power	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Objective	   Subjective	  
Rational	   Emotional	  
Hegemon	   Leader	  
Self-­‐help	   Interdependence	  
Sovereignty	   Commons	  
Suspicion	   Trust	  
 
Such elegant dichotomies are widely employed to debate and explain foreign policy 
decisions. However, while often useful to teach undergraduate neophytes or to debate 
with non-experts, such binaries can become rooted to an extent that they also hinder 
scholarly research. For example, when scholars debate whether India’s nuclear program 
was driven by a quest for reputation or security, and focus on the 1998 tests, they often 
ignore the complex environment, the particularly history, and the myriad of contingent 
causes which lead to its gradual nuclearization, over a period of almost fifty years. 
Binaries thus pervade and constrain IR scholarship. As Francis Gavin and James 
Steinberg note: 
…binary choices—‘either-or choices,’ which are the standard fare of academic hedgehogs—
provide far less to policymakers than the ivory tower realizes. … Statesmen, unlike academics, do 
not have the luxury of ‘betting’ on one theory or the other … In their desire to achieve the rigor of 
their natural science counterparts, most social science academics have developed a profound 
aversion to the inherent uncertainty and contextual specificity that plagues strategic policy 
formulation and hew to the notion that the theories they work with cannot usefully make the 
transition from the “laboratory” to the real world.17 
Despite such limitation, scholars continue to perpetuate binaries, including in the history 
of their own discipline. For decades, students have thus been taught that realists are 
cynics and immoral warmongers, while liberals are idealists seeking greater cooperation 
                                                
17 Francis J. Gavin and James B. Steinberg, "Mind the Gap: Why Policymakers and scholars ignore each 
other, and what should be done about it," Carnegie Reporter 6, no. 4 (2012): 11. 
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and peace.18 The tussle between idealism and realism is accordingly referred to as the 
modern discipline’s alleged “first debate” in the first half of the 20th century.19 As Michael 
C. Williams shows in his re-interpretation of the work of Hans Morgenthau, such 
approach has ignored the specific political and moral functions of “realism” against the 
background of inter- and post-War Europe and the United States.20 
The binary approach is also reflected in the debate on what role “ideas” play in 
international politics.21 In their most radical versions, this line of inquiry seeks to quantify 
ideas, values and principles in order to measure their influence on policymaking.22 
Systemic theories, in turn, completely dismiss the role of ideas in international politics and 
in foreign policy, which is reduced to a set of automatic reactions to structural demands. 
In this radical perspective, given the anarchical order of self-help, states are 
deterministically forced to follow security-maximizing principles and, as a consequence, 
diplomats are little more than robots reacting to exogenous inputs.23 American structural 
IR theorists thus dedicated much effort during the Cold War debating if and how the 
                                                
18  See, for example, the following widely employed manual to teach introductory courses to International 
Relations at the undergraduate level: John Baylis and Steve Smith, The globalization of world politics: an 
introduction to international relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
19 Lucian M. Ashworth, "Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of 
International Relations," International Relations 16, no. 1 (2002); Peter Wilson, "The myth of the ‘First Great 
Debate’," Review of International Studies 24, no. 05 (1998). 
20 M.C. Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
21 For an overview, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and 
political change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
22  Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, A tale of two cultures: Qualitative and quantitative research in the social sciences 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
23 Beginning with the structuralist, or neo-realist turn in the late 1970s: Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of 
international politics," (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). He would subsequently clarify that “the behavior 
and practice of states and statesmen are omitted from international political theory not because of their 
unimportance but because [it] requires a distinct theory dealing with the politics and policies of states,” 
quoted in Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 340. 
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United States and the Soviet Union were constrained by ideology, respectively by 
Liberalism and Communism.24  
The constructivist critique of the 1990s has often responded by focusing on the variation 
in what is shared between states or other international actors: norms, constructed through 
an inter-subjective, social process marked by perpetually changing agent-structure 
dynamics.25 But, even here, “good” and “bad” norms appear as a sanitized construct, 
divorced from ethical and moral concerns.26 Of greater value has been the Constructivist 
research paradigm’s contribution to understand how a particular state’s or decision-
making elite’s “worldviews” come into being, change and are replaced over time 
according to both internal political dynamics and external shocks.27 In radical contrast 
with the structuralist (neo-realist) school mentioned above, domestic approaches to 
foreign policy have thus made a comeback in recent years, often under the disciplinary 
tag of “foreign policy analysis,” “neoclassical realism,” “critical security studies,” or “post-
structuralism.”28  
                                                
24 This is reflected in the scholarship on whether Soviet foreign policy was driven by ideological or power 
and security considerations. Cases of potential tension between Soviet values and interests, and the issue of 
interference, include the Hungary crisis in 1956, the decision to occupy Afghanistan in 1979, or the Poland 
solidarnosk movement in 1980. For a classic overview see the work by Adam Ulam "Soviet Ideology and 
Soviet Foreign Policy," World Politics 11, no. 02 (1959): 152. For a more recent debate on the role of ideas 
and power in the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s collapse, see Robert English "Power, ideas, 
and new evidence on the Cold War's end: a reply to Brooks and Wohlforth," International Security 26, no. 
4 (2002). 
25  Alexander E Wendt, "The agent-structure problem in international relations theory," International 
organization 41, no. 03 (1987); John G. Ruggie, "What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism 
and the social constructivist challenge," International organization 52, no. 04 (1998). 
26 For a constructivist distinction of “good” and “bad norms”: Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
"International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998). 
27 Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the world: great power strategies and international order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005).  
28 For foreign policy analysis: Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013). For an early neo-classical realist approach: G. Rose, "Neoclassical 
realism and theories of foreign policy," World politics 51, no. 01 (1998). On the European turn towards 
critical security studies: Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, Critical security studies: concepts and cases 
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Strategic culture 
While rejecting both binaries and the theory-driven approach to IR, this dissertation 
adopts the framework of strategic culture for two reasons. The first reason is purely 
tactical and conceptual, in order to liberate the reader from the charged ideological and 
political debate about Indian foreign policy. Referring to a “strategic culture” thus allows 
me to transcend the toxic binary between idealism and realism. Rather than being forced 
to refer to Indian decisions in the various case studies as driven either by values 
(democracy) or interests (security), this allows me to explore nuance, a wider spectrum of 
strategic thinking, and the possibility of an Indian governmental culture of involvement.  
The second reason is more substantive, and relates to the vast literature on the alleged 
lack of an Indian strategic culture. As detailed in Chapter 1, one of the widest consensuses 
in the IR literature and in the Indian public debate is that the country’s leaders and 
decision-makers suffer from an exceptional inability to think and act strategically. This 
dissertation seeks to correct this perception and demonstrate that given significant 
challenges and despite various shortcomings, Indian foreign and security policies towards 
the neighborhood reflect surprising levels of strategic acumen and continuity.  
The field of strategic culture has developed in tandem with the neoclassical and 
constructivist critiques of structural realism after the 1990s. A. I. Johnston has offered a 
cogent definition and framework for its study, most notably in his own work on the 
                                                                                                                                            
(London: Routledge, 1997). On a post-structuralist variant: R. B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: international 
relations as political theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
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historical roots of contemporary China’s “cultural realism.”29 Against the background of 
new rising powers beyond the West, particularly in Asia, he therefore emphasizes that 
studies on strategic culture can “help policymakers establish more accurate and 
empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played, 
reducing uncertainty and other information problems in strategic choice.”30 
While adopting Johnston’s conceptual approach, this dissertation, however, makes a few 
necessary adaptations to the five criteria he sets out for a more successful study of strategic 
culture. First, in terms of object of study, my dissertation’s focus (regional involvement) is 
situated at a medium range, in-between the higher level of “grand strategy” and the lower 
level of “strategic studies” that focus strictly on military force.31 The former generally 
studies the macro issues of India’s strategic worldviews and balancing behavior, while the 
latter’s emphasis is more reductionist, on its armed forces or nuclear capability. This 
study explores an intermediary range of strategic culture, examining India’s regional 
posture of involvement and its various instruments, from coercion to cooperation, as the 
output of a wider decision-making environment that comprises political, diplomatic, 
military and intelligence inputs. 
Second, in terms of the nature of cultural constraints, my dissertation focuses on the 
institutional dimension of India’s political system. It seeks to understand to what extent 
liberal and democratic beliefs influence Indian strategic thought and practice in the 
                                                
29  Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural realism: Strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
30 Alastair I. Johnston, "Thinking about strategic culture," International security 19, no. 4 (1995): 64. 
31  For a seminal definition of grand strategy: “The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in 
the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for 
the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best 
interests,” Paul M. Kennedy, Grand strategies in war and peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 5. 
For a military-oriented approach to strategic culture, see Colin S Gray, "Strategic culture as context: the 
first generation of theory strikes back," Review of international studies 25, no. 01 (1999). 
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region. As so often in the IR literature, even Johnston’s model falls into the binary trap of 
distinguishing “soft idealpolitik” and “hard realpolitik,” which implicitly assumes that 
beliefs, ideology, and morality will inevitably to clash with security interests. I seek to escape 
this rationalist fallacy, and focus instead on what J. Goldstein and R. Keohane called 
“causal beliefs,” as opposed to “principled beliefs.”32 The former are based on the 
experience of practice (e.g. liberal democracy enhances long-term stability in diverse 
societies) while the latter are more frequently used in the binary literature of IR and in 
public rhetoric but rarely, if ever influential in practice (e.g. democracy promotion as a 
matter of principle). 
Third, in terms of method of inquiry and proof, the influence of strategic culture is often 
inferred from discourse analysis (public speeches) or practice (behavior), but often neglects 
to connect both levels. In the case of India, this is further hindered by an extraordinary 
wide gap between its exceptionalist rhetoric (non-interference) and its under-studied 
practice (involvement), discussed in detail in Chapter 1. With resource to declassified 
documents and interviews, this dissertation seeks to bridge this gap, establishing a causal 
link between Indian strategic thought and practice in the neighborhood.  
Fourth, in terms of transmission, the strategic culture literature focuses on a variety of 
channels, especially organizational training, education and doctrines in the military field. 
This dissertation does not offer evidence for such formal transmission, given the variety of 
organizations and decision-making apparatuses analyzed. Instead, it hopes to show that 
continuity in strategic thought and practice indicates an extraordinary influence of 
                                                
32 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and foreign policy. 
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informal transference of knowledge between subsequent generations of Indian officials, 
dating back to the colonial period under the Raj, as suggested in Chapter 1. 
Fifth, in terms of change and continuity of strategic culture, the literature emphasizes the 
importance of resisting the extreme views of culture as either persistently rigid or 
constantly malleable. By tracing the practice of Indian neighborhood involvement across 
sixty years, from the 1950s to the 2000s, and analyzing its pre-1947 colonial roots under 
the Raj, the dissertation is attentive to both dynamics of change and continuity. Given the 
rich literature that portrays India’s foreign policy as reactionary and fickle – being 
constantly revamped by ideology, leadership and other changing factors – the emphasis 
will, however, be on the lines of continuity. 
 
Contribution to other IR theories and debates 
While problem-driven, policy-oriented, and focused on a single case, this dissertation 
addresses issues and employs concepts that will be of interest to several IR research fields 
and other comparative cases. As Richard Rose notes, “a study of a single country 
becomes an extroverted case study if it employs concepts that make it possible to derive 
generalizations that can be tested elsewhere.”33  
First, with its focus on India, in particular, this study caters to the rising demand for 
scholars to develop non-Western IR theories, concepts and narratives.34 While there has 
been significant work on Brazil, Southeast Asia, and China, comparatively little work has 
                                                
33 Richard Rose and William J M Mackenzie, "Comparing forms of comparative analysis," Political Studies 
39, no. 3 (1991): xx. 
34 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An 
introduction," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007). 
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been done on the field of IR in India, and its intellectual history, concepts and 
traditions.35 As Stanley Hoffman presciently observed, IR was born as a distinctively 
American discipline, with a rationalist and positivist bias distinguishing it from scholarly 
approaches in England and continental Europe.36 As the field rapidly internationalized 
with the globalization and industrialization of higher education in recent decades, leading 
also to a proliferation of IR departments and research across India, this dissertation seeks 
to contribute to recent calls to develop an Indian school, approach or theory of 
International Relations.”37 
Second, the dissertation’s focus on how democratic India addressed security challenges in 
the region contributes to the current revival of interest in the normative dimension of 
realism. By rejecting IR’s disciplinary binary and its caricaturized portrayal of realism as 
an immoral, cynic and power-maximizing approach, these efforts have concentrated on 
recovering the specific historical and political context against which realists N. 
Machiavelli, H. Morgenthau, or K. Waltz developed their theses.38 Such attempts have 
been particularly visible in the United States, where growing interest has been devoted to 
                                                
35 On China, see: “Yan Xuetong on Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua School of International Relations, and 
the Impossibility of Harmony,” http://www.theory-talks.org/2012/11/theory-talk-51.html. On Southeast 
Asia, from a Constructivist perspective, see Amitav Acharya, Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: 
ASEAN and the problem of regional order (London: Routledge, 2014). 
36  On the discipline’s “American intellectual hegemony” and its “propensity toward parochialism in 
international relations theory and, more particularly, the persistence of an assimilationst logic exemplified, 
and bound up with, a distinctly American conception of disciplinarily, science, and progress,” see Robert 
M. A. Crawford and D. S. L. Jarvis, International relations - still an American social science? (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), 3. See also Stanley Hoffmann, "An American social science: 
international relations," Daedalus 106, no. 3 (1977); Nicolas Guilhot, The invention of international relations theory: 
Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010). 
37  Siddharth Mallavarapu, "Theorizing India's Foreign Relations," in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign 
Policy, ed. David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2015). 
38 See Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations; K. Booth, Realism 
and world politics (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011). On the consequent rediscovery of the “English school” 
of Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and others, under the “critical security studies” label, see Shannon Brincat et 
al., eds., Critical theory in international relations and security studies (London: Routledge, 2011). 
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the work of R. Niebuhr, which President B. Obama described as one of his main 
influences.39 Not much interpretative effort is required to recover this moral dimension in 
realist statecraft; a mere reading of the classics will do, as transpiring in the following 
passage of H. Morgenthau’s seminal Politics among Nations: 
Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral 
principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible –
between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete 
circumstances of time and place.40  
This revisionist project, which recovers and revalues the work of allegedly archetypical 
realists such as H. Morgenthau, is of great scholarly importance today because it recovers 
the ethical and ideological dimension of realism, and thus questions the tired binaries 
discussed in the introduction to this section.  
In the case of India, as discussed above and in Chapter 1, this is even more urgent, given 
that the poverty of historiographical and empirical work on Nehru’s foreign policy has 
often translated into a binary debate on his alleged “realist” or “idealist” inclinations. 
Instead, as Srinath Raghavan’s work on the 1950s suggests, the Indian Prime Minister 
appears as a “liberal realist,” and “far more adroit and pragmatic than the naïf and 
idealist of retrospective detraction, (…)  at the juncture of liberal and realist traditions.”41 
This suggests the possibility of a specific Indian realist school of strategic thought, 
                                                
39  On the “Niebuhrian” American tradition in foreign policy see Andrew Bacevich’s introduction in R. 
Niebuhr, The irony of American history: University of Chicago Press, 2008 [1952]). See also William Inboden, 
“Diversity under Freedom: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Transatlantic Community,” Foreign Policy Paper Series, 
The German Marshall Fund, Washington, July 2012.  
40 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (New York: Knopf, 1954), 11. See 
also Kissinger rejecting his image as an uber-realist: “The distinction between idealism and realism rejects the 
experience of history. Idealists do not have a monopoly on moral values; realists must recognize that ideals 
are also part of reality. We will be less frequently disillusioned if we emphasize a foreign policy designed to 
accumulate nuance rather than triumph through apocalyptic showdowns,” Henry A. Kissinger, "The limits 
of universalism," New Criterion 30, no. 10 (2012): 23. 
41 Srinath Raghavan, War and peace in modern India (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 14. 
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reflecting the country’s historical trajectory, democratic identity, relative capability, and 
geographic location.42  
Second, while seeking to facilitate a realist understanding of Indian foreign policy, this 
dissertation’s focus on the country’s democratic identity also contributes to a wider 
geographic understanding of liberal theories of IR, which have focused almost exclusively 
on Europe and other Western states.43 As one of the few liberal democracies situated 
outside the political West, India represents an interesting outlier to improve our 
understanding on how regime type, institutions and values can affect foreign policy in 
other regions of the world. The fact that India has been almost exclusively surrounded by 
autocratic states in its neighborhood since 1947 poses a further interesting test to the 
salience of liberal principles in its foreign policy. 
Third, the dissertation also contributes to the literature on Constructivism and its 
emphasis on how norms shape state behavior. On the one hand, it demonstrates how 
independent India adapted Western norms of non-interference and state sovereignty to 
the region, reflecting a process of localization that began under the colonial Raj.44 As 
suggested in Chapter 1, post-colonial India’s relations with its smaller neighbor states 
mirror the colonial norm of conditioning native states’ sovereignty. On the other hand, 
constructivists will also be puzzled by the low levels of normative inter-subjectivity in the 
relations between India and its neighboring states, despite high levels of socio-cultural 
                                                
42 On the Nehruvian legacy as a line of continuity, and a “mindset” described as “cautious prudence,” see 
Pratap B. Mehta, "Reluctant India," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 108. 
43 See, for example, Michael W Doyle, "Liberalism and world politics," American Political Science Review 80, 
no. 04 (1986); G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world 
order," Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (2009). 
44  On norm localization and adaptation to different regions, see Amitav Acharya, Whose ideas matter? Agency 
and power in Asian regionalism (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
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links. Given such similarity and proximity, why do levels of regional inter-state 
cooperation remain so low, and distrust so high?  
Fourth, in terms of mid-range theories, the dissertation contributes to the burgeoning 
literature on foreign policy analysis and its focus on decision-making processes, 
bureaucratic and organizational politics.45 The case study method, with nine crises 
examined in detail, generates valuable insights into Indian foreign policy’s the 
institutional and ideational environments. Beyond inferential discourse analysis, the 
archival and oral sources allow for a reconstruction of the decision-makers’ assessments, 
thought and debates, and how these influenced cries postures. 
Fifth, the dissertation contributes to the literature on regional powers, and on the puzzling 
variation in how they relate to their peripheral small states.46 While much emphasis in the 
last three decades has been on studying regional cooperation and multilateralism, less 
attention has been devoted to understand the classic policies of hegemonic involvement 
and intervention. Given its abnormally low levels of institutional and economic 
integration, South Asia offers, in this context, a valuable “live laboratory” for scholars, as 
India’s integrity and security continues to be dependent on stability in its periphery.  
Finally, the dissertation contributes to the renewed debate on the merits and pitfalls of 
foreign and, in particular, liberal interventionism.47 The literature has recently been 
                                                
45 For an overview, see Hudson, Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory.  
46  Daniel Flemes, ed. Regional leadership in the global system: ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers (London: 
Routledge, 2010); Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and powers: the structure of international security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Sandra Destradi, "Regional powers and their 
strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership," Review of International Studies 36, no. 04 (2010). 
47  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," International 
Organization 60, no. 03 (2006); John M Owen, "The foreign imposition of domestic institutions," International 
Organization 56, no. 2 (2002). For a classical American debate, see Hans J. Morgenthau, "To intervene or 
not to intervene," Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967). 
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revived under the liberal and Western variant of “democracy promotion” or the 
multilateral principle of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), driven by the neo-
conservative or liberal internationalist impulses in American post-Cold War foreign 
policy.48 While the liberal urge to promote democracy and human rights has always 
influenced U.S. foreign policy, it assumed a central role after the end of the Cold War.49 
In 1993, political scientist Larry Diamond thus emphasized that “a more democratic 
world would be a safer, saner, and more prosperous world for the United States.”50 Even 
at the libertarian Cato Institute, Joshua Muravchik’s detailed study on “exporting 
democracy” concluded that “what is good for democracy is good for America [because] 
the more democratic the world becomes, the more likely it is to be both peaceful and 
friendly to America.”51 Reflecting the Democratic Party’s Wilsonian tradition, U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott emphasized in the 1990s that “only in an 
increasingly democratic world will the American people feel themselves truly secure.”52 
During the 2000s, the neo-conservative wing in the Republican Party, under George W. 
Bush, would further embrace the idea that the United States’ national security interests 
depended on its capacity to promote and enforce democratic regime changes abroad. 
                                                
48 M. Cox et al., eds., American democracy promotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); G. John 
Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy?," The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 23, no. 2 (1999); T. Carothers, "The 
continuing backlash against democracy promotion," New Challenges to Democratization (2010). 
49 Nicolas Guilhot, The democracy makers: human rights and international order (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005). On the 1980s, in particular, see also Robert Pee, Democracy Promotion, National Security and 
Strategy: Foreign Policy Under the Reagan Administration (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
50 Larry Diamond, "Promoting democracy," Foreign Policy, no. 87 (1992): 30. See also Sean M Lynn-Jones, 
Why the United States should spread democracy (Boston: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
1998). 
51 Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington DC: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1992), 222. 
52 Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the national interest," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (1996): 63. 
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When referring to India, however, American policymakers and analysts often derided 
India’s reluctance to pursue a more liberal foreign policy, and scholars swiftly concluded 
that neophyte India had no experience in promoting democracy, human rights or any 
other “values” abroad.53 As this dissertation seeks to demonstrate, especially in its second 
part, India’s long and experienced tradition of regional involvement and intervention 
includes a variety of instruments to promote regime democratization and liberalization 
and to protect humanitarian and minority rights. Too often, however, this rich liberal 
strand in India’s neighborhood policy has been simply forgotten or rejected for not 
conforming to Western benchmarks of “democracy promotion” or “liberal 
interventionism.” 
 
5. Dissertation structure 
Chapter 1 offers a broad overview of the historical foundations and development of 
India’s regional strategy, and reviews the literature and debates on the country’s strategic 
culture.  
Part I of the dissertation provides case study-oriented insights into the decision-making 
processes that drove Indian responses to the nine crises in the three neighboring states of 
Nepal, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Myanmar (Burma), across three periods. What specific 
factors and cost-benefit analyses determined India’s response, and its degree and direction 
of involvement? By reconstructing policy debates, the case studies in Chapters 2, 3, 
                                                
53 See, for example, Daniel Twining and Richard Fontaine, "The Ties that Bind? U.S.–Indian Values-
based Cooperation," The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011). For a recent attempt to correct such bias, see 
Richard Youngs, The puzzle of non-western democracy (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2015); Ted Piccone, Five Rising Democracies: And the Fate of the International Liberal Order (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016). 
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and 4 suggest that India’s posture, degree and direction of involvement in each regional 
crisis are determined by a combination of three strategic assessments: dispensation, order 
and geopolitics. 
Part II of the dissertation proceeds to assess to what extent India’s strategic culture of 
crisis response and involvement in the region is also shaped by its liberal democratic 
identity. Do decision-makers recognize that different regime types (democratic, 
autocratic, and more or less liberal) bring specific dividends and disadvantages, and if so, 
how does that shape Indian degree and direction of involvement in the neighborhood? 
Chapter 5 offers an introductory overview to the liberal dimension in Indian foreign 
policy and then proceeds to show how India’s open society and democratic institutions 
exert an indirect liberal influence on the government’s policies towards neighboring states. 
Chapter 6 explores the main argument of the dissertation, namely that India’s strategic 
culture of regional crisis response and involvement is directly influenced by its liberal 
democratic identity. By linking India’s three strategic assessments (dispensation, order and 
geopolitics) to different regime types – democratic, authoritarian, and more or less liberal 
– the chapters re-examine the nine case studies to evaluate how India’s posture is driven 
by a short/long-term and cost-benefit analysis.  
The Conclusion reviews the dissertation’s main findings, discusses the contribution to 
the study of Indian foreign policy in the neighborhood, and forward specific challenges to 
the future practice of India’s regional strategy in and beyond South Asia.  
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CHAPTER 1 – FROM THE RAJ TO THE REPUBLIC: REVALUING INDIA’S 
STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
This chapter offers anoverview of the foundations and development of India’s regional 
strategy. The first section moderates the great expectations about “rising power” India’s 
capacity to contribute to a variety of liberal internationalist causes, especially that of 
promoting democracy abroad. By putting the country in comparative context with its 
democratic peers, it highlights India’s extraordinary success given limited state 
capabilities and an insecure and illiberal regional environment. While proud of its 
exceptional political system in the non-Western world, India is also a weak and isolated 
democracy.  
The second section proceeds to examine the causes behind the vast literature about the 
alleged absence of an Indian strategic culture, based on the mythology that its post-
colonial elites’ naïve idealism has crippled the country’s ability to pursue its “interests” as 
a “normal power.” Driven by rationalist fallacies, by an excessive focus on rhetoric, and 
by the poverty of historical and empirical sources that examine strategic practice, such 
allegations have hindered a realist understanding of Indian strategic culture.  
The third section then focuses on the foundations of India’s regional strategy. It argues 
that that these are rooted in the colonial period, under the British Raj, and that despite its 
continuity in practice after 1947, independent India’s political leaders developed a 
revisionist foreign policy discourse that portrayed their country as an exceptionally benign 
power in the neighborhood. The consequent gap between India’s regional strategic 
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practice and discourse resulted in a trapping effect on scholarship and also on Indian 
officials’ ability to publically articulate their policies of regional involvement. 
 
1. Proud, weak and isolated: India and its democratic peers 
Just a few decades ago, many Westerners dismissed India as another failed state or 
questioned the sustainability of its future existence.54 Scholarly debates then centered not 
on how or why, but whether India would be able to succeed at all: Would its democratic 
system succumb to authoritarianism or military rule? would it be able to sustain its 
moderate “Hindu rate of growth,” wavering around 3%, despite its economic 
isolationism and autarky, and still avoid mass famines? Would it be able to secure and 
defend itself externally against Pakistan and China, and internally against ethno-national 
secessionism or Communism? Would its political reforms, driven by revolutionary 
affirmative action programs, lead to fragmentation and political chaos? 
After the 1990s, as India embraced economic reforms, such gloom quickly morphed into 
the opposite extreme of glorification: India was suddenly surging as a “superpower,” 
seemingly ready to take on the world, and thus drawing new interest from Western 
scholars, strategists, and business entrepreneurs. An extraordinary amount of hopes and 
demands have, since then, been deposited on India.55 As a “rising power,” it is constantly 
beckoned and expected to play the role of a more “responsible stakeholder” in the liberal 
                                                
54 For example, on India as a “soft state,” bound to fail in economic governance, see Gunnar Myrdal, Asian 
drama: an inquiry into the poverty of nations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968). On the roots of 
American negative views of India, see Harold Robert Isaacs, Scratches on our minds: American views of China and 
India (New York: J. Day, 1958). Fro a sceptical view, see also Selig S. Harrison, India: the most dangerous decades 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). 
55 See, for example, Philip Stephens, “India faces a choice: is it a big power or great power?” Financial Times, 
May 19, 2009: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92dbb440-14bc-11de-8cd1-0000779fd2ac.html.  
	  
	   43	  
order.56 India is now asked to build and protect “public goods,” whether by stabilizing 
Afghanistan, combating climate change, negotiating multilateral frameworks, or 
protecting freedom of navigation and other “global commons.”57  
Between the lines of such expectations reigns the suggestion that India has been freeriding 
on this open system for over half a century, and that it must therefore start investing to 
earn its returns.58 India “can”, “must”, and “should:” this is how many policy briefs 
begin, generally setting out a demanding list of tasks for the country’s foreign policy to 
embrace its “global responsibility.” 
Such great expectations about India are particularly prevalent in the liberal 
internationalist agenda, whether on promoting democracy, applying sanctions on 
authoritarian regimes, the humanitarian principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 
or ambitious state- and nation-building projects. 59  These expectations have been 
                                                
56 The phrase was first used by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, R. Zoellick, in 2005, referring to China. For 
an overview, see Xenia Dormandy, "Is India, or will it be, a responsible international stakeholder?," 
Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2007). For an Indian view, see C. Raja Mohan, "Rising India: partner in 
shaping the global commons?," The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2010). 
57 For example: on India filling a “vacuum” left by the United States in Afghanistan, see Larry Hanauer 
and Peter Chalk, India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan (Washington DC: RAND, 2012). On 
multilateral negotiation strategies, see Amrita Narlikar, "India rising: responsible to whom?," International 
Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013). On climate change, see Stewart Patrick, "Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty 
of Integrating Rising Powers," Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010). On supporting the United States’ rebalancing 
to the Asia-Pacific, and the role of Southeast Asia, in particular, see Jonah Blank et al., Look East, Cross Black 
Waters: India's Interest in Southeast Asia (Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 2015). For an Australian view on 
India’s new leadership responsibilities in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific, see David Brewster, India's 
ocean: the story of India's bid for regional leadership: Routledge, 2014). On expectations about India becoming a 
“responsible nuclear power” after the bilateral deal with the United States in 2005, see the testimony of 
Ashton B. Carter before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on Apr. 26, 2006: 
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/3992/assessing_the_india_deal.html. 
58 See e.g. the summary of the workshop on “Rising India: Implications for World Order and International 
Institutions,” organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, in New Delhi, on Oct. 20-21, 2010: 
http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/IIGG_DelhiMeetingNote_2010_11_01.pdf. 
59  See Daniel Twining, "India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: “Rogue State” or Responsible 
Democratic Stakeholder?," India Review 7, no. 1 (2008); Alan Bloomfield, India and the Responsibility to Protect: 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2016).  
	   44	  
increasingly placed on India in equal measure by the two wings of the American foreign 
policy establishment since the end of the Cold War.  
Under President Bill Clinton, in the 1990s, and to some extent also under President B. 
Obama, since 2009, the Democratic Party has pursued a post-Cold War policy of liberal 
internationalism leading to a variety of policies to promote human rights and democratic 
governance worldwide, whether through direct interventionism (principally in the 1990s) 
or offshore coercive policies such as sanctions (particularly since 2009). Similarly, under 
the neo-conservative tilt of President George W. Bush, in the 2000s, the United States 
adopted an aggressive policy of “democracy promotion,” including through coercive 
intervention and regime change, from Afghanistan to Iraq. This liberal impulse in U.S. 
foreign policy has deeper roots, reaching back to the 19th century, but has taken a more 
salient influence as the country embraced its unipolar, or hegemonic, identity after the 
end of the Soviet Union.60  
After the 1990s, as they suddenly discovered India as a liberal democracy and “natural 
ally” in Asia, Americans as well as Europeans thus often expected India to automatically 
jump on the moral bandwagon of human rights and democracy promotion worldwide.61 
Naturally, when New Delhi either repeatedly excused itself from joining, or in some cases 
also actively opposed such initiatives  – whether on Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Burma, Libya 
or Syria – Washington was often left either puzzled or fuming: how could a liberal 
democracy refuse to join such benign initiatives? What was “wrong” with India? 
                                                
60 For an overview on the post-Cold War era from a liberal perspective, see G. John Ikenberry, ed. The crisis 
of American foreign policy: Wilsonianism in the twenty-first century (Princeton University Press, 2009). For a 
summary of the neo-conservative view, see Ivo H Daalder and James M Lindsay, "America unbound: the 
Bush revolution in foreign policy," (2005). 
61 For an early definition of India as a “natural ally” of the United States, see Robert Blackwill, "Why is 
India America’s Natural Ally?," The National Interest (2005). 
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Paradoxically, by defrauding such great expectations, India has often come under greater 
pressure than China, leading analysts to blur the differences between both states.62   
Whether driven by geopolitical interests or by genuine liberal sentiments, such great 
hopes, expectations and demands deposited on India will continue to face disappointment 
until they recognize the country’s particular history, capacity and location. These three 
conditions make India exceptional among its democratic peers worldwide. First, at the 
ideational level, this requires an understanding of India’s domestic politics, and its identity 
as a liberal and democratic, but also as a post-colonial and non-Western state. Second, at 
the material level, this requires an understanding of its limited state capacity, based on a 
developing economy that still faces severe extractive challenges. Third, at the geographic 
level, this also requires an understanding of India’s profoundly illiberal regional 
environment and the security threats that permeate its neighborhood.  
By taking these three dimensions into account, and comparing India’s strategic context to 
that of other democratic powers, a more realistic picture emerges on what India can and 
may also be willing to contribute to strengthen the liberal order. 
 
a) Identity: Liberal democratic, non-Western, and post-colonial 
The liberal and democratic credentials of India’s political system reflect its identity as a 
post-colonial, non-Western, and diverse society. India is at least as democratic as its 
Western peers, but its democracy is Indian; an aspect that is often overlooked. 
                                                
62 Eric Heginbotham and George Gilboy, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
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India has been a continuously functioning democracy of universal franchise since the 
country adopted its first independent constitution, in 1949. Its representative and liberal 
institutions and traditions are even older, developing under British rule from the late 19th 
century onwards.63 This democratic experience has survived a variety of challenges, 
including Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule in the 1970s, chronic under-development, 
complex coalition politics, massive political mobilization of the lower castes, cyclical 
episodes of communal violence, and a myriad of separatist and other insurgencies. 
Despite such threats and trials, democracy has thrived in India.64 It is now the world’s 
largest democracy: 814 million voters enrolled during its last general election, in 2014.  
Table 4 compares India to twelve other democratic great powers. In terms of longevity of 
its regime, only the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and France are ahead 
of India – the second post-colonial state is Nigeria, with half the longevity (28 years). India 
is also formally the largest democracy in the world, with almost as many registered votes 
as those in all of its peers taken together. While average voter turnout in India is 
moderate (62%), it has been consistently rising, in contrast with declining participation in 
most Western and developed democracies.  
Not surprisingly, India’s state identity is therefore also profoundly exceptionalist, based on 
the perception that it offers a democratic model for other post-colonial, non-Western, and 
developing countries. This exemplary identity of the Indian state goes back to the anti-
                                                
63 On these colonial roots, see Bayly, C. A. Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought In the Age of Liberalism 
and Empire, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
64 For a good overview, see Atul Kohli, ed. The success of India's democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).  
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colonial struggle, which its leaders often define as having laid the ground for a universal 
movement towards political liberation from imperialism.65   
 
Table	  4:	  India	  and	  its	  democratic	  peers.	  
	  
Age	  of	  current	  
democratic	  








change	  (in	  %:	  first	  
-­‐	  last	  election)69	  	  
United	  States	   211	   190	  (2)	   47%	   -­‐6	  
United	  Kingdom	   126	   46	  (18)	   71%	   -­‐10	  
Australia	   110	   15	  (43)	   84%	   -­‐13	  
France	   65	   43	  (19)	   64%	   -­‐28	  
India	   61	   834	  (1)	   62%	   +11	  
Germany	  	   61	   61	  (12)	   78%	   -­‐10	  
Japan	   59	   101	  (6)	   68%	   -­‐13	  
Nigeria	   28	   67	  (10)	   42%	   -­‐11	  
Brazil	   26	   140	  (4)	   54%	   +51	  
Turkey	   28	   56	  (13)	   76%	   +6	  
South	  Africa	   17	   25	  (31)	   63%	   -­‐32	  
Indonesia	   12	   185	  (3)	   86%	   -­‐3	  
Mexico	   9	   83	  (9)	   49%	   +27	  
 
                                                
65 On the early exceptionalist and universal foundations and ambitions of Indian state identity, see M. 
Bhagavan, The Peacemakers (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012). On exceptionalism during the colonial 
freedom struggle, in particular by R. Tagore, see Pankaj Mishra, From the ruins of empire: The intellectuals who 
remade Asia (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2012). 
66Based on a dichotomous coding of democracy (1800-2010): https://sites.google.com/site/mkmtwo/data.  
67 During the last parliamentary election, in millions, as of 2015, bases on IDEA’s voter turnout database: 
http://www.idea.int/vt/field.cfm?field=78&region=-1. 
68  From 1945 until most recent elections, as of 2015, based on IDEA’s voter turnout database: 
http://www.idea.int/vt/. 
69 As of 2016, based on IDEA’s voter turnout database: http://www.idea.int/vt/. 
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In a recent overview, scholar Perry Andersen offered a summary of this exceptionalism: 
former PM M. Singh notes that India’s struggle for independence has “no parallel in 
history,” culminating in a constitution that is “the boldest statement ever of social 
democracy;” historian R. Guha observes that India anticipated “by some fifty years, the 
European attempt to create a multilingual, multireligious, multiethnic, political and 
economic community;” economist Amartya Sen calls India “especially fortunate” in its 
millennial traditions of “public arguments, with toleration of intellectual heterodoxy;” and 
scholar S. Khilnani notes that “independent India became the first country in the non-
Western world to choose a resolutely democratic constitution,” which represents “the 
third moment in the great democratic experiment launched at the end of the 18th century 
by the American and French Revolutions.”70  
Such exceptionalism has been gradually gaining ground with time, and a rising number 
of Indian now publically recognize the dividends of democratic rule, and refer to the 
democratic system as more than a mere accident of history or a matter of convenience. 
This rising sense of exceptionalism and confidence in the Indian democratic model is 
discussed, in detail, in Chapter 5.   
 
b) Capacity: limited and developing  
India’s elephantine geographic and demographic size, its large economy, its nuclear-
armed military, and other absolute indicators are often invoked as proof that India is a 
                                                
70 Quotes from P. Anderson, "Gandhi Centre Stage," London Review of Books 34, no. 13 (2012). For a 
comprehensive overview on the history of democratic India since 1947, Ramachandra Guha, India after 
Gandhi: The history of the world's largest democracy: Pan Macmillan, 2011). For an exceptionalist definition of 
India, see Sunil Khilnani, The idea of India: Penguin Books India, 1999). 
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“great power” or possibly even an embryonic “superpower.”71 Despite rapid growth rates 
since 1991, however, this overlooks the Indian state’s fragility to perform key functions. 
India thus still lags far behind its peers in terms of extractive capabilities, for example to 
control its territory or to convert resources into wealth. In his research on the Indian 
state’s capacity in a global context, political economist Milan Vaishnav showed how it has 
been consistently outperformed by most (sometimes even all) of its peers, both democratic 
and undemocratic, on indicators such as per capita public sector employment, total tax 
revenue as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), judicial enforcement of 
contracts, per capita police officers, or healthcare worker density.72 
Among more than one hundred low-income developing countries, India will rank 
comparatively well, even though just below the median. But rather than comparing it to 
the 15 worst countries in terms of state capability, including Myanmar and Afghanistan, 
India’s limitations are only exposed when pitted against its geopolitical peers, especially 
other powers with regional or global ambitions. In this perspective, at the current pace, it 
would require India 63 and 116 years, respectively, to reach Singapore’s present levels of 
government effectiveness and resource efficiency.73 Chart 1 illustrates this discrepancy 
with reference to the State Fragility Index over the last twenty years: except for Nigeria, the 
                                                
71 On the potential and limits of this term as applied to India, see “India: The Next Superpower?” LSE 
Ideas Report, SR010, March 2012: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR010.aspx. 
72 Milan Vaishnav, “Five Truths about India,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nov. 2, 2012: 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/02/five-truths-about-india/. 
73 L. Pritchett et al., "Capability traps? The mechanisms of persistent implementation failure," Center for 
Global Development Working Paper, no. 234 (2010): 17. 
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Indian state’s fragility is superior to all other eleven democratic states in our sample 
basket, including Indonesia and Mexico.74   
)A"2,&<(&B,",%&C2"D-$-,3&:/6%E4&:/6-"&"/6&F%%2*&0<GGHI'J<H7&
As reflected in these indexes, the Indian state is often the weakest in comparison to most 
other great powers, and often even the weakest among all other democratic powers. 
These basilar deficiencies are often overlooked when demands are placed on India to 
assume a more liberal interventionist profile in its region. While, in principle, the Indian 
government will often share the will to embrace such grand tasks, one cannot ignore that, 
in practice, it remains profoundly constrained in its capacity to pursue them. 
       
74 “State fragility” is defined as “closely associated with [its] state capacity to manage conflict; make and 
implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system 
coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining 
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c) Environment: isolated and insecure 
Finally, a third comparative dimension relates to India’s geographic environment, which 
is marked by a high concentration of illiberal regimes and a formidable set of security 
challenges. India is an isolated democracy situated in a volatile context marked by high 
levels of internal and external conflict.75 
In 2013, according to the Freedom House Index, India was the only “free” state in South 
Asia and exclusively surrounded by “partially free” or “unfree” states. New Delhi’s 
geographically closest free capitals were distant Ulan Bator (Mongolia), Jakarta 
(Indonesia) and Telaviv (Israel). Besides India, in 2011, only four other such “free” states 
in the world faced a neighborhood exclusively composed of unfree or partially free states: 
Mongolia, Mali, Israel and Ghana. 76  Only in 2015, for the first time since its 
independence, could India afford the liberal luxury of facing democratically elected 
governments in all of its neighboring countries. Chart 2 illustrates India’s democratic 
isolation in the region since the 1970s, based on the annual Freedom House Index. 
Besides isolation, democratic India is also located in one of the world’s most unstable and 
insecure regions, with a variety of conflicts and inter-state conflicts.77 According to the 
Global Peace Index for 2012, for example, Southern Asia was the world’s third least peaceful 
                                                
75 On the causes of protracted insecurity in South Asia, see Thaza V. Paul, ed. South Asia's weak states: 
understanding the regional insecurity predicament (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
76 See the full index for 2013 at http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific. 
77 For an overview on ethnic conflict in South Asia and Indian exceptionalism in the region, see Deepa M. 
Ollapally, The politics of extremism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Maya 
Chadda, Ethnicity, security, and separatism in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
	   52	  
among thirteen regions.78 Compared to the location of its democratic peers in relatively 
more secure and stable regions, this places a further burden on the Indian state.  
Chart	  2:	  Freedom	  House	  Index,	  India	  and	  neighbors	  (1972-­‐2016)	  
 
AFGH. BANGL. BHUT. MYAN. CHINA INDIA MALD. PAK. SRI L. NEPAL 
1972 4.5 3 4 6 7 2.5 2.5 4 2.5 5.5 
1973 6.5 4 4 6 7 2.5 2.5 4 2.5 5.5 
1974 6.5 4 4 6 7 2.5 2.5 4 2.5 5.5 
1975 6.5 6 4 6 7 3.5 4 5 3 5.5 
1976 6.5 5.5 4 6 7 4 4 4.5 2.5 5.5 
1977 6 5 4 6.5 6 2 4 5 2 5.5 
1978 7 4 5 6.5 6 2 5 5.5 2.5 5.5 
1979 7 3 5 6.5 6 2 5 5.5 2.5 4.5 
1980 7 3.5 5 6.5 6 2.5 5 6 2.5 3.5 
1981-82 7 5 5 6.5 6 2.5 5 6 2.5 3.5 
1982-83 7 5.5 5 7 6 2.5 5 6 3.5 3.5 
1983-84 7 5.5 5 7 6 2.5 5 6 3.5 3.5 
1984-85 7 5 5 7 6 2.5 5 4.5 3.5 3.5 
1985-86 7 4.5 5 7 6 2.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 
1986-87 7 4.5 5 7 6 2.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 
1987-88 6 4.5 5 6.5 6 2.5 5.5 3 3.5 3.5 
1988-89 7 4 5.5 7 7 2.5 5.5 3 4.5 4.5 
1990 7 5 5.5 7 7 2.5 5.5 4 4.5 4 
1991 7 2.5 5.5 7 7 3.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 
1992 6 2.5 6.5 7 7 3.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 
1993 7 3 7 7 7 4 6 4 4.5 3.5 
1994 7 3 7 7 7 4 6 4 4.5 3.5 
1995 7 3.5 7 7 7 4 6 4 4.5 3.5 
1996 7 3 7 7 7 3 6 4.5 4 3.5 
1997 7 3 7 7 7 3 6 4.5 3.5 3.5 
1998 7 3 6.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 
1999 7 3.5 6.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 6 3.5 3.5 
2000 7 3.5 6.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 3.5 3.5 
2001 7 3.5 6.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 3.5 3.5 
2002 6 4 5.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 3.5 4 
2003 6 4 5.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 3 4.5 
2004 5.5 4 5.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 3 5 
2005 5 4 5.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 3 5.5 
2006 5 4 5.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 4 4.5 
2007 5 4.5 5.5 7 6.5 2.5 5.5 5.5 4 4.5 
2008 5.5 4 4.5 7 6.5 2.5 4 4.5 4 4 
                                                
78 Data compiled from the Global Peace Index for South Asia as defined by the United Nations, which 
includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/. 
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2009 6 3.5 4.5 7 6.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 4 4 
2010 6 3.5 4.5 7 6.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4 
2011 6 3.5 4.5 6.5 6.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4 
2012                    
2013                    
2014                    
2015                    
2016                    
In the 2011 State Fragility Index, for example, only three extremely or highly fragile states 
were located outside Africa and the Middle East (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar), all of 
which India’s neighboring states. And except for China and Bhutan, who both score a 9 
in the index (moderate fragility), all other neighboring states of India are seriously, highly 
or extremely fragile.79 South Asia is also one of the world’s most conflict-torn regions in 
terms of inter-state and intra-state (social) warfare: along with East Africa, it is the only 
among the project’s ten “politically-relevant neighborhood contexts” that scores more 
than 20 annual warfare events since the end of the Cold War.80 
No other democracy in the world faces such an illiberal and threatening regional security 
environment, which needs to be taken into account when demands are placed on India to 
“promote democracy” or enforce sanctions on authoritarian states. This geographic 
location fundamentally constrains India’s capacity to pursue a liberal foreign policy. 
* 
Commenting on his country’s exceptional democratic regime and the associated 
difficulties this poses, K. S. Bajpai, one of India’s senior-most diplomats, observed: 
We have more neighbours than all but a handful of countries – seven by land and three by sea 
(…) Jungles, mountains, deserts, oceans connect or separate them; Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, 
                                                
79 Ranging from Sri Lanka (13) to Myanmar (22) and Afghanistan (23): 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/SFImatrix2011c.pdf.  
80 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm#regcon. 
*)!
Communism animate them; we must deal with military dictatorships, monarchies, Marxist 
democracy, happily a real democracy. The geographical and political complexity is exceptional, 
requiring knowledge, skill and flexibility…81 
The introductory and comparative analysis above highlighted the Indian state’s 
democratic but non-Western identity, its chronic fragility and limited capabilities, and its 
isolated situation in an insecure regional context. Chart 3 illustrates India’s exceptional 
condition in terms of state capacity and regional context with its peers, in terms of 
capacity (measured as the tax/GDP ration) and regional insecurity (measured as the 
respective Global Peace Index). 
)A"2,&8(&ME+%5,-./"$$3&N%"O&"/6&-/*%+12%(&:/6-"&"/6&-,*&5%%2*&
 
This exposes the limits of comparisons that pit India against other democratic states such 
as United States and European countries, but also to Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia or 
       
81 Bajpai, "Engaging," 81. 
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Japan. A more apt comparison, perhaps, would be between the India of Nehru, in the 
1950s, and the United States of presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson or 
Abraham Lincoln. 82  While Indians generally welcome the liberal West’s great 
expectations about their country, such hopes have to be tempered by the specific history 
and identity, limited material resources, and volatile geographic location of their state.  
This dissertation is informed by this context, which is most apparent in India’s relations 
with its neighboring states. For example, rather than interpreting India’s refusal to 
support “liberal” interventions in Iraq, Libya or Syria as reflexive ideological hostility 
against the West, often described as an allegedly “non-aligned” position, emphasis will 
rather be placed on how India’s own understanding of liberal democracy shapes its 
assessments, posture and involvement in neighboring states.  
Referring to this centrality of India’s regional context, in 1952, PM J. Nehru thus noted: 
…our political outlook is governed more and more by geographical reality and does not depend so 
much on what Washington or London or some other distant centre might think. …  from the point 
of view of India’s interests, they [our immediate neighbors] are of primary importance in different 
ways and concern us more than many bigger and otherwise more important countries.83 
 
2. The myth of India’s strategic incapacity: idealist and thoughtless  
How well has independent India performed in terms of its foreign and security policies? Is 
it even possible to adopt an objective and comparative criterion of optimality? Given the 
context above, scholars disagree whether the glass is “half full or half empty,” but they 
                                                
82 See J. Ann. Tickner, Self-reliance versus power politics: the American and Indian experiences in building nation states 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
83 In a letter to India’s Chief-Ministers, Aug. 2, 1952: Avtar S. Bhasin, Nepal-India, Nepal-China relations: 
documents, 1947-2005 v.1 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2005), 261. 
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tend to adopt a rather critical approach. The rich IR and strategic studies literature on 
India has focused on detailing a myriad of problems that debilitate the state’s capacity to 
ensure the country’s security, to counter external threats, or to pursue its policies abroad.  
On the nuclear front, for example, India is thus seen to suffer from a “doctrinal lag,” 
missing “significant institutional capacity and strategy to manage [its] nuclear 
hardware.” 84  India’s military modernization plans, including procurement policies, 
training and recruitment, resource allocation, and indigenization plans, have shown to be 
dangerously debilitated by dysfunctional civil-military relation.85 Challenges to the Indian 
Armed Forces’ operational preparedness, effectiveness and war-fighting qualities have 
been identified in detail, whether during the 1962 war with China or the peacekeeping 
operation in Sri Lanka, in the 1980s.86 On the domestic security front, scholars have 
thoroughly diagnosed the material, doctrinal, and operational shortcomings of India’s 
counterinsurgency efforts.87  
The literature also presents a litany of problems that afflict India’s diplomatic apparatus, 
whether it is the alleged lack of strategic acumen, policy planning and implementation 
deficiencies, or the Ministry of External Affairs’ chronic understaffing.88 In his review of 
India’s strategic thought, Rahul Sagar thus concludes that “the execution of India’s 
                                                
84 Gaurav Kampani, “Institutional ‘Software’: The Hidden Dimension of Nuclear Instability in South 
Asia,” India in Transition, Apr. 25, 2011: http://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/kampani. On India’s nuclear 
program driven by the quest for “status” and “reputation,” see George Perkovich, "India’s Nuclear Bomb " 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
85 For an overview, see Anit Mukherjee, "Facing Future Challenges," The RUSI Journal 156, no. 5 (2011). 
86 For example, on the China war, see John P Dalvi, Himalayan blunder (Bombay: Thacker & Co, 1969); 
Neville G. Maxwell, India's China war (Garden City: Anchor, 1972). 
87 Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, eds., India and counterinsurgency: lessons learned (London: Routledge, 
2009). 
88 For a historical perspective on the 1970s, see S. Tharoor, Reasons of state: political development and India's 
foreign policy under Indira Gandhi, 1966-1977: Vikas Publishing House, 1982). On recent material limitations, 
see D. Markey, "Developing India's Foreign Policy "Software"," Asia Policy 8, no. 1 (2009). 
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foreign policy is so haphazard and hesitant as to make it nearly impossible to attribute it 
to some clearly thought out ideological stance.”89  
Kanti Bajpai, at Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew School, reviews various schools of Indian 
strategic thought, but laments that while it has “a respectable record in promoting world 
order, over the past two decades India has been rather more reactive than creative.”90 
Boston University’s Manjari C. Miller, in turn, notes that India’s “inability to develop 
top-down, long-term strategies means that it cannot systematically consider the 
implications of its growing power” and that, therefore, “New Delhi does very little 
collective thinking about its long-term foreign policy goals.”91  
Flaws in India’s foreign and security policies have thus been described in minutiae, and 
there is little doubt that there are monumental shortcomings. However, while scholars 
have diagnosed and described deficiencies in great detail, they devote surprisingly scarce 
attention to explaining their causes. So even if one agrees with their negative assessments, 
the question remains as to what makes India such a basket case for policy failure. What 
factors induce this alleged “sub-optimal” policy-making? Why are India’s civil-military 
relations dysfunctional? Why do Indian governments modernize their military without 
strategic foresight? What explains the institutional deficiencies of nuclear command and 
control structures? What causes Indian diplomats to underestimate external threats and 
fail to respond appropriately to secure their country? 
                                                
89 Rahul Sagar, "Grand Ideology, Bland Strategy," in Grand strategy for India 2020 and beyond, ed. V. 
Krishnappa and George Princy (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012), 71. 
90 Kanti Bajpai, "The Global Commons and India’s National Security Strategy " in Grand strategy for India 
2020 and beyond, ed. V. Krishnappa and George Princy (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012), 61. 
91 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, "India's Feeble Foreign Policy: A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own 
Rise," Foreign Affairs 92, no. 3 (2013). 
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Depending on their epistemological biases, theoretical background, geographic location, 
and level of methodological sophistication, scholars have suggested different explanations, 
but however shallow or deep, an extraordinarily large amount of them boil down to 
India’s “idealism” and its officials’ consequent incapacity to think and act “strategically.”  
 
a) The mythology of idealism and strategic incapacity 
Common to most approaches is the assumption that India suffers from extraordinary 
limitations (or is reluctant) to pursue its security “interests.” This rationalist view, deeply 
rooted in the American neo-realist and positivist philosophy of International Relations 
(IR), assumes that every state’s capacity to respond to external threats and ensure its 
security depends on an optimal strategy to maximize power. From this perspective, India 
is presented as either incapable or even opposed to abiding by the rules of power politics. 
Idealistic, status-obsessed or naïve, its state is thus characterized as being unable to 
address external threats and challenges. This narrative is widely predominant and the 
literature reviewed for this dissertation produced a rich variety of terms to describe India 
and its foreign and security policies, a summary of which is listed in Table 5. 
 
Table	  5:	  Scholarly	  references	  to	  India	  and	  its	  foreign	  and	  security	  policies	  
Idealist	   Non-­‐strategic	   Rhetorical	  
Ideological	   Reactionary	   Naïve	  
Utopian	   Haphazard	   Sophomoric	  
Irrational	   Ad	  hoc	   Drifting	  
Moralistic	   Lackadaisical	   Feeble	  
Liberal	   Sub-­‐optimal	   Pious	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Prickly	   Inefficient	   Insouciant	  
Platitudinous	   Non-­‐institutionalized	   Non-­‐aligned	  
Status-­‐obsessed	   Aimless	   Third-­‐Worldist	  
 
American analyst George Tanham has most famously developed this outlook with his 
thesis that India lacked a strategic culture. In a 1992 report commissioned by the U.S. 
governmental think tank RAND, he focused on a variety of historical, geographical and 
religious “determinants” to conclude that Indian strategic thinking is “inchoate and ad 
hoc (reactive) rather than precise and systematic.”92 A few years later, in a rejoinder 
article, he further asserted that “Indians continue to be relatively neglectful of security 
issues and to have no institutionalized method of appraising threats and fashioning 
strategic responses.”93 The extraordinary influence of his approach in India is reflected in 
the overall concurring responses it drew among Indian scholars at the time.94  
While broadly quoted, Tanham’s assertions in the 1990s were far from new, and 
mirrored the old Orientalist and British argument that Indians were not entitled to 
independence, because they allegedly lacked the necessary rational and strategic faculties 
for self-rule.95 After independence, such views were reflected in more subtle derisions of 
                                                
92 George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought (Washington: RAND, 1992). See also George K. Tanham, 
"Indian Strategic Culture," The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1992). 
93 George K. Tanham et al., eds., Securing India: strategic thought and practice (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 19. 
94 Varun Sahni thus agrees that India does not have a formal, institutionalized strategic culture, but argues 
that this is not uncommon among great powers. W. P. S. Sidhu also agrees, but argues that there is an 
important “invisible” and non-codified strategic culture. Mattoo agrees in terms of military strategy, but 
argues that India had a grand strategy under Nehru. Finally, Kanti Bajpai also generally agrees with 
Tanham, but argues that it will be only a matter of time until India develops its own strategic culture. 
Tanham et al., Securing India: strategic thought and practice. 
95  For an introduction on this Orientalist narrative, see Carol A Breckenridge and Peter Van der Veer, 
eds., Orientalism and the postcolonial predicament: Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1993). 
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India’s new leadership, and of J. Nehru in particular, as being incapable of steering the 
country safely through international politics.  
This view posited that India’s new leadership, freshly emerged from of a non-violent 
freedom struggle, was not only unversed in the demanding tasks of diplomacy, but also 
naively predisposed to embrace idealist, pacifist and socialist policies. Writing in 1956, 
just after the Bandung conference and the rise of non-alignment, Oxford University 
historian G. F. Hudson thus saw India being driven by “callow nationalism:” 
Suddenly confronted with the need to conduct a foreign policy in a world of extremely complex 
international relations, the Indian nationalist leaders looked around for information and advice, 
for a simple set of rules to enable them to interpret the bewildering phenomena of world affairs. 
(…) There is a disposition among Indians whose minds have been formed by the experience of the 
Gandhi era to overestimate the effectiveness of purely moral force in all human affairs and to 
underestimate the ruthlessness and aggressiveness of totalitarian Realpolitik as it operates in our 
time.96 
This was not a rare view, restricted to the distant comfort of St. Antony’s College, but it 
permeated most Western interpretations of independent India’s external conduct. Even a 
long-time India expert like the correspondent Taya Zinkin, for example, described Indian 
foreign policy as a reflection of “Nehru’s moods,” and a series of “reactions [which are] 
by definition the negation of policy, since it precludes the pursuit of a pattern, or even the 
calculation of India’s interests.”97  
As illustrated in the following section, with reference to the principle of non-interference, 
Nehru’s flourished speeches on developing a “third way” of non-alignment did not help 
to disprove these views, further creating the impression that Indian foreign policy was 
                                                
96 G. F. Hudson, "The Paradox of Jawaharlal Nehru: Democracy at Home, and Abroad?," Commentary 22, 
no. 6 (1956): 527. 
97 Taya Zinkin, "Indian Foreign Policy: An Interpretation of Attitudes," World Politics 7, no. 02 (1955): 179. 
On the anti-imperialist, pacifist, and socialist roots as the basis of Nehru’s foreign policy, and his “mistrust 
of power,” see also Bajpai, "Engaging," 78-80. 
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being driven by post-imperial, liberal and idealist principles. From here, in the 1950s, to 
the popular contemporary narratives about India being incapable to think and act 
strategically, it is but only a small step.  
Whether because of “naïve Nehru,” or the inordinate influence of Gandhian pacifism, 
Fabian socialism, British liberalism, the anti-imperial freedom struggle, or Third-Worldist 
non-alignment, Indian foreign and security policies have, according to this approach, 
repeatedly failed to pursue national interests and even endangered the state’s survival.98 
Even avowedly neo-realist explanations will thus describe India’s foreign policy as “driven 
by the desire to achieve major power status” and Nehru pursuing “a foreign policy that 
was beyond India’s extant capabilities,” because of the history of colonialism and 
Gandhi’s “doctrine of non-violence and ethical practice.”99 
In terms of nuclear strategy, B. Karnad, for example, argues that India has tended to 
exercise self-restraint in fighting Pakistan and China due to “historical and cultural 
reasons”, most notably Nehru’s “moralistic” agenda.100 Stephen Cohen and S. Dasgupta, 
in turn, note that India’s doctrine of “strategic restraint” is driven by an ideological 
aversion to use the military as an instrument of state policy.101 At London’s King’s 
College, Harsh V. Pant argues that Nehru transformed India into a “soft state,” and is 
                                                
98 On Nehru’s alleged “idealism,” for example, see the introductory chapter in Harish Kapur, India's foreign 
policy, 1947-1992: shadows and substance (New Delhi: Sage, 1994). 
99 Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the world order: searching for major power status (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 251-9. 
100 Bharat Karnad, India's nuclear policy (Westport: Praeger, 2008). 
101 Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without aiming: India's military modernization (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012). 
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therefore still “in search of a foreign policy” because “India’s ability to think strategically 
on issues of national security [is] at best questionable.”102 
S. Ganguly has developed the most elegant analysis of the allegedly pernicious influence 
of Nehruvian idealism and of other ideological proclivities by its post-colonial leadership 
and bureaucracy. In his view, India’s foreign policy developed in three stages: a first 
period, up to the 1960s, driven by utopian objectives and causing the 1962 defeat against 
China; a second period, up to the 1980s, driven by PM Indira Gandhi’s alignment with 
the Soviet Union, after 1971, and a continued embrace of socialism, non-alignment and 
other “moral” causes such as global disarmament; and the third and current “awakening” 
period, after the 1990s, marked by delayed realism and adjustment to American 
unipolarity. Ganguly and M. Pardesi thus conclude that “India’s policymakers chose, 
quite deliberately, to ignore systemic constraints and decided to pursue an explicitly 
ideational foreign policy and with mostly disastrous consequences.”103  
This three-staged approach suggests a quasi-biological understanding of Indian foreign 
policy, which is described as infantile and naïve under Nehru, and then gradually 
evolving to shed its ideological compulsions and reach pragmatic maturity in the post-
Cold War phase. Theoretically, it also suggests that an exceptionalist India, driven by 
morality, was progressively socialized into the crude anarchy of power politics by being 
punished, for example in the 1962 defeat against China. Thus commenting on Indian 
                                                
102 “Indian policymakers themselves are not clear as to what this status of great power entails. … India has 
little to offer except some platitudinous rhetoric” Harsh V. Pant, The China syndrome: grappling with an uneasy 
relationship (Noida: Harper Collins 2010), 122-3. See also Harsh V. Pant, "A Rising India's Search for a 
Foreign Policy," Orbis 53, no. 2 (2009). 
103 Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy," India Review 
8, no. 1 (2009): 5. 
	  
	   63	  
foreign policy’s allegedly radical “reorientation” in the early 1990s, S. Ganguly observes 
that: 
India’s leaders have come to the harsh realization that force has continuing utility in international 
politics, that political rhetoric and posturing are no substitute for rapid economic growth, and that 
grand ideological coalitions ill-serve India’s material interests. (…) Having shed most of its 
ideological burden, and adopted more pragmatic policies at home and abroad, India is in a 
position to move into the ranks of the major powers.104 
The critique of this alleged ideological baggage remains deeply entrenched and is widely 
prevalent in the literature on Indian foreign policy, both among foreign scholars and – 
perhaps more surprisingly – also in India itself. 105 Writing in 2003, C. Raja Mohan, for 
example, recognized that while Nehru had crafted a careful balance between idealism 
and realism, the 1990s saw the transformation of India from a “reactive power,” which he 
metaphorically describes as a “vegetarian, slow-footed and prickly porcupine,” into a 
“normal power,” which he describes as a “tiger”.106 In the same line, former diplomat P. 
Menon describes Prime Minister N. Rao’s government, in the early 1990s, as having been 
driven by “pragmatism”, in contrast with “the two earlier phases … [which] depended 
more on intangibles like leadership charisma, India’s unique post-colonial era prestige, 
and intellectual legerdemain, rather than on home-grown realities.”107 
It would be fallacious to argue that India’s experience under colonialism did not have any 
influence on its strategic thought and practice after 1947.108 However, there is little more 
                                                
104 S. Ganguly, "India's foreign policy grows up," World Policy Journal 20, no. 4 (2003): 47. 
105 For example, in David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
106 The “centre of gravity of Indian foreign policy (…) shifted from idealism to realism in the 1990s,” 
Mohan, Rubicon, 261, 66, 68. 
107 Prabhakar Menon, "The Quiet innovator: Foreign policy under P. V. Narasimha Rao," in The 
Ambassadors' club: the Indian diplomat at large, ed. Krishna V. Rajan (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012), 288. 
108  On the influences of post-imperial ideology on independent India’s foreign policy, see Manjari 
Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China (Stanford: 
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than circumstantial evidence to sustain the bold claims and conjectures that Indian 
foreign policy has been driven or determined by the ideology of idealism, and that this caused 
the various strategic inefficiencies identified in the literature.  
While Indian leaders and diplomats certainly share a particular worldview, by focusing on 
their public speeches instead of internal decision-making processes and practice as evidence, 
the field of Indian foreign policy studies ended up perpetuating, for many decades, the 
mythological mantra of idealism. In 1974, P. N. Haksar, one of PM Indira Gandhi’s chief 
advisers, thus beckoned public intellectuals and scholars to distinguish India’s strategic 
rhetoric and practice: 
 Every country seeks to cast its foreign policy in some ideological mould. One has, therefore, to be 
analytical and perceptive in distinguishing between the form and the substance, between outward 
appearance and inner reality. One has to distinguish between the slogans and the flags with which 
people march and the real factors motivating and shaping events.109 
Despite such warnings, the idealist narrative kept gaining ground in scholarship and in 
the public sphere, often fed unintentionally by Nehru’s most ardent acolytes, who were 
bent on building a revisionist narrative of his foreign affairs as a heroic attempt to 
transform world politics and usher in an era of global peace.  
The idea that India suffers from a “strategic deficit”, both in thought and practice, is 
therefore deeply ingrained today and prevalent beyond just the corridors of 
universities.110 Across society, Indians widely agree that their country lacks a strategic 
culture, and while the causes are passionately debated, they generally focus on the alleged 
                                                                                                                                            
Stanford University Press, 2013); Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The politics of postcolonial identity from 1947 
to 2004 (London: Routledge, 2013). 
109 Delivering the Sardar Patel Memorial Lecture, on Dec. 27 and 28: Parmeshwar N. Haksar, Indias Foreign 
Policy and its Problems (New Delhi: Patriot, 1989), 79-80. 
110 K. Subrahmanyam, Shedding Shibboleths: India's Evolving Strategic Outlook (New Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2005). 
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idealist legacy. Military officials have been particular prone to embrace this approach. 
Retired Indian Army Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, for example, laments that India’s “strategic 
culture has always been one of timidity, of helpless rage – that of behaving like a soft State 
that whines, but does not retaliate even in the face of the gravest provocation.”111 Not 
surprisingly, New Delhi’s think thanks have thus recently begun pooling efforts to correct 
this alleged deficiency, for example by inventing a new “grand strategy.”112  
Eschewing the mantra “that India lacks a strategic culture”, former National Security 
Advisor S. S. Menon thus lamented, in 2012, that “while one can understand foreigners 
spreading this idea, it is incomprehensible to me that some Indians should also believe 
this.” 113  How did it come to this? What environment allowed and nurtured the 
proliferation of this idealist mythology, and the associated idea of an Indian strategic 
incapacity? Three main causes can be identified. 
 
Democracy’s strategic hysteria and angst 
The first driver of this mythological narrative is related to the democratic nature of the 
Indian political system and its open society, which tends to underrate its own mechanisms 
of survival and defense and, instead, highlight its shortcomings and failures. As British 
scholar David Runciman has shown, the public spheres of liberal democracies have a 
                                                
111 “Why India suffers from the Panipat Syndrome,” Feb. 12, 2016, Rediff Online: 
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-india-suffers-from-the-panipat-syndrome/20160212.htm. 
112 See, for example, S. Khilnani et al., eds., Non-Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 
Twenty First Century (New Delhi Centre for Policy Research 2012); V. Krishnappa and Princy George, eds., 
Grand strategy for India 2020 and beyond (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012); Kanti Bajpai et al., eds., India's 
grand strategy: history, theory, cases (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014); Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and strategy: rethinking 
India's foreign policy (New Delhi: Sage, 2009). For a critical review of these and other attempts, see Teresita C. 
Schaffer, "New Delhi's New Outlook," Survival 52, no. 6 (2010). 
113 Shivshankar Menon, "K. Subrahmanyam and India’s Strategic Culture," Pragati, no. 59 (2012): 22. 
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proclivity to engage in such bipolar oscillations, or “dual dangers,” between tragic 
narratives about their impending doom in face of external adversities, on the one hand, 
and jubilant narratives about their exceptionalist triumph and missionary zeal to 
transform world politics: the “history of modern democracy is a tale of steady success 
accompanied by the constant drumbeat of anticipated failure.”114 
While this may be incomprehensible to Americans of today, cushioned by geography and 
hegemonic power, such angst deeply affected the United States’ strategic debates in the 
past, whether in the late 19th century as it fought off the Spanish empire in Cuba, in the 
1930s as it faced Nazi Germany submarines off its Eastern coast, or during the Cold War 
as rivalry with the Soviet Union drove another wave of “red scare.”115  
Similarly, in India, such strategic angst permeated the public debate in face of an 
adversarial Cold War context, and particularly in face of authoritarian Pakistan and 
Communist China. Speaking to an American audience in Washington DC, in 1981, J. 
Mehta, a former Foreign Secretary and adviser to Nehru, thus observed that while his 
country’s “achievements have in many ways exceeded Indian or international 
expectations (…) India advertises, as only democracies do, its failures.”116 In the case of 
                                                
114  “Democracy’s Dual Dangers,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov. 18, 2013: 
http://chronicle.com/article/Democracys-Dual-Dangers/142971. See also David Runciman, The confidence 
trap: a history of democracy in crisis from World War I to the present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
115 For the inter-War angst about democracy as a handicap, see Walter Lippmann, Public opinion (New York: 
Macmillan, 1922). On the American roots of the modern revival of realism, in particular its structural 
variant, see Michael C. Williams, The realist tradition and the limits of international relations: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). On anxious U.S. Cold War attempts to moralize the use of military and nuclear force, see 
Bernard Brodie, Morals and strategy (Santa Monica: Rand, 1964). On interventionism: Stanley. Hoffmann, 
"Duties beyond borders: on the limits and possiblities of ethical international politics," (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1981). 
116 Jagat S. Mehta, Rescuing the future: bequeathed misperceptions in international relations (New Delhi: Manohar, 
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India, four additional factors compound this angst and, consequentially, facilitated the 
proliferation of the myth about its strategic debility. 
First, India’s prolonged colonial experience, whether under Islamic or Western rule, 
continuously fed a strategic narrative of insecurity and vulnerability in face of external 
incursions into the subcontinent. 117  Ram Madhav, of the nationalist organization 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and adviser to India’s current Prime Minister N. 
Modi, therefore observes that, 
…we are driven by a romanticist attitude of peace, love, etc. when what we actually need is a 
strategic culture. India was invaded by successive waves of hordes for more than 2000 years 
through one mountain pass called the Khyber Pass. Why has no Indian king ever thought of 
sealing that pass to prevent the invasions? That is where the difference in strategic cultures stands. 
That is why we can’t even seal our borders with Bangladesh.118 
Similarly, recalling the Indian defeat against China in 1962, the director of the 
Intelligence Bureau at the time, B. N. Mullik lamented that “India did not have the same 
range of thinking and the same system as was prevalent in China, and which proved more 
successful,” and attributed this to the history of foreign rule on the subcontinent.119 
Second, unlike in the United States and other democracies, India’s highly insulated and 
often also invisible diplomatic and security decision-making processes further feeds the 
narrative about its policies being “reactionary,” reflecting a thoughtless, impulsive or 
ideological nature. First under the “shadow” of Nehru, and then under that of his 
successor or influential bureaucrats, this lead to an unusually low electoral salience of 
                                                
117 V. P. Menon notes that despite being “one geographical entity … throughout her long and chequered 
history, [India] never achieved political homogeneity … mutual jealousies and conflicts made the country 
an easy prey to any organized invasion.” Vapal P. Menon, Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Calcutta: 
Orient Longman, 1956), 7. 
118 “We need a new strategic culture,” http://organiser.org/Encyc/2012/12/3/We-need-a-new-strategic-
culture.aspx. See also Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," 259. 
119 B. N. Mullik, My years with Nehru: the Chinese betrayal (Bombay: Allied, 1971), 591-2. 
	   68	  
foreign affairs, unlike in other regional or great powers.120 When K. Subrahmanyam thus 
spoke about an Indian “strategic deficit,” he was not questioning the acumen of its leaders 
and bureaucrats to plan and implement policies, but denouncing weak institutionalization 
as reflecting a “vested interest among the Indian political class to discourage the 
development of strategic thinking.”121 
Third, India’s strategic angst has been further inflated in the last two decades by domestic 
politics and the unprecedented veto-power of regional and other smaller parties on 
foreign affairs.122 Former diplomat an UN Under-Secretary General Shashi Tharoor thus 
expresses his concern that India’s increasingly “fractious” and “chaotic democracy” may 
be hampering the country’s ability to think, prepare and efficiently execute coherent 
foreign policies.123 Similarly, Sunil Khilnani questions whether India, as “a relatively new 
democratic state,” will “manage to concentrate its will to the degree required to achieve 
long-term goals.”124  
Finally, the formidable rise of an increasingly assertive China across the Himalayas in 
recent years, compounded by the continued border conflict and military tensions with 
Beijing, have further encouraged Indian angst and hysteria about the country’s alleged 
strategic deficiencies. In this view, China benefits from its autocratic regime, which 
                                                
120 On India’s comparatively “low electoral salience of foreign policy and the high encapsulation of the 
central foreign affairs and defense bureaucracies,” see V. Narang and P. Staniland, "Institutions and 
Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy," India Review 11, no. 2 (2012). For a similar argument: Pratap 
B. Mehta, "Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India," India Review 
8, no. 3 (2009). 
121 He further notes that “in the absence of a structured national security decision-making apparatus, 
leaders tend to be influenced by parochial and short-term political considerations,” Subrahmanyam, 
Shedding Shibboleths, 26, see also 3-17.  
122 Discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
123 Shashi Tharoor, Pax Indica (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 154, 57. 
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exudes centralization, decisiveness, clarity and cohesion – all criteria on which democratic 
India is seen to fall short on. This may sometimes manifest as a direct “China envy” but is 
normally articulated with resource to indirect metaphors: India, the slow-moving, passive 
elephant that is being overtaken by the aggressive and flexible Chinese dragon.125  
 
The poverty of historiography 
Secondly, the mythology about India’s lacking strategic culture has also proliferated 
because of an extraordinary poverty of historical research. While even scholarship in 
Western democracies has battled against the politics of secrecy, the Indian state’s 
incapacity to preserve its records and its unwillingness to make them accessible to the 
public finds no parallel among its peers.126 
India’s Public Records Act mandates that government files go through a declassification 
process and transferred to the National Archives of India, or other publically accessible 
institutions, after thirty years. 127  Such regulations have been, however, ignored for 
decades, making it virtually impossible for any scholar to conduct primary research on 
India’s diplomatic and strategic practice. The official compilation of Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s documents provides scholars with an extraordinary asset to 
                                                
125 For a critique of such comparisons: Tanvi Madan, “China’s Marathon is India’s Triathlon,” Brookings 
UpFront, Feb. 4, 2013: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/02/04-india-china-madan. 
126 For a comparative perspective: Michael P Colaresi, Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National 
Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
127  http://nationalarchives.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/html/public_records93.html. On the 
problems in archival preservation, see https://dinyarpatel.com/category/indian-archives-and-libraries/.  
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understand his politics and policies, but as of 2015, its most recent published volume 
barely covered the year of 1959.128  
Official war histories are rare, and a crucial report on the 1962 war with China remains 
classified.129 Diplomatic records from the Ministry of External Affairs only began to be 
made accessible in the 1990s, and only in a very limited number, mostly on procedural 
issues involving India’s diplomatic missions abroad. Amongst many other voices, S. 
Tharoor has thus decried the negative effect of such a lack of historical sources on Indian 
scholarship and the public debate: 
The lack of a coherent and effective declassification policy compounds this problem [of policy-
relevant research]. It is difficult for analysts to understand Indian foreign policy making from 
Indian sources, as the analysts have no legitimate access to such sources or to any documentation 
at all, other than material of historical value (though even many in that category have not been 
declassified.130 
Across a variety of sectors, scholars and diplomats have made similar observations, asking 
the Indian government to review and upgrade its declassification processes, and 
underlining the costs of the lack of historiography on the country’s foreign policy, defense 
and security planning.131  
The importance of the past in shaping current decision-makers’ policies has been widely 
studied, with particular reference to the importance of analogies, and underlines how 
                                                
128 The volumes have recently made available, in digital format, at http://nehruportal.nic.in.   
129 The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report remains classified. Neville Maxwell, "Henderson Brooks Report: 
An Introduction," Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 14/15 (2001). 
130 Tharoor, Pax Indica, 342. 
131 On military history and the defence sector see Anit Mukherjee, “Tell it like it is,” The Times of India, 
June 9, 2010: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/Tell-It-Like-It-Is/articleshow/6024645.cms; 
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diplomatic and strategic historiographies can facilitate learning and greater efficiency 
through transmission of memory.132 When asked why he read Greek classics like Plutarch 
to help him in complex decision-making, U.S. President Harry S. Truman noted that 
“the only thing new in the world is the history you don’t know.”133   
However late, over the last decade, this has lead to unprecedented change, as successive 
Indian governments started to accelerate declassification, with the Ministry of External 
Affairs alone transferring thousands of records to the National Archives.134 Such new 
openness contributed to a thriving new historiographical scholarship on Indian foreign 
policy, defense and strategic issues, and this dissertation hopes to contribute to this 
growing literature.135 The consequent “archival turn” allow a new generation of scholars 
to develop new insights on how India’s decision-making and policy processes operated in 
practice and, based on empirical and historical proof, contest the ossified conjectures about 
the role of idealism or about the alleged absence of Indian strategic thought.136  
                                                
132 See, e.g. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 
1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
133 Quoted in http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2009/spring/truman-history.html.  
134 For a list of more than 60,000 files recently transferred to the National Archives of India, see 
http://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/national-archive-new.pdf. Private papers of Indian political leaders 
and officials have also been made available at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, in New Delhi: 
http://www.nehrumemorial.nic.in/en/archives/catalogue-of-private-papers.html. The Association of 
Indian Diplomats and the Indian Council of World Affairs have also made extraordinary efforts to compile 
and publish oral histories with retired Indian Foreign Service officials: 
http://www.associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/ifajgeneral.htm. 
135 Scholars who have used these new archival materials for research on Indian foreign and security policies, 
after 1947, include Rakesh Ankit, Manu Bhagwan, Nicolas Blarel, Rudra Chaudhuri, Alexander Davis, 
David Engerman, Amit Das Gupta, Andreas Hilger, Yogesh Joshi, Andrew Kennedy, Raphaelle Khan, 
Tanvi Madan, Paul McGarr, Anit Mukherjee, Swapna K. Nayudu, Pallavi Raghavan, Srinath Raghavan, 
Jayita Sarkar, Zorawar D. Singh, Vineet Thakur. 
136 See, for example, the observation on how lack of archival history has been “complicit in the construction 
of the narrative that Nehruvian foreign policy was weak, too focused on immaterial things … or childlike,” 
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Yet, even when taking on a historical angle, foreign policy studies of the early period tend 
to be biased towards the “great man” approach, concentrating on the correspondence of 
J. Nehru.137 However determinant, especially in public, focusing excessively on his role 
often misses the variety of other bureaucratic cultures and personalities that also shaped 
India’s foreign relations, and to whom the Indian Prime Minister often deferred 
significant decision-making power.138 
 
The ossified speech: academia, ideology and politics 
Finally, while driven by democratic hysteria or the poverty of historiography, the myth of 
a lacking or deficient Indian strategic culture has also had a devastating impact on 
scholarship in India over the recent decades.139 In the United States, quantitative and 
data-focused academia is currently being reproached for being detached from practice 
and reality, and various analysts have bemoaned how the scholar-practitioner, or theory-
policy gap has widened, with detrimental effects to American strategic culture.140  
In India, the result is the same, albeit for different reasons. Such a gap was relatively 
narrow in India up to the late 1960s, when governments attempted to promote a higher 
education environment that could contribute to improve policy-making: the School of 
                                                
137 See, for example, Andrew Kennedy, The international ambitions of Mao and Nehru: national efficacy beliefs and the 
making of foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
138 As explored in this dissertation, through the views of Indian officers posted at missions in Kathmandu, 
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International Studies, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, reflected such an initiative and 
played an important role in several policy debates, bringing scholars and practitioners 
together, and also cultivating a debate with their international peers.141 After the 1970s, 
however, the gap progressively widened and transformed into today’s abyss.  
In a 2013 address at India’s 3rd International Studies Convention, in New Delhi, India’s 
NSA S. S. Menon thus offered a scathing critique of IR studies in India and of a widening 
theory-practice gap, based on what he saw as: 1) “post-modern emphasis on narrative 
and discourse”, unintelligible to practitioners; 2) Western-centric focus, ignorant of 
India’s strategic history; 3) an excessive focus on micro-issues, myopic and unrealistic to 
policy-makers confronted with complex contexts; and 4) a flawed scientific ambition, 
neglecting the flexible, artistic and contingent dimensions of diplomacy and strategy. 142 
Three processes explain why and how the Indian academic world of IR gradually 
separated from policy and practice over the last decades. 
First, bereft of historical and other empirical evidence, and forced to focus on the analysis 
of speech instead, the discipline veered methodologically into over-theorization. Whether 
under the post-modernist, post-colonial or constructivist mantle, discourse analysis and 
interpretative inference proliferated, and theory has become an end, rather than a mean 
to explain Indian state behavior. Indian IR has thud often excelled in global debates 
                                                
141  First established as the Indian School of International Studies, in October 1955, following 
recommendations of a government committee headed by H. N. Kunzru. A. Appadorai served as the first 
director. Over the following decades, the School would host influential policy dialogues with visiting 
professors, including H. Morgenthau, H. Bull, and K. Waltz, besides government officials. 
142 Dec. 11, 2013: http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22632/. 
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about IR theory, but hardly engaged the practice of the Indian state or contributed to a 
clearer understanding of Indian foreign policy.143  
Second, deprived of any practical and historical understanding of how “diplomacy” and 
“strategy” operates in practice, the discipline gradually divorced from realism, identified 
as a status quo, Western-centric, and immoral approach to international politics. Rather 
than studying the state, the discipline embraced the ideological mission to revise and 
reform it, in a “critical” effort that professed a principled aversion to power prior even to 
understanding how it operates in practice. By seeking to contest the state, Indian IR has 
thus embraced an activist stance marked by hostility, which deters younger scholars to 
understand the specific constraints and contingencies shaping policy.144  
Finally, rather than contributing to, and shaping the public debate on foreign policy, 
Indian IR quickly turned into a political battleground, hostage to spurts of mudslinging 
between acolytes of Nehru’s enlightened “exceptionalism” on the one hand, and 
nationalist and other critics of his “idealism” as a malign burden. Any scholarly output on 
Indian foreign policy is therefore prone to be immediately engulfed by an ideological, 
partisan and false that pits “Nehruvians” against “nationalists.” 
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debates on theories of International Relations. For a comprehensive overview, see Kanti P Bajpai and 
Siddharth Mallavarapu, eds., International Relations in India: Bringing theory back home, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Orient 
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region and nation, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2005). 
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b) Realigning speech and practice 
The devastating impact of the mythological narrative about idealism and the alleged lack 
of an Indian strategic culture also affected government officials, who over the last decades 
have become prisoners of the poverty of the public debate. If idealism is seen as the 
opposite of realism, and if India’s alleged liberal democratic “values” are seen as coming 
in the way of its “security interests,” how can today’s Indian leaders or diplomats 
effectively articulate a policy that defends Nepal’s democratization as being in the long-
term interest of India? How can Indian officials and scholars possibly counter Western 
assertions that their country is a “reluctant” newcomer to liberal interventionism and 
democracy promotion, when they are oblivious to their country’s monumental efforts to 
democratize Nepal in the 1950s, defend humanitarian rights during its 1971 
humanitarian in Bangladesh, and promote conflict resolution in Sri Lanka in the 1980s? 
The poverty of Indian strategic memory, and the hysteric self-criticality of its democratic 
public sphere have thus constrained India’s own strategic vocabulary, with its officials 
often conceptually struggling to articulate their own policies. This communicative 
deficiency was diagnosed as early as 1981, by K. Subrahmanyam: the “sophisticated, 
eclectic blend of policies and values underlying the Indian pursuit of national interest,” he 
observed, are not always understood by outside powers “because of the confusing 
verbiage employed by India,” which leads “some of them conclude that the inchoateness 
of our policy as they see it is because of the peculiar Hindu view of the world.”145 
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distraught of the Western world did not help to promote any deeper understanding of our country … we 
ourselves have contributed little,” Haksar, Problems, 2. 
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More worrisome is the possibility that this conceptual poverty may have had reverse 
effects on India’s strategic practice. Former diplomat K. S. Bajpai alludes to this 
possibility: 
We have neglected to develop either the conceptual or mechanical apparatus needed to cope with 
the role of power in world affairs and … unless we do so, urgently and extensively, we cannot be 
as effective as our size, situation and resources, not least the talents of our people, ought to have 
made us long since. (…) [The] Slogans of non-alignment, third-world solidarity, anti-
imperialism … [were] even at best of times … substitutes for thought; now they stifle thought.146  
Similarly, strategic analyst C. R. Mohan recalls that while Nehru had been, overall, 
“extremely conscious of preserving and pursuing India’s interests in a pragmatic 
manner,” his moral rhetoric degenerated under his successors into a “mantra” of 
“ideological accents” that “begun to distort Indian diplomacy.”147  
This possibility further underlines the importance of scholarly enterprises seeking to 
realign India’s strategic speech and practice. P. N. Haksar had, in the mid-1980s, rung 
alarm bells about the expanding “hiatus” between public perception and diplomatic 
reality, and the dangers of India’s exceptionalist speech hindering a clearer understanding 
of its practice. In a lecture to New Delhi’s bureaucratic intelligentsia, in 1986, he thus 
noted that: 
 …for us to perceive [Indian foreign policy] in realistic terms, it has to be cleared of the entire 
gamut of ideas and emotions (particularly emotions) which we have gathered around rather simple 
words, such as [the] ‘Non-Aligned Movement’. These are ‘outer garments’ of all great powers’ 
foreign policy, which must be shed for better practice and analysis.148 
Despite such warnings, however, little has changed. A quarter of a century later, National 
Security Adviser S. S. Menon would reiterate a similar concern, noting in 2012 that “we 
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must encourage our own ways of looking at developments, and develop our own strategic 
culture, vocabulary and doctrine,” especially because “others tell us that the articulation 
of our policies is normative, moralistic and academic, even in explaining [our] acts 
of realpolitik.”149 In a quest to excavate such realist foundations of strategic practice, 
Menon noted, for example, the importance of studying the Indian approach to the use of 
force, so often publically described as an anathema to India’s pacifist image.150  
Such a practitioners’ view is confirmed by recent scholarly forays into Indian foreign 
policy noting that despite electoral insulation, political change and institutional 
constraints, a “remarkable continuity runs through the thinking of Indian strategic elites,” 
which calls for “deeper historical studies of the roots of [India’s] strategic worldviews.”151 
S. Khilnani characterizes this approach as a “reason of state perspective,” which assumes 
that the modern Indian state, from the colonial Raj period onwards, is “in possession of a 
stable set of rational interests across time.”152 This dissertation seeks to contribute to this 
perspective, by focusing on patterns of continuity in the strategic practice of the Indian 
state towards its neighbors.  
 
                                                
149 Dec. 11, 2013, in New Delhi: http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22632/. 
150 Oct. 21, speaking on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs,” at the National Defence College, in New 
Delhi: there is a “long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of  [defensive] force as legitimate in 
certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice.” He thus calls for “studying 
the Indian way, the Indian view and Indian practice in the use and role of force in statecraft,” Avtar S. 
Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2010 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2011), 85, 88. 
151 “…the basic priorities of Indian elites remain the same,” based on a “strategic core.” Narang and 
Staniland, "Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy," 77, 91. 
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3. From the Raj to the Republic: India’s regional strategy  
India can learn from its diplomatic history only when it ends the pretence that our global 
engagement began at the stroke of midnight on August 15, 1947. Independent India eagerly 
embraced the many instruments inherited from the Raj for the conduct of India’s foreign relations. 
Post-colonial Delhi also held on to many principles of British India's foreign policy.153 
 C. Raja Mohan  
In no other foreign policy area is the gap between India’s strategic rhetoric and practice 
as wide as in its neighborhood. The official and public discourse insists on principles such 
as non-interference and portrays India as a benign power that is often misunderstood by 
its neighbors or must resist becoming boxed in by hostile extra-regional powers. The 
sparse scholarship, on the other hand, simplistically defines India’s regional strategy as 
driven by hegemonic realism – reflexively inherited from the British Raj – and therefore 
an exception to its otherwise idealist impulses.  
Both such narratives run counter to what is known about India’s practice in the region, and 
which will inform this dissertation’s empirical chapters on how successive governments, 
under different leaders and political parties, dealt with regime crises in Nepal, Sri Lanka 
and Myanmar, from the 1950s to the 2000s. On the one hand, India interfered in Nepal 
(1950-51), coercively imposing a regime change there. How does that conform to the 
advocated principle of non-interference and India’s supposed idealism? On the other 
hand, India’s involvement in Nepal (1950s) and Sri Lanka (1980s) indicates that beyond 
just reflexive realist “security interests” to maximize power, New Delhi may have also 
been driven by an attempt to encourage liberalization in those countries. How does that 
conform to the scholarly consensus that India’s approach to the region is driven by 
                                                
153  C. Raja Mohan, “Heritage Clause,” The Indian Express, Aug. 24, 2009: 
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/heritage-clause/506011/0. 
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hardnosed realism and has no space for “democracy promotion”? As suggested in the 
introduction to this dissertation, a simplistic “idealism” versus “realism” approach fails to 
grasp the possible connections between security and liberalism in India’s strategic culture. 
In the quest to understand the foundations of Indian strategic culture towards the region, 
and its consequent patterns of involvement, one must therefore begin by examining its 
pre-independence roots. Path-breaking work has recently shed light on Indian 
“indigenous” strategic thought, most notably in Kautilya’s monumental Arthashastra 
treatise during the Maurya empire (ca. 300-150 BCE), which is often compared to that of 
China’s Sun Tzu and Europe’s Machiavelli.154  
Similar historical incursions have been made into the medieval and early modern periods, 
in particular on the Southern and Central Indian Chola, Vijayanagar and Maratha 
empires.155 Innovative insights on the Mughal Empire, in particular at its 16th century 
apogee, have further expanded our understanding of the pre-colonial elements in Indian 
strategic thought.156 While these attempts to recover “indigenous” roots are ideologically 
soothing for a post-colonial nation, their deep historical incursions pose a methodological 
problem in terms of process tracing and causal linkage: the deeper they excavate in time, 
the more difficult it becomes to prove that past concepts, for example Kautilya’s mandala 
theory, determine the thinking of today’s Indian decision-maker, several centuries or even 
millennia later. 
                                                
154 On Kautilya’s Arthashastra see, for example, the excellent recent project on “Indigenous Historical 
Knowledge” at the government-funded Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: P. K.  Gautam et al., 
eds., Indigenous historical knowledge: Kautilya and his vocabulary (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2015).  
155 Manjeet S. Pardesi, Deducing India's grand strategy of regional hegemony from historical and conceptual perspectives 
(Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2005). 
156 Jayashree Vivekanandan, Interrogating international relations: India's strategic practice and the return of history (New 
Delhi: Routledge, 2011). 
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While such excellent efforts are welcome, and should continue, our immediate focus must 
go to the colonial Raj as the modern precursor of independent India. Reflecting a natural 
process in the historiography of a proud post-colonial nation, India’s IR community has 
dedicated extraordinary little attention to identify continuities between the colonial and 
independent state’s foreign and security policies. 
 
a) Roots in the Raj: Security, Liberalism and Non-Interference  
The modern Indian state gradually developed after the 17th century, first as a commercial 
enterprise under the East India Company (EIC), which partially coopted the preceding 
Mughal and Maratha empires, and then morphed throughout the 19th century into a full 
colonial state, which emerged, after 1857, as the Raj. At the heart of this colonial 
enterprise lay a tension between security interests and liberal principles, reflected in a 
persistent British debate on the risks of interference in India’s autochthonous polities.  
 
Asia’s pivot: Expanding security imperatives 
As an economic project, the EIC’s rise was initially contingent on its capacity to locally 
generate fiscal revenue in order to expand military power and ensure its security. A rich 
literature details this British quest for regional predominance, control and stability, and 
how the EIC’s extractive nature forced it into an expansionist spiral after the 1820, with a 
succession of military campaigns into the frontier areas and beyond, including into the 
Punjab, Sindh, Afghanistan, and Burma. Overstretched and faced with growing internal 
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instability and social unrest, this eventually caused the 1857 revolt and its replacement by 
the Raj’s imperial institutions.157  
The security dimension of this new Raj thus split. Internally, on the subcontinent, it 
inherited the EIC’s mechanisms to extend its influence into the myriad of princely states, 
especially the subsidiary alliance system and Britain’s role as the subcontinent’s 
paramount power.158 As historian C. A. Bayly notes, the “foundations of British rule in 
India consisted not only in direct administration but in the creation of a flexible and 
expert diplomatic system among its subordinate allies and dependents (…) [as well as on] 
the further development of the residency system, an embryonic Indian political service 
and a series of techniques for neutralizing disaffected Indian states”.159  
From the late 19th century onwards, however, it also became clear that the Raj’s survival 
relied increasingly on its capability to control the external environment, beyond the 
subcontinent. The security of India thus became dependent on a wider context, leading to 
a variety of intermediary “ring fence” or “buffer” states that separated and protected the 
subcontinent from the extra-regional influence of Russia and China.160 Referring to the 
pivotal importance of Tibet, Viceroy Curzon thus observed, in 1904, that India: 
                                                
157  On how the EIC’s “insecurity on its extended frontiers and the desire to seize new revenues encouraged 
expansion” and “squeezing the Indian states for tribute” lead to “internal revolt,” see C. A. Bayly, Indian 
society and the making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 120. 
158 First introduced by Lord Wellesley, Governor-General from 1798 to 1805. Through the system of 
“subsidiary alliance,” in return for a tax, an EIC representative (“resident”) would be posted in the state 
with a military force to protect it from internal threats and external aggression: Bayly, Indian Society, 110-11. 
See also Michael H. Fisher, "Indirect Rule in the British Empire: The Foundations of the Residency System 
in India (1764-1858)," Modern Asian Studies 18, no. 3 (1984). 
159 Bayly, Indian Society, 110. 
160 In 1902, Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, ex-Vice Roy of India (1884-94), defined a “buffer zone” as “an 
intervening zone sufficient to prevent direct contact between the dominions of Great Britain [the Raj] and 
those of other great military powers,” quoted in Sneh Mahajan, "The foreign policy of the Raj and its 
Legacy," in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, ed. David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath 
Raghavan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 53. 
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is like a fortress with the vast moat of the sea on two of her faces and with mountains for her 
walls on the remainder. … [On Tibet as a buffer zone] We do not want to occupy it, but also we 
cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes... That is the secret of the whole [Indian] position in 
[relation to] Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and as far eastwards as Siam. He would be a 
short-sighted commander who merely manned his ramparts in India and did not look beyond161 
As the Asian pivot of Britain’s imperial project, India’s geopolitical importance thus kept 
increasing, leading to the development of a series of military and diplomatic institutions 
that implemented policies with considerable autonomy from London. By the 1920, as the 
Raj reached the apogee of its territorial expansion, the security India had become 
tantamount to the security of Asia, from Southern Africa to Eastern China.162 
 
                                                
161 March 30, in a budget speech, on foreign affairs, quoted in Thomas Raleigh, ed. Lord Curzon in India; 
being a selection from his speeches as viceroy & Governor-general of India, 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan, 1906), 408. 
162 On the wider frontiers of the British Raj, beyond the subcontinent, see Robert J. Blyth, The empire of the 
Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858-1947 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Alex McKay, 
Tibet and the British Raj : the frontier cadre, 1904-1947 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997); Sneh Mahajan, 
British foreign policy, 1874-1914: the role of India (London: Routledge, 2002); Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial 
connections: India in the Indian Ocean arena, 1860-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
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Missionary zeal: Deepening liberal principles 
Besides its extractive commercial and security purposes, the Raj was, however, also 
driven by a tacit ideological mission, which shaped its policies and laid the liberal 
foundations of modern India. For example, historian C. A. Bayly notes that, as early as 
the 18th century, “through carefully selected tutors, [British] residents began to implant 
       
163 Source: http://www.atlasofbritempire.com/height-of-empire.html 
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western notions of ‘progressive’ government in the minds of their Indian charges.”164 As a 
consequence, after the 1857 political reforms, “a succession of English-educated rajas and 
diwans (…) more effectively promoted British interests in their respective states than any 
number of interfering early-nineteenth century [British] residents.” 165  The ideas of 
representative responsibility were persistently communicated to local Indian rulers, 
further driving the liberal spirit into the subcontinent.166  
However colonial, conservative and orientalist – based on the idea that Indian society was 
medieval and despotic, and therefore unfit for representative democracy and self-rule –
after 1857 the Raj kept sowing the seeds of its own demise through a variety of legal, 
social, economic, administrative and institutional reforms.167 At the same time, Anglicized 
Indian elites imported and adapted liberal values to the Indian context, demanding 
political reforms, greater autonomy, civic rights and representation, which culminated in 
a mass freedom struggle for self-rule after the 1930s and negotiations for independence 
after the end of World War II. This was particularly visible when the Indian National 
                                                
164 Bayly, Indian Society, 111. 
165 Bayly, Indian Society, 197. 
166 V. P. Menon recalls the impact of this rhetoric: “Successive viceroys laid emphasis upon the duties and 
responsibilities of the rulers. The classic instance was the speech of Lord Curzon at the installation of the 
ruler of Bahawalpur. He exhorted the Indian ruler to be 'the servant as well as the master of his people'; 
emphasized that 'his revenues are not secured to him for his own selfish gratification but for the good of his 
subjects'; avowed that 'his internal administration is only exempt from correction in proportion as it is 
honest'; advised him that 'his gaddi is not intended to be a divan of indulgence but the stern seat of duty';” 
Menon, Integration, 14. See also S. R. Ashton, British policy towards the Indian States, 1905-1939 (London: 
Curzon Press, 1982); C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
167 On tensions between British arguments about providential presence, however conservative and based on 
“[medieval] ordering difference” e.g. based on “durbar model” emulating Mughal practices, and the liberal 
spirit of the legal system, for example via the Ibert bill (1882-3), see Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 186-91, 203-14. See also Francis G. Hutchins, The illusion 
of permanence: British imperialism in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
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Congress imposed various representative clauses on the princely states.168 The liberal 
dimension of the Raj, and its influence on independent India’s democratic institutions has 
developed into a thriving body of literature.169  
Reflecting how deep these liberal principles were ingrained in the Indian elites’ political 
thinking at the time of independence, V. P. Menon, who after 1946 helped negotiate the 
incorporation of hundreds of princely and other states from the Raj, recalls that “the new 
Government of India could not possibly uphold the idea of autocracy in [such] states,” 
because such a system represented an anathema to the new republic’s liberal identity.170  
 
Security, liberalism and the dilemmas of interference  
The Raj’s internal security imperatives and its liberal principles often came into tension, 
animating a strident debate on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
India’s native and neighboring states. As V. P. Menon would later recall, the British had 
to walk a thin line: while, on the one hand, and in principle, they strived to avoid the 
temptation of over-interference (fearing hostile opposition, entanglement and 
overstretching their resources in political micromanagement), on the other hand, and in 
                                                
168 1918: Montagu-Chelmsford Report and reforms institutionalize relations with states, especially by 
uniformization, leading to creation of Chamber of Princes. 1935: Government of India Act with a Council 
of State and House of Assembly, differentiating provinces and states, leading to elections in 1937. 1946: 
clash between new Constituent Assembly and Chamber of Princes (states). In 1947, the Indian National 
Congress expected that that at least 50% of states’ representatives should be elected: Menon, Integration, 17-
18, 23-24, 51-2. See also Barbara N. Ramusack, The Indian princes and their states (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
169 Beyond the works referenced above, see also Judith M. Brown, Modern India: the origins of an Asian democracy 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985); Harald Fischer-Tine and Michael Mann, eds., Colonialism as 
civilizing mission: cultural ideology in British India (London: Anthem Press, 2004); Mithi Mukherjee, India in the 
shadows of empire: a legal and political history, 1774-1950 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010); Uday 
Singh Mehta, Liberalism and empire: India in British liberal thought (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
170 “For their very existence, their rulers had to have either the support of their people, or the protection of 
the Government of India The former the rulers generally lacked; the latter had automatically terminated 
with the lapse of paramountcy” Menon, Integration, 329. See also Ian Copland, The princes of India in the 
endgame of empire, 1917-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 229-87. 
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practice, they could also not avoid the luxury of under-interference (risking loss of control, 
instability spilling-over into British territory, and rising external influence from rival 
powers).171  
The dilemma was compounded by the moral impulse to spread liberalism, especially 
when such despotic regimes faced internal opposition and unrest.172 In 1859, for example, 
J. S. Mill thus berated the East India Company for having supported despotic rule in the 
North Indian state of Awadh (Oude) for almost a century, and welcomed the Raj’s 
decision to “fulfill[ing] the obligation it had so long before incurred, of giving to the 
people of Oude a tolerable government” as a “tardy discharge of an imperative duty.”173 
The colonial foundations of such liberal dilemmas of non-interference on the 
subcontinent are elegantly encapsulated in an 1835 speech by acting Governor-General 
Charles Metcalfe, on “Duty towards native states - Interference and Non-
Interference.”174 In what could have been the analysis of J. Nehru or of any succeeding 
Indian Prime Minister, he recognized that, “as the predominant power in India, 
interference is sometimes forced on us,” but also emphasized the “wide difference 
                                                
171 Menon, Integration. Bayly also recalls the negative experience of excessive interference under the EIC, 
which faced repeated rebellions (Marathas 1770s, Awadh 1797, Rajputs 1820-30s) after the British had 
attempted to impose their own nominees on the thrones of princely states “in violation of the sense of the 
neighbourhood and the dominant alliances in local polities.” Bayly, Indian Society, 171. 
172 On the debate on interference in the mid-19th century, between those defending sates’ autonomy even if 
ruled despotically, and those defending states’ annexation to spread liberal rule and enforce control e.g. 
when mismanaged or “doctrine of lapse,” and the consequent the creation of the Political Department and 
Indian Political Service as “a government within a government” which encroached on states’ internal 
sovereignty to varying degrees, see Menon, Integration, 9-13. 
173 John Stuart Mill, "A few words on non-intervention," New England Review 27, no. 3 (2006 [1859]): 260. 
174 Aug. 14: John William Kaye, ed. Selections from the papers of Lord Metcalfe (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 
1855), 237-44. 
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between a reluctant interference, when it is unavoidable, and a disposition to rush into 
interference when it is not necessary.”175  
In defense of non-interference as a default policy, Metcalfe prudently described the 
infinite risks of foreign involvement, including the danger of weakening local institutions, 
costly overextension, popular animosity, and escalatory involvement by rival powers – a 
list which reads just like a contemporary realist case against interventionism.176 He also, 
however, delineated specific conditions warranting intervention, which reflected both 
concerns about security (e.g. “general disturbance produced by internal disorder” that 
spills over to British provinces) and about the effects of illiberal rule (“prolonged anarchy, 
with its evil consequences to the people,” “extreme misrule and oppression,” and “unjust 
usurpation [of power], devoid of legitimate claim, or opposed to the choice of the 
people”.177 These latter conditions reflect the early liberal nature of Indian strategic 
thought on the subcontinent. 
With its territorial expansion after the late 19th century, the Raj developed a wide 
spectrum of security and legal instruments to institutionalize its relations with the states in 
its geostrategic protection belt. While liberal concerns were less salient than they had 
been on the subcontinent towards the princely states, the key principle remained: the 
sovereignty of these buffer states was limited, contingent on their cooperative (or, at least, 
neutral) security posture towards India. This was particularly apparent in the conflicted 
                                                
175 He defines this issue as the “most difficult of any in Indian policy; but interference is so likely to do evil, 
and so little certain of doing good, that it ought …  to be avoided as much as possible.” Kaye, Selections from 
the papers of Lord Metcalfe, 237. 
176 For example, on the danger of creating a precedent: “[we often] twist our obligation of protection 
against enemies into a right to interfere in the internal affairs of protected States.” Kaye, Selections from the 
papers of Lord Metcalfe, 239. 
177 Kaye, Selections from the papers of Lord Metcalfe, 239-40. 
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relations between the Raj and the Kingdom of Nepal, which underwent a succession of 
crises until stabilizing in the 1920s.178  
Against the background of Asia’s new “Great Game,” in 1904 Viceroy Curzon thus 
articulated how Tibet – or any other state crucial to the protection of India – was 
expected to condition its sovereignty to the Raj’s superior security interests: 
I would suffer any imputation sooner than be an unfaithful sentinel at my post, or allow the future 
peace of this country to be compromised by encroachment from the outside as to whose meaning 
there cannot be any question. If the Tibetan Government is wise it will realise that the interests of 
Indian defence and the friendship of the Indian Government are entirely compatible with the 
continued independence and autonomy of Tibet, so far as these may be said at present to exist. But 
it should also realise that they are incompatible with the predominance of any other foreign 
influence, carrying with it insecurity on our frontier and adding gratuitously to our cadres.179 
Whether on the subcontinent or in the frontier regions around South Asia, the Raj’s quest 
for security thus developed in tandem with a strategic culture that made prudent but 
determined use of political interference and, if necessary, military intervention. 
 
b) The post-colonial republic: Revolution in speech, continuity in practice 
To what extent did the Raj’s strategic legacy transit to the independent Republic of India? 
In terms of strategic practice in the region, there are indications of tremendous continuity, 
both on the security and liberal fronts. Despite a new geopolitical context, post-1947 
                                                
178 The Kingdom of Nepal thus “had more independence than any of the princely states of India 
[Hydarabad] but had less than a completely sovereign Asian State [Thailand],” Asad Husain, British India's 
relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857-1947: a diplomatic history of Nepal (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), 56. 
For historical antecedents (and limits) of Nepal playing off China against the Indian Raj, see Leo E. Rose, 
Nepal: strategy for survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 102-15. The 1923 Nepal-Britain 
Treaty recognized Nepal as a sovereign state, but with limitations: for example, Kathmandu’s military 
imports were contingent on British satisfaction “that the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly 
and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importations,” (Article 5: 
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1925/TS0031.pdf). 
179 March 30, 1904, budget speech: Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India, 409. 
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Indian officials applied much of the Raj’s thinking on subcontinental security, order and 
interference to their country’s foreign policy towards the neighbors in Nepal, Ceylon and 
Burma. This hypothesis will be examined in this dissertation’s empirical chapters.  
In terms of strategic rhetoric, however, India’s post-colonial leadership adopted a 
revolutionary posture, distancing itself from the Raj by describing it as an immoral 
imperial project that represented the worst of Western power politics. For public and 
domestic consumption, such political speech was revisionist, idealist and exceptionalist, 
and described independent India’s foreign policy as a righteous quest to overcome the 
bellicose nature of international politics. This divergence posed a significant impediment 
for the development of a body of scholarship and public debate on the regional dimension 
of India’s strategic culture. 
 
The continuity of strategic practice 
In terms of strategic practice towards the region, independent India largely inherited the 
legacy of the Raj, despite partition with Pakistan and a changed geopolitical context.180 
The new state’s bureaucratic and military apparatus was, in effect, the continuation of the 
former.181 Candidly acknowledging this inheritance, V. P. Menon noted that the modern 
Indian state was the outcome of a colonial enterprise, which had established “a political 
                                                
180 For a similar argument on such continuity, see T. A. Keenleyside, "Diplomatic apprenticeship: pre-
independence origins of Indian diplomacy and its relevance for the post-independence foreign policy," India 
Quarterly 432(1987). 
181  On the organizational background of modern India’s administrative, bureaucratic and military 
apparatus, see Terence Creagh Coen, The Indian political service: a study in indirect rule (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1971); B. B. Misra, The administrative history of India, 1834-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1970); Philip Woodruff, The men who ruled India (London: J. Cape, 1953); David Gilmour, The ruling caste : 
imperial lives in the Victorian Raj (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006); Partha Sarathi Gupta and 
Anirudh Deshpande, The British Raj and its Indian armed forces, 1857-1939 (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
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and administrative system hitherto unknown to Indian history” that was “impersonal… 
[and based on] a regular and uniform system of administration composed of a hierarchy 
of authorities, one subordinate to another, with powers and functions clearly 
demarcated.”182 On the legal and diplomatic front, the Republic of India was also a 
formal success state to the Raj, taking over 627 treaties, conventions and agreements, as 
well as the membership to 51 international organizations.183  
Looking back to 1947, K. P. S. Menon, India’s first Foreign Secretary and one of the 
senior-most Indian bureaucrats who had served in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) since 
1921, thus acknowledged that while independence was symbolically “nothing short of a 
political revolution,” in essence the state carried on its business as usual, as “the members 
of the Legislative Assembly continued to let off steam; the judges upheld the majesty of 
the law; and the ICS maintained law and order.”184 Similarly, on the diplomatic and 
military fronts, the post-colonial institutions and personnel were widely, and in some cases 
even exclusively coopted from the Raj.  
For example, the Secret and Political Department was formed in 1783 by the East India 
Company, renamed in 1843 as the Foreign Department, and then reorganised in, 1914, 
as the Foreign and Political Department, with two separate secretaries for the princely 
states on the subcontinent, and for relations with European and other powers. In 1935, 
                                                
182 Menon, Integration, 10. India’s independence was gradual: for example, as per the Government of India 
Act, 1935, the members of the Constituent Assembly were indirectly elected in the Jan. 1946 provincial 
assembly elections, and almost one fourth of its members represented princely states: Granville Austin, The 
Indian constitution: cornerstone of a nation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
183 India was founding member of the League of Nations and held various diplomatic representations, 
legations abroad, starting with London, in 1919: Vineet Thakur, "The Colonial Origins of Indian Foreign 
Policymaking," Economic & Political Weekly 49, no. 32 (2014): 59. 
184 He served as the first Indian in the Foreign & Political Department. After joining the ICS in 1921, he 
served in Peshawar, Ceylon, Zanzibar, Baluchistan, and as Agent-General in China (1943-47): Kumara P. 
S. Menon, Many Worlds Revisited: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1981), 262. 
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the external affairs and political departments split, and an integrated Indian Political 
Service created to serve both.185 The British reluctance, after 1935, to include Indians in 
the foreign policy-making apparatus delayed this process in comparison to other 
bureaucratic areas.186 But at the time of independence dozens of senior Indian officials 
had served the Raj across South Asia and also other regions, from Africa to Malaya, and 
imbibed its strategic culture.187  
While possibly less exposed to the experience of dealing with grand global and strategic 
challenges, this elite cadre assimilated the Raj’s regional policies, experienced in dealing 
with a variety of security challenges across South Asia. Not surprisingly, several Indian 
ambassadors who served in Nepal, Ceylon and Burma in the 1950s had a long experience 
in working for the Raj across the subcontinent.188 Similarly, most of India’s Foreign 
Secretaries in the 1950s and 1960s had served in areas of the Raj that became 
independent states after the late 1940s.189 
                                                
185 For a view on how “the structures of administering the colonial government’s external relations were 
continued by [independent India] as a matter of deliberate choice,” see Pallavi Raghavan, "Establishing the 
Ministry of External Affairs," in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, ed. David M. Malone, C. Raja 
Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 81. And K. Shankar Bajpai, 
"The Evolution of the Indian Foreign Service Establishment," Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 1, no. 3 (2011). 
186 On the Indian participation in the bureaucratic cadres, see W. Murray Hogben, "An Imperial Dilemma: 
The Reluctant Indianization of the Indian Political Service," Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 4 (1981). 
187 Foreign policy was kept at the discretion of the Governor General, as a “prerogative of the Crown” A. 
Appadorai, The domestic roots of India's foreign policy, 1947-1972 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 
49. For a perspective from the first Indian IPS officer to join the Foreign and Political Department, in 1935, 
as one of its two Deputy secretaries, see Menon, Many Worlds Revisited: An Autobiography, 135. By 1939, the 
Indian Civil Service (ICS) had 759 Europeans, and 640 Indians. In comparison, the Indian Political Service 
(IPS) only had less than twenty Indians. When created on Oct. 9, 1946, the new Indian Foreign Service 
(IFS) had 19 out of its 20 officers drawn from the ICS. In, 1946 when Nehru took over the Department of 
External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of the interim government, only two Indian IPS officers 
were serving in it. He appointed G. S. Bajpai as Secretary-General: Mehta, Rescuing, 83-5. 
188  In Nepal: Amb. Bhagwan Sahay (1955-1960), who joined the ICS in 1929. In Ceylon: High 
Commissioner B. N. Chakravarty (1955-56), joined the ICS in 1928. In Burma: K. K. Chettur (1952-55), 
joined the Indian Audit Department in 1925, and had also served in Rangoon in the 1930s. 
189 K. P. S. Menon served in Ceylon, as Agent General, in the late 1930s. Subimal Dutt (ICS 1928) had 
served as Indian Agent in Malaya (1941). Y. D. Gundevia joined the ICS in 1930, served in Burma before 
1947 (and also as High Commissioner in Ceylon, 1957-60).  
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With the separation of Burma (1937), the partition of Pakistan (1947), and the Chinese 
annexation of Tibet (1950), independent India’s bureaucracy and political leadership 
faced a significantly changed geopolitical context, different from the one they had grown 
accustomed to while serving (or contesting) the Raj. This was compounded by a severely 
curtailed state capacity, the traumas of a violent partition, and an adverse geostrategic 
context with the rise of Communist China, Soviet Russia and the emerging Cold War 
rivalries with the United States. Map 2 illustrates independent India’s new geopolitical 
environment in South Asia. 
Despite this, the Raj’s security horizons and strategic culture continued to manifest 
themselves, as reflected in one of J. Nehru’s first proclamations as part of India’s interim 
government, formed in 1946: “We are of Asia and the peoples of Asia are nearer and 
closer to us than others (…) India is so situated that she is the pivot of Western, Southern 
and South-East Asia.” 190  While subsequent choices and circumstances drove India 
towards geostrategic introversion, the colonial legacy remained intact on the 
subcontinent. T. N. Kaul, one of Nehru’s closest advisers in the 1950s, thus recalls that 
India remained “vitally concerned with Afghanistan, Burma, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives … [because] their stability, peace and security are 
vital to India’s own and vice versa.”191  
                                                
190 Quoted in Bimal Prasad, The origins of Indian foreign policy: the Indian National Congress and world affairs, 1885-
1947 (Calcutta: Bookland, 1962), 334. 
191 Triloki N. Kaul, Reminiscences, discreet and indiscreet (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1982), 175-6. 
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Beyond the legacy of security, there are also indications that independent India’s foreign 
policy inherited and developed the liberal culture of the Raj. In one of the most perceptive 
studies of such influences, A. P. S. Rana noted that the ideas of non-alignment and 
internationalism were “typical and representative of the [Indian] leadership and the bulk 
of the educated elite that had evolved in several stages since the early days of the East 
       
192 http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00maplinks/modern/maps1947/maps1947.html  
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Indian Company … [and which] continue to constitute the framework within which 
adaptations are worked out in the contemporary [post-1947] politics of the country.”193  
Scholars have shown how this liberal legacy influenced India’s foreign policies of anti-
imperialism, anti-colonialism or anti-racialism at the global level, for example at the 
United Nations and on Apartheid South Africa.194 Very little attention, however, has been 
dedicated to examine this liberal legacy’s influence on relations with the neighbors: for 
example, did Indian officials equate liberal democracy with political stability and security, 
and if so, did they prescribe and promote it in the region?  
Finally, there are also strong indications that independent India’s relations with its 
neighbors were deeply influenced by the Raj’s culture of subcontinental interventionism, 
as defined in Charles Metcalfe’s seminal speech of 1843, examined in the previous 
section. As Secretary of the State Department after 1947, where he worked with V. S. 
Patel to persuade and coerce 554 different native or princely states to join the Indian 
Union, V. P. Menon thus recalled that his “most important consideration was the overall 
security of the [new] country” and that, therefore, the Government of India had the 
“right of entry into any State where internal stability was threatened.”195  
While promoting the principle of non-interference, in practice Nehru also violated it 
when deemed necessary, for example by coercing Nepal’s Rana autocracy into a 
democratic regime change, in 1950-51. Speaking to Ceylon’s Prime Minister S. 
                                                
193 A. P. Rana, The imperatives of nonalignment: a conceptual study of India's foreign policy strategy in the Nehru period 
(New Delhi: Macmillan, 1976), 196-7. 
194 See, for example, Manu B. Bhagavan, The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World (New Delhi: 
Harper Collins, 2012); Davis and Thakur, "Walking the Thin Line: India's Anti-Racist Diplomatic Practice 
in South Africa, Canada, and Australia, 1946–55; Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment 
and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46, no. 2 (2008). 
195 Menon, Integration, 68. 
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Bandaranaike, in 1960, he therefore suggested that while always necessary in principle, 
non-interference was not always practicable, given that India could not afford to simply 
ignore the “problems” of the world, and that of its neighbors, in particular: 
We are planning [to develop our own country] and we have no desire to get entangled in other 
countries’ problems. We have enough of our own and yet we cannot escape them. They [other 
countries’ problems] surround us and try to overwhelm us because the world becomes so restricted, 
in spite of these controversies, grows so much as one world that whether we have the virtues of one 
world or not, we have to suffer the disadvantages of it all the time because all the ills of other 
countries also pursue us apart from our own. So we face these world problems because we cannot 
escape them.196 
As this dissertation goes on to explore, such logic permeated Indian strategic thought on 
Nepal, Ceylon/Sri Lanka and other small neighbors as their country’s new “buffer 
states.”197 However, while in practice and in private Indian leaders and officials denoted a 
continued comfort with their hegemonic inheritance from the Raj in South Asia, such 
thought and practice often clashed with their exceptionalist and revisionist speeches in 
public.198 
 
                                                
196 Dec.1960, before parliament: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1960," (New Delhi 1961), 363. 
197 A former Indian MEA official defines this approach cogently: “India while pursuing a policy of 
accommodating her smaller neighbours, could hardly afford to give up the basic postulates of the policy 
pursued by the British in the past. There could be no running away from the fact that small states in the 
region fell in India’s security perimeter and therefore must not follow policies that would impinge on her 
security concerns in the area.” Avtar S. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka relations and Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict: documents, 
1947-2000 v.1 (New Delhi: Indian Research Press, 2001), xxi. 
198 A former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka reflects the consequent comfort with India’s 
inevitable hegemonic status: “Ceylon lives in the shadow of the Indian colossus separated only by the Palk 
Straits and it would seem as hard to convince the Singhalese hat India presents no potential threat to them 
as it would be to persuade South American governments that they should have no anxiety whatsoever 
about American intentions”. V. H. Coelho, Across the Palk Straits: India-Sri Lanka relations (Dehra Dun: Palit & 
Palit, 1976), 154. 
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Rhetorical revisionism and exceptionalism 
While Indian foreign and security policies in the region reflected continued practice, the 
post-colonial Indian leadership adopted an exceptionalist discourse of righteousness and 
idealism, imbuing their polity with the moral mission to revolutionize world politics. As 
C. R. Mohan notes on defence and strategic issues, India’s “post-colonial political class 
deliberately induced a collective national amnesia about the country’s rich pre-
independence military traditions.”199 Mohan observes that this is particularly striking in 
the neighborhood: 
…acknowledging that India might have had a foreign policy before Independence is quite painful 
for our political classes. It is even more difficult for them to accept that the founder of independent 
India’s foreign policy [J. Nehru] preserved many elements of the Raj legacy, especially in dealing 
with our neighbours. The first three treaties Jawaharlal Nehru signed after independence during 
1949-50 were slightly modified versions of the 19th-century agreements that Calcutta negotiated 
with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal.200 
Having shaped their identity under the mass anti-colonial freedom struggle against British 
imperialism, it would be unrealistic to expect Indian political leaders to acknowledge this 
continuity. Instead, they became the principal driver of a moral and revolutionary 
discourse on foreign and strategic affairs that characterized power, military capabilities, and 
war as a Western obsession and anathema to the righteous mission of new India.  
In this popular narrative, India and the rest of the colonized world had served as 
unwilling peons to Europe’s petty imperial conflicts. Anarchy and conflict in the 
international system, and the associated theses of realpolitik, power politics, balancing, 
                                                
199 C. Raja Mohan, "The Return of the Raj," American Interest 5, no. 5 (2010): 5. One of the most popular 
handbooks used in Indian departments thus hardly makes any reference to pre-1947 traditions: J. 
Bandyopadhyaya, The making of India's foreign policy: determinants, institutions, processes, and personalities, 3rd ed. 
(New Delhi: Allied, 2003 [1970]). 
200  C. Raja Mohan, “Heritage Clause,” The Indian Express, Aug. 24, 2009: 
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territorial expansion or security dilemmas, were accordingly a Western and imperial 
creation, which the post-colonial nations could mitigate and possibly also overcome. 
Conversely, India was also not keen to recognize its liberal democratic quality as a 
colonial inheritance. Any governmental attempt to “promote democracy” and associated 
liberal values in the neighboring countries thus often reflexively invited accusations of 
ideological imperialism and vested security interests.201  
The historiographical and disciplinary IR debate on the extent to which this worldview 
and Nehruvian rhetoric, in particular, determined or influenced India’s foreign and 
security policies will continue. However, as illustrated tentatively above, and across this 
dissertation, India’s neighborhood policy demonstrates that there was a significant gap 
between both – Indian officials thus often spoke and acted in glaring contradiction. Such 
a stark contrast between practice and rhetoric is also perfectly embodied in the Mahatma 
Gandhi, who developed the exceptionalist Indian discourse of pacifism despite being a 
shrewd practitioner of political realism.202  
By neglecting the past and being oblivious to the living legacy of the Raj’s strategic 
practice after 1947, Indian scholars often unwillingly assisted in the propagation of such 
discursive myths, further contributing to the gap between speech and practice. 203 
Independent India’s foreign policy would thus be defined as either a visionary and blank-
slate creation of J. Nehru, or as the idealist continuation of the Indian National Congress’ 
                                                
201 Chapter 5 discusses in detail how India’s survival and success gradually lead to a greater comfort, and 
identification with liberal democracy. 
202 See, for example, Karuna Mantena, "Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence," 
American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012). 
203 As noted by C. R. Mohan, “the proposition that all that preceded 1947 was ‘colonial’ and therefore 
negative and irrelevant has cut us off from the rich diplomatic experience before independence.” C. Raja 
Mohan, “Heritage Clause,” The Indian Express, Aug. 24, 2009: 
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principled resolutions during the freedom struggle.204 Nehru’s focus on the principle of 
“non-interference,” for example, which set the basis to the tripartite Panchsheel agreement 
with China and Burma, in 1954, has accordingly been described as reflecting his idealist 
naiveté and India’s negative experience with British colonialism.  
Such views ignore that, besides playing a strategic function to reduce the Sino-Indian 
security dilemma in overlapping spheres of influence such as Nepal, non-interference also 
served an important domestic role to shield the government from persistent demands of 
Indian public opinion to intervene in neighboring countries. Addressing the Indian 
Parliament, in 1960, Nehru thus warned parliamentarians that their idealist zeal, whether 
in support of Nepal’s democrats, Ceylon’s Tamils or India’s diaspora in Burma, was 
welcome in principle, but often impracticable or even counter-productive: 
 …it should be remembered that this great Parliament, which is sovereign in India, and whose 
writ runs to every corner of India, cannot send its writs beyond the corner of India and cannot 
send its writs where they cannot be accepted and will not be accepted. … Sometimes Hon[orable] 
Members speak here as if we have merely to pass a resolution here or deliver a speech there and the 
history of the world will change and the great forces at work in the world will somehow climb 
down because a speech has been made or a resolution passed. Let us be idealists: I hope we shall 
never cease to be idealists. But let us also be realists and let us realise what is the world.205 
 
                                                
204 For an argument that the Indian National Congress principles and resolutions “became the foundations 
of India’s [post-1947] foreign policy” and that this was “likely to lead to a tendency to conceive of India’s 
role in the world in terms of a preacher of moral principles and to rely more on the declaration of such 
principles than on the skillful practice of diplomacy and military preparedness for safeguarding vital 
national interests,” see Prasad, The origins of Indian foreign policy: the Indian National Congress and world affairs, 
1885-1947, 1, 267-7. Rahul Sagar thus argues that, while “historically at least, India’s elite [before 1947] 
did in fact think about strategic matters” their views were mostly “idealist.” Rahul Sagar, "Before Midnight: 
Views on International Relations, 1857-1947," in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, ed. David M. 
Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 65. For 
similar views, see Mahajan, "Establishing the MEA; Appadorai, The domestic roots of India's foreign policy, 1947-
1972, 27-37. 
205 March 16, 1960, before parliament: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1960," 82. 
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c) The exceptionalist trap: effects on scholarship and policy articulation  
Over the decades, the initial gap between India’s strategic practice and its exceptionalist 
discourse widened into a gulf, reflected in an extraordinary small and shallow scholarly 
literature on its neighborhood policy. Given lacking or lagging declassification, and other 
reasons discussed in the previous sections, almost seventy years after independence there 
is not a single published book on India’s foreign policy towards Nepal, Sri Lanka or 
Myanmar, that makes systematic use of declassified government sources. Former NSA S. 
S. Menon thus lamented, in 2013, that: 
there is very little of that quality which is empirically based on the historical record and which 
suggests the real policy dilemmas that we face … We are yet to find a paradigm to satisfactorily 
explain the paradox of India having more in common than most countries with her neighbours in 
terms of language, culture, economic complementarity, common history, and so on, but still having 
difficult or complex relations with each of them. Instead our studies concentrate on the day to day 
politics and compulsions that affect these relationships rather than their drivers or explanations of 
why they are as they are.206  
By relying mostly on theoretical conjectures, ideological views, or ossified narratives – and 
mixing a variety of secondary sources and sparse interviews – scholars have thus helped 
perpetuating various myths about India’s neighborhood policy, including the 
evolutionary account from Nehruvian idealism to greater realism after the 1970s.207 Two 
of these narratives have been particularly pernicious. 
 
                                                
206 Dec. 11, 2013: http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22632/. 
207 For example: “India’s regional policy under Nehru … was ill-conceived and ill-defined [and] purely 
reactive” Kapur, India's foreign policy, 93. 
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Bully India: reflexive realism and the Raj’s hegemonic heritage 
The idea of a Janus-faced India, hyperrealist in its own neighborhood but relatively “soft” 
and idealist beyond it, is one of the strongest entrenched narratives in Indian foreign 
policy scholarship.208 Foreign scholars and practitioners, in particular, thus often gleefully 
refer to New Delhi’s regional interventionism as alleged proof that India can shed its 
idealism to behave like a “normal power.”  
The problem, however, is that there is little or hardly any research on the specific 
mechanics of this regional realism, which is therefore dismissed as a reflexive impulse to 
control the neighborhood, and thus allegedly indicating a lack of strategic thought or 
culture.209 One of the most quoted sources on India’s regional security competition with 
China in South Asia, the American scholar John Garver, thus classified India as a 
“regional hegemonist,” which “presumes to block the natural and rightful expansion of 
China’s relations with its neighbours.”210 Critical narratives from the neighboring small 
states, which naturally accuse the Indian government of overreacting and bullying in 
times of crisis, have further contributed to the understanding that India’s involvement is 
driven by an obsessive quest to control the region.211  
Scholars thus widely quote a myriad of secondary sources to infer, for example, that 
“although it was never enunciated explicitly or officially, successive Indian governments 
                                                
208 For example, the view that Nehru’s “idealism became hard realism when it came to dealing with the 
neighbours,” Ashok K. Behuria et al., "Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?," Strategic Analysis 36, no. 
2 (2012): 234. 
209 This informs typical descriptions of India’s neighbourhood policy as “too often reactive and at times 
quite dismissive” Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?, 102. 
210 John W. Garver, Protracted contest: Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth century (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 31. 
211 For a Sri Lankan and Nepalese, respectively, see K. M. De Silva, Regional powers and small state security: 
India and Sri Lanka, 1977-1990 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1996); Surya P. Subedi, Dynamics of foreign policy and law: a 
study of Indo-Nepal relations (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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have systematically pursued an active policy of denial in South Asia similar to that 
applied to the Western Hemisphere by the United States in the nineteenth century.”212 
The most frequent comparison is between an alleged “Indira doctrine” and the American 
“Monroe doctrine” of the 19th century. No effort, however, is dedicated to explaining the 
strategic thought, causes and reasoning that drives this quest to limit extra-regional 
influence in South Asia.  
Instead, such realism is generally dismissed as an archaic expression of the India’s former 
hegemonic status under the colonial Raj, and as an indication that Indian officials are 
incapable to adjust to the new geopolitical context.213 M. Ayoob thus notes that India’s 
“quest for predominance” in South Asia derives “from the Indian elite’s perception that it 
inherited the Raj’s strategic and political legacy.”214 Similarly, political scientist Subrata 
Mitra concludes that as a “quintessential successor state, India is keen to retain the status 
quo which its leaders understand in terms of its relative power and territorial boundaries 
that it was privy to prior to the end of colonialism.”215   
While the argument for continuity from the Raj is strong and intuitive, as developed in the 
preceding sections of this chapter, it should not be instrumentalized as a basket-case 
explanation for every Indian behavior in the region, nor as proof of absence of strategic 
thought. This dissertation will seek to expose the causal reasoning that drives India’s 
                                                
212 Devin T. Hagerty, "India's regional security doctrine," Asian Survey 31, no. 4 (1991): 363. For example, 
on an alleged “Indira Doctrine,” such work often cites a foreign policy analyst in the aftermath of the 1983 
Sri Lanka riots: Bhabani Sen Gupta, “The Indian Doctrine,” India Today, Aug. 31, 1983, pp. 20-21.  
213 Two former American foreign service officers thus observe that “it is no wonder that generations of 
diplomats of other South Asian countries have complained in private to outsiders that their Indian 
counterparts act as if they were the inheritors of the British raj.” Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. 
Schaffer, "Better Neighbors?: India and South Asian Regional Politics," SAIS Review 18, no. 1 (1998): 113. 
214 M. Ayoob, "India in South Asia: The quest for regional predominance," World Policy Journal 7, no. 1 
(1989): 109. 
215 Subrata K. Mitra, "The reluctant hegemon: India's self-perception and the South Asian strategic 
environment," Contemporary South Asia 12, no. 3 (2003): 400. 
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neighborhood policy and, in particular, its attempts to limit the involvement of extra-
regional powers. 
 
Benign India: revisionist and righteous 
The second and converse myth about India’s neighborhood strategy portrays it as 
benevolent and righteous, in line with its overall exceptionalist narratives. Whenever 
proof emerges of Indian involvement, for example in Nepal, such practice is readily 
denied as unconceivable, or dismissed as an anomaly driven by a stray “deep state” 
agenda of an individual, an intelligence agency, or its conservative establishment. This 
reflects the discomfort of the public sphere, and accordingly sometimes also of India’s 
own officials, to admit that the government has occasionally, when deemed necessary, 
employed coercion and force against its neighbors, and that these tools can be as as 
legitimate and effective as diplomacy in the instrumental repertoire of a regional power.  
Reflecting such discomfort while looking back, diplomat Jagat Mehta thus classified 
“India’s relations with its neighbours [as] its greatest failure,” because “we should have 
stuck to our principles of non-interventionism.”216 Similarly, in 1985, just two years 
before sending the Army into Sri Lanka, and three years before imposing a trade 
blockade on landlocked Nepal, PM Rajiv Gandhi declared India’s principled 
commitment to non-interference and further stimulated such exceptionalist narratives: 
                                                
216 Mehta sustains his criticism with reference to his success in negotiating a variety of bilateral agreements 
on hydropower with Nepal, in the 1970s, noting that “humiliated nations do not make pliable partners in 
progress,” Jagat S. Mehta, The tryst betrayed: reflections on diplomacy and development (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 
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India wants to live in a peaceful neighbourhood. We cannot develop and progress if there is 
tension around us. We believe in total equality, brotherhood, mutual cooperation. We do not want 
an Indian hegemony on the countries around us. Even the smallest countries - Bhutan, and 
Maldives - must have their own independent personalities, character, government, their own 
independent methods of development and progress.217 
The pervasive influence of such righteous narratives on India’s strategic discourse, and 
perhaps also practice, is aptly diagnosed by scholar S. D. Muni’s observation that in 
“dealing with big-small [state] relationships we, most of the time, seem to be conditioned 
by a moral, ethical assumption that the big is bad and the small is innocent.”218 K. 
Subrahmanyam, thus beckoned Indians to abandon romantic ideas about their country’s 
alleged sovereign equality with its neighbors, and scholars, in particular, to face the 
fundamental reality of power differentials and clashing security interests: 
There is nothing abnormal or unusual in this [hegemonic] situation and there is no justification 
for the sense of guilt some in India exhibit about our relationship with our neighbours. No big 
country … is loved by its neighbours though it may be feared, very often disliked and sometimes 
even respected. … [Tensions are normal because of a] fundamental factor of basic conflict of 
security interests between India and her neighbours. Nothing is to be gained by glossing over this 
and talking of community of interests and identity of views.219 
Not surprisingly, only very few scholars have thus been able to break through 
exceptionalist narratives in public discourse and forward a candid, pragmatic and realist 
analysis of democratic India’s regional strategy, especially with reference to Nepal and Sri 
Lanka.220 Transcending the “bully” and “benign” India narratives, which she respectively 
qualifies as “hegemonic” and “defensive,” scholar Maya Chadda, for example, has shown 
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219 Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," 245-6. 
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how the Indian state’s regional strategy is driven by a policy of “relational control” over 
its neighbors, whose internal stability is seen as critical to Indian domestic security and 
nation-building strategy.221 
 
d) Realigning strategic thought, speech and practice in the region 
In 1998, J. N. Dixit, one of India’s most experienced diplomats in the region and its first 
National Security Adviser, recalled that throughout his career he and his colleagues had 
often faced the “difficult task of reconciling the moral vision on the basis we wish the 
international order to be structured with the non-moral requirements of ‘realpolitik’ to 
which we have had to adjust, time and again.”222  
More than just difficult, such a task of reconciling morality with reality has proven to be 
sisyphean, and maybe also chimerical because it is based on a false binary between values 
and interests. Instead, Dixit’s candid admission that Indian foreign policy persistently 
conformed to the “non-moral requirements of realpolitik” represents a rare realist voice 
in the idealist wilderness of India’s discourse about power politics.  
India’s relations with its neighbors are a particularly promising issue area to evaluate the 
divergence between practice and discourse, as this dissertation proposes to, since it is 
where the country’s core security interest – territorial integrity – is often affected by 
neighboring instability. Domestic security often requires a range of coercive instruments 
to be applied beyond borders, which will necessarily violate the principle of non-
interference. Eric Gonsalves, one of India’s senior-most retired diplomats, who began his 
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career in 1949, thus notes that “we have to redefine our attitude towards intervention in 
our neighbourhood [and] should not rule it out,” because “if one aspires to be even a 
regional power, one must consider all possible scenarios and make contingency plans.”223  
However rare and however different from that the United States, European or other 
great powers, Indian regional involvement and interventionism has a history of its own, 
which will require a deeper and less dispassionate study for improved performance in the 
future. The following empirical chapters on Indian relations with Nepal, Ceylon/Sri 
Lanka and Burma/Myanmar seek to contribute to this objective. 
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PART I – STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS DETERMINING CRISIS RESPONSE 
 
- Charlie Rose (PBS): “India being the largest functioning democracy, how it is that it can have 
as its close neighbor [Myanmar] a system which is totally different from democracy?”  
- Pranabh Mukherjee (India’s Minister of External Affairs): “But what can I do? India [as] a 
democracy, parliamentary democracy, flourished, despite poverty, despite backwardness, despite 
illiteracy, despite slow growth rate[s]. [But] we cannot change our neighbors. We have to live 
with them. It’s better to live in peace. I cannot alter the [system of] government in my 
neighborhood.”224 
 
How has India “lived with” its non-democratic neighbors? The Indian minister’s response 
to journalist Charlie Rose, just as the military rulers in Myanmar cracked down on pro-
democracy protestors in 2007, suggests both pragmatism and passivity, as if India was 
condemned to perpetually coexist with all neighboring states, whether military, 
monarchic or ethno-nationalist autocracies. In practice, however, India has adopted 
different postures towards neighboring governments, from engagement to coercion, and 
at times even undermined them or supported regime change.  
Beyond the principled myth of “non-interference” as one of India’s alleged foreign policy 
axiom, this historical record indicates a far more activist role than the helplessness implied 
by minister P. Mukherjee before American cameras. The first part of this dissertation 
therefore seeks to understand what factors drive New Delhi’s neighborhood activism: it 
does so by examining what strategic assessments drove India’s posture during regime 
crises in three neighboring states – Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar – across three time 
periods, from the 1950s to the 2000s.  
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The introduction of this dissertation reviewed around three dozen regime crises in South 
Asia and found a puzzling variation in India’s posture, both in terms of degree of 
involvement (from inaction to intervention), and also in terms of direction of involvement 
(from engaging authoritarian regimes to coercing democratic governments). Clearly, 
regime type never determined India’s posture: in the early 1960s, J. Nehru invoked non-
interference to engage an absolutist monarchy in Nepal and a military regime in Burma, 
while in the 1980s PM R. Gandhi used coercion and military force to intervene in 
formally democratic Sri Lanka.  
However, conventional explanations, as reviewed in the preceding Chapter 1, insist in 
attributing India’s foreign policy to grand motives such as “idealism” or “realism.” In the 
neighborhood, in particular, India’s crises postures and involvement are simplistically 
described as a reflexive pursuit of security interests as a regional power, popularly also 
known as “hegemonic bullying”. Such explanations attribute Indian behavior either to a 
deeply rooted imperial culture, or to a compulsive obsession to destabilize its neighbors. 
The nine case studies in this part (chapters 2, 3 and 4) serve to unpack these grand claims. 
Beyond “values,” “interests” or “security,” what specific assessments drive India’s posture 
during each crisis? A variety of possible factors emerge: 1) the neighboring regime’s 
relative strength, attitude towards India, and eventual alternatives; 2) the relative intensity 
of each crisis, and possible impact of disorder and instability on India’s domestic security; 
3) New Delhi’s varying leverage and capacity to influence the crisis outcome; 4) the 
regional security environment and presence of extra-regional or rival powers; 5) the 
experience and outcome of preceding Indian involvement; 6) the degree of consensus 
among different organizations within the government; 7) the influence of Indian domestic 
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politics and pressure groups on decision-making; or 8) the effect of other countries’ 
postures, international pressure and norms. 
Each case study reconstructs the Indian decision-making process, examining the relative 
influence of these and other factors. While describing such assessments, it is important to 
underline that I am not interested in justifying India’s posture, or in legitimizing its success in 
hindsight. Instead, the objective is to identify basic lines of strategic thought that drive 
Indian practice. By tracing these assessments across three time periods, from the 1950s to 
the 2000s, Part 1 seeks to identify both patterns of continuity and change in India’s 
strategic culture of crisis response and involvement.  
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CHAPTER 2 – PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT DESPITE LIBERAL SETBACKS 
(1956-1962) 
 
We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and 
freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for 
the good of the country it governs and no government dares do anything, which in the short or long 
run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.225  
J. Nehru to India’s Constituent Assembly (1947)  
 
This chapter deals with the first three crises in Nepal, Ceylon and Burma, during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, under Prime Minister J. Nehru. In each case, neighboring regime 
underwent a liberal reversal: in Nepal, the royal coup of 1960 ended parliamentary 
democracy and returned the kingdom to autocratic royal rule; in Ceylon, the elections of 
1956 steered the regime towards Sinhala ethno-nationalism, sowing the seeds for conflict 
and future war; and in Burma, the military coup of 1962 ended 14 years of multi-party 
democracy and put the fate of Rangoon in the hands of a few generals. 
In all three cases, Nehru’s India had been a firm advocate and supporter of political 
liberalization. In Nepal, it interfered in 1950-51 to end autocratic rule and thereafter 
committed vast resources to support democratization. In Ceylon, while engaging in 
complex bilateral negotiations on the fate of a million stateless people of Indian origin, it 
underlined that the country’s future stability depended on an inclusive constitutional 
model that recognized the demands of the Tamil minority. In Burma, it had provided 
military assistance for the newly independent, federal and democratic government to fend 
                                                
225 Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and after: a collection of speeches (New York: John Day, 1950), 204-5. 
	   110	  
off a Communist rebellion, in 1948, and then supported the democratic regime of Prime 
Minister U Nu. 
Despite such extraordinary support and strong commitment favoring political 
liberalization among its neighbors, Prime Minister J. Nehru pursued a policy of 
pragmatic engagement of these illiberal regimes. What assessments lead to this 
cooperative posture? Why did India compromise on its alleged “idealism”? Why did it 
refrain from using its leverage to adopt a coercive posture, seeking to save the democratic 
experiments in Nepal and Burma, or mitigate the illiberal tilt in Ceylon? 
 
1. Nepal 1960 
We must not let the Nepalese rulers take us for granted, in their attempt to appease other powers. 
A friendly, but firm approach is necessary, so that our national and security interests do not 
suffer.226 
 T. N. Kaul, former Indian diplomat  
The royal coup of December 1960 ended Nepal’s first democratic experiment, which had 
begun in 1951 and culminated in 1959 with a new constitution, parliamentary elections 
and a government formed by the Nepali Congress. India had been deeply involved in the 
country’s political liberalization throughout the decade, so Nehru lamented this reversal 
in public. But despite domestic pressure and capacity to do so, he refrained from formally 
condemning or attempting to dislodge the new absolutist regime. Instead, and despite 
tensions, India pursued an overall policy of engagement, based on two prior assessments: 
1) the degenerating security environment along the Himalayas, with an increasingly 
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assertive China making hostile inroads into Nepal; and 2) the rising costs of a weakening 
and divided democratic regime in Kathmandu, under increasing pressure from the King. 
* 
On the cold Kathmandu morning of December 15, 1960, a contingent of the Royal 
Nepal Army arrested the kingdom’s first democratically elected Prime Minister, B. P. 
Koirala, just as the head of state, King Mahendra, made a radio proclamation to explain 
that he had been forced to take over power in order to guide the country to “true 
democracy.” By dissolving the parliament, he promised to save national interests from 
being overridden by what he identified as “corrupt personal and party interests” which, 
he alleged, had “disrupted administration,” proven unable to “preserve law and order,” 
and pursued “mismatched economic theories”.227 He re-instituted direct royal rule and 
thus put an end to nine years of democratic reforms. 
How did India react to this sudden regime change? Two opposing theories persist until 
today, none of which entirely accurate: one posits that a cynic Nehru was given prior 
notification and consented to the coup, ditching the democrats to support the King’s 
absolutist rule.228 The other one speculates that an idealist Nehru was caught by surprise 
and thereafter worked to undermine the King’s regime by assisting the Nepali Congress’ 
armed struggle to reinstitute democracy.229 
                                                
227 Proclamations of December 15 and 26: Bir B. S. D. Mahendra, Pages of history: A collection of proclamations, 
messages and addresses, Series 1 (Kathmandu: Ministry of National Guidance, 1963), 1-7. 
228 Based on conversations with M. P. Koirala and Rishikesh Shaha, Nepalese scholar G. R. Sharma 
suggests that “Nehru not only had prior knowledge but had also consented to the change [1960 coup].” in 
Matrika P. Koirala, A role in a revolution (Lalitpur: Jagadamba Prakashan/Himal, 2008), xii. 
229 This was a frequent accusation of the Nepalese government, and also of the opposition in Indian 
parliament. According to the Nepalese home minister, the NC’s armed rebellion after 1961 lead to around 
300 incidents and almost 300 casualties [NAI HI/1012(27)/63 p.2]. Foreign Secretary S. Dutt recalls that 
despite “one or two persons holding high official positions” suggesting such support, Nehru was “strongly 
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The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Nehru was certainly not surprised by the coup, 
India having been well aware of Mahendra’s deep discontent with democracy, at least 
since 1958.230 But Nehru may not have expected, nor preferred, such an absolute take-
over, which placed many of his old friends under humiliating detention. India’s Foreign 
Secretary at the time, S. Dutt, thus notes that the Prime Minister was “angry beyond 
measure” and saw Nepal’s “complete reversal of democracy” as one of his “greatest 
disappointments.”231 
Nehru had good reasons to be disappointed: India had been deeply involved in Nepal’s 
liberal experiment since 1951, when it coerced the ruling Rana aristocracy out of power 
and mediated an agreement between the King and the democrats.232 This was followed 
by a massive effort to modernize of one of the world’s most isolated countries, previously 
closed to all foreign contact.  
From delivering aid and fostering trade and investment, to rendering expert support to 
help Nepal create a modern state bureaucracy, upgrade its military, design a new 
constitution, and hold free elections, India had taken the lead to initiate and support one 
of Asia’s boldest experiments in political liberalization. By the late 1950s, the landlocked 
                                                                                                                                            
opposed” and “issued instructions against Indian territory being used for subversive activities against 
Nepal.” Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva Associates 1977), 265. A 1962 
inquiry concludes that “the cause of these incidents is internal” and that “our border authorities are taking 
all possible precautions to prevent the transit of armed rebels” [Letter of 7/3/1962, NAI HI/1012(27)/63 
p. 257-9]. However, for an indication that New Delhi may have used the rebels as leverage see Shriman 
Narayan, India and Nepal: an exercise in open diplomacy (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970), 94-5. 
230 Speaking to parliament on Dec. 16, 1960, Nehru says he was aware of the King’s discontent but that he 
had had “no intimation.” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 409. PM B. P. Koirala recalls King Mahendra was 
planning a coup since before the 1959 election. D. P. Tripathi, ed. Nepal in transition: a way forward (New 
Delhi: Vij 2011), 58. In a speech on Jan. 28, 1960, the King had exhorted Nepalis to work together, “so 
that I may not be compelled to take some other measures.” Quoted by Sam Cowan in “The Maharaja and 
the monarch,” Record Nepal, April 21, 2015, at http://recordnepal.com/wire/maharaja-and-monarch-0 
231 Dutt, With Nehru, 261, 64. 
232 On India’s role in the 1950-51 transition, see Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 103-75  
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kingdom’s economy relied almost exclusively on India, whose assistance projects also lead 
to a new road connection Southwards and key hydroelectric projects. 233  Most 
importantly, India contributed massively to modernizing Nepal’s feudal state 
administration, having trained close to one thousand Nepalese officials by 1960, and 
deputing dozens of its own high-ranking officials to Kathmandu.234 
Such levels of assistance often led New Delhi to become entangled, ending up 
micromanaging its neighbor’s politics and governance, in blatant violation of Nehru’s 
promise, in 1950, that “we do not interfere internally in a foreign government” because 
“it is up to the Nepalese to run their affairs.”235 Despite such principled promises, Nepal 
quickly transformed into J. Nehru’s greatest state-building project abroad, a major effort 
that, just after taking its first baby steps with the elections of 1959, suddenly collapsed 
under the weight of an absolutist royal hand.  
Liberal India’s grief and concern at such loss led to tensions with Kathmandu, which are 
examined in Part II of the dissertation. More remarkable, however, is that despite its 
preference and massive investment in the democratic regime ousted in December 1960, 
New Delhi adapted swiftly to the new circumstances, pursuing a policy of engagement 
towards King Mahendra. 
                                                
233 Between 1956 and 1963, Nepal’s total external trade with India ranged between 93 and 99% and a new 
Treaty of Trade and Transit entered into force in 1960. S. D. Muni, Foreign policy of Nepal: National 
Publishing House, 1973), 221. In 1956, Nehru estimated Indian investments in Nepal to be six times higher 
than in Burma: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1956," (New Delhi 1957), 74. Key project included the 
Tribhuvan Road built by the Indian Army, and hydro-electric projects at Kosi, Trisuli and Gandak: Muni, 
Foreign policy of Nepal, 179-216. See also Eugene B. Mihaly, Foreign aid and politics in Nepal: a case study (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965).  
234 By 1960, India had allotted 964 out of its total 1442 training slots under the Colombo Plan to Nepalese 
officials: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1961," (New Delhi 1962), 2. In 1960, of 230 foreign experts in 
Nepal, the largest contingent was from India (78, followed by 75 Americans) [NAI 6(27)-R&I/60 p. 48]. By 
the end of the 1950s, the Embassy in Kathmandu was the third largest Indian diplomatic mission abroad, 
after Washington and London. 
235 May 22: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 88.  
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Such Indian pragmatism was immediately apparent after the coup, throughout 1961, in 
three different ways.236 First, while not refraining from expressing his “regret” at the 
democratic “setback,” Nehru persistently fended off fierce domestic pressures and 
demands, including from his own party, to formally condemn or take punitive actions 
against the royal regime.237 Second, he made a clear assessment that King Mahendra was 
firmly in the saddle and that therefore, rather than trying to resuscitate the democratic 
project of the 1950s, India should now concentrate energies to adapt to the reality of 
changed circumstances.238 Third, Nehru insisted in keeping all political and diplomatic 
channels open with Kathmandu, continuing existing aid projects and thus preserve some 
degree of normalcy in the bilateral relationship.239   
Why did Nehru pursue this engagement, shedding the load of ten years of investment in 
Nepal’s liberalization, and despite domestic opposition and sufficient capacity to at least 
attempt to coerce King Mahendra into reinstating democracy? However conflicted, two 
developments forced India, in 1960, to ditch democracy and court the King: 1) a changed 
external security environment, with an increasingly hostile China to the North; and 2) a 
                                                
236 American scholar L. Rose argues that India’s position “cannot properly be categorized as hard-line anti-
royal regime”: Rose, Strategy for survival, 234. 
237 Dec. 16, in parliament: “it is not for me to criticize the actions there.” On Jan. 6, 1961 at annual session 
of his party (INC), he opposes a resolution by R. Jha (of Bihar) that condemned the coup and urged King 
Mahendra to reinstitute democracy: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 409, 13. On Feb. 23, Nehru again before 
parliament: “Hon. Members sometimes imagine that we should issue directives to other Governments, tell 
them what to do and what not to do. That is a kind of thing which obviously we neither want to do nor can 
do but which irritates the other [Nepalese] Government very much.” MEA, "FAR 1961," 34. 
238 Dec. 20, in parliament: Unlike past “intervals,” he notes, “this is a complete reversal of democracy … 
and it is not clear to me that there can be a going back to the democratic process in the foreseeable future.” 
Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 412. 
239 Jan. 8, 1961: Nehru directs his Foreign Secretary to continue existing aid projects in Nepal. April: new 
trade agreement signed. Besides signing seven further aid agreements, in 1961 India provided 16 advisers, 
182 technical personnel, 23 professors, and 330 scholarships (of a total 360): MEA, "Annual Report 1961-
62," (New Delhi 1962), 23-4. On Aug. 16, 1961, Nehru: “We have continued this help, and we have made 
no difference to it even though some changes took place in Nepal, as the House well knows, which were not 
very much to our liking.” MEA, "FAR 1961," 223.  
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new internal balance of forces in Nepal, with an activist King undermining any credible 
democratic alternative that could deliver on India’s external security concerns. 
 
China, the rising threat from the North 
… as much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by 
anything going wrong in Nepal which either permits that barrier [Himalayas] to be crossed or 
otherwise weakens our frontier.240 
PM J. Nehru, 1950 
Even while seeking to engage China diplomatically in the mid-1950s on Nepal, Nehru 
underlined that his support for democratization and modernization of the kingdom was, 
in the long term, a project to secure India from a Northern offensive.  
Relations with China had taken a negative turn in the late 1950s, and Indian threat 
assessments increased dramatically the Sino-Indian border dispute flared up, in 1959. 
Furthermore, China had been pursuing an increasingly independent course on Nepal – 
ignoring Nehru’s outreach that had invited it to work with, and not against India. With 
the possibility of a military escalation and war with China on the horizon, New Delhi was 
in no condition to alienate the King or engaging in a risky regime change operation – any 
of which would have only pushed the monarch further into Chinese hands or engulfed 
the Kingdom into a spiral of destabilization and conflict that would harm India the most. 
Nehru’s outreach to China on Nepal in the mid-1950s has often been construed as an 
appeasement policy that naively played into Chinese hands, neglecting security 
considerations. His focus on diplomacy was, however, premised on the rather pragmatic 
                                                
240 Dec. 6, 1950, quoted in Sam Cowan, “The Indian checkposts, Lipu Lekh, and Kalapani,” Record 
Nepal, Dec. 14, 2015, at http://recordnepal.com/wire/indian-checkposts-lipu-lekh-and-kalapani  
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assessment that a) that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had historical and 
legitimate security interests in Nepal, which were expected to increase after the 
annexation of Tibet; b) given geographic and cultural linkages, Indian security stakes in 
Nepal were far superior to those of the PRC; and that therefore c) in an attempt to avoid 
conflict as the dominant power in Nepal, India needed to take the initiative to mediate 
and moderate Chinese interests in the kingdom. Thus, when, in 1954, the PRC first 
expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Nepal, Nehru assumed a 
tutelary and mediating role in order to get implicit Chinese support for India’s primacy 
over Nepal.241 The establishment of Sino-Nepalese diplomatic relations, in 1955, was 
therefore executed not despite, but because of Indian interests.242 
But even before this outreach policy began, around 1954, India’s approach had always 
been anchored in the assessment that its security depended on Nepal.243 Deposed Prime 
Minister B. P. Koirala, thus recalls Nehru warning him, in the early 1950s:  
The Chinese have always been imperialistic. They consider themselves to be the centre of the 
world, and now that the Communist regime, which has an aggressive ideology, is aligned with the 
basic imperialistic instinct of China, [it] desires to create trouble. The Chinese basically think the 
others are barbarians and they alone are fit to rule, and on top of that there is the existing 
Communist ideology.244  
Beyond mere words, such a threat assessment also guided Indian policies to strengthen 
Nepal as a first defensive bulwark against Chinese incursion, especially by modernizing 
                                                
241 See e.g. Nehru’s discussion on Nepal with Zhou Enlai, Oct. 20, 1954: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 358-61, 70  
242 Formal relations established on August 1, 1955. J. Nehru’s support, confirmed in a letter to King 
Mahendra three months earlier, referred to certain conditions: China was to be represented in Nepal via a 
non-resident ambassador in India, and “whatever discussions take place between your Government and the 
Chinese Government, it will be desirable to have them in New Delhi.” Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of 
Jawaharlal Nehru Vol. 27, Second Series (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2000), 20-31. 
243 See his June 21, 1952 letter to B. P. Koirala: “It is not my concern what kind of Government the 
Nepalese people would like to have themselves. But if something happens in Nepal which endangers our 
own security, then of course this is a matter of great consequence to us.” Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of 
Jawaharlal Nehru Vol. 28, Second Series (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 269. 
244 Quoted in Tripathi, Nepal in transition, 51. 
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the Nepalese Army, developing road infrastructure, and an extensive Indian military-
intelligence network set up in 1952 along the Sino-Nepalese border.245  
After 1957, as China began its direct inroads into Nepal without India’s tutelary role, and 
actively courted both the King and the democratic parties, the India-China diplomatic 
channel gave way to a competitive security dynamic.246 The Indian threat assessment 
kept increasing: Nehru’s talks with Zhou Enlai failed, the dispute along the Sino-Indian 
border escalated, Beijing formally annexed Tibet in early 1959 and, in June of 1960, the 
PLA launched a military raid into Nepal’s strategic Mustang valley, just after signing the 
Sino-Nepalese Boundary agreement. 247  Thereafter, the new China threat would 
dominate all Indian views on Nepal, including its response to the coup in 1960.248 
The centrality of this Chinese threat assessment is confirmed by changing relations with 
the United States.249 Nehru’s initial skepticism about an American presence in Nepal was 
shaped by a deeply held strategic concern to insulate the Kingdom from the increasingly 
                                                
245 The 1951 report by Maj. Gen. Thorat, order by the Intelligence Bureau and Home Minister, concluded 
that the “defence of India was not possible without the defence of Nepal”. Mullik, My years, 104-42. In 
1951-52, this leads to the deployment of an Indian Military Mission to Nepal, including 18 check posts 
along the Sino-Nepalese border, each with 20-40 Indian military and intelligence personnel. In 1958, the 
mission is downsized and reconstituted as the Indian Military Training and Advisory Group, with 11 
Indian officers led by a Maj.-Gen. NAI 6(27)-R&I/58 p. 2 of May report, see also Sam Cowan, “Indian 
checkposts” op. cit. 
246 For example, Nepalese PM B. P. Koirala recalls Mao’s advice during his 1960 visit to Beijing: “[we] 
came to realize that going by the advice of others [Russia] provided more benefits to them than for us … 
You, too, should do what is good for you, rather than follow someone else’s [India] instructions.” B. P. 
Koirala, Atmabrittanta: late life recollections: Himal, 2001), 227. 
247 This prompted e.g. Sept. 1960 concern by Embassy counsellor P. R. S. Mani about “unpreparedness of 
the Nepalese authorities and their lagging efforts to assert their jurisdiction as well as to bring about 
development according to their patterns in the border areas.” NAI, MEA 6(27)-R&I/60 p. 66. On the 
April, 1960 visit of Zhou Enlai and Marshal Chen Yi, Ambassador H. Dayal: “[it] marks the entry of the 
Chinese directly into Nepalese affairs. This development, which is inevitable with the deterioration in our 
relations with China, could have grave consequences for us as well as for Nepal.” NAI 6(27)-R&I/60 p. 32, 
see also Ambassador B. Sahay’s report for March (p. 4) and May (p. 6). 
248 The director of the Intelligence Bureau, recalls that “every attempt was made to convince Nepal that she 
need no longer depend on India for her development and defence … [but] China was making a deep dent 
in an area of undoubted [Indian] influence.” Mullik, My years, 269-70. 
249 For a detailed discussion, see Madan, "Eye to the East," 217-9. 
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competitive and interventionist triangular Cold War rivalry between the United States, 
the USSR and the PRC.250 These concerns were particularly targeted at Washington 
because it was the farthest removed from South Asia, and thus seen as having the highest 
trouble-making potential in Nepal, given the absence of any direct stakes.251 But Nehru’s 
policy was one of “equal denial” to any external involvement and this is underlined by his 
equivalent apprehension about the Soviet Union’s presence in Nepal. 252 
However, while Indian apprehensions of an escalating conflict were seemingly confirmed 
by the CIA’s outreach to the Tibetan resistance, culminating with a first airdrop of 
weapons in 1957, they were supplanted by more rising concerns about China. The 
United States would therefore be rewarded for their policy of deference to India while 
Nehru exhausted his diplomatic capital with Beijing.253 More importantly, Washington 
understood the strategic concern behind India’s policy of denial: a 1957, NSC briefing 
                                                
250 Nehru on American aid, in a letter to his ambassador on Feb. 26, 1949: “India cannot possibly permit 
the growth of strong vested interests in Nepal controlled by foreign authority.” Similarly, in 1952, Nehru 
opposes an American Library in Kathmandu on the grounds that “it is rather naïve to think this can come 
without any conditions or strings being attached to it.” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 65, 233-4. 
251 In 1954, Nehru to his ambassador: “[while] there is no present or near danger to Nepal from the so-
called [Chinese and Nepalese] Communists, a far greater danger is from the Americans.” A few months 
later: “American agents are particularly active creating anti-India propaganda.” In October, to Zhou Enlai: 
“[In Nepal,] America is creating a lot of trouble.” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 233-4, 329, 47.  
252 When Nepal unexpectedly announces full relations with the USSR, in 1956, India’s Foreign Secretary 
opposes on the grounds that this “would give rise to widespread misunderstanding about Soviet intentions” 
and Nehru persuades Moscow to postpone the embassy opening. Nehru, SWJN SS v27, 30. Nepal’s PM T. 
P. Acharya recalls: “the Indians were very angry with me. I didn’t tell the Indian Ambassador I was going 
to do that.” in James F. Fisher, Living martyrs: individuals and revolution in Nepal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 173. 
253 In 1954, the U.S. Ambassador George Allen thus seeks to reassure Sir Narayana Pillay that  “we had no 
desire to disrupt Indian-Nepalese relations and throw Nepal into hands of Communist China,” in 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d807. See also NSC brief: 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d623. 
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thus notes that “the United States should regulate its activity in Nepal so as not to 
encourage the Chinese Communists to expand their operations there”.254 
As China accelerated its independent outreach to Nepal, American and Indian views thus 
started to converge, leading to a slow, but gradual alignment of interests and punctual 
cooperation, beginning with Nehru’s 1956 visit to the United States.255 This mutual 
respect went to such an extent that it even defeated shrewd Nepalese attempts to play off 
Washington against New Delhi, which had often succeeded in the past.256 
After finally opening its new embassy in Kathmandu, in August 1959, with Indian 
concurrence, the United States hosted King Mahendra for an official visits in April 1960, 
and while the royal take-over later that year came as an unpleasant surprise, Washington 
shared India’s preference for a pragmatic engagement of the new regime.257   
 
                                                
254 NSC 1957 brief notes that the United States “refrained from establishing a resident diplomatic mission 
in Nepal because such action would doubtless lead the Communist Chinese, and perhaps also the Soviet 
Union, to open a similar mission” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d168. 
The Chinese seemed to share this view, as early as Oct. 1954: “to prevent the US from citing a precedent, 
he [Zhou Enlai] will consider Prime Minister Nehru’s suggestion [of not opening an embassy], but if the US 
sends a dedicated ambassador, we will do the same.” 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121742. 
255 See Dec. 1956 U.S. Embassy cable, briefing Washington for Nehru’s visit: “India is aware of Chinese 
danger along her northern border and Chinese threat of subverting Nepal and Burma. We believe Nehru 
highly conscious and worried on these scores” in http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-
57v08/d160. On joint aid projects after 1956, and a tripartite Nepal-US-India agreements in 1959, see 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d3. 
256 E.g. Oct. 1958, on Nepal’s Foreign Secretary request for aid: “Nepal itself could and should undertake 
‘clear’ with GOI Nepalese approach to US for specific project assistance. Indeed Thapa had already done 
this personally with Nehru. Latter, after explaining GOI in no position help RNA, even encouraged Thapa 
turn to USG for help” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d274. See also 
November meeting with J. F. Dulles: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d275.  
257 Immediate U.S. reaction: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d290 A Jan. 
1962 brief thus recommends that given new Chinese attempts to “detach Nepal from India’s sphere of 
influence”, the US would “continue to favor efforts to bring about an accommodation between the King 
and the Nepali Congress.” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d88  
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Royal revival: Nepal’s democracy turns into a liability 
“From the beginning, Nepal has been a headache to us.”258 
J. Nehru to Zhou Enlai (1954) 
A second reason for Nehru’s policy of engagement related to the changes in Nepal’s 
domestic political balance, with the weakening of India’s traditional allies in the Nepali 
Congress party and the rise of a more interventionist monarch. The coup only formalized 
this shift and, in the absence of any credible alternative, India’s assessment was that any 
attempt to take on the King would only push him further into Chinese hands or fuel 
domestic conflict with grave security implications for India. 
The principal factor was the emergence, in 1955, of King Mahendra who, short of openly 
sabotaging Nepal’s democratic reforms, quickly confirmed Indian apprehensions that he 
would be far less pliable and liberal than his father Tribhuvan.259 Divergences soon 
surfaced, with Mahendra repeatedly blocking democratic reforms. 260  Even more 
detrimental to Indian interests was the King’s active involvement in politics to increase his 
own power by using the nationalist pro-China and anti-India cards to play off different 
parties against each other. This did not surprise New Delhi, which was well aware of the 
long, and successful Nepalese strategic tradition to enhance its autonomy by balancing off 
its neighbors.261 However, for the first time in its history, Kathmandu was being ruled by 
                                                
258 October 20, 1954: Nehru, SWJN SS v27, 29.  
259 See Nehru’s announcement of Tribhuvan’s death in parliament on March 14, 1955: MEA, "Foreign 
Affairs Record 1955," (New Delhi 1956), 62. On the new king’s personality as a “complete contrast” with 
his father’s, based on “shrewdness,” see Dutt, With Nehru, 263.  
260 In 1955, for example, Nehru disagreed with King Mahendra’s suggestion of a limited franchise for 
parliamentary elections: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 375-76. The monarch also rejected proposals for a 
Constituent Assembly, and according to Amb. H. Dayal, was lobbying for a “draft which would strengthen 
the rights of monarchy a against the people and popular institutions.” NAI, MEA 6(27)-R&I/58 p. 1. 
261 Diplomat J. Mehta, who dealt with Nepal at the time, recalls: “we should not have been surprised when 
we were flattered by imitation and Nepal got tempted to adopt a sub-continental variant of non-alignment 
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more than one man – and the competitive logic of democratic politics, instigated by the 
King’s hidden hand, soon proved to be fatal for what India had hoped to be the ideal 
reward for its long investment in Nepal’s democratization: a pliable, but strong and stable 
and democratic government, friendlier towards India than to China.  
Nepalese leaders and diplomats had been well aware, and directly cautioned by New 
Delhi, since at least the mid-1950s, that Kathmandu was not to deal northwards without 
first consulting southwards.262 But in an ironic twist, the strongest pro-China tilt was 
implemented by the Nepali Congress government, elected in the Spring of 1959, a party 
which New Delhi had nurtured and expected to be most favorable to its concerns. Thus, 
in order to assuage accusations of compromising Nepal’s sovereignty by serving Indian 
interests, Prime Minister B. P. Koirala formalized Nepal’s new non-alignment strategy as 
an “open door policy” to diversify diplomatic relations, and thus contributed to reduce 
India’s leverage.263 From full diplomatic relations with four states in 1955 – India, the 
United Kingdom, France and the United States – by the time King Mahendra took over 
in 1960, Nepal had established relations with 29 states, 18 of which alone under B. P. 
Koirala’s 18-month long government.264  
                                                                                                                                            
between two powerful contending neighbours” Mehta, Rescuing, 240. Amb. H. Dayal’s Spring 1960 
assessment also notes that “[Nepal’s diplomatic] flights into the outer space of world politics [were] 
occasioned at least in part by a desire to emulate India.” NAI, MEA 6(27)-R&I/60 p. 8. 
262 As early as October 1954, Nepal’s Ambassador to India N. B. Shah, cautions India expected Nepal to 
“cautiously proceed in the matter [China] and be in close consultation with the Government of India.” 
Quoted in: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2624/stories/20091204262407700.htm. Nehru’s 
consequent discontent, in 1956, after Nepal’s PM T. P. Acharya visits Beijing to sign the Sino-Nepal 
General Friendship Agreement and recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Tibet: “they have not only 
bypassed us and practically ignored us, but have done so with discourtesy.” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 390.  
263 Jagat Mehta recalls, after a visiting Nepal in 1958: “while BP Koirala did not want to alienate India, 
Nepalese nationalism was inclined to be neutral between India and China, and this provoked anger in India 
… by 1959, the hatred of overlordship of India had become part of rising Nepalese nationalism.” Mehta, 
Tryst betrayed, 111. See also opposition party protests during Nehru’s visit in 1959: NAI, MEA 6(27)-R&I/59 
p. 7 of June report. 
264 Based on “Fact sheet of Nepal’s Diplomatic relations, 1951-71” in Muni, Foreign policy of Nepal, 255-64. 
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Koirala was aware of India’s concerns about China, and up to a certain point, Nehru 
understood and accepted his explanations about domestic compulsions.265 But the rift 
kept widening in 1959-60. Koirala kept emphasizing Nepal’s quest for “independence” 
and visited Beijing to sign a boundary agreement despite Indian opposition.266 On the 
other hand, to Kathmandu’s chagrin, Nehru stated that Nepalese and Indian security 
were indivisible.267 B. P. Koirala’s increasingly isolated position in Kathmandu, amidst 
his party’s rising factionalism, further aggravated Indian concerns about the sustainability 
of his government and effects on Nepal’s capability to ensure its own security. 
* 
Under the new circumstances after the late 1950s, India’s Nepal policy and Nehru’s 
option to engage the monarch after his coup in 1960, were constrained by two 
assessments: 1) the external threat of China, including the possibility of a war involving 
Nepal; and 2) the internal rise of King Mahendra, accentuated by the decline of India’s 
preferred democratic faction, the Nepali Congress. Nehru knew that holding on to the 
democratic experiment in Kathmandu risked becoming a security liability for India, 
                                                
265 B. P. Koirala recognized that by 1959 India-China relations had reached “a very explosive point”, that 
“a faction in the Government of India felt that I was becoming too friendly with China” and of “that 
perhaps I would be too independent and I was critical of India’s unnecessary interference in our affairs”, 
but despite this Nehru was “understanding” and “considerate,” quoting him as saying: “if it helps you to 
create a nationalist image for yourself by taking us to task, you are welcome to do that, because we do not 
want to destroy your image as a nationalist.” Tripathi, Nepal in transition, 50, 52-3. 
266 On China’s invitation, the Nepalese PM recalls the Indian ambassador’s warning: “it will not be good if 
you visit somewhere else before coming to India. You should come to us first.” Koirala, Atmabrittanta, 207. 
267 B. P. Koirala recalls difficulties in drafting a joint communiqué during Nehru’s visit in June, 1959: “our 
[Nepal] emphasis was on independence, whereas his was on a ‘special relationship’”. Koirala, Atmabrittanta: 
Late Life Recollections, 208. The rift escalated after Nehru’s Nov. 27 statement that “any aggression on Nepal 
will be considered an aggression on India.” Koirala responds on Nov. 29: as a “fully sovereign independent 
nation”, Nepal “decides its external and home policy according to its own judgment and its own liking 
without ever referring to any outside authorities” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 398, 400-1. See also Amb. B. 
Sahay’s earlier assessment, in September: “China with the help of her friends in Nepal is now trying to 
wean it away from India and the Nepalese Government is to some extent responsive to such attempts.” 
NAI, MEA 6(27)-R&I/59 pp. 3-4. 
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whether by pushing King Mahendra even further into Chinese hands, or by plunging his 
Kingdom into civil war. It was up to the King to give the final blow and bury democracy. 
India regretted this, but was ready to adjust and engage with reality to pursue its 
immediate interests.268 
 
2. Ceylon 1956 
Ceylon in the 1950s posed a dual test to the Indian principle of non-interference. Up to 
1956, Nehru faced a deeply conservative regime that had reluctantly accepted 
independence from Britain and pursued a pro-West foreign policy that clashed with 
India’s non-alignment. After a regime change in 1956, a reformist government openly 
associated with non-alignment and offered New Delhi greater political influence in 
Ceylon, but implemented an ethno-nationalist agenda that fueled domestic conflict, 
alienated the Tamil minority, and threatened the neighbour’s domestic stability. India’s 
focus on engagement during the period demonstrates that while morally averse to 
Ceylon’s illiberal tilt and concerned about its impact on the island’s long-term security 
and order, the immediate prospects of greater influence over a geopolitically realigned 
regime prevailed. 
* 
In late May, 1958, Ceylon was swept by a wave of deadly race riots, taking the lives of 
hundreds, possibly more than one thousand people, most of which from the island’s 
                                                
268 King Mahendra would keep playing the “China card” just as his democratic predecessors had done, but 
never crossed India’s red security lines and stayed neutral during the 1962 India-China war. Seeking to 
assuage India, he sold himself as a “political realist” committed to “non-alignment”. Bir B. S. D. Mahendra, 
Statement of principles, Foreign Policy speeches (Kathmandu: Ministry of Panchayat Affairs, 1964), 1-5. 
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Tamil minority. The violence raged on for weeks while the Sinhala-majority government 
looked on, wavering between passive negligence and active connivance.269 Eventually, as 
chaos persisted and blood kept spilling, the Governor-General O. E. Goonetilleke 
declared emergency and deployed the military, noting that the riots had been “the work 
of a Master Mind … a time-bomb set about two years ago, which has now exploded.”270 
He was referring to Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and his rise to power after 
the 1956 parliamentary elections, a pivotal moment which, according to historian K. M. 
De Silva classified as “a change of regime rather than merely a change of government.”271 
Bandaranaike’s victory had brought a revolution in political leadership by replacing the 
conservative United National Party (UNP) elite that ruled since independence, by 
adopting socialist and populist redistribution policies benefitting the lower- and middle-
class Sinhala majority community in the South of the country, and by enacting a major 
geostrategic shift away from the West and towards the emerging non-aligned block in 
Asia.272 
PM Bandaranaike’s strategy of mass mobilization targeting the Sinhala majority also 
unleashed a profound socio-economic modernization, which contributed to an 
unprecedented expansion of Ceylon’s democratic system, but also fueled its consequent 
                                                
269 For a critical account of the government’s role during the riots as either conniving with “goons,” its 
delayed police response, and belated declaration of emergency by PM Bandaranaike (May 27), see Tarzie 
Vittachi, Emergency '58: the story of the Ceylon race riots (London: Andre Deutsch, 1958), 85-90. 
270 Vittachi, Emergency, 79. 
271  K. M. De Silva and W. Howard Wriggins, J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: a political biography v.1 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 17. 
272 On the elite structure of Ceylon’s political leadership in the 1950s, and the role of the Bandaranaike and 
Obeyesekere families under the British colonial regime, see De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.1, 4-7; K. 
M. De Silva and W. Howard Wriggins, J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: a political biography v.2 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
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ethnic conflict.273 Tensions between the Sinhala and Tamil communities dated back to 
the colonial period, and the Tamil demands were often ambiguous, varying between full 
independence, some type of confederation with India, or autonomy within a federal 
Ceylon.274  
But Bandaranaike’s 1956 alliance with Buddhist extremists and subsequent policies of 
Ceylonisation to favor the Sinhala majority played a determinant role in letting the genie of 
ethnic conflict out of its bottle and run amok.275 Initiatives such as the “Sinhala Only” 
Language Act irreversibly upset the status quo of linguistic parity and initiated a spiraling 
Sinhala chauvinist competition between the ruling parties.276 Most devastatingly to social 
stability, the 1956 “revolution” massively reduced the Tamil access to key sectors in the 
state – from education and administration to the military – thus feeding a sense of 
discrimination that led to the minority’s gradual radicalization.277 All this eventually 
                                                
273 In 1931 Ceylon became the first Asian country to adopt universal suffrage and held general elections, 20 
years ahead of India. But the socio-economic transformations and ethnic conflict of the 1950s were so 
drastic, also threatening conservative interests, that they were one of the main reasons for the attempted 
military coup of 1962: Donald L. Horowitz, Coup theories and officers' motives: Sri Lanka in comparative perspective 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). For the roots of the conflict, see Neil DeVotta, Blowback: 
linguistic nationalism, institutional decay, and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
274  For the gradual assertion of Tamil political activism in Ceylon, and the reasons behind S. J. 
Chelvanayakam’s split form the ACTC, in Dec. 1949, to create the Federal Party and demand full 
federalism, see A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism, 1947-
1977: a political biography (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 23-77. 
275 The ruling United National Party (UNP) split in 1951, with Bandaranaike creating the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) under the Sinhala Maha Sabha, which he had founded in 1934. As he converts to 
Buddhism and speaks of it repeatedly for “national progress” and “world peace,” his ethno-religious 
nationalism becomes increasingly apparent thereafter. On Bandaranaike as a failed “arbiter” to contain the 
devastating effects of his policies, see James Manor, The expedient utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 245-318. 
276  The UNP had favoured linguistic parity between Sinhala and Tamil, based on the 1953 
recommendations of the Official Language Commission, but backtracked in 1955 under pressure from the 
SLFP and Bandaranaike’s “Sinhala Only” policy. De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.1, 297-302. For the 
UNP’s new approach, see Jayewardene’s speech in parliament, 19 Oct. 1955: G. E. P. de S. 
Wickramaratne, ed. Ceylon and Kotelawala: a selection of speeches made in the Legislature in Ceylon by John Lionel 
Kotelawala, 1931-1956 (Dehiwela: n/a, 1964), 292-301. 
277 Symbolically, after 1954, it would take twenty years for another PM to visit Jaffna – the country’s 
second-largest city and hub of Tamil culture: Coelho, Palk Straits, 102. On PM. S. Bandaranaike’s decision 
not to visit in Dec. 1964, after a devastating cyclone: 
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plunged the country into one of Asia’s most violent ethnic conflicts and civil wars, of 
which the May 1958 riots had only been the opening act. 
 
Conflicted but strategic engagement 
India’s reaction to Ceylon’s illiberal turn in 1956 was one of conflicted restraint. On the 
one hand, it welcomed Bandaranaike’s reformism, and his personal profile and policy 
agenda were more favorable to India, promising greater influence. On the other hand, 
however, PM Nehru and his diplomats in Colombo worried about his Ceylonisation policies 
because they were seen as sowing the seeds for a conflict that could devastate the island’s 
fragile stability and spillover across the Palk Straits to affect India’s own domestic security, 
given the links with the Tamils of Southern India. I 
ndia’s top diplomat in Colombo at the time, acting High Commissioner M. M. Nair, 
reflects this conflicted assessment, derogatorily describing the outgoing elites as having 
been “drunk with power,” and that India should therefore welcome the “advent to power 
of people from the middle and lower middle class … who discarded [Western] coat and 
trousers in favour of the [local] plain shirt and dhoti,” even while cautioning that “the 
seeds of [ethnic] discord were also sowed”.278 
Beyond this rising domestic conflict between the Sinhala and Tamil communities, New 
Delhi’s assessment was further constrained by negotiations on the fate of a specific sub-
                                                                                                                                            
[http://transcurrents.com/tc/2009/01/why_sirimavo_refused_to_visit.html. On the Tamils from an over-
represented to an under-represented minority in higher education and civil administration, see Asoka 
Bandarage, The separatist conflict in Sri Lanka: terrorism, ethnicity, political economy (London: Routledge, 2009), 29-
109. Similarly, between 1950s and 1960s, military commissions in Ceylon Light Infantry awarded to 
Tamils fall from 18% to 4%. Horowitz, Coup Theories, 57-75. 
278 NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 pp. 1, 15-18. 
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community of around one million Tamils that had settled on the island more recently, 
during colonial rule, to work in the tea plantations, and which Colombo saw as aliens that 
had to be deported back to India as soon as possible.279 A complex bilateral agreement 
reached in 1954 for their repatriation or integration had faced severe obstacles and while 
Nehru hoped to resuscitate it, PM Bandaranaike gave it the final death blow immediately 
after coming to power, demanding the deportation of all plantation Tamils to India.280  
This uncooperative attitude bordered on confrontation, and was rooted in the wave of 
Sinhala ethno-nationalism that swept the island after 1956: given that “anti-India” 
slogans had become a rallying cry on the streets of Colombo, a diplomatic report 
euphemistically notes that there was “not the same anxiety now on the part of Ceylon to 
come to any reasonable solution [on the stateless Tamils]” and that the “Indo-Ceylon 
problem” had witnessed “little progress” and thus remained in “cold storage.”281  
Yet, despite principled discomfort with Ceylon’s illiberal turn, concerns about long-term 
stability, and interrupted negotiations about the stateless Plantation Tamils, Nehru 
refrained from making any condemnatory statement or applying coercion.282 Instead, he 
                                                
279 Negotiations about the fate of the “Plantation Tamils” dated back to the colonial period, but became 
contentious after Ceylon disenfranchised the community, with the Ceylon Citizenship bill (1948) and the 
Indian and Pakistani Residents Citizenship Act (1949). For India’s reactions, see Avtar S. Bhasin, India-Sri 
Lanka relations and Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict: documents, 1947-2000 v.2 (New Delhi: Indian Research Press, 2001), 
453-67. PM J. Kotelawala reflects the hostile approach, speaking to parliament on Feb. 2, 1954, after the 
first agreement with India: “We cannot afford to have this extra population. We must send back as many as 
we can – the whole lot if we can – but not by forcible repatriation.” Wickramaratne, Ceylon and Kotelawala, 
219. See also John L. Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister's story (London: G. G. Harrap, 1956), 98-111. 
280 For Nehru’s approach, see his letter to Kotelawala in Jan. 1956 [SWJN REF XX], and his Feb. 23, 
address to parliament: MEA, "FAR 1956," 22. Despite a revised agreement in Oct. 1954, in 1955 Ceylon 
rejected 96% of a total 28,000 applications for citizenship. MEA, "Annual Report 1955-56," (New Delhi 
1956), 12. By 1959 more than 900,000 Tamils remained stateless. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.2, 805. 
281 NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 p. 3, 6. 
282 Nehru on Sept. 2, 1957, address to parliament: “we are interested in finding a solution” but “so far as we 
are concerned, strictly, legally and constitutionally, it [Indians in Ceylon] is none of our problem. They are 
not our nationals. It is a problem of Ceylon.” MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1957," (New Delhi 1958), 174. 
And in Apr. 1958: “I would beg this House to remember that we should not be too eager to condemn any 
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fended off domestic pressures to take a more assertive stance on Ceylon’s domestic politics 
at bilateral and multilateral levels, including from influential members within his own 
party.283 While he continued to express concern about Ceylon after 1956, in particular on 
the fate of the stateless people, Nehru also recognized that Bandaranaike was in no rush 
to solve the issue with India. In the Indian Prime Minister’s view it was thus useless, and 
possibly also counterproductive to the security of the Tamils – whom Sinhala extremists 
often referred to as a “fifth column” – to further pressure Colombo.284 A few months after 
the 1958 riots, he therefore questioned his restless parliamentarians: 
What is the good of telling me ‘Go and solve it immediately’? How am I to solve it [problem of 
Ceylon Tamils] immediately? I cannot. Am I to threaten Ceylon and make the lot of those people 
and everybody much worse? It might satisfy some kind of ambition on our part to display the 
strong hand, the fist. We do not normally, when we are in the right mood, display the fist to 
anybody.285 
Nehru had, for years, cautioned against any coercive attitude against Ceylon, warning 
that such an approach would only confirm the island’s deeply held suspicions about 
Indian expansionism and drive it further away, into Western hands. His restrained 
approach to the revolutionary “regime change” of 1956 was therefore a result of the 
overriding positive assessment about Bandaranaike as a harbinger of greater Indian 
political and geostrategic influence.286 
                                                                                                                                            
Government, or the Ceylon Government, merely because it has not solved it quickly.” MEA, "Foreign 
Affairs Record 1958," (New Delhi 1959), 71. 
283 Despite being under control of Nehru’s INC under Chief Minister K. Kamaraj (1954-63), Tamil Nadu’s 
politics in the 1950s were dominated by assertive demands for greater recognition of Tamil language, with 
separatist undertones and with links to the Tamil cause in Ceylon. Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Urban Life and 
Populist Radicalism: Dravidian Politics in Madras," The Journal of Asian Studies 20, no. 03 (1961). 
284 Paradoxically, despite being a majority, Sinhala anxiety about the Tamils and their connections to India 
thus reflects an intense minority and insecurity complex. This approach is, for example, betrayed in PM 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s reference to Plantation Tamils as an “alien population” and a threatening 
“problem” for the “indigenous” population, in a Nov. 10, 1964 speech: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.2, 845. 
285 Dec. 9, 1958: MEA, "FAR 1958," 319. 
286 Following Nehru’s May 1957 visit to Colombo, the joint statement included eleven paragraphs on 
various global issues reflecting a geopolitical realignment, but only one short reference to “outstanding 
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Conservative Ceylon’s alignment with the West  
Ceylon cannot politically or economically stand by herself. A glance at the map is sufficient to 
demonstrate this. When the British Empire fades away, where will Ceylon go? She must associate 
herself, economically at least, with larger groups and India is obviously indicated.287 
J. Nehru (1939) 
The British Empire had formally faded away when the Indian Ocean island attained 
independence in 1948, but despite Nehru’s expectations, Ceylon did not “associate 
herself” with India. The state remained a South Asian abnormality in more than one 
way. Unlike the anti-colonial mass mobilization on the subcontinent, Ceylon’s anglophile 
elites had only reluctantly agreed to negotiate their transition to freedom, and the new 
state’s constitution and military forces remained tied to the Crown in London.288 Unlike 
most of the other South Asian leaders, the first Prime Minister, D. S. Senanayake (1947-
52) had therefore remained “singularly immune to the attractions of the contemporary 
Indian political scene.”289 This explains the prevalent Indian view that “Ceylon’s ties with 
Britain in 1948 were generally much closer than those of India’s. … [and the country] 
continued in a pro-British and culturally Anglo-Saxon orientation.”290 
                                                                                                                                            
[bilateral] problems.” Confronted with this by parliamentarians upon returning to Delhi, Nehru gives 
vague and evasive responses: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1957," 95-7. 
287 After returning from Ceylon, in a report the INC President: Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of 
Jawaharlal Nehru Vol. 10, Second Series (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1977), 61. 
288 Reflected already in 1939: “it is unfortunate that many of the leaders of Ceylon should help in creating 
barriers between India and Ceylon. They do not seem to realize that India can do well without Ceylon in 
the future to come, [but] Ceylon may not be able to do without India”. Nehru, SWJN SS v10, 61. Only 59 
of 101 members of Ceylon’s House of Representatives voted for independence in 1947. Until 1972, the 
British monarch remained as Ceylon’s head of state, and the British Privy Council the final court of appeal. 
289 De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.1, 16. 
290 Coelho, Palk Straits, 138-9. 
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The latent Indian discomfort was both ideological and cultural, rooted in its view of the 
Ceylonese leadership as entitled, conservative and committed to a political system that 
preserved socio-economic entitlement and a strategic alignment with the West.291 This led 
to occasional tensions in bilateral relations after 1947, but escalated under PM John 
Kotelawala (1953-56) who pursued an aggressive policy of strategic and economic 
diversification that risked reducing Indian influence on the island and impinged on its 
security interests. “Sir” Kotelawala’s personal style, as a conservative and brash British 
Army veteran, was the almost perfect opposite of Nehru, and his repeated statements 
underlining that “Ceylon is in many ways as different from India as England is from the 
European continent,”292 or that the “English gave us freedom,” were not taken lightly in 
New Delhi.293  
Kotelawala recognized that “Ceylon had everything to gain by a policy of good 
neighbourliness towards India.”294 But as with all of India’s smaller neighbors, and 
building on his predecessor’s policies, he quickly adopted an activist foreign policy that 
strived to increase the country’s security by a strategy of extra-regional balancing and 
strategic diversification. This was based on a deeply held Ceylonese threat assessment of 
India that cut across parties and ideological differences. In a memo to his PM D. 
Senanayake (1952-1954), minister J. R. Jayawardene, who was to become President in 
the 1980s and widely known as “Yankee Dick” for his pro-American stances, first defined 
the country’s new balancing strategy, based on two main threats: excessive dependence 
                                                
291 See e.g. Nehru’s derogatory reference to Kotelawala as “a landlord and therefore a conservative” in Oct. 
20, 1954 conversation with Zhou Enlai: Nehru, SWJN SS v27, 22. 
292 Kotelawala, Asian Prime Minister, 98. 
293 Wickramaratne, Ceylon and Kotelawala, 280. Symbolically, in April 1954 Queen Elizabeth became the first 
foreign head of state to visit Ceylon after Kotelawala took over as PM. 
294 Kotelawala, Asian Prime Minister, 94. 
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on India, and a possible Communist takeover, especially with support from Southern 
Indian states. Comparing the island’s position to that of Britain facing Europe and to that 
of the 19th century United States in Northern America, he concluded that “India should 
not be allowed to proclaim a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ in the Indian Ocean” and stressed the 
need for Sri Lanka to find extra-regional allies.295  
After becoming Prime Minister in 1954, J. Kotelawala similarly underlined such need for 
external security guarantees, proclaiming that “the day Ceylon dispensed with the 
Englishmen completely, the Island would go under India” and that “if South India goes 
communist, as it is going now, [it] invades us.”296 His open denunciation of Communism 
served the dual purpose to rally domestic support among the conservative electorate, and 
to signal Ceylon’s alignment with the Western block. He thus promised to “hound out 
Communism from this country” and labeled the Soviet Union as “Ceylon’s Enemy no. 
1.”297 To greatest Indian annoyance, however, were his assertive stances in favor of the 
West, openly denouncing Communism and comparing it to a “new colonialism” 298, 
especially at the Bandung summit of April, 1955.”299  
Beyond the rhetoric of anti-Communism and diplomatic disputes with India, he pursued 
association with the emerging security architecture sponsored by the United States across 
                                                
295 Memo to the PM on March 19, 1954, in Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 8-9. 
296 May 26, 1955, speech in which he also makes repeated references to the work of Indian strategist 
Panikkar as indicating New Delhi’s quest to transform the island into a “forward defense area” for 
geopolitical control of the Indian Ocean. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, xxvi, 11-16. On March 5, 1954, he 
linked the issue to the minority Tamils in Ceylon: “I am not frightened by immigrants, but I am frightened 
of immigrants going communist.” Wickramaratne, Ceylon and Kotelawala, 226. 
297 Wickramaratne, Ceylon and Kotelawala, 197, 280. Moscow opposed Ceylon’s entry to the UN until 1955.  
298 “The old colonialism had at least the redeeming virtue of a democratic basis. The new colonialism is 
nakedly totalitarian in intention and effect” Kotelawala, Asian Prime Minister, 8. 
299 He recalls Nehru reproaching him: “Why did you do that, Sir John? Why did you not show me your 
speech before you made it?” He also quotes from a letter from India’s former Home Minister C. 
Rajagopalachari accusing him of having behaved “like a jackdaw pretending that it had the plumage of a 
peacock.” Kotelawala, Asian Prime Minister, 187, 74. 
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Asia, notably by allowing United States military airplanes carrying French troops to 
Indochina to stopover in Colombo and, in August of 1954, lobbying for Ceylon and the 
other Colombo Powers (including India, Pakistan and Burma) to join the South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO).300  
While PM Kotewala almost caved in to American pressure to end Ceylon’s Rubber-Rice 
agreement with China (signed in 1952), and his visit to the United States in the Fall of 
1954 assumes symbolic importance, none of the more provocative projects against Indian 
security concerns are implemented – especially a 1950 proposal for a major U.S. air base 
in Ceylon. Initially suggested by Colombo, the idea illustrates a typical dilemma in 
Washington’s South Asia policy during the 1950s: on the one hand, skepticism about 
India’s non-alignment and incapacity drove the temptation to take advantage of PM 
Kotewala’s overtures, in order to enlist Ceylon’s support for anti-Communist 
containment in Asia; and, on the other hand, concern that an exaggerated threat 
assessment and American involvement could lead to Indian hostility or destabilize the 
island’s domestic politics to the extent of a Communist take-over.301 
The 1956 regime change set this tension to rest, as Ceylon ended its pro-West tilt and the 
new PM Bandaranaike embraced a non-aligned position that is more palatable to 
Nehru.302 Despite occasional concern about “radical leftist elements” in the “nationalist-
                                                
300 Kotelawala, Asian Prime Minister, 128. On SEATO, see Wickramaratne, Ceylon and Kotelawala, 271-7. 
301 See e.g. June 1953 cable by Amb. Satterthwaite in Colombo: Indian reaction “almost certain to be 
negative and should be a matter of some concern” http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-
54v11p2/d964. See also J. F. Dulles Oct. 1953 instructions to bring Ceylon “back in step” against 
“Commie China”, but cautions that “excessive amount of aid to Ceylon at this time might react 
disadvantage US by damaging our relations with other countries in the area.” 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d981 and his brief to Eisenhower on 
Ceylon’s entry into SEATO: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d997  
302 This threat assessment reflected in J. F. Dulles’ attempts to seek a workaround to the Battle Act to supply 
Ceylon with aid, which is signed during his visit to Colombo on March 11, 1956, just a few weeks before 
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neutralist government” American assessments concurred that Ceylon’s geostrategic pivot 
was overall beneficial, given that India “would probably try to bolster Bandaranaike in 
the event of a major challenge to him by either communist or old-style conservative 
forces”.303 
Nehru had been well aware of Ceylon’s balancing strategy, and despite concern at this 
pro-Western tilt, he chose to wait it out. In a 1952 letter to his regional Chief Ministers, 
while Washington debated Colombo’s proposal to host an American air base, he confides: 
they [Ceylon] are a little afraid of this great big giant of a country overlooking them and fear 
always leads to wrong action. If we threaten them, we only increase their fear. Therefore, I have 
avoided speaking the language of threats and have tried to be friendly to them even if they have 
acted in an improper way.304 
Recalling his time in Colombo (1954-56), Indian High Commissioner B. N. Chakravarty, 
notes that Ceylon looked at India with a “mix of fear and jealousy”, afraid of becoming a 
Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese invasion, as Kotelawala had often propagated. 
Chakravarty goes on to note that the island’s “fear of India is perhaps genuine” because 
Ceylon “does not believe in our repeated assurances that we have no designs against her 
(…) [and we thus have to] understand the psychology of a small neighbour and be very 
careful in our words and deeds.”305  
While in Colombo, B. N. Chakravarty had, in 1955, warned against the influence of 
Kotelawala’s coterie of pro-Western advisers, including J. R. Jayewardene and C. E. L. 
                                                                                                                                            
the elections: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d136 After meeting PM 
Kotelawala, he reassures Eisenhower: “They are 100 percent anti-commie and very apprehensive of 
Nehru’s policies.” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d138  
303 National Intelligence Estimate, March 1958: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-
60v15/d182  
304 July 5, 1952: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, liii. 
305 NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 p. 6. In 1953, U.S. Ambassador in Colombo reports that “high Indian military 
personages are known to have told their friends in the Ceylon Government that India is determined some 
day to get possession of the great naval base at Trincomalee” 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d964  
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Wickremesinghe, and cautioned that “we should not, therefore, be surprised to see 
Ceylon taking a stand, in the international sphere, often opposed to that of India.”306 In 
the wake of the election campaign, he goes on to clearly identifiy Bandaranaike, from the 
opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), as a trusted friend of India and as one of the 
few voices opposing the government’s pro-West policy.307 
So it is not surprising that when Bandaranaike was elected, in the Spring of 1956, New 
Delhi rejoiced at the prospect of Ceylon finally associating itself with India and non-
alignment.308 An Indian diplomatic note from Colombo, described it as being “in a sense, 
a revolution” because Kotelawala (“slowly becoming a dictator”), had been “definitely 
inclined to toe the American line” and “took no sincere steps to settle the Indo-Ceylon 
problem or to support India its foreign policies”309. In New Delhi, the new alignment with 
Bandaranaike was officially welcome by the Ministry of External Affairs as leading to a 
“general agreement between him [Bandaranaike] and the Prime Minister of India on 
almost all important international problems”.310 
Looking back at 1956, Vincent Coelho, who would serve as Indian High Commissioner 
in Colombo during the 1970s, described the transition as a watershed moment in India-
Ceylon relations, because the “traditional association with Britain … then finally gave 
place to “a new concept of third-wordliness” and “a close similarity between Ceylon’s 
approach to international relations and India’s.”311 This new association was formalized 
                                                
306 NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 p. 5. 
307 NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 p. 4. 
308 Amal Jayawardane, ed. Documents on Sri Lanka's foreign policy: 1947-1965 (Colombo: Regional Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2004), 5-11. 
309 1956 assessments by Assistant High Commissioner M. M. Nair: NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 pp. 1, 15. 
310 MEA, "Annual Report 1956-57," (New Delhi 1957), 13. 
311 Coelho, Palk Straits, 140. 
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when, in late 1957, a little over a year after being elected, PM Bandaranaike formally 
took over the two remaining British military bases on the island, while declaring that 
“today our independence is complete”.312  
* 
India’s posture towards the massive changes in Ceylon during the 1950s illustrates a 
difficult dilemma facing Nehru and Indian policymakers in the region: before 1956, 
conservative regimes in Colombo actively defied India’s security interests by pursuing a 
pro-West balancing strategy, but delivered in terms of domestic order and stability. 
Conversely, after 1956, the new reformist regime delivered to Indian security concerns by 
associating with non-alignment, but its illiberal policies destabilized the island’s ethnic 
balance, which threatened Indian interests in order and stability. As in the case of Nepal, 
these dual concerns  (external security and internal stability) were seen as interdependent, 
New Delhi therefore seeking to pragmatically pursue a fine balance between both, but 
eventually forced to compromise on the latter after 1956. Despite its liberal identification 
with the plight of the Tamil minority and concern at the long-term effects of Ceylon’s 
illiberal tilt after 1956, India’s more immediate focus on political and security influence 
was to prevail via engagement. 
 
                                                
312 At the formal hand-over ceremony, which began phased British withdrawal from the Katunayake air 
and Trincomalee naval bases, respectively on Oct. 15 and Nov. 1, 1957: S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Speeches 
and writings (Colombo: Department of Broadcasting and Information, 1963), 400. 
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3. Burma 1962 
The military coup of March 1962 terminated 15 years of democracy in Burma. The 
deposed Prime Minister U Nu had been one of Nehru’s closest allies, receiving Indian 
support for his democratization efforts in the 1950s, which also led to a joint commitment 
to non-alignment. Despite these strong links, Nehru immediately recognized the new 
military regime, India becoming the first country to do so, and thereafter pursued a policy 
of engagement. Beyond just pragmatism, incapacity or lack of alternatives, India’s 
response was rooted in a dual assessment about the declining capacity of U Nu to deliver 
on two fronts: 1) on the external front, the possibility of an impending military conflict 
with China, warranted at least a neutral, if not cooperative regime in Rangoon; 2) on the 
internal front, Prime Minister U Nu was weakened and isolated, his democratic regime 
unable to tackle domestic insurgencies and ensure the safety of the large Indian diaspora. 
Both factors directly impinged on Indian security interests. 
* 
As per his day of birth and a Buddhist tradition, Prime Minister U Nu was known as 
“Saturday’s son,” but it was on a Friday – March 2, 1962 to be exact – that he was 
brusquely woken up, around 2:00 a.m., by the sight of a pistol and an Army official 
shouting “we caught the maggot” into a walkie-talkie.313 This was a coup: that same day, 
the Burmese Army Chief, General Ne Win and his Union Revolutionary Council 
                                                
313 U Nu, U Nu: Saturday's son (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 236, 343. 
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suspended the democratic constitution of 1948 and dissolved both houses of 
parliament.314 U Nu would remain under detention for the next twelve years. 
Just a few weeks earlier, Burma’s democratically elected Prime Minister had visited India 
to lecture on the concepts of mingala (virtue) and myitta (universal love) in the holy Hindu 
city of Varanasi, in the company of Prime Minister J. Nehru, whom he believed to be a 
reincarnation of emperor Ashoka and tried to convert to Buddhism. 315  Nehru 
reciprocated the respect, albeit in secular terms: India’s ties to Burma constituted “a 
special relationship,” because it was “nearer to us than any foreign country.”316  
Since at least 1948, when U Nu’s newly independent government survived a Communist 
coup with the military assistance from Nehru, 317 India had been deeply committed to 
ensure the success of Burmese attempts to co-opt the country’s minorities through an 
inclusive, parliamentary democracy, including a hybrid “liberal-socialist” and federal 
constitution.318 Nowhere was this quasi-alliance more apparent than in their joint foreign 
policy of the 1950s to develop the “third way” of non-alignment, which led to intense 
coordination, whether on the Colombo Powers after 1952, on the tripartite Panchsheel 
initiative of 1954, or on how to engage the United States, the Soviet Union or China, 
                                                
314 Gen. Ne Win would go on to declare the “Burmese Way to Socialism” on April 30, 1962, and created 
the one-party rule by Burmese Socialist Program Party, in July, which lasted until 1988. 
315 He visited India between Jan. 11-17: Nu, Saturday's son, 235-6.  
316 March 17, 1955 letter, in Nehru, SWJN SS v28, 293. Nehru’s links to Burma had been shaped much 
before independence, especially with Aung San, whose wife Khin Kyi served as ambassador to India. 
317 India’s military assistance to the government arrived in mid-1949, “without which Burma might never 
have recovered,” according to U Nu: Saturday's son, 192, 227. 
318 For the negotiated independence from the British and the new constitution, see John F. Cady, A history of 
modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 544-72. On Burma as a “transitional society” in the 
1950s, see Lucien W. Pye, Politics, personality and nation building: Burma's search for identity (New Haven: Yale 
University, 1962).  
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including at the United Nations.319 As Den Xiaoping would later recall, U Nu was a 
“friend of Nehru … a pro-Indian element” and their relationship like one “between the 
student and his teacher.”320 
But just a few days after his great friend and student had been humiliated as a “maggot” 
and frogmarched into a Rangoon jail, Nehru ordered his Ambassador in Burma – in 
words that were “realistic and yet nostalgic at having to let U Nu down” – to formally 
recognize the new military regime.321 On March 6th India became the first country, even 
before China, to offer a “statement of acknowledgment” which the generals had 
demanded as a prerequisite for diplomatic relations.322 The following months further 
reflected New Delhi’s concern to engage the military regime, and despite revolutionary 
changes in Burma – from a new constitution and single-party rule to isolationist 
economics that led to occasional tensions – bilateral relations gradually normalized over 
the next years.323 
                                                
319 At the UN, for example, Indian representatives supported Burmese denunciations of KMT forces 
operating with Western support from its territory and both countries’ approaches overlapped on most 
global issues. India also represented Burma at several UN bodies. Uma Shankar Singh, Burma and India, 
1948-1962 : a study in the foreign policies of Burma and India and Burma's policy towards India (New Delhi: Oxford & 
IBH, 1979), 155-216. For Nehru’s influence on U Nu, see also William C. Johnstone, Burma's foreign policy: a 
study in neutralism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 40-115; Nu, Saturday's son, 236-85. 
320 To an Albanian delegation, June 19, 1962: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110806  
321 According to Eric Gonsalves, deputy chief of mission in Rangoon (E-mail correspondence, July 3, 2015). 
322 As DCM in Rangoon, Eric Gonsalves recalls Nehru’s instructions: “if the considered opinion of the 
Embassy [is] that we have to deal with the military government, we should go ahead and give them 
recognition.” http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/ohericgonsalves.pdf pp. 33-34, see also MEA, "AR 61-62," 21. On 
delayed Chinese recognition: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118237. On U.S. 
“hesitation” to recognize the regime: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d49.  
323 In June 1962, two Indian Navy vessels visit Burma on a goodwill visit and the President of India invites 
Gen. Ne Win to visit India MEA, "Annual Report 1962-63," (New Delhi 1963), 19. A 3-year trade 
agreement is signed on Dec. 24. MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1962," (New Delhi 1963), 323. 1963, May: 
India’s deputy minister of external affairs, Dinesh Singh, visits Burma. 1964, February: Ne Win visits India 
to check on Nehru’s health in a “dramatic demonstration to India … that Burma still considers India a 
friend.” NAI, MEA HI/1012(12)/64-I p. 17.  
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Why did Nehru ditch his close friend and the Burmese democratic experiment to engage 
with one of Asia’s most isolated military regimes? Two factors emerge: first, India’s 
assessment that a rising threat from, and possible military conflict with China, warranted 
at least a neutral regime in Rangoon. Second, an assessment of the domestic situation 
showed that U Nu was isolated and his democratic regime incapable to tackle minority 
insurgencies, which threatened instability that could affect Indian border regions. Both 
factors were linked: to defeat the insurgents and to increase domestic support, U Nu had 
engaged in a pro-China tilt after 1960, which decreased Indian incentives to hold on to 
him.  
 
Beijing’s tightening Burma embrace 
Despite the close collaboration of the 1950s, both countries were on diverging 
geostrategic paths, as Burma gravitated back to its Southeast Asian identity, which had 
been interrupted by annexation to the British Raj between 1885 and 1937. On the other 
hand, India’s partition in 1947, with the creation of East Pakistan, and its introvert 
economic model had accelerated separation, further reducing New Delhi’s relative 
influence in Burma, despite the personal link between Nehru and U Nu. Indian diplomats 
in Rangoon expressed concern, but there was little they could do, as the country became 
one of the Cold War’s active fronts, with CIA-supported Kuomintang forces staging attacks 
against Communist China.324 
                                                
324 Burma had separated from India in 1938, and independence from Britain in 1948 further accelerated its 
geopolitical and economic gravitation away from the Indian subcontinent. Indian embassy reports thus note 
the rising influence of a) Thailand and Yugoslavia, especially in the defense sector after 1955 (NAI, MEA 1-
4/55/55-BC(B), p. 25); b) Israel, especially after Ne Win’s first visit abroad (in 1959), to Israel, whose local 
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Of greatest concern, as Burma moved eastwards, was the rising influence of Communist 
China against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Indian relations, which exposed the 
security of India’s semi-enclaved Northeast to a Chinese incursion via Northern Burma. 
New Delhi thus saw the security of India to be dependent on the security and stability of 
Burma, in particular in its Northern areas. 
Up to the mid-1950s, as India continued to engage China and signed the tripartite 
panchsheel agreement focusing on non-interference, Sino-Burmese relations developed 
under the guiding hand of Nehru.325 U Nu had initially proceeded cautiously on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations and initial consultations about the border dispute, 
between 1954 and 1956, but as Beijing began courting and reassuring him, and he came 
under domestic pressure to curtail the various insurgency groups supported by China, his 
position became more flexible.326 
India’s initial reactions were mixed. In 1959, Ambassador L. Mehrotra’s assessment was 
still positive, noting that “the border tension between India and China [has] brought 
Burma closer towards us,” reflecting Burmese continued concern about Chinese 
                                                                                                                                            
Embassy is described as “one of the most active [which] freely hob-nobs with all political groups” (NAI  
3(12)-R&I/61-I p. 4); c) U.S., U.K. and Australian embassies in Rangoon described as “our rivals” (NAI, 
MEA 3(12)-R&I/60 p. 109); d) Pakistan, especially after dialogue between Ne Win and Ayub Khan 
flourishes after the latter’s visit to Rangoon, in December of 1960 (NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/59 p. 84). 
325 U Nu refused to take major decisions on China without first consulting with Nehru. For example, when 
pressed by Zhou Enlai, in June 1954, to sign a bilateral border agreement, he interjects: “We should do as 
[suggested by Prime Minister Nehru]. We can first issue a joint statement and then consider signing an 
agreement.” http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120364 U Nu would visit Beijing in Dec. 
1954 to establish diplomatic relations, which was facilitated by Nehru during his prior visit to China in 
October, when he had cautioned Zhou Enlai to respect the Burmese border demands: “Supposing we 
publish a map showing Tibet as a part of India, how would China feel about it?” Nehru, SWJN SS v27, 20. 
326 In 1956, U Nu and Ba Swe (as the new Prime Minister) begin negotiating a border agreement in Beijing. 
U Nu seems bent on assuaging China, and even offers a tract of disputed territory to Beijing. While the 
agreement would only be signed a few years later, he claimed it as his success Nu, Saturday's son, 252-68.  
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incursions across the disputed border.327 General Ne Win had, as head of the military 
caretaker government between 1958 and 1960, upped the ante by approving a first draft 
of the Sino-Burmese Border Agreement and Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, 
during his January 1960 visit to Beijing.  
After returning to power, U Nu was therefore under unprecedented pressure: his policy of 
tackling the minority insurgents through amnesties and appeasement had failed, the 
economic and military support from the USA had been scaled back as the Kuomintang 
operations fizzled out, his bargaining power with the Army had been significantly 
reduced, and India was involved in an escalating conflict with China. By reaching out to 
Beijing to get a final agreement on the disputed border, U Nu thus hoped out to flush out 
insurgents operating from China, and regain important domestic political support.  
A first indication of the Indian concern at this strategy is reflected in a 1961 assessment 
that “there was excessive fraternization with China over the [1960] successful Sino-
Burmese frontier settlement,” that U Nu had taken with him “an unnecessarily large 
delegation to Peking,” and that the Chinese “policy of improving relations with India’s 
neighbors, if necessary by a special display of sweet reasonableness”, had led the Burmese 
into “a sort of blind spot with regard to Chinese aggression in India.”328 
Nehru acknowledged that the border Treaty signed by U Nu affected Indian interests at 
the trijunction point and India accordingly sent protest notes to Beijing and Rangoon.329 
In public, Nehru fended off intense domestic pressure for him to prevent or counteract 
                                                
327 NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/59 p. 73 of August, 1959 report. According to a May, 1960 embassy assessment, 
Yangon also appreciated India’s support to take on China on the border dispute, and for having been able 
to induce its Communists into the democratic system: NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/60 pp. 100-101. 
328 NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/61-I pp. 3, 7. 
329 MEA, "FAR 1961," 12-13, 33-4. 
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the Sino-Burmese rapprochement and border agreement with repeated references to the 
principle of non-interference.330 More importantly, he emphasized that Indian pressure 
would only push Burma further into the Chinese embrace, eventually paralyzing U Nu: 
“Burma is relatively a small country; on either side of Burma are these big countries China and 
India and Burma naturally feels a little apprehensive of both these countries …  We are friends 
with it. Why do anything carelessly which might increase their fear or apprehension?”331 
In practice, however, Nehru was worried and India was running out of patience, time 
and options. Despite U Nu’s immediate visit to New Delhi to assuage the Indian Prime 
Minister, it was clear that as a result of his attempt to take advantage of the Sino-Indian 
conflict to consolidate his domestic role, Burma had tilted towards Beijing.332  
Commenting on “the Burmese honeymoon with the Chinese giant”, the Indian 
Ambassador in Rangoon thus expressed concern that the “Burmese are more suspicious 
of us than of the Chinese whose achievements, intentions and policies are hardly known 
in this country but whose propaganda is often accepted at face value” and that “it is 
therefore incumbent on us using whatever means lie at our disposal to counteract Chinese 
influence.”333  
This was only reinforced when, in January of 1961, Zhou Enlai visited Burma to ratify 
the border agreement and offered a major loan for economic and technical cooperation 
                                                
330 Domestically, Nehru explained such limitations repeatedly before parliament. E.g. Feb. 1961: “we 
cannot ask any country not to make a proper treaty with China because China and we have fallen out.” 
And in April: “when we were consulted at an early stage about their dealings with China, we told them to 
go ahead and get a good border settlement if they could. Of course, we told them not to do anything which 
would affect our interests … But our advice to them was to get a good settlement if they could.” MEA, 
"FAR 1961," 33, 130. 
331  MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1959," (New Delhi 1960), 235. 
332 During Nov. 1960 visit to New Delhi, U Nu attempts to assuage Nehru on border treaty with China: 
MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1960," 343. Indian ambassador R. S. Mani in Feb. 1961 notes that the 
agreement had only been possible because “realist elements in Burma, particularly in higher Army circles, 
realize[d] that the Sino-Indian dispute, more than anything else, helped to settle Burma’s frontier disputes 
with the Chinese.” NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/61-I p. 4. 
333 NAI, MEA 3(12)-HI/62 pp. 3, 14. 
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agreement, while also “pandering to the vanity of the Burmese by his lavish use of the 
phrase ‘Your Excellency’ while he addressed every Burmese audience as ‘Pauk Phaws’ 
[Kinsmen]”.334 This was, for the Indian ambassador, a clear sign that “China seems to be 
all set to invade the Burmese markets in a big way [and that] the loan agreement might 
constitute a threat to our own export promotion efforts in Burma.”335 
How was this honeymoon expected to end? In one of the last assessments prior to the 
March 1962 coup, in advance of a final meeting between Nehru and U Nu, ambassador 
R. S. Mani suggests that “U Nu’s party circles [AFPFL-Clean] seem to think, in my 
opinion over-optimistically, that they know where to stop. (…) But if and when they 
[China] decide to extend their influence – say, when they find that they have sufficiently 
isolated India – it is doubtful if Burma will be smart enough to be able to counter the 
pressures.”336  
Such pragmatic, but also concerned Indian assessments were also rooted by the gradual 
disengagement of the United States, which India saw as the most reliable guarantee to 
mitigate Chinese pressure on Burma. Starting in 1950, Washington had been supporting 
the Kuomintang guerrilla operating from Eastern Burma against the PRC, which U Nu – 
with active support from India at the UN – had repeatedly denounced as a violation of 
the country’s sovereignty and even lead to the suspension of American aid.337 Relations 
                                                
334 NAI, MEA 6(12)-R&I/61 p. 2. 
335 NAI, MEA 6(12)-R&I/61 pp. 3-4. This coincides with the Chinese and Burmese armies launching a 
major coordinated offensive, “Mekong River Operation,” against KMT bases north of Kengtung, in Shan 
State, with tacit, albeit secret approval of Rangoon. 
336 Aug. 21, 1961, to the Commonwealth Secretary: NAI, MEA 6(12)-R&I/61 p. 81. India was also 
concerned about increasing Chinese references to the border agreements with Burma and Nepal to 
pressure India. See e.g. meeting between Chinese MFA Director Zhang Wenji and Indian ambassador 
Parthasarathy in Beijing, July 17, 1961: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121626.pdf  
337 In March 1953, Burma ended all American assistance given its support for KMT operations. 
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improved with massive American economic and military assistance after 1955, reflecting 
Washington’s concern to stem Communism and rope Burma into its security alliance.338  
However, while there was increasing concern about U Nu’s weakening regime and about 
the Army’s rising influence under Ne Win, the United States gradually disengaged after 
reducing its threat assessment about Burma’s impending collapse to Communism and 
also after failing to build a link to Ne Win.339 Against this background, a 1961 Indian 
Embassy report from Rangoon warns that “with the dissolution of the pro-American 
influence in the armed forces, the pressure for shifting the foreign policy of Burma 
[towards the West] will be weakened.”340 
 
U Nu’s decreasing domestic capacity to deliver 
The best, almost indispensable, helmsman for steering this strait course [domestic order under 
democracy] is Premier U Nu.341 
J. Nehru (1954) 
U Nu may have seemed “almost indispensable” and firmly in command of Burma’s 
democratic regime in 1954, but it soon became clear to New Delhi that a lagging 
                                                
338 J. F. Dulles visits Rangoon in Feb. 1955 but is not able to persuade U Nu to join SEATO: 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d15. See also June 1956 by Department of 
State counselor MacArthur supporting assistance: “Our decision may well be decisive in leading Burma 
down the path of closer relations and orientation towards the West or forcing it into close association and 
dependency on the Communist bloc.” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d44 
339 Gen. Ne Win visits the United States in 1960, but the visit is deemed a “fiasco”: 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d62  
340 March 1961 report by CdA G. Ramachandran: NAI 6(12)-R&I/61 p. 15. The concerns reflect Indian 
knowledge about the shift in the Army’s officer cadre, after Ne Win executed a purge to replace pro-
American with pro-Chinese officials, in 1958. On American disengagement and the need for an alternative 
influence, Ambassador R. S. Mani views Ne Win’s March 1961 visit to Moscow favorably: “[he] may have 
turned to the U.S.S.R. to fill the gap caused by the elimination of American technical assistance to the 
Army. From our point of view, if Burma had to turn elsewhere for filling this gap, it is better they turn to 
U.S.S.R. rather than China.” NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/61-I p. 8. 
341 In instructions to the Indian embassy in Rangoon: NAI B/54/1333/4-5 p. 71. 
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economy and persistent insurgency were taking a toll on his leadership. India could – and 
lacking any credible alternative, would – cling on to U Nu, but it was well aware of the 
changing dynamics and, especially after 1955, the rise of rival centers of power with 
leaders that were less inclined towards India: besides factions within his own part, the 
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), the Army’s influence under Ne Win also 
kept growing.342 After losing the 1956 elections, he returned to power in 1957, only to be 
coerced into accepting a military caretaker government (1958-1960).343  
By the time he returned to power for a third time, in 1960, his domestic isolation was 
apparent – he started spending longer periods abroad for meditation, even while his 
parliamentary majority was being riddled by rivalries.344 Despite seeking to reassure New 
Delhi by discounting the possibility of any immediate military coup, in 1961 the Indian 
Ambassador L. Mehrotra thus warned that “since the formation of General Ne Win’s 
Caretaker Government, the Army, having tasted power, became a factor to reckon with 
in Burmese politics.”345  
Indian assessments about the growing isolation of U Nu, the rise of new centers of power, 
and the overall weakening of his democratic government, aggravated concerns about his 
                                                
342 Amb. K. K. Chettur June 1954 report on decline of U Nu an waning Indian influence: “[we must] 
prepare ourselves accordingly, for U Ba Swe who, it is clear, will not have the same affection for us or our 
policies which U Nu has” and therefore “any lose threads hanging about in so far as the relations between 
India and Burma are concerned, should be tied up before U Nu leaves the stage” NAI, MEA B/54/1411/4 
pp. 58-59. And in 1955 report: “coolness towards India has been noticeable … Though at the top level 
ideological affinities and old ties are strong, the lower rungs of the Administration are often discriminating 
against the Indian population here” NAI B/54/1333/4-5 p. 64. On Ne Win’s rising influence in the Army 
and in politics see NAI 1-4/55/55-BC(B), p. 85. 
343 In 1958, after the AFPFL and his government are ridden by defections, including the resignation Deputy 
PM U Ba Swe and 15 cabinet ministers, U Nu invites Ne Win to form caretaker government for a period of 
six months, which is subsequently extended. U Nu would return to power after the Feb. 1960 elections. 
344 By 1961, a visibly weakened U Nu takes two months off to meditate, while Ne Win expands his domestic 
and international support, going on several trips abroad. Internal party factions in the AFPFL resurface, 
including in U Nu’s Union Party, which further erodes the government’s parliamentary support.  
345 February report: NAI 6(12)-R&I/61 p. 14. 
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ability to deliver on two crucial domestic issues. First, the Burmese Prime Minister was 
losing the initiative on tackling a variety of insurgencies among the non-Burman ethnic 
minorities, both in the East and – to India’s particular concern – also in the North. 
Because of its peripheral situation and fragile security conditions, India’s Northeastern 
region remained under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs, and its latent 
instability took a turn for the worse in the 1950s, as a myriad of ethnic minorities 
launched armed rebellions, starting with the Nagas, in 1956, with support and training 
bases in East Pakistan.346  
Despite new Indian Army deployments, vast parts of the Indo-Burmese border regions 
escaped any effective civilian or military control by either New Delhi or Rangoon, thus 
serving as a safe logistical corridor for rebels on both sides.347 Impinging on Indian 
domestic security, such movements across the border were thus monitored regularly by 
Indian officials, and with added concern in the late 1950s, given growing indications of 
possible support from China, via insurgent groups in Northern Burma.348  
Such assessments soon mirrored the severe limitations of the democratic government in 
Rangoon and its Army to exercise control over Northern Burma.349 India was therefore 
                                                
346 Naga insurgents were trained and armed in East Pakistan by Pakistan’s Special Services Group. By 
1961, the Naga Army was 5,000 strong, with 15,000 militiamen: Bertil Lintner, Great game east: India, China, 
and the struggle for Asia's most volatile frontier (Noida: Harper Collins, 2012), 106-12. 
347 In 1952, for example, the Naga Sawlaw tribe raids Indian territory and kills 90. Sent in for a punitive 
strike, the Burmese Union Military Police has to resort to heavy shelling. In March 1953, U Nu and Nehru 
meet in Manipur and cross into Burma, seeking to get Naga allegiance. Nu, Saturday's son, 228-31. In 1957, 
the Indian Army’s Assam Rifles cross into Burmese territory to pursue Naga insurgents: B. Pakem, India 
Burma relations (New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1992), 122-4.  
348 In 1954, for example, on suggestion of the Governor of Assam and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Nehru 
requests the Indian Embassy in Rangoon to confirm whether the Naga National Council’s leader Z. Phizo 
had crossed into Burma: NAI, MEA B/54/1821/4. Similarly, in 1954-55, the IB also consults the MEA on 
number of Lushais joining the Burmese Army, expressing concern about the security of Manipur as 
militancy gains ground there: NAI, MEA B/54/6421/4 p. 6. 
349 Paradoxically, New Delhi often had much batter intelligence on Northern Burma via its Army officials 
posted in the Northeast, than via its Embassy in Rangoon and information provided by U Nu’s 
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concerned at the effectiveness of U Nu’s liberal policy of engaging his own insurgents with 
amnesties and inducements, including promises for further decentralization, a “federal 
principle” and the possibility for states to secede from the Union, which drew the ire of 
Burmese nationalists and the Army because it failed to stem insurgent violence and 
threatened the country’s stability and cohesion. 350  This explains Nehru’s restrained 
position when, in 1958, U Nu was coerced into accepting a military caretaker 
government led by Ne Win on the grounds of ensuring the state’s immediate security and 
order: extraordinary circumstances required stretching the law.351  
After 1960, U Nu’s limitations in delivering on the issue of insurgency are further exposed 
in Indian assessments from Rangoon, including a concern that in order to consolidate 
domestic support among the Naga minority on its own territory, “Burma as a friendly 
neighbor was turning a blind eye to the activities of the [Indian] Naga rebels [operating 
across the border].”352 Conversely, Ne Win had built some links with India, including 
                                                                                                                                            
government, which was hardly in control of its Northern areas. See, for example, March 1955 meeting in 
Myitkyina, attended by Col. P. N. Luthra on behalf of the Governor of Assam, which catches the Indian 
Embassy by surprise: NAI, MEA 3-2/55-BC (B). 
350 After 1958, the Burmese military expresses rising discontent with U Nu’s amnesties and liberal approach 
to the insurgents. In late 1962, he pushed on for a “federal principle,” which further threatened territorial 
integrity in the military’s view: Nu, Saturday's son, 332-44. 
351 Nehru’s reaction on Oct. 2: “the political changes announced last week did not appear to have been an 
army putsch.” Quoted in Singh, Burma and India, 74. 
352 For example, after Indian Nagas shoot down an Indian Air Force DC3 plane and cross into Burma to 
hold its crew captive there, Amb. Mani complains to Burmese deputy Foreign Minister, in May 1961, but 
recognizes that “the main difficulty is that the Burmese will not be able at present to translate their good 
intentions into effective action, owing to the treacherousness of the terrain and paucity of personnel.” The 
Burmese, he emphasizes, are “afraid that, if they go too far in our support, their own Burmese Nagas, who 
are now quiet, might start giving trouble” NAI, MEA 6(12)-R&I/61 p. 49, 83. An earlier embassy report, 
from February, had cautioned that “the [Indian] Naga rebels have a few friends in Burma” NAI, MEA 
3(12)-R&I/61-I p. 8. 
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with Nehru, in 1959, as head of the caretaker government, and gave indications of a 
stronger, more effective response to address Indian concerns.353 
A second issue on which U Nu had failed to deliver, and which affected India’s response 
to the 1962 coup, was the safety of the large Indian diaspora in Burma – around one 
million people, most of which were either Indian citizens or stateless. Many of the 
wealthier Indians had left before or during the World War, but the flow was to accelerate 
after independence.354 To great Indian alarm, U Nu’s decreasing power translated into a 
rising wave of ethno-nationalist Burmanization policies, with new citizenship, land and 
commercial laws targeting the Indian community.355 This had a devastating impact on 
their assets and working conditions, leading to mass emigration to the economically 
fragile “motherland”, whose policy had been to encourage assimilation.356  
As early as 1955, Indian assessments identify the issue as “a disturbing factor” in bilateral 
relations, expected to worsen with Burma’s deteriorating economy and the rise of 
                                                
353 Ne Win had visited New Delhi in Oct. 1959, including a positive interaction with Nehru. Johnstone 
argues that they agreed to stand by the MacMahon line while negotiating with China, and discussed the 
benefits of governing border areas directly: Johnstone, Burma's foreign policy, 142-47. 
354 The share of Indians in Burma’s total population ranged from 5 to 7% up to the 1940s, gradually 
declining thereafter. An estimated 550,000 Indians left between 1948 and 1968, with a peak in 1963-64.  
Nalini R. Chakravarti, The Indian minority in Burma: the rise and decline of an immigrant community (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), 167-86. 
355 1953: land nationalizations begins. 1954: Burma proposes draft extradition agreement, which New Delhi 
rejects, preferring to “link it up with the conclusion of an [more comprehensive] Immigration Agreement” 
in light of problems affecting the Indian community: NAI, MEA 3(1)BC(B)/58 p. 4. 1957: Burmese 
parliament amends immigration acts and authorities delay registration of more than 40,000 Indians: NAI 
3(12)-R&I/58 p. 21. 1961: Burma bans all money order remittances to India. For precipitous fall in 
remittances, see Pakem, India Burma relations, 153. 
356 1952 MEA report stresses: “first objective in regard to Indian overseas communities should be to help 
them to assimilate themselves to local conditions” NAI, MEA B/52/1335/4 p. 35. In 1954, the MEA 
instructs its embassy in Rangoon: “our policy is, of course, to encourage local Indian residents to acquire 
the nationality of the land of their adoption, and we would naturally be happy if the maximum number of 
old Indian residents applied for Burmese citizenship.” NAI, MEA B/54/3012/4 p. 53. 
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Burmese and Buddhist extremism.357 By 1961, with U Nu back in power, Ambassador R. 
S. Mani informs New Delhi that “the animosity towards Indian nationals in Burma 
continues unabated” developing into “a clear conflict between Indian national interests 
and the interests of Indian nationals in Burma.”358 To New Delhi’s great distress, and in a 
last attempt to appease the rising wave of Burmese nationalism and save his government 
at the cost of further attacks on Indian migrants – most of which Muslims – U Nu 
supported the State Religion Promotion Act, in October 1961, making Buddhism the 
country’s official religion.359 
* 
From the mid-1950s onwards, India’s influence on Burma’s domestic affairs and foreign 
policy declined in tandem with the gradual weakening of the democratic governments in 
Rangoon and, in particular, Prime Minister U Nu’s growing isolation and the rise of the 
Army as an alternative centre of power. The coup of March 1962 only formalized this 
process, delivering the final deathblow on a liberal experiment that had proved unable to 
tackle domestic insurgency and, in order to regain initiative, had gravitated towards 
China. Despite its principled preference and significant support for a democratic 
neighbour to the East, and Nehru’s personal links to U Nu, India’s response to the 1962 
coup pursued engagement based on an external assessment of the rising threat of China, 
and on an internal assessment that indicated a lacking capability of Rangoon to deliver on 
                                                
357 See NAI, MEA B/54/1333/4-5 p. 51. Embassy report of 1955 notes that there is “a widespread feeling 
among Indians that there is no future for them in Burma (…) Even Indians nationals who have taken or 
applied for Burmese nationality are apprehensive of the future” NAI, MEA 1-4/55/55-BC(B), p. 67. 
Annual report for 1955: “If the present unsatisfactory economic conditions continue, the Burmese will very 
likely, increasingly blame Indians for their troubles” NAI, MEA 1-4/55/55-BC(B), p. 121. 
358 Amb. R. S. Mani, in Aug. 1961, to New Delhi: NAI, MEA 6(12)-R&I/61 pp. 83-84. 
359 Riots in November, including attacks on Indian mosques in Rangoon, prompt Amb. R. S. Mani to 
express his concern to the MEA’s Foreign Secretary: NAI, MEA 6(12)-R&I/61 p. 121. 
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domestic order and security, whether on tackling insurgents or protecting Indian migrants 
from Burmanization policies. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the assessments that drove India’s posture of engagement towards 
three illiberal regime changes in Nepal, Ceylon and Burma. In early 1962, Prime 
Minister J. Nehru faced authoritarian rule in Nepal (absolutist monarchy) and in Burma 
(military junta), and an increasingly illiberal state in Ceylon, which had steered towards 
ethnic conflict based on discriminatory policies towards the Tamil minority. 
While the pattern of these assessments is analyzed in the conclusion of Part 1 of this 
dissertation, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn specifically from this period: 
1. India’s posture of engagement was driven by pragmatic assessments on the 
changing internal (political) and external (security) circumstances involving the 
neighboring countries, and respective implications for its own interests. 
2. In terms of domestic politics of the neighboring country, India’s assessment was 
principally driven by the quest to ensure domestic stability and order, reflecting a 
concern about the risk of crisis escalation spilling across borders and affecting its 
domestic security (especially in the case of Burma and Sri Lanka).  
3. India’s assessment was also driven by the neighboring regime’s geopolitical 
alignments: in the cases of Nepal and Burma, the focus was on China, while in Sri 
Lanka it was on the West and the United States.  
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4. While morally and ideologically committed to the outgoing liberal regimes, India’s 
political and security assessments prevailed, leading it to pursue a cooperative 
engagement of the new regimes. 
5. Engagement was more out of choice than necessity: especially in the cases of 
Nepal and Sri Lanka, India could have used its leverage to pursue a more coercive 
posture, but refrained from doing so given its cost-benefit calculus in each case. 
6. PM J. Nehru rejected extraordinary domestic pressures for India to adopt a 
coercive posture against the illiberal regimes in Nepal, Ceylon and Burma, not 
because of some principled commitment to non-interference, but because he saw 
it to be counterproductive to India’s security interests (for example, by further 
pushing Nepal and Burma into Chinese hands). 
7. As democratic regimes in Nepal and Burma failed to deliver, becoming a liability 
both to internal stabilization (political fragmentation and isolation) and external 
security (rapprochement with China), India’s short-term imperatives prevailed, 
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CHAPTER 3 – COERCIVE INVOLVEMENT AMIDST POLITICAL 
LIBERALIZATION (1987-90) 
 
Whether it is an attack from foreign forces, whether it is through internal dissension, whether it is 
through pressures, the system, the democratic system has held. Today it stands distilled by time 
and proved to the world that India’s basic democratic strength cannot be changed. We stand for a 
politics of conciliation, not of confrontation, of solving problems by sitting down across the table, 
discussing them, solving them, sorting them out, preventing them from growing, preventing 
pressures from increasing to a point where our system will not be able to sustain them. 360 
 PM Rajiv Gandhi (1985) 
 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s quote above, given a little less than a year after Sikh 
bodyguards assassinated his mother, Indira Gandhi, typically reflects a principled Indian 
commitment to democracy as a morally superior form of government. It also contains, 
however, a rare assessment about the democratic “system” as the most effective model to 
diffuse a country’s “internal dissension” and “pressures” in the long term.  
While the young Indian Prime Minister was thus probably referring to successful peace 
agreements signed earlier that year in the insurgency-ridden states of Punjab and Assam, 
the fact that he delivered his speech at the National Defence College, with several 
references to South Asia’s regional security, can also be interpreted as a portentous advice 
to its neighbors to emulate the virtues of the Indian democratic system.  
In this Indian line of thought, failing to do so would sooner or later lead to: 1) an 
escalating regime crisis, with rising internal dissent and turbulence; 2) the consequent 
instability and disorder threatening India’s domestic and external security interests, and 
                                                
360 Oct. 8, 1985, in New Delhi: MEA, "FAR 1985," 299. 
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therefore 3) a necessary Indian coercive posture, through involvement supporting regime 
change. Part II of the dissertation examines this causal link in India’s regional crisis policy 
in greater detail, especially the short- and long-term calculus on how liberal or 
authoritarian regimes best deliver on India’s security interests.  
Given the objectives of this first part of the dissertation, however, the focus is on 
understanding the strategic nature of the assessments that drive India’s crisis response 
posture. As predicted by PM R. Gandhi in 1985, India’s neighbors faced extraordinary 
domestic pressures and dissent over the following years, resulting in deep regime crises 
and change. In Nepal, mass protests in 1990 forced an end to monarchical absolutism, 
returning the kingdom to multiparty democracy after thirty years. In Sri Lanka, the 
ethnic conflict turned into a civil war, as a new generation of militant Tamils began an 
insurgency for secession. And in Burma, General Ne Win’s isolated military regime broke 
down under a mass pro-democracy uprising, in 1988.  
Unlike in the 1950s, in all these three cases, India adopted a coercive posture, supporting 
liberalization. In Nepal and in Burma, it denounced the prevailing authoritarian regimes 
as unsustainable, openly siding with pro-democracy forces and calling for regime change. 
In Sri Lanka, it first pressurized the regime to pursue constitutional changes to end the 
ethnic conflict, and then intervened militarily to enforce a solution.  
Such coercive involvement is particularly surprising given India’s relative domestic and 
international weakness in the late 1980s: internally, New Delhi faced unprecedented 
levels of political dissent, insurgent violence and an uncertain economic transition, while 
externally it witnessed the collapse of its quasi-ally, the Soviet Union and an uncertain 
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environment. Despite such fragility, why did India adopt bold and coercive postures 
towards its neighbors, including a military intervention in Sri Lanka?  
Exceptionalist narratives on Indian foreign policy frequently explain such coercive 
postures as reflecting an “idealist” turn to promote democratic values among its 
neighbors, as underlined by PM R. Gandhi’s quote above about the righteousness and 
effectiveness of the “democratic system.” Hegemonic narratives, in turn, explain India’s 
coercive posture in the late 1980s as a realist reflex to maximize control over its neighbors 
and expand its security-umbrella. Beyond such simplistic explanations, a closer study of 
Indian strategic assessments explains how the crises were expected to affect India’s 
domestic and external security interests. 
 
1. Nepal 1990 
In the spring of 1990, the Nepalese people took to the streets of Kathmandu in a mass 
movement to demand multi-party elections and parliamentary democracy. The uprising 
was fueled by an informal trade blockade, which New Delhi had enforced on the 
landlocked kingdom after a dispute in 1988, and throughout the protests the Indian 
government kept pressuring King Birendra to embrace democratic reforms – which 
eventually lead to a regime change in April of 1990. India’s coercive posture was, 
however, determined by two prior security assessments about royal rule in Kathmandu: 
Birendra had been pursuing a strategy of extra-regional strategic diversification – 
especially with China – that threatened India’s security and “special relationship” with 
Nepal; and while this lead to an escalating conflict in bilateral relations after 1987, the 
monarch persisted on his policy, refusing Indian overtures and cutting off all 
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communication channels with New Delhi. As the monarch crossed more than one Indian 
red line, a democratic regime became practically necessary.  
* 
On February 20, 1990, a day after the Royal Nepalese Army had opened fire and killed 
eleven protesters participating in a mass pro-democracy demonstration, an Indian Air 
Force jet flew into Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan airport. Out of it emerged General S. K. 
Sinha wearing a Gurkha dhaka topi on his head, ready to execute the mission India’s Prime 
Minister V. P. Singh had entrusted onto him as the new ambassador to the kingdom: to 
convince King Birendra to listen to the people on the streets and embrace democracy.361  
Over the following weeks, the retired Army official made extraordinary diplomatic efforts 
to walk a thin line – he had to preserve his access and influence over the increasingly 
besieged monarch and, at the same time, avoid the impression that India was siding with 
the old regime against the popular uprising.362 But as violent protests kept escalating, 
patience in New Delhi quickly ran out, the Indian external affairs minister eventually 
noting that the Government of India “cannot be averse” and “cannot but feel 
committed” to the “peaceful” Nepalese “aim of reestablishing a multiparty democratic 
system under a constitutional monarchy”.363 The King would cling on to his absolute 
power for another six weeks, at the cost of dozens of lives and rising pressure from India 
until, on April 15th, he finally gave in by dismissing his cabinet, inviting the political 
                                                
361 Shreenivas K. Sinha, A Soldier Recalls (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), 341. 
362 Gen. S. K. Sinha’s privileged access allowed him to present credentials just two days after arriving, in the 
royal Winter palace, in Pokhara. He recalls repeated meetings seeking to “impress on [the] King the need 
to soon come to terms with the forces of democracy” and cautioning him that “an Army cannot fight its 
own people forever”. On the other hand, Sinha kept secretly in touch with pro-democracy leaders. Sinha, 
Soldier Recalls, 357-8, 68. 
363 March 30, 1990 statement in parliament in Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 784-5. 
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parties to form an interim government, and accepting a limited royal role under a new 
constitution and multi-party democracy. 
For almost thirty years, since the 1960 coup executed by his father, King Birendra’s rule 
had proved relatively stable, even surviving a free referendum.364 However, despite this 
apparent tranquility, Indo-Nepalese relations went through a period of acute conflict in 
the late 1980s, with New Delhi adopting an increasingly coercive posture, eventually 
enforcing an economic blockade on the landlocked kingdom, after refusing to renew 
separate trade and transit treaties.365 By slashing Nepal’s economic growth from a peak of 
10% to little more than 1%, Indian involvement played a decisive role in fueling 
discontent against the King and the democratic regime change in the Spring of 1990.366  
While one may therefore be tempted to infer that New Delhi’s policy was, from the onset 
of the crisis, directed at achieving such liberalization of Nepalese politics, a closer 
examination indicates that regime change was an unintended – and in some conservative 
circles even undesired – effect of the initial bilateral dispute.367 If not a preference for 
more democracy in Nepal, what then determined India’s coercive posture towards Nepal 
in the late 1980s? Two related security assessments played a determinant role. 
 
                                                
364 After student protests in 1979, King Birendra held a referendum in 1980 at which the continuation of 
the panchayat system prevailed over multi-party democracy (55% to 45%). 
365 For a critical background on the blockade, and negotiations for the 1978 trade and transit treaty see 
Jagat S. Mehta, Negotiating for India: resolving problems through diplomacy (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006). Ch. XX 
366 93% of Nepalese respondents in a survey classified India’s role as “very important” or “important,” 
Ramjee P. Parajulee, The democratic transition in Nepal (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 210. In June 
1990, Nepal’s new PM Bhattarai paradoxically referred to his country’s new democracy as a “negative 
benefit” which could not have been achieved without the Indian blockade: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 799. 
367 Based on the account of Ronen Sen, then a key advisor to PM R. Gandhi (Interview 081). One of King 
Birendra’s advisers, Chiran Thapa, confirms: despite the crisis, the Indian government did not intend to 
dethrone the monarch. New Delhi has its priorities “clearly defined,” concerned about China and that 
“things didn’t go out of control.” He underlines the role by two former Indian ambassadors to Nepal (H. C. 
Sarin and M. K. Rasgotra), who “constantly counselled restraint” (Interview 027). 
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Nepal’s attempts to escape the Indian security umbrella 
First, and most importantly, India’s posture was driven by a negative assessment of King 
Birendra’s strategy to diversify Nepal’s security and economic linkages, especially with 
China, which were seen to threaten India’s predominant influence. 
While Indian concerns only manifested themselves openly after 1987, they had been 
privately expressed to Kathmandu much earlier: given its geographic situation bordering 
China, and in order to preserve its benefits from an open border and the “special 
relationship” instituted by the 1950 Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 
Nepal was to refrain from taking any decision potentially threatening Indian security – a 
vague condition that each side has variably interpreted and disputed since then.  
Exploring this ambiguity and driven by a changed global context after taking over in 
1975, King Birendra had embraced an increasingly assertive balancing strategy, starting 
with his proposal for a Nepal Zone of Peace (NZOP) – demilitarized and neutral between 
China and India.368 Described in 1982 as Nepal’s top foreign policy priority, and eagerly 
endorsed by Beijing, the initiative concerned New Delhi because Nepalese diplomats 
were vigorously pursuing it at multilateral settings despite Indian opposition.369 But most 
importantly, its implementation would mean the “shifting of India’s northern security line 
from [the] Indo-Tibetan to [the] Indo-Nepalese border, in the heart of Indian mainland 
… [and would therefore] accordingly demand the sealing of the Indo-Nepal border.”370 
                                                
368 Initiative first forwarded by him in Feb. 1975, along with support for Sri Lanka’s initiative for an Indian 
Ocean Zone of Peace, and Pakistan’s initiative for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. 
369 In Feb. 1982, Nepal’s PM S. B. Thapa describes the NZOP as “the top priority of our foreign policy.” 
Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 725. By 1988, 97 states supported the initiative, including China and all other South 
Asian states. For the causes behind India’s opposition, see Muni, India and Nepal, 76-89. 
370 Muni, India and Nepal, 79. 
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Despite being aware of, and repeatedly warned about the security implications for India 
of the NZOP, and about its “equidistant” balancing strategy to transcend the India-
China dynamic, Kathmandu persisted.371  In the view of one of his main advisers, King 
Birendra did so because he interpreted several precedents as indicating rising Indian 
comfort with greater Nepalese autonomy and policy of diversification:  
Nepal had to take advantage of [the new] maneuverability with the end of the Cold War and 
made possible with technology. [It was a] strategy to take advantage of globalization for Nepal’s 
benefit to [the] maximum extent possible (…) There were other options, opportunities now that 
we felt didn’t hurt India’s fundamental interests of security.372 
Perceptions and feelings aside, by persisting in its pursuit for the NZOP and by seeking to 
rope in third countries such as the United States, Kathmandu’s policy did indeed set off 
alarm bells in New Delhi.373 Nepal was seen to be slipping away from under the Indian 
security umbrella, and two clashes after 1987 further reinforced this assessment.374 
The first clash related to King Birendra’s decision to order a consignment of Chinese 
military supplies, including anti-aircraft guns, without consulting India. After his 
successful state visit to China in September 1987, negotiations for the contract began in 
                                                
371 India first promises to study the NZOP closer, but after 1983 rejects it on grounds that it may erode the 
centrality of its bilateral treaty of 1950 and the “special relationship” it instituted by submitting Nepal’s 
security to that of India: S. D. Muni, "Nepal as a Zone of Peace," Strategic Analysis 7, no. 10 (1984). Nepalese 
persistent attempts to convince New Delhi otherwise kept failing until 1989: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 754. 
372 C. Thapa (Interview 027), who refers to what Kathmandu interpreted as three “precedents”: 1) After a 
special request by King Birendra to Saudi King Faizal, during the 1973 energy crisis, New Delhi had 
granted Nepal special transit rights to import Saudi oil; 2) India had cleared Soviet military assistance to 
Nepal via Calcutta, after 1978 Birendra’s visit to Moscow, in 1978; and 3) After 1977, under PM M. Desai, 
India had reversed policy and agreed to Nepal’s demand of separate trade and transit agreements. 
373 C. Thapa thus argues that, at the time, Nepal’s priority was a “third country relationship, especially 
Japan, USA, European, and Arab countries,” so as to transcend the India-China competition and further 
leverage its bargaining power: Birendra’s “idea was to diversify policy as long as it did not affect Indian 
interests” (Interview 027). Serving at the U.S. Department of State, Howard Schaffer recalls: “much to 
Nepal’s dismay, we (…) did not try to pressure India on its Nepal policy.” 
(http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Schaffer,%20Howard%20B.toc.pdf pp. 118-190. 
374 India’s deputy minister of external affairs, K. N. Singh, recalls Nepal’s attempts to play off India against 
China, but “not really in a position to do it … it was almost funny because anyone [in Nepal] with anything 
in their head would know that in their position you can’t do anything against India” (Interview 075). 
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March 1988, and the first batch arrived in June 1988.375 Just a few weeks later, India’s 
deputy minister of External Affairs flew in secretly to Kathmandu to express Prime 
Minister’s Rajiv Gandhi’s surprise and alarm at the development, which the King first 
denied, and then tried to justify as not having any hostile intent.376  
The root of the dispute lay in differing interpretations of the 1950 Treaty clause that 
required Indian consent for Nepalese military imports through its territory: Kathmandu 
argued for a narrow and literal reading, noting that the Chinese weapons had not been 
delivered via India, while New Delhi argued for a wider reading and applicability under 
the new geopolitical conditions of accessibility, noting that under the clause’s original 
“spirit” any Chinese military assets in Nepal would undermine Indian security.377  
While it remains unclear why, over the next months Kathmandu refused to heed to New 
Delhi’s repeated warnings through a variety of official channels or cancel the two 
remaining weapon installments. 378 Instead, besides persisting on its sovereignty and 
legitimacy to import weapons from any country, the Nepalese took further steps of 
                                                
375 500 trucks, arriving undercover and overnight, with US$20 million worth of NORINCO P-793 anti-
aircraft guns and other weapons and equipment. In September, China reiterated its support for the NZOP 
and announced a major economic assistance package. See Garver, Protracted Contest, 152; Avtar S. Bhasin, 
Nepal-India, Nepal-China relations: documents, 1947-2005 v. 5 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2005), 3194-5. 
376 K. N. Singh flew in on July 22 after PM R. Gandhi asked him to “go and have a look”. He recalls his 
message: “You violated [the] 1950 Treaty, imported weapons from Russia without telling us, [and now] 
Chinese have been giving arms and you did not tell us, but we know the trucks are here – and for what do 
you need antiaircraft guns? If you want adversarial relation, that is up to you” (Interview 075). 
377 C. Thapa thus notes that anti-aircraft guns were a) imported directly from China, so not violating the 
1950 Treaty per se; b) “defensive weapons” and of no concern to India; and c) required to prepare for an 
eventual insurgency (Interview 027). For a summary of the Nepalese position see also Subedi, Dynamics of 
foreign policy and law: a study of Indo-Nepal relations, 26. For a summary of the Indian interpretation, see Muni, 
India and Nepal, 47-9, 58-9. Six month after the India-Nepal Treaty was signed, Nehru noted that “even a 
child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without passing through India.” Quoted in S. D. Muni, Pangs of 
proximity: India and Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis (New Delhi: Sage, 1993), 16.  
378 Nepal’s Foreign Minister, for example, recalls that the issue was brought up repeatedly in meetings 
throughout 1988, including by Ambassador A. Deo (June), deputy minister K. N. Singh (July), and External 
Affairs Minister P. V. N. Rao (August), as well as by PM R. Gandhi in a meeting with Birendra (the King’s 
response “did not satisfy the Indian Prime Minister”): Shailendra K. Upadhyay, Tryst with diplomacy (New 
Delhi: Vikas, 1991), 75-81.  
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rapprochement towards China, including a new intelligence sharing agreement in late 
1988. 379  Beijing naturally jumped at the low-cost opportunity to rub salt into the 
deepening wounds of Indo-Nepalese relations, further aggravating Indian threat 
assessments.380  
The second clash related to Nepal’s policy of economic diversification and liberalization, 
seen as threatening India’s special role in the Kingdom’s developmental efforts. New 
Delhi perceived two measures to be of particular concern. First, starting in 1986, 
Kathmandu awarded a series of infrastructure projects to China and other countries in 
the lowland Terai, a region in which – given the open border – India saw any third-
country presence as a potential security challenge and thus demanded a “first right of 
refusal.”381 Second, in 1987, Nepal enforced new labor legislation to stem immigration 
and restrict the rights of Indian workers, which New Delhi saw as a further violation of 
the 1950 Treaty and of the reciprocal benefits it accorded to millions of Nepalese citizens 
residing in India.382  
                                                
379 Garver, Protracted Contest, 151. Even as the crisis escalated, on Apr. 7, 1989, the King’s chief spokesman 
and former PM R. S. Bista, dismissed Indian concerns: “arms procured from China are defensive in nature 
and limited in quantity; they cannot be said to pose even the smallest threat to India.” Bista advocated 
rapprochement with China and visited Beijing in September: Avtar S. Bhasin, Nepal-India, Nepal-China 
relations: documents, 1947-2005 v.3 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2005), 2190. 
380 Nov. 19-21, 1989, as trade blockade is in full swing, Chinese PM Li Peng visits Nepal, announces major 
grants, and emphasizes: “We consider it unjustified for a neighboring country of Nepal to impose a 
blockade against the Kingdom … [and hope] India will be more magnanimous and generous.” Bhasin, 
Nepal-India, Nepal-China relations: documents, 1947-2005 v. 5, 3202-6. 
381 Nepal’s Foreign Minister recalls this as an Indian demand on various upcoming infrastructure projects, 
especially in the Terai region, first articulated in Dec. 1986 by K. N. Singh, who expressed particular 
concern at these being allotted to Chinese companies. A compromise is reached on some issues: India 
agreed to rebuild a road on a grant, and Nepal withdrew contract for China to build energy distribution 
lines in a 25-30 km belt near the border with India: Upadhyay, Tryst, 43-64. C. Thapa notes that Nepal’s 
policy was to abide by World Bank criteria and thus awarded contracts strictly to the lowest bidder, in this 
case China, which Indian officials opposed given “security interests.” K. N. Singh recalls: “yes, they gave 
tenders to lowest bidder, China, but that went against the spirit of our friendship.” (Interviews 027, 075). 
382 Apr. 1987: Nepal enforces stricter regulations for alien workers in Kathmandu, requiring Indians to 
have appropriate documentation to avoid deportation. The new immigration policy implemented most 
recommendations from the governmental Task Force on Internal and International Migration, created in 
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Both issues were compounded by the effects of Nepal’s diversification strategy leading its 
more open economy to grow three times faster, at close to 10%, and India’s share in the 
Kingdom’s total trade to fall abruptly, from 96% to 29%, in just twenty years.383 In New 
Delhi’s view, Nepal was therefore not only freeriding on generous Indian trade and 
transit offers regulated by the 1978 bilateral agreements, but also pursuing a policy of 
“systematic discrimination” against Indian economic interests.384  
On March 23, 1989, the existing trade and transit agreements between India and Nepal 
expired, New Delhi revoking all non-reciprocal benefits and imposing an unofficial 
embargo with a devastating impact.385 From the onset, Nepalese officials knew that this 
measure was not the outcome of a mere technical conflict, but meant to retaliate and 
remind Nepal that, in exchange for the benefits of an open border and the “special 
relationship” institutionalized in 1950, it was precluded from taking any action impinging 
on India’s security.386 It could not have both, and India’s unofficial embargo therefore 
hoped to either nudge or force King Birendra and his government to re-embrace the 
                                                                                                                                            
1983, which had emphasized the need to reduce immigration from India, despite the 1950 Treaty: 
http://bipinadhikari.com.np/Archives/Articles/Reassessment_of_Harka_%20Gurung%20Report_19950
428.php 
383 From 1971 to 1991: Parajulee, Democratic Transition, 184. Nepal’s FM on this policy in Apr. 1989: “It is in 
our interest to let interdependence grow.” http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/11/world/nepal-s-
economy-is-gasping-as-india-a-huge-neighbor-squeezes-it-hard.html  
384 Apr. 26, 1989, India’s EAM P. V. N. Rao, who says 1950 Treaty now “eroded,” because “not only are 
Indians as individuals discriminated against but Indian firms, having won contracts against international 
bidding, have been deprived of what is due to them through maneuvers in favour of third countries.” He 
also contests Nepal’s decision to withdraw tariff/customs benefits, leading to a 50% fall in Indian exports: 
Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 758-60, 67. 
385 Nepal was not a GATT member, nor India a signatory to the International Convention on Transit 
Trade of Landlocked Countries. Nepal’s economic growth fell from 10% to 2%. An MEA spokesperson 
explained the measure as a response to Nepal’s policy of “changing trade patterns” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.3, 
2187 fn1. For Indian reaction see also pp. 2172-2256. 
386 Nepal’s FM recognizes that already in March, 1988, “it was clear that India was not interested in any 
talk [on trade] before the security issue was taken up” Upadhyay, Tryst, 91, 94. Also, royal adviser C. 
Thapa: trade was “not the major issue, more than anything else, we knew it [crisis] was motivated by 
Chinese weapons” and “other security issues.” (Interview 027).  
	   162	  
wider “spirit” of the 1950 Treaty: Nepal would be better off curtailing some of its 
autonomy in exchange for a friendly India than by persisting on its quest for 
independence through strategic diversification, especially via China.387  
Even the most critical Indian voices against the economic blockade acknowledged that 
New Delhi was thus left with little option but to coercively counter Nepal’s moves.388 The 
warnings had become increasingly explicit, Nepal’s Foreign Minister for example 
recalling India’s Foreign Secretary, K. P. S. Menon’s veiled threat, in late 1988, that 
Nepal was “systematically undermining these [India-Nepal] special ties based on trust” 
and that while “India does not believe in the ‘buffer state’ theory … if Nepal keeps up this 
trend in its policy we [Indians] believe that Nepal’s future will be insecure.”389 
The security factor in India’s assessments was so predominant that it even survived a 
change in government, in December of 1989. The new Prime Minister, V. P. Singh, had 
openly criticized his predecessor’s approach during the electoral campaign, and 
accordingly one of his first foreign policy initiatives was to start a bilateral dialogue, 
normalize relations, and end the blockade as soon as possible.390 However, just three 
months later, in March 1990 and at the peak of the crisis in Kathmandu, his government 
                                                
387 K. N. Singh attributes the “nosedive in relations” to Nepal “badmouthing India and ineptly playing the 
China card”. PM R. Gandhi had had enough of “imaginary grievances of the Nepali establishment.” K. 
Natwar Singh, Walking with lions: tales from a diplomatic past (Noida: Harper Collins, 2013), 121. On India 
using the trade embargo to signal concern about the “long-term security implications” of Nepal’s 
diversification strategy, see Muni, India and Nepal, 47-9. 
388 J. Mehta, for example, notes that Nepal’s diversification strategy “predictably invited adverse reactions 
from India.” In particular, playing the China card was “a mistake” and “a provocative statement risking 
revulsion in India and insignificant security gains for Nepal” Mehta, Rescuing, 230. 
389  In a meeting in New Delhi, on Dec. 6 1988, quoted by Nepal’s FM: Upadhyay, Tryst, 80-81. 
390 Nepal welcomed V. P. Singh’s outreach attempts and, in an apparent quid pro quo, awarded an 
important road reconstruction project to India on Dec. 13. Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 778-9; MEA, "Foreign 
Affairs Record 1989," (New Delhi 1990), 326. Normalization attempts include three rounds of technical 
dialogue in New Delhi (Jan. and Feb.) and in Kathmandu (April). Nepal’s FM, however, recalls this was 
fruitless because of the deeper issues involved: “[the] question of security dimension of India is such that no 
party in India can ignore [it] and this was [remained in early 1990] … the main problem between our 
relationship.” Upadhyay, Tryst, 103. 
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would propose a draft agreement to update and expand the mutual security clauses of the 
1950 Treaty which reflected India’s perennial security concerns – including clauses which 
royalist Nepal rejected immediately as an insult, on grounds of eroding its 
independence.391 In stark contrast, just two months later, after the regime change, Nepal’s 
new democratic caretaker government promised to cooperate with the Indian 
government to address all its security concerns.392 
 
His Majesty’s Himalayan radio silence  
Nepalese and Indian strategies had clashed numerous times before, but the crisis in the 
late 1980s spiraled into open conflict and an irreversible situation favoring regime change 
because of a second Indian assessment: King Birendra cut key channels of 
communication and rejected New Delhi’s overtures to negotiate, even as the pro-
democracy parties on the streets gained track as a credible alternative.  
Several theories have been forwarded for King Birendra’s lack of responsiveness after 
1987, including his progressive isolation, the conservative profile of his advisers and his 
cabinet, and his underestimation of India’s hostile response paired with an overestimation 
of Chinese willingness to support him.393 Whatever the cause, His Majesty’s silence 
                                                
391 Discussed at bilateral dialogue in Kathmandu, March 30-April 1, possibly presented by Indian Foreign 
Secretary S. K. Singh, it reportedly included a clause that Nepal’s future defence acquisitions required 
“prior consultation” from India. [XX: draft in Bhasin; v1 1994]. See also Subedi, Dynamics of foreign policy and 
law: a study of Indo-Nepal relations, 50. 
392 June 10, India-Nepal joint statement: “prior consultations with a view to reaching mutual agreement on 
such defence-related matters which, in the view of either country, could pose a threat to its security.” 
Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 799.  
393 For a summary of these theories, see T. Louise Brown, The challenge to democracy in Nepal: a political history 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 114-42. K. N. Singh emphasizes that the King was isolated, opposed to change 
and accommodation, “badly” influenced by his wife Queen Aishwarya and a circle of “third rate courtier 
advisers” which led the cabinet and other government officials to embrace anti-Indianism as “proof of royal 
allegiance” (Interview 075). 
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caused alarm because it was precisely during periods of bilateral tension that New Delhi 
most expected channels of communication to remain open.  
Throughout 1988, as the bilateral conflict flared up, New Delhi had therefore pursued a 
gradual policy of engagement, secretly reaching out to King Birendra through a variety of 
channels to express concern, draw red lines, and also hint at possible repercussions – K. 
N. Singh’s July 1988 being the best example of such attempts.394 At the same time, India 
also offered a variety of inducements, including its availability to consider a revision of the 
1950 Treaty, which were not taken up by Kathmandu.395 King Birendra, however, kept 
sending “mixed” signals, and the last drop came in late December 1988, when he did not 
show up at an informal breakfast meeting that PM R. Gandhi had conveyed for several of 
his counterparts at the sidelines of a regional summit.396  
Ambassador Ronen Sen, then serving as PM R. Gandhi’s national security adviser, 
recalls that India was initially “willing to give the benefit of doubt, but to face repeatedly 
such incidents was curious and threw up questions in New Delhi about the King’s bona 
fide intentions.”397 Indeed, despite the protocol incident and an escalating trade crisis, 
                                                
394 During his July 1988 visit as PM R. Gandhi’s special envoy, K. N. Singh meets the monarch privately to 
candidly list India’s various grievances and Nepalese actions going “against the letter and spirit” of the 1950 
Treaty. He pointedly asks: “[do] you intend to restructure or remold our bilateral relations?” And he warns: 
“India could live without the Treaty. [But] could Nepal? … As your friend, we’re telling you about 
[possible] consequences. Beyond a point, you will have to give up your strategy.” Despite specific threats, 
including about the King’s brother (Gyanendra), Singh recalls that thereafter “His Majesty dragged his 
royal feet. He prevaricated” (Interview 075) and Singh, Walking, 123. 
395 According to R. Sen, an offer conveyed repeatedly without success (Interview 081). Upadhyay, Tryst, 82. 
396 SAARC summit in Islamabad, Dec. 29-31. PM R. Gandhi interpreted this as an “insult” according to 
R. Bhandari: http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jun/11inter.htm. King Birendra’s adviser C. Thapa 
attributes it to a “protocol misunderstanding” (INT027) and R. Sen says that after being given an 
explanation, India was willing to give the monarch the benefit of the doubt (INT081). 
397 Ronen Sen recalls PM R. Gandhi’s “deep disappointment at the manner” in which Nepal was 
proceeding, catching India by surprise, and refers to the counterfactual precedent of Bhutan voting in 1986 
against India at the UN on a Pakistani proposal, but having informed India beforehand, and thus “more 
acceptable because we were not caught by surprise.” (INT081). Royal adviser C. Thapa confirms: India 
	  
	   165	  
India kept a variety of bilateral dialogues running throughout 1989, seeking to return the 
bilateral relationship to normalcy.398 But Kathmandu remained defiant, delaying Indian 
offers of negotiation, refusing to define its demands, and the King’s chief spokesperson 
accusing the Indian government of “carrying out a campaign of malicious and slanderous 
propaganda against the institution of monarchy, the people and other institutions and 
[the] political system of Nepal.”399 
As tensions escalated even further and Indian parliamentary elections approached in late 
1989, PM R. Gandhi was keen to solve the issue and reached out personally to King 
Birendra at the sidelines of a Non-Aligned Movement summit, which resulted in an 
agreement to pursue normalization through a secret channel established between two of 
their most trusted advisers.400 But when even this attempt collapsed after only a few 
weeks, following the monarch’s unexpected refusal to meet the Indian special envoy or to 
even consider his non-paper proposals to return to the “status quo ante,” New Delhi was 
                                                                                                                                            
was “very upset” when finding out that Chinese weapons had been purchased, despite King Birendra’s 
initial assurances that they had been a “gift.” (INT027). 
398 Despite the crisis, dialogue went on in 1989 as promised by PM R. Gandhi: dialogues are held between 
Water Resources Secretaries (March), Home Secretaries, Directors General of Civil Aviation, and Railway 
Authorities (May), Surveyors General, Defence and Foreign Secretaries (June), and the Joint Commission 
(July). External Affairs Minister N. Rao visited Kathmandu in August for a final attempt to normalize 
relations. MEA, "Annual Report 1989-90," (New Delhi 1990).  
399 Quoted in Bhasin, Nepal-India v.3, 2236. Further signals interpreted in New Delhi as hostile: Nepal kept 
insisting on the NZOP, internationalized the bilateral trade dispute at the UN and Non-Aligned 
Movement, and pro-government legislators opposed the Indian Army’s deployment of Gurkha soldiers to 
Sri Lanka: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 770-4.  
400 Meeting held Sept. 4-6 in Belgrade, at the sidelines of the NAM summit. Ronen Sen recalls PM R. 
Gandhi’a outreach to King Birendra and their agreement to start a secret and candid exchange of their 
mutual concerns via two of their advisers (himself and C. Thapa). The first round of consultations is held in 
Delhi (INT081). Thapa, recalls “good talks” in Belgrade, and Birendra favorable to Gandhi’s suggestion 
because in his view the crisis did not reflect any substantive disagreement, but had arisen from a “lack of 
communication”. He illustrates: “when [before this meeting] we tried to get them [India] to specify how we 
could get more trust, then they would always put the ball in our court and ask us what we wanted. This is 
problematic, because you can’t ask for trust without substance, specifics.” On the first meeting with Ronen 
Sen, Thapa recalls a “frank discussion of problems and possible solutions.” (INT027) 
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left both puzzled and concerned.401 As a final attempt to reach out to King Birendra also 
failed, India began seeing Nepal’s royal regime transformed as an obstacle, refusing to 
participate in any conflict resolution mechanism.402  
The King’s resolute silence – from the secluded comfort of his Winter palace in Pokhara 
– contrasted with the noise from the rapidly shifting situation on the ground in 
Springtime Kathmandu, as the political parties formed an unprecedentedly broad 
alliance with the Communist parties and took to the streets in a mass movement to 
demand democratization.403  
* 
King Birendra’s strategy in the 1980s to reduce dependence on India by reaching out to 
China and other countries to diversify its security and economic relations, was at the root 
of an escalating bilateral crisis with India, which saw this as a Nepalese attempt to escape 
its security umbrella. The monarch’s persistent refusal to engage New Delhi in any 
                                                
401 After the first meeting in New Delhi, Ronen Sen recalls flying in secretly to Kathmandu with a non-
paper that a) candidly listed Indian concerns; b) implicitly admitted to Indian shortcomings and capacity to 
deliver more; c) invited Nepal to “look beyond the legalistic dimension” of the 1950 Treaty; and d) 
expressed India’s availability to meet halfway and “go beyond the spirit of the [1950] understanding.” Sen 
underlines that suggestions were “not sacrosanct,” and while referring to the possibility of a Treaty revision 
in “strong” and “candid” terms, the non-paper did not include a draft proposal in order “not to interfere 
with due process.” To India’s surprise, however, King Birendra did not grant Sen a meeting, which was 
“very unusual” given the precedent of his previous missions as the PM’s special envoy to other heads of 
state or government. Sen says that R. Gandhi was thus “puzzled” at this “sudden offensive stance” after 
their personal investment in normalization (INT081). C. Thapa confirms Sen’s account and recalls the non-
paper as lining out “reasonable” and “perfectly acceptable” steps “to return to the status quo ante.” On 
Birendra’s lack of response (“a big mistake … if we had accepted the Indian proposal, none of the [regime] 
changes would have happened”), he offers three theories: a) Domestic opposition to normalization with 
India, in particular by Foreign Secretary N. B. Shah and PM M. M. Singh Shrestha; b) Assessment that 
India had already shifted policy objectives to achieve a democratic regime change, thus making any 
normalization attempt useless; and c) Decision to wait for outcome of elections in India, expecting pro-
democracy protests in Nepal to “fizzle out” thereafter. (INT027) 
402 R. Sen recalls these attempts: 1) PM R. Gandhi and his wife invited Crown Prince Dipendra for a 
private lunch in New Delhi, to pass on a message to his father; 2) Attempts to reach out via Indian officials 
who were trusted friends of the monarch, including Dinesh Singh, M. R. Scindia and Abid Hussein. 
(INT081) 
403 Under the leadership of G. M. Singh, the Nepali Congress launched a nation-wide protest movement 
(Movement for Restoration of Democracy) on Jan. 18, later on joined by several Communist parties. 
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conflict resolution mechanism to normalize the bilateral relationship eventually lead to a 
total breakdown in communication between both governments. New Delhi’s assessment 
thus shifted accordingly, as pro-democracy protests gained track: by 1989, a regime 
change in Kathmandu was not only probable, but also increasingly desirable for India’s 
twin interests of achieving order and security in Nepal. Rather than determined by a 
moral proclivity to support to democratization, or a hegemonic reflex to destabilize a 
small neighbor, India’s coercive posture in 1990 was the outcome of a strategic 
assessment about how regime change in Nepal became indispensable to India’s security 
interests and influence in the Himalayan kingdom. 
 
3. Sri Lanka 1987 
 [Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict threatened a] ripple effect on our polity and disintegrate us (…) 
[Indian involvement was therefore] an external projection of our influence to tell our neighbours 
that if, because of your compulsions or aberrations, you pose a threat to us, we are capable of, or 
we have a political will to project ourselves within your territorial jurisdiction for the limited 
purpose of bringing you back. … It is not arrogant. It is realpolitik.404  
 J. N Dixit, as High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (1989) 
In July 1987, India initiated its boldest experiment in liberal intervention in a Sri Lanka 
torn by an embryonic civil war. While formally based on a bilateral agreement, New 
Delhi deployed military force to compel Colombo into implementing an ambitious 
roadmap of constitutional reforms for conflict resolution. India’s coercive posture was 
rooted in three strategic assessments: 1) The Sri Lankan regime’s structural ethno-
nationalism and exclusive focus on a military solution to defeat insurgents, which 
                                                
404 March 10, 1989, at the United Services Institution, in New Delhi: Avtar S. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka 
relations and Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict: documents, 1947-2000 v.3 (New Delhi: Indian Research Press, 2001), 
2349-50. 
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threatened to prolong and escalate the conflict; 2) Colombo’s attempts at extra-regional 
balancing to counter India, which threatened to internationalize the conflict and affect 
India’s leverage and regional security predominance; and 3) the conflict’s spillover effect, 
which threatened to affect domestic security in India’s border region of Tamil Nadu. 
* 
At 16:47 on June 4, 1987, Indian Air Force (IAF) Grp. Cpt. B. K. Sunder’s attempt to 
contact the Sri Lankan Air Traffic Control in Colombo was greeted with ominous silence. 
Escorted by four Mirage 2000 fighter jets, he proceeded to execute Eagle Mission 4, or 
Poomalai (Garland), by lowering his AN-32 transport plane to about 1,500 feet and violate 
the island’s sovereign air space. A few minutes later, his and four other AN-32s dropped 
23 tones of humanitarian relief on to the city of Jaffna, where Tamil insurgents resisted a 
Sri Lankan Army offensive.405 Looking up to see the nine Indian planes conclude the 
airdrop with a provocative fly-by just after having been ordered by the Sri Lankan 
president to end his counter-insurgency offensive, Army Commander Cyril Ranatunga 
promised to himself: “I will never forget and will not forgive India to my dying day.”406  
Later that day the Sri Lankan government formally expressed “outrage” at the mission as 
an “unwarranted assault on our sovereignty and territorial integrity”.407 But President 
Julius R. Jayewardene perfectly understood the mission’s implied message: New Delhi 
                                                
405 http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1987ipkf/1022-chapter01.html  
406 Cyril Ranatunga, Adventurous journey from peace to war, insurgency to terrorism (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2009), 
143. India had attempted a naval relief operation the day before, but its 20 vessels were intercepted by the 
Sri Lankan Navy. The Sri Lankan government was given only an hour’s notice about the airdrop: Bhasin, 
India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1904-13; J. N. Dixit, Assignment Colombo (Delhi: Konark, 1998), 94-106. 
407 Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1917-19. Colombo instructed Sri Lankan Permanent Representative at the 
UN to raise the issue at the UNSC. India’s PR, C. Garekhan, recalls dissuading him: “it is your right to 
raise issue [but] no adoption of resolution possible, it was anyway not such a big deal, basically a 
humanitarian intervention in fashionable language.” [INT 034] 
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had moved into a coercive mode, ready to take any action necessary to pursue a political 
solution to the island’s ethnic conflict, and he was expected to cooperate.408  
And so he did: less than two months later, on July 29, Jayewardene hosted PM R. Gandhi 
in Colombo to sign the “Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in 
Sri Lanka,” creating an Indian military mission to enforce a cease-fire, disarm the Tamil 
insurgents, and assist in the implementation of constitutional amendments which 
amounted to a regime change.409 Less than a week later, the Indian Army had already 
deployed 3,000 men as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which would 
grow to a peak deployment of four divisions and almost 100,000 men.410 
India’s coercive posture in 1987 was the final step to an escalating involvement that had 
begun four years earlier, after Sri Lanka’s 1983 “Black July” race riots that took the lives 
of thousands of minority Tamils, and rendered around 100,000 refugees.411 This further 
encouraged the radicalization of the Tamil minority, which had started to embrace 
insurgency and secession in the 1970s.412 It thus became increasingly difficult for India to 
                                                
408 Indian outreach thereafter: June 12, through a letter by The Hindu editor N. Ram to Sri Lankan Minister 
G. Dissanayake outlining a first set of proposals and suggesting India as a mediator, “obviously with Rajiv 
Gandhi’s concurrence” De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 633. June 15: bilateral agreement on supply 
relief supplies. Late June: first Indian Army units put on alert for deployment. June 30: Sri Lanka’s FM A. 
C. S. Hameed acknowledges: “this ethnic conflict cannot be resolved without India’s participation.” By 
July, backchannel negotiations and drafts exchanged: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1920-32; Dixit, Assignment, 
119-77; De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 534-5, 636. 
409 PM R. Gandhi dismissed charges of interference: India’s involvement “in response to a specific and 
formal request of the Government of Sri Lanka … Your President asked for our cooperation in his effort to 
restore trust and peace.” MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1987," (New Delhi 1988), 257-8. 
410 Avtar S. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka relations and Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict: documents, 1947-2000 v.4 (New Delhi: 
Indian Research Press, 2001), 1981; Avtar S. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka relations and Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict: 
documents, 1947-2000 v.5 (New Delhi: Indian Research Press, 2001), 2444.  
411 Speaking on Aug. 15, 1983, on government’s alleged connivance in the riots, S. Thondaman, a cabinet 
minister form the [Tamil] Ceylon Workers Congress: “there is substantial evidence to believe that the 
events [were] ….not a sudden and spontaneous outbreak [but] a concerted attempt … by means of a 
carefully laid out plan over a long period of time.” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1097. 
412 Tamil militancy rose in the 1970s to replace the moderate Federal Party, and establish a violent quest for 
secession after the Tamil United Liberation Front adopted the Vaddukoddai Resolution on May 14, 1976. 
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stand by as the neighboring country slid into civil war, clashing with its ideal objective of 
a united, stable, and peaceful Sri Lanka.413 For four years thereafter, New Delhi trialed 
different, and often also contradictory policies to nudge all sides towards conflict 
resolution – it armed and detained Tamil insurgents, appointed and withdrew special 
envoys, mediated and interrupted negotiations, and even micro-managed constitutional 
discussions.414  
Beyond narratives about alleged benign altruism, hegemonic intent, or personal 
animosity, what led India in 1987 to abandon the offshore approach of “leading from 
behind” and embrace a full-blown coercive involvement with “boots on the ground”?415 
While liberal concerns played a foundational role in defining India’s approach to the 
conflict (and are examined in detail in Part II of the dissertation), the shift was driven by 
three strategic assessments. 
 
                                                
413 M. K. Narayanan who was in charge of the Tamil issue at the Intelligence Bureau in the early 1980s, 
defines the Indian policy dilemma: “We didn’t want Eelam [separate Tamil state]. … We didn’t want a 
hostile Sri Lanka. We didn’t want hostile Tamil groups in Sri Lanka. We didn’t want a hostile MGR [Chief 
Minister of India’s Tamil border state]. … Several concentric policy circles of priorities but at the axiomatic 
core we wanted a united SL.” [INT077]. The Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit offered the most 
comprehensive summary of the rationale and objectives of Indian involvement in a March 10, 1989 speech 
in New Delhi: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.4, 2347-50. 
414 FS M. K. Rasgotra recalls the dilemmas of involvement after 1983: “we exercised restraint, because 
whenever we go in to try to solve their problems, it always rebounded on us.” (Interview 040). 
415  For example, according to Sri Lankan Army Commander at the time: “The Indian government, with 
the furtive idea of gaining hegemony, directly and indirectly supported the destabilization process [of SL 
after July 83],” Ranatunga, Adventurous journey, 101-2. For versions underlining Indira Gandhi’s personal 
animosity towards J. Jayewardene, or Indian hegemonic intent, deep state interests, and post-colonial 
insecurities, see Sumantra Bose, States, nations, sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India, and the Tamil Eelam Movement (New 
Delhi: Sage, 1994), 130-74; Sankaran Krishna, Postcolonial insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the question of 
nationhood (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).  
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Colombo’s non-cooperation, from reluctance to resistance 
[After 1983, Sri Lanka] seemed more inclined to test, or probe the limits of Indian tolerance, 
than in finding a lasting solution to the ethnic muddle [by] using India’s good offices.416  
 M. K. Narayanan, Director of Intelligence Bureau 1987-89  
Of greatest influence was India’s assessment that President J. R. Jayewardene was not 
committed to finding a negotiated solution, moving from reluctance to resistance against 
Indian mediation, even while continuing to seek a military victory over the insurgents. 
While profoundly disturbed by the 1983 riots, Indian PM Indira Gandhi had initially 
dismissed suggestions – and extraordinary domestic pressure – for a military intervention 
in Sri Lanka.417 Instead, she persuaded Jayewardene to let India play a mediatory role.418  
This was the first act to a cycle that would repeat itself annually for the next four years 
(1983-87), with almost ritual regularity: after every bilateral crisis, ethnic riot, or peak in 
violence (normally May-July), Jayewardene would back down under Indian pressure and 
commit to a new phase of negotiations with Tamil parties or insurgents (August-
November), only to abruptly opt out and go on the offensive through political, economic 
or military means (December-April), which then lead to a new spiral of violence and 
conflict with India.  
                                                
416 M. K. Narayanan, "Role of Intelligence and Security Agencies," in Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, 
Failures, and Lessons ed. Rupesinghe Kumar (Colombo: Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006), 120-1. 
417  Her first reaction, on July 23, 1983: “This is an internal problem of Sri Lanka. India does not wish to, 
nor does it, interfere in the domestic affairs of another country” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1467-8. See also 
pp. 1468-1557 for demands in parliament for a military intervention, which P. Ramachandran says was 
considered by PM I. Gandhi, in a meeting with him and Defence Minister R. Venkataraman, “inspired by 
Grenada” (Interview 031). FS M. K. Rasgotra recalls asking the Indian PM in Nov. 1983: “if he’s not the 
guy that will bend a little, and sort out the domestic situation [in Sri Lanka], should we not consider 
throwing him out?” a suggestion she brushes off: “we will deal with whomever is in power.” (Interview 040). 
418 Aug. 12, 1983: Pressured by PM I. Gandhi, Jayewardene sends his brother H. W. Jayewardene to New 
Delhi to assure her about his commitment to solve the conflict and to share his proposals. She responds: 
“these [proposals] may not meet the [Tamil] aspirations,” but her offer of “good offices” is accepted and G. 
Parthasarathy is appointed special envoy on Aug. 18. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1540. 
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In 1983, negotiations began under Indian auspices after the “Black July” riots, but quickly 
collapsed as the Sri Lankan government imposed a naval blockade and pressed on a 
military offensive in early 1984.419 The All Party Conference reconvened again in August, 
only to be called off by Jayewardene in December despite Indian pressure, leading to a 
new bilateral standoff in mid-1985.420 In July and August 1985, India facilitated talks 
between the Sri Lankan government and various Tamil organizations in Bhutan, leading 
to an exchange of proposals which Jayewardene finally deems “totally unacceptable” in 
January, 1986.421 Finally, the cycle repeated one last time, as India developed the most 
detailed set of proposals in May, 1986, which it forwarded to all sides over the next 
months. They were then rejected by Jayewardene in December, after which he gave his 
armed forces green light to impose a blockade on the North and go on the offensive 
against the insurgents in early 1987.422 
                                                
419 Jayewardene accepts India’s good offices and began a new round of talks with the All Party Conference 
(APC), which faltered in October after he refused to include the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), 
the only significant non-insurgent Tamil organization. In Dec. 1983, he pitched for a limited set of reforms 
under “Annexure B” instead of the more substantive “Annexure C” proposals favored by India. Ignoring 
Indian advice, he postponed the APC in March 1984, after which violence escalated again. Bhasin, India-Sri 
Lanka v.1, 139; Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1563, 99. 
420  The APC is called off in December. Feb. 1985: PM R. Gandhi hosted Sri Lankan envoy 
Athulathmudali, in an effort to restart dialogue and invited President Jayewardene to visit India, but he 
prefers to stall in order to “bide time,” and visits Pakistan instead, where he makes a provocative statement 
on Kashmir: De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 607-8; Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1661. 
421 After a letter from PM R. Gandhi in May lamenting the lack in progress, Jayewardene visited New Delhi 
in June, leading to cease-fire agreement and two rounds of secret talks between the Sri Lankan government 
and Tamil insurgents facilitated by India, in July and August, in Bhutan. After India finally succeeded to 
coax the insurgents to submit their proposals, Jayewardene rejected them in Jan. 1986, leading to the end of 
cease-fire and India cancelling its good offices. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1172, 262-3, 65-67, 678-9; MEA, 
"FAR 1985," 190; De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 610-11. 
422 An Indian delegation led by P. Chidambaram and K. N. Singh developed a detailed set of proposals, 
which lead to substantive discussions between the Sri Lankan government and the TULF (37 meetings held 
in July and August) and also with insurgent groups. Presented on Dec. 17, the proposals are rejected just 
two days later by Jayewardene. In Jan. 1987 he announces an economic blockade on Jaffna, followed in 
March by aerial bombing, and the military offensive in May that provoked the Indian relief mission on June 
4. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1306-48, 781, 793, 796-824, 848; Dixit, Assignment, 51-2; De Silva, Regional 
powers, 176-86, 201-20. 
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In the Indian view after 1985, these cycles indicated a deliberate Sri Lankan strategy to 
delay any meaningful peace process, and this non-cooperative intent was becoming 
increasingly clear through a variety of tactical steps by Jayewardene. First, in 1983, he 
banned the moderate TULF from parliament, which decreased the probability of a 
negotiated understanding, but then, after 1985, deceptively engaged the party again 
despite knowing that it had been sidelined by the insurgent organizations.423   
Second, he would refuse to take the initiative on negotiations, constantly putting the onus 
on India (or the insurgents) to begin or move them forward – and whenever participating, 
he would publically profess to do so reluctantly, under pressure from New Delhi, and by 
submitting proposals that were bound to be rejected.424 Sri Lankan diplomatic and 
intelligence briefs to Jayewardene also indicate that he was well informed about India’s 
concerns and the pros and cons of negotiating with Tamil parties and insurgents, which 
further suggested his unwillingness to cooperate with the Indian-led peace process.425  
                                                
423 The sixth amendment was passed on Aug. 8, 1983, barring all 18 TULF representatives from 
parliament as they refused to take an oath to defend the country’s territorial integrity: Bhasin, India-Sri 
Lanka v.3, 1562. J. Dhanapala, at the time posted at the Sri Lankan High Commission in New Delhi, notes 
that while in the first few days after the riots India was ready to give Colombo the benefit of doubt, 
accepting explanations blaming individual cabinet members like Cyril Matthew, Jayewardene subsequently 
“did not play his cards well” because by passing the 6th amendment and by refusing to host a public inquiry, 
he gave out wring signals to India (Interview 073). V. Anandasangeree, a senior TULF member at the time 
notes how Jayewardene used the TULF after 1985 as a main interlocutor in “utterly useless talks, to bide his 
time,” despite knowing they had been sidelined, and not allowing them to consult with the LTTE 
(Interview 002). 
424 He would repeatedly refer to “Indian proposals” to which the Indian EAM responds, in 1984: India 
“has no proposals, cannot have any proposals. We can only make use of our good offices” Bhasin, India-Sri 
Lanka v.3, 1578-83. One of India’s most senior intelligence officers dealing with the Tamil insurgents, and 
present at the talks in Bhutan, notes that the composition and proposals of Sri Lanka’s government 
delegation were conservative, showing no initiative or commitment, which sent a wrong signal: S. 
Chandrasekharan, "The Timphu Talks: an Opportunity Missed?," in Sri Lankan Crisis and India's Response, 
ed. V. Suryanarayan (New Delhi: Patriot, 1991), 86-7. Dixit referred to the talks as “the dialogue of the 
deaf.” Dixit, Assignment, 44. 
425 In June 1984, Foreign Minister Hameed warns him that India saw his peace initiative as “a device to 
buy time to permit a solution along exclusively Sinhala lines.” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 143.  
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Third, Jayewardene took open pride in exploring organizational and personal differences 
within the Indian government to his own advantage, playing off different leaders, 
mediators and government organizations against one another and thus delaying 
negotiations.426  
Fourth, after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, in October 1984, the Sri Lankan President 
made a fatal underestimation, expecting Rajiv Gandhi to terminate Indian involvement 
and back off – when exactly the opposite happened.427  
Fifth, his public statements about India as a threat and comparing the Sri Lankan conflict 
to the Indian conflicts in Punjab and Kashmir, only confirmed New Delhi’s assessment 
that he was not amenable to embrace the political pillar of India’s prescribed dual 
counter-insurgency strategy.428  
Finally, despite justifying his reluctant cooperation and occasional anti-India rhetoric with 
the need to appease Sinhala pressure groups domestically, including his own Prime 
Minister R. Premadasa, President J. R. Jayewardene was firmly in control: he had been 
                                                
426 K. N. Singh recalls him boasting in 1987 “I’m the Sunil Gavaskar [famous Indian cricket batsman] of 
Sri Lanka: you have sent six bowlers [envoys], and they’re all out, so who’s next?” (Interview 075). Foreign 
Secretary M. K. Rasgotra describes G. Parthasarathy as his “first victim,” in 1983: “GP was supposed to 
seduce Jayewardene, but ended up seduced, trusting he would accept our Annexure C proposals.” 
(Interview 040, see also Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1565-69.) P. Chidambaram recalls how “old fox” 
Jayewardene promised to implement a new set of proposals worked out by India in 1986, only to reject 
them just two days after they were announced: “he was shrewd and played his smart game … [he] got 
Rajiv [Gandhi] convinced that he was a great friend of India, played him well” (Interview 036). 
427 According to his semi-official biography, Jayewardene “believed, at this stage [late 1984], that Rajiv 
Gandhi was more likely to follow the [less interventionist] example of his grandfather [Nehru] than his 
imperious mother [Indira Gandhi]” which may explain why he chose to “bide time” instead of accepting 
an invitation to visit India for talks: De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 592, 607-8. C. Gharekhan 
recalls this as a fatal underestimation: “After 1983 [riots], to put it mildly, India was [had been] tolerant” 
and while R. Gandhi “continued the mantra that we will not support secession, [after 1984] he pursued a 
more assertive policy” (Interview 034).  
428 Nov. 3, after attending her funeral: “In India, some Sikhs are agitating for a separate State, Khalistan. In 
Sri Lanka some Tamils are doing the same, seeking to establish “Eelam”. (…) In India, a few enraged 
Hindus massacred innocent Sikhs. In Sri Lanka a few enraged Sinhalese massacred innocent Tamils”. R. 
Gandhi replied saying issues were “not comparable,” but he repeated the comparison on Apr. 18 in an 
interview to Radio Australia, further incensing Indian officials. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1284-5, 633-5. 
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elected in 1982 for a six year-long mandate, and the 1977 legislative elections had given 
his party a parliamentary super-majority that allowed him to adopt a new constitution 
and then amend it at will to hold on to power.429 All this reinforced earlier Indian 
assessments that Sinhala ethno-nationalism and resistance to address Tamil grievances 
were deeply rooted across all Sri Lankan parties: paradoxically, despite being largely non-
cooperative, President Jayewardene was thus the best possible partner and his tactics were 
received with continued, albeit diminishing Indian tolerance.430  
The tipping point was reached in early 1987, when it became clear that Jayewardene’s 
public commitments to a military solution were not only meant to appease domestic 
hardliners, but rooted in a firm belief in force to end the ethnic conflict: “[The] Tamil 
problem is more a military problem and any military problem has to be tackled 
militarily.”431 More importantly, Sri Lanka was investing massively in modernizing its 
Armed Forces, leading the share of its defense expenditure to skyrocket from 3.8% in 
1980 to 16.8% in 1987. 432  Jayewardene had entrusted this mission to Gen. Cyril 
Ranatunga, whom he recalled into active service to establish a new Joint Operations 
Command and execute an aggressive defense diplomacy to procure military supplies and 
training abroad.433  
                                                
429 Sept. 1978: New constitution promulgated with a presidential system. Aug. 1982: Third amendment 
passed, allowing Presidential re-election. Dec. 1982: He wins a constitutionally dubious referendum to 
extend the Parliament’s mandate by another 6 years. 
430 According to a former Indian high commissioner to Colombo: “the ruling elite of Ceylon, whether it be 
the UNP or the SLFP, has since independence thought it expedient to play on the Singhala-Buddhist ethos 
of the island, thereby alienating the Tamil element of the population.” Coelho, Palk Straits, 149. 
431 From a Dec. 1985 statement: “…it is not difficult to handle Jaffna. We can cut off food and supplies to 
the peninsula and flush out terrorists in a month’s time.” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1233-36. Also, in May 
1, 1986: “military solution was the answer to a military question” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, cxii. 
432 K. M. De Silva, "The Police and Armed Services," in Sri Lanka: Problems of Governance, ed. K. M. De Silva 
(New Delhi: Konark, 1993), 365. 
433 Ranatunga, Adventurous journey, 109-24. 
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In 1986, these assessments drove India’s accusations of duplicity, as expressed by the 
Minister of External Affairs before parliament: “professing that they  [Sri Lankan 
government] want a political solution, they [are] in their hearts, or in actual fact, opting 
for a military solution.”434 When, in January 1987, Jayewardene ordered an economic 
blockade followed by aerial bombardments on the North, R. Gandhi made one last 
appeal, repeating India’s mantra since 1984:  
We know that no ethnic problem such as this [in Sri Lanka] has a military solution [because] 
military solutions are only temporary solutions. They do not solve the problem. They only suppress 
the problem and, if there is to be a solution, it must be a negotiated solution.435  
On top of such warnings, India explicitly refused to entertain Jayewardene’s last-minute 
appeals to support a military operation, based on Colombo’s belief that it was about to 
clinch a historic victory over the insurgents. 436 Despite being could shouldered and 
warned, in late May the Sri Lankan president reassuringly ordered his Army to execute 
Operation Liberation: “You can flatten Jaffna if this [insurgent] menace can be eradicated 
and I will build a new Jaffna.”437  
This was the final confirmation of Indian assessments, as expressed by PM R. Gandhi two 
days later, when he announced that the “Sri Lankan Government was [had been] buying 
time for pursuing the military option … [committing a] massacre of unarmed 
noncombatant civilians.” 438 A red line had been crossed, leading to his decision to 
                                                
434 Speaking to parliament on Feb. 27, 1986: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1719. 
435 March 4, in parliament: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1844. For similar warnings by various Indian 
ministers since 1984 see MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1984," (New Delhi 1985), 275; MEA, "FAR 1985," 
98, 114-15; MEA, "FAR 1987," 90-91, 160. 
436 For R. Gandhi’s refusal, see Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1874.  
437 Quoted in Ranatunga, Adventurous journey, 132. See also De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 630. 
438 Quoted in MEA, "FAR 1987," 189-90. According to K. N. Singh, R. Gandhi ordered the June 4 
operation because “Sri Lanka’s defiance of India’s mediatory efforts, which it had used as a convenience, 
should be neutralized.” Dixit, Assignment, 106-7. 
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authorize the Indian Air Force humanitarian relief operation, on June 4, and thus coerce 
Colombo to end the Sri Lankan Army offensive and accept an Indian intervention. 
 
“Yankee Dick” balances India and internationalizes the conflict 
New Delhi’s coercive posture in 1987 was based on a second assessment: Colombo was 
attempting to balance Indian influence by reaching out to extra-regional support, which 
threatened to internationalize the conflict and affect regional security.439  
Especially after 1983, President Julius Richard Jayewardene – who Indians informally 
called “Yankee Dick” for his pro-American inclinations – engaged in an “effort at 
searching for a countervailing force or forces against Indian pressure” despite being well 
aware of New Delhi’s concern at his attempts “to draw away from the traditional non-
aligned positions.”440 The policy was motivated by the traditionally pro-Western foreign 
policy of his party (the UNP), as well as by heightened geopolitical concerns after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, the need for reliable partners to assist in military modernization, 
and a new strategy to liberalize the island’s struggling economy.441  
                                                
439 R. N. Kao, former director of India’s external intelligence (RAW) and adviser to I. Gandhi, 1981-84: 
“Sri Lanka became a seat for outside influences which we consider not very friendly towards us. Naturally, 
it caused some concern.” Quoted in Rohan Gunaratna, Indian intervention in Sri Lanka: the role of India's 
intelligence agencies (Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 23. 
440 De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 586, 89. 
441 On his geopolitical views, see De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 400-22. Even before 1983, Indian 
Foreign Secretary M. K. Rasgotra recalls incessant concern from Sri Lankan officials, including his 
counterpart W. T. Jayasinghe: “when are you going to invade Sri Lanka?” (Interview 040). On his 
economic liberalization program, see De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 450-73; De Silva, Regional 
powers, 37-54. According to U.S. Ambassador W. H. Wriggins, Washington, the World Bank and the IMF, 
“thought this was marvelous, to find a democratic government that had seen the light and was really 
following liberal economic principles” 
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Wriggins,%20William%20Howard.toc.pdf  
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To achieve this and to reduce Indian pressure, Jayewardene knocked on every possible 
door for assistance. The United States initially welcomed economic liberalization and 
facilitated Sri Lanka’s outreach to Israel.442 But despite repeated requests, Washington 
denied any military assistance, advising Jayewardene instead to respect India’s 
predominant regional role and concerns.443 Howard Schaffer, the U.S. State Department 
country director for Sri Lanka at the time, recalls that relations were “better than they 
had ever been” and Washington “enthusiastic” about Jayewardene for his new economic 
policies, but that “our basic policy was to support the Indians in their mediation efforts … 
[and] not provide the Sri Lankan government with any military assistance.”444 
Sri Lanka’s outreach to China faced a similar fate: private expressions of sympathy 
against Indian interference but only limited military assistance and a persistent refusal to 
get entangled in the conflict at the risk of Indian hostility. For example, following PM 
Premadasa’s 1979 outreach visit to Beijing, the Chinese make a few supportive statements 
(“big should not bully the small”) and supply weapons, but when Jayewardene visits in 
May 1984, he is told by Deng Xiaoping that “it was in his interest to reach a negotiated 
settlement with India.”445 
                                                
442 Despite concerns by the U.S. State Department, Eagleburger, V. Walters, and C. Weinberger decided to 
deliver on Jayewardene’s request for facilitation with Israel, which opens an interest section at the United 
States Embassy in June 1984: http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Reed,%20John%20H.toc.pdf p.25]  
443 U.S. Ambassador J. Reed on Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger’s meeting with Jayewardene, Oct. 1, 
1983: “They used every possibility to get us to influence the situation, and to help them out. [But] We were 
very careful, very even handed. They wanted to buy more arms, and munitions from us … they were 
looking for help wherever they could get it”, but “we could not get involved.” 
[http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Reed,%20John%20H.toc.pdf 20-21] The Sri Lankan DCM in 
Washington at the time confirms: the U.S. answer was always “go and talk to the Indians,” making it clear 
they were “not going to come in between India and Sri Lanka.” (Interview 064), see also John Gooneratne, 
A decade of confrontation: Sri Lanka and India in the 1980s (Pannipitiya: Stamford Lake, 2000), 105-17. 
444 “We believed that the involvement of any outside power should be left to the Indians … It was quite 
clear that the Indians were deeply involved; there was no reason why we should be as well” 
[http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Schaffer,%20Howard%20B.toc.pdf pp. 93, 118] 
445 De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 588-9. See also Garver, Protracted Contest, 306.  
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Attempts to link up economically with Singapore and to join ASEAN, between 1980 and 
1983, also failed.446 Finally, in 1985, Jayewardene reached out to India’s archrival 
Pakistan, where he was received with open arms and able to secure important military 
assistance – so he called it “a better friend than India.”447 
Because of its partial success, New Delhi was initially tolerant of Sri Lanka’s balancing 
strategy, but as it persisted the threat assessment increased.448 Despite international 
accusations of over-sensitiveness, New Delhi had good reasons to be worried.449 By 1986, 
Sri Lanka had managed to rope in a rising number of Israeli and Pakistani military 
advisers, adding on to British and other foreign mercenaries, as well as Chinese weapon 
supplies.450  
                                                
446 See Kuan Yew Lee, From Third World to first: the Singapore story, 1965-2000 (New York: HarperCollins, 
2000), 416-7; Mervyn De Silva, Crisis commentaries: selected political writings of Mervyn de Silva (Colombo: 
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2001), 71; De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 417-19. 
447 Apr. 18, 1986, in an interview to Radio Australia Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1284-5. On his visit to 
Islamabad in March 1985, and Pakistani military supplies as a “tremendous encouragement” in the words 
of the Sri Lankan Army Commander, see De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 608-9; Ranatunga, 
Adventurous journey, 111. 
448 M. K. Narayanan recalls that Jayewardene was being “extremely shrewd” and “difficult” by “playing 
American and Pakistani cards … We didn’t have an equivalent Monroe doctrine, but India was not 
prepared to accept any Sri Lankan behavior to India’s security detriment.” (Interview 077). It thus became 
clear that while “India tends to see its security interests as coincidental with that of Sri Lanka … [t]he latter 
does not always share this view.” Narayanan, "Role of Intelligence," 115. 
449 Such criticism notes India’s “almost obsessive concern” about any foreign presence in Sri Lanka, for 
example in the Trincomalee port or about the Voice of America retransmission station planned North of 
Colombo after 1983: De Silva, Regional powers, 25-26, 114-16. It is questionable whether Indians were 
genuinely concerned about these projects, or using them to whip domestic support or bargain for external 
support, e.g. with the Soviet Union: July 03, 1987, R. Gandhi tells Gorbachev “we think that the 
Americans want to obtain a base in Trincomalee.” quoted in Srinath Raghavan, "At the Cusp of 
Transformation," in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, ed. David M.; Mohan Malone, C. Raja; 
Raghavan, Srinath (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 128. 
450 After Sri Lanka lifted trade restrictions with Israel, in June 1985, Tel-Aviv supplied Shinbet officers for 
training and defence supplies, including Uzi guns and Dvora patrol boats. By 1986, 178 Israeli officials were 
serving in Sri Lanka. On British and other foreign mercenaries after 1983, including Pakistani Special 
Forces, see Gunaratna, Indian intervention, 11-13. The Army Commander recalls: “China, Pakistan, and 
Israel were the only nations which were willing to provide military assistance for us in those darkest hours.” 
Ranatunga, Adventurous journey, 111. 
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In India’s view, Sri Lanka’s balancing strategy risked internationalizing the conflict with a 
triple negative effect.451 First, by increasing Colombo’s incentive to opt for a military 
solution, it decreased the success chances of Indian mediation. 452  Second, by 
simultaneously involving and playing off rival powers, it threatened to transform the 
conflict into an arena for extra-regional rivalries and, in particular, a into a proxy theater 
for Cold War competition.453 And third, by signaling commitment to a military solution, 
Colombo would drive Tamil insurgents to respond either by falling back even further 
onto Indian territory, or by roping in their own extra-regional support.454 Summarizing 
the Indian position in March 1987, India’s deputy minister for External Affairs, K. N. 
Singh, thus noted that 
…the meddling of outside powers, not entirely friendly to India is naturally a grave concern to us 
and to our security and we are keeping a very watchful eye on what is going on … [the Indian 
and regional] security environment is being affected with hostile countries getting involved in the 
affairs of Sri Lanka and getting involved in their Defence processes, whether it is in the capacity of 
mercenaries or advisers (…) If all these armaments keep coming in, if the Defence budget 
continues to grow, then obviously something is going to happen in Sri Lanka which must have 
adverse affects not only in our [bilateral] relationship, but [also] on the [regional] security 
environment.455 
                                                
451 March 24, 1986 warning by the Indian External Affairs Minister: “they got involved in another wrong 
policy in calling Mossad … and SAS mercenaries as well as those of South Africa reportedly, in order to 
build up the military muscles and to deal with their own people,” in MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1986," 
(New Delhi 1988), 71. 
452 See e.g. Aug. 16, 1984 by the deputy EAM R. R. Mirdha: “[the] ethnic problem in Sri Lanka can not be 
solved by military action … to our profound regret and unease, [Sri Lankan government] has thought it fit 
to induct outside security agencies into a domestic political situation,” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1632. 
453 M. K. Narayanan thus notes that “apart from diminishing India’s role in a traditional area of its 
influence, this seemed to enhance chances of unhealthy security competition in the region,” Narayanan, 
"Role of Intelligence," 117. PM R. Gandhi on Aug. 7, 1987: “The Sri Lankan crisis has shown how hostile 
forces can exploit difficulties in other regions to introduce unwarranted presences, threatening presences, 
presences that threaten regional stability and regional security.” MEA, "FAR 1987," 273. 
454 J. N. Dixit, in 1989: “Discrimination [against a minority] backed up by force will only result in, first 
militancy and terrorism, and then separatism  (…) that minority is [then] bound to seek assistance from 
foreign sources, who are inimical to your country.” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.4, 2353. 
455 March 19, 1987, deputy EAM K. N. Singh in parliament: MEA, "FAR 1987," 93, 96. 
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India’s approach is, however paradoxically, best defined by Sri Lankans themselves, 
especially in its diplomatic apparatus and the opposition who, up to 1987, repeatedly 
cautioned President Jayewardene against balancing India, and lobbied him to pursue an 
alternative model of neutralism or finlandization.456  
A Sri Lankan diplomat privy to such internal debates in the 1980s thus notes that 
Jayewardene’s strategy went against the “modes of behavior expected by India of the 
other countries of [the] subcontinent” and that New Delhi’s denial attempts were 
therefore a “perfectly understandable attitude, squarely in the realist mode of 
thinking.”457 Speaking six months before the Indian airdrop, in January 1987, the Sri 
Lankan opposition leader A. Bandaranaike emphasized that “the Indian Government 
had one fundamental concept in its domestic and foreign policy, which the [Sri Lankan] 
Government has failed to understand: … As long as India feels that there is no [extra-
regional] geopolitical threat from Sri Lanka, India will do anything to help us.”458 
 
Spillover and contagion: Tamil solidarity and domestic security  
A third and final Indian assessment that determined 1987’s coercive posture related to the 
rising capability and mobility of the Tamil insurgents, which threatened to affect India’s 
                                                
456 See e.g. brief prepared by FM Hameed for Jayewardene, before his June visit to the United States, 
noting that “[the] economic and political strategies of this Government would inevitably lead it to subserve 
global U.S. interests in a matter threatening her [India’s] basic security interest,” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 
147-8. In June 1985, G. Dissanayake submits a study on India-Sri Lanka relations, proposing a model 
based on past Finland-USSR relations. De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 614. 
457 Gooneratne, A Decade, 71, 198. For an internal critique: “Sri Lanka’s foreign policy must be centered on 
a non-hostile relationship with India” but Jayewardene “ignored geo-politics, [and] the implications of the 
geo-strategic importance of India vis-à-vis the superpowers,” De Silva, Crisis Commentaries, 78. 
458 Speaking in parliament on Jan. 8: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1369. 
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domestic security, in particular in its border state of Tamil Nadu.459 In the 1960s, India 
had successfully dealt with its own variant of Tamil separatism, but Sri Lanka’s 
incapability to do so began to pose a threat to its own stability, given the strong cross-
border links between both communities.460  
M. K. Narayanan, who dealt with the insurgents from Chennai since the late 1970s and 
then rose to become chief of the Intelligence Bureau [IB], recalls India’s concerns: 
The issue was we were trying to see the mirror image of what would happen [in India] if Eelam 
[an independent Tamil state] was created. … We could not afford a breakaway group, even in 
another country, which had many similarities with India. So [the] basic issue was we had to 
preserve our own domestic security, and to know how to go about to protect Indian unity. If you 
[are] seen as permitting, in a neighbourhood that has great fraternity across [all its other] borders, 
an Eelam to exist with or without [our] support, then you [will] have problems in your other 
areas. This [was] the bigger strategic issue. … Everything in Sri Lanka was impinging directly 
on India’s internal security.461 
A variety of factors informed this Indian assessment after 1983, leading New Delhi to 
warn Colombo repeatedly about the conflict’s repercussions on Indian territorial 
integrity, domestic stability and security.462 First, from the late 1970s the Tamil insurgent 
organizations had built a wide network in Southern India for financial, logistical and 
political support, including training bases – often with assistance from local organizations 
and even the state government.463 Second, after Colombo started pursuing Northward 
                                                
459 J. N. Dixit alludes to the salience of proximity: “Had Sri Lanka been 15,000 miles away with seas in 
between, like Fiji is, perhaps our involvement could have been less.” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.4, 2347. 
460 Sri Lankan Tamils had long been inspired by Tamil Nadu’s separatist Dravidistan agenda and its 
autonomy within India after the 1950s. After their non-violent, federal profile failed and morphed into a 
separatist insurgency, they turned increasingly to Tamil Nadu for assistance, encouraged by India’s role in 
supporting Bengali secessionism during the 1971 war in East Pakistan: Wilson, Chelvanayakam, 118 fn 7-8. 
461 Interview 077. 
462 Sept. 27, 1984, deputy EAM R. N. Mirdha, at the UN General Assembly: “If the spate of violence in the 
northern province continues, it is bound to have serious repercussions in other parts of Sri Lanka and 
precipitate in influx of refugees into our country (…) the repression and denial of human and political rights 
of the Tamils in Sri Lanka give rise to repercussions in our country.” MEA, "FAR 1984," 275. 
463 This domestic angle is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The Joint Secretary covering Sri Lanka, K. 
Sahdev, recalls rising concern from intelligence agencies after the 1960s: “Slowly but surely, Sri Lanka was 
	  
	   183	  
military offensives after 1983, the insurgents were forced to fall back on their Indian 
bases, which further entangled Tamil Nadu in the conflict. Third, the rising inflow of 
Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka – more than 90,000 by 1985 – accelerated the spillover 
effect as the conflict escalated.464 Fourth, after 1982, the myriad of rival insurgent 
organizations started to attack each other for influence and resources on Indian territory, 
which further destabilized the border region. Finally, New Delhi feared a contagion effect 
of transnational solidarity and revival of the Tamil separatist agenda in India.465 
It is against this background that the Government of India began to train and equip some 
of the Tamil insurgents in a secret operation after 1983.466 The reasoning was that this 
would a) enhance Indian leverage to pressure Colombo into pursuing a political 
solution;467 b) build a limited self-defense capability for the Tamil minority to deter 
further military offensives and push the conflict into a stalemate;468 c) increase the central 
government’s operational control over various rival insurgent groups that threatened 
                                                                                                                                            
becoming a domestic problem for us [so we kept telling GoSL] ‘please put your house in order’. … [but] 
neighboring instability kept begging more [Indian] interventionism and proactive policy” (Interview 013). 
Different Tamil insurgent organizations also frequently clashed with each other and the Indian police in 
Madras, and bombed its airport, killing 29, in Aug. 1984. 
464 MEA, "FAR 1985," 98, 114-15. Just during the Army’s 1985 offensive, a peak of 12,000 refugees arrived 
at an average of 500 per day: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 199-202. 
465 M. K. Narayanan notes that, at least until the late 1970s, the separatist factor had weighed in IB 
assessments, “because we were not sure if these parties [DMK and other regional parties] had really ditched 
such principles” (Interview 077). High Commissioner J. N. Dixit also recalls that “there was a perception 
that if India did not support the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka … there would be a resurgence of Tamil 
separatism in India” Dixit, Assignment, 328.  
466 By 1986, India had allegedly trained 2000 LTTE, 8000 PLOTE, 1500 EPRLF, 1250 EROS, and 1500 
TELO insurgents, according to Gunaratna, Indian intervention, 5-8, 22-23, 34-48, 135-59. 
467 Foreign Secretary M. K. Rasgotra recalls I. Gandhi’s strategy: “by strengthening Tamils we’ll get a 
stronger hand over GoSL” (Interview 040). A former High Commissioner to Sri Lanka notes that the “aim 
was to acquire leverage over President Jayewardene” given Indian assessment that he “would not take the 
Tamils seriously until they presented a threat to him,” Thomas Abraham, "The Emergence of the LTTE 
and the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement of 1987," in Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures, and 
Lessons ed. Rupesinghe Kumar (Colombo: Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006), 20.  
468 A minister in the Tamil Nadu government, P. Ramachandran, recalls that, after 1983, instead of a 
military intervention, the policy was to “equip the [Tamil] boys, give them some arms, to help them protect 
Tamil civilians from the unilateral onslaught of Sri Lankan armed forces. … LTTE was going for 
[separatist] homeland and all that but that was not in the [Indian] scheme of things” (Interview 031).  
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India’s domestic order and security, and chaotically thrived under informal and 
competing patronage from local authorities and political parties;469 and d) cultivate the 
insurgent organizations to participate in negotiations and to eventually reform as 
disarmed stakeholders in a post-conflict settlement.  
This last objective was particularly important, and was aprly summarized by M. K. 
Narayanan, who dealt with the Tamil issue at the Intelligence Bureau during the 1980s. 
As the main motives for the training he recalls: 1) to avoid that “islands of support for the 
militants’ cause soon mushroomed” in India and “ensure that the militant factions were 
kept in line;” 2) Collect intelligence, especially on foreign military advisers and 
mercenaries in Sri Lanka, and also on insurgents’ plans of escalation, location of illegal 
training bases, weapons supply routes, money laundering and other criminal activities in 
or via India; 3) “maintain ‘lines of communication’ open” to gain insurgents’ confidence 
so as to “reaching a modus vivendi with the militant leadership,” “keep them satisfied 
regarding India’s bona fide intentions”, and transform them into “agents of influence for 
any future eventuality;” and 4) Lay ground-work for a political dialogue, using support as 
leverage to “create a ‘coalition of the willing parties’ inclined to a negotiated solution,” 
and keep support “so that they could be prevailed upon later to participate in the 
negotiations” and to abandon their separatist quest for Eelam.470  
As underlined even by the Sri Lankan author of one of the most critical accounts of the 
Indian involvement, the operation to train insurgents “was not aimed at dividing the 
                                                
469 M. K. Narayanan recalls that the IB’s main concern was whether the conflict could pose a “serious 
threat to peace and order” and “lead to an implosion on Indian soil,” and whether its escalation and 
refugee influx could “lead to a ‘Bangladesh type’ of situation and call for urgent contingency measures,” 
Narayanan, "Role of Intelligence," 116, 18. 
470 Narayanan, "Role of Intelligence," 120-23. 
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island into two, but to give a clear message to Colombo … However, for five long years 
[1983-7] Colombo never seemed to understand that message.”471 
While many of these objectives would fail over the next few years, with particularly 
dramatic repercussions for India’s military involvement after 1987, it is important to note 
that the Tamil insurgency had developed its links to India long before New Delhi’s secret 
operation, that the training program was intended to minimize the conflict’s destabilizing 
spillover effect on Indian territory, and that it was directed at ending, not perpetuating 
the conflict or facilitate Sri Lanka’s breakup.472 As Thomas Abraham, the Indian High 
Commissioner in Sri Lanka had noted in 1979, India was fully committed to protect Sri 
Lanka’s territorial integrity, but only committed to non-interference as long as Colombo 
recognized that “the security and territorial integrity of both our countries are 
inextricably linked up.”473 Yet, in 1987, by pursuing a military solution that created 
further waves of refugees and incentives for the Tamil insurgents to fall back on Indian 
support bases, Colombo had crossed another Indian red line, ignoring New Delhi’s 
understanding of Indo-Sri Lankan inextricable security links. 
* 
India’s adoption of a coercive posture in 1987, seeking to enforce a liberal solution on Sri 
Lanka’s ethnic conflict, was determined by a three-fold strategic assessment after the 
                                                
471 Gunaratna, Indian intervention, 6, see also 33. 
472 On initially India playing off different insurgent groups to maximize control, preferring TELO and only 
switching to LTTE at a later point, A. Balasingham recalls that “India was trying to balance us [LTTE] 
with the others,” quoted in Abraham, "Emergence of the LTTE," 20-22. On why India favoured the 
LTTE after 1985, M. K. Narayanan recalls: “[the] clearest thinking from the LTTE. Balasingham was 
amazing in his foresight, concerned about future, and anxious that India should play a role. Others were 
[just] militant groups. [The] LTTE alone had a broader vision and agenda …[so] In some ways it was 
much easier [for us] to deal with the LTTE than with the smaller militant groups, the Uma Maheshwaran’s 
etc. which didn’t have much [appeal, vision, legitimacy]. It was helpful to have the LTTE – even if led by a 
psychotic leader,” (Interview 077).  
473 Speaking in Jaffna, June 20: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 134. 
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declining effectiveness of its mediation attempts after the 1983 race riots: 1) President 
Jayewardene’s reluctant and resistant posture, as he refused to commit to India’s agenda 
of a negotiated settlement and pursued a military solution instead, which was 
compounded by the lack of any credible alternative in Colombo; 2) Jayewardene’s foreign 
and security policy of extra-regional diversification threatened to internationalize the 
conflict, affect the regional security balance, and undermine India’s predominance; 3) 
The escalating conflict threatened the order and stability in the border region of Tamil 
Nadu, with the nexus of a rising number of incoming refugees and the insurgents’ new 
mobility and operational capability impinging on Indian domestic security. Taken 
together, these assessments led to the perception of a narrowing window of opportunity to 
terminate the conflict: a united and stable Sri Lanka depended on a successful 
liberalization of its constitution and, conversely, India’s domestic and regional security 
depended on a united and stable Sri Lanka.474 
 
3. Burma 1988 
India’s support for the Burmese pro-democracy uprising in 1988 has been described as a 
classic example of its allegedly “idealist” foreign policy. Indeed, the government 
immediately denounced the military crackdown, supported the protestors, and called for 
free elections and political reforms. However, beyond spontaneous ideological 
identification with democratic aspirations or personal idiosyncrasies, the Indian coercive 
posture against the military regime was determined by three strategic assessments: 1) 
                                                
474 Part II of the dissertation examines these issues more closely, including a) India’s strategic thought on the 
link between liberalization, order and security; and b) how this influenced Indian strategic practice. 
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General Ne Win’s archaic and authoritarian regime had been unresponsive to repeated 
Indian attempts to increase cooperation, and was collapsing; 2) the domestic security 
situation in India’s insurgency-ridden Northeast required cross-border support from 
Rangoon, which Burma’s Army – the Tatmadaw – had not delivered on; and 3) the 
Chinese had already made inroads with the authoritarian regime which were expected to 
further accelerate under military rule, threatening India’s geopolitical primacy in the 
region. On all these fronts a new democratic regime in Burma was seen as a harbinger of 
greater cooperation to further India’s economic, domestic and regional security interests.  
* 
General Ne Win had formally resigned three weeks earlier, but the authoritarian regime 
he had built since the coup of 1962 survived – and so did his astrological obsession with 
the number 9, which had led him to demonetize existing kyat bills with odd 
denominations of 45 and 90.475 So it was on the opposite astrological belief of the number 
8 as auspicious to a new order that, on Monday, August 8, 1988 (8-8-88), around half a 
million protesters flooded downtown Rangoon to defy martial law and demand 
democracy. Shortly before midnight, the Burmese Army’s 22nd, 44th and 77th Light 
Infantry Divisions began firing into the crowd, initiating a violent crackdown that would 
kill around 3,000 unarmed civilians over the next few days.476 The Indian Embassy, 
which overlooked the protests’ epicenter, immediately opened its gates to provide 
“humanitarian assistance” and treated injured students and monks in a makeshift 
                                                
475 Donald M. Seekins, Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2006), 338. 
476 http://www.massviolence.org/The-repression-of-the-August-8-12-1988-8-8-88-uprising-in?cs=print 
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hospital.477 As violence and political uncertainty continued to reign in Rangoon for the 
following weeks, the Indian government came out in full support of the uprising:  
We have noted the undaunted resolve of the Burmese people to establish a fully democratic 
structure in their country. This aspiration fully accords with India's firm commitment to 
democracy. It is our hope that the Burmese people will be able to fulfill their legitimate democratic 
aspirations for a representative government. The need of the hour is for the unity and consensus of 
democratic forces for a peaceful and orderly transition to permit free and fair elections.478 
On September 18, a military coup aborted constitutional attempts to embrace democratic 
reforms and established the Army-led State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC).479 Throughout this period and thereafter, at least until the SLORC cancelled 
the outcome of the 1990 parliamentary election won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National 
League for Democracy (NLD), New Delhi publically pressured the Burmese military 
regime into implementing political reforms towards democratization. 480  India’s 
Ambassador in Rangoon at the time, I. P. Singh, recalled: 
“From the very start of the movement, the Indian Embassy, under instruction from Delhi, took a 
firm stand in support of Burmese people’s demand for democracy. Perhaps it was for the first time 
that the silly argument of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries even when vital 
issues affecting human rights are involved, was not resorted to.” 481 
Beyond just words, India also interfered by hosting refugees, curtailing diplomatic 
relations and providing various pro-democracy organizations with logistical and financial 
                                                
477 The Embassy provided “medicines and surgical supplies to volunteer organisations,” who helped the 
wounded: Indu P. Singh, "India-Burma Relations," World Focus, no. xx January (1992): 10. 
478 Sept. 10, by MEA spokesperson: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1988," (New Delhi 1989), 290. 
479 On uncertainty after July, the short-lived interim government, and his role as President until the coup in 
Sept., see Maung Maung, The 1988 uprising in Burma (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 
480 Speaking at the UN General Assembly on Oct. 4, EAM P. V. N. Rao: “[India] watched with growing 
concern the trails and tribulations faced by the people of Burma (…) we cannot but sympathise with 
democratic aspirations.” MEA, "FAR 1988," 336. 
481 Singh, "India-Burma Relations," 10. 
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support.482 India shifted to pursue engagement with Rangoon’s generals only in 1991, 
after it became clear that the military regime had entrenched itself permanently. 
Much has been written on how India’s liberal posture cut official relations with Burma in 
that intermediary period, from 1988 to 1991, and how it hindered normalization 
attempts thereafter.483  Less attention, however, has been devoted to the motivations 
behind the initial decision, in 1988. Why did India take a coercive posture and support 
democracy? Existing explanations underline India’s liberal preferences (ideology), 
idiosyncrasies of PM R. Gandhi and the Indian ambassador (personality), or a 
spontaneous and haphazard process (chance).484 While all these factors did play an 
influence, India’s posture was, however, determined by three strategic assessments. 
 
                                                
482 Indian support included: 1) Intent to recognize former PM U Nu’s planned interim government in Sept. 
1988, and facilitating compromises between his and other groups, especially the NLD; 2) Financial and 
logistical support to pro-democracy organizations in Burma, as well as those operating in exile (Thailand, 
India); 3) Open border policy, especially via camps in Northeast India, to host several thousand refugees; 4) 
PM R. Gandhi’s support to allow AIR Burmese programming to expand frequency and contents; 5) 
Curtailing diplomatic relations to a minimum, delaying appointment of a new ambassador after 1989, and 
imposing restrictions on Indian trade and investments.  
483 These factors are examined in more detail in chapters 5 and 6. Ambassador R. Bhatia thus notes: India 
followed a “clear, courageous and principled policy line”, because given levels of violence “silence could not 
be an option” and thus “New Delhi was in the forefront to support its democratic aspirations, even at the 
cost of damage to government-to-government relations” Rajiv K. Bhatia, India-Myanmar relations: changing 
contours (New Delhi: Routledge, 2016), 99-100. 
484 On 1988’s “idealist India” that made a “realist turnaround” in the 1990s, see Renaud Egreteau, Wooing 
the generals: India's new Burma policy (New Delhi: Authorspress 2003), 43, 132. 1988 is also described as an 
“idealist position” and a “curious mix of conscious decision and ignorance,” Bibhu P. Routray, "India-
Myanmar Relations: Triumph of Pragmatism," Jindal Journal of International Affairs 1(2011): 300, 04. On 
personality and chance: “a logical choice, more spontaneous than carefully thought-out (…) Often 
presented as a well-calculated pro-democracy stance by activist circles, India’s position after 1988 was 
primarily the outcome of the personal and impulsive engagement of a handful of high-profile people,” 
Renaud Egreteau and Larry Jagan, Soldiers and diplomacy in Burma: understanding the foreign relations of the Burmese 
praetorian state (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), 150, 52. 
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Rangoon’s increasingly weak and non-cooperative regime 
The first assessment related to General Ne Win’s non-responsiveness to repeated Indian 
attempts throughout the 1980s to strengthen and expand bilateral relations, compounded 
by the declining domestic power of his regime. 
Burmese isolationism had lead Ne Win to insulate his country by limiting contact with its 
neighbors, and even to abandon the Non-Aligned Movement, in 1979. In 1982, the 
country also passed a new discriminatory citizenship law classifying the Indian minority 
as “guest citizens.” So while Indian governmental mantras of the mid-1980s internally 
assured that “our relations with Burma are cordial,” the relationship was stagnant.485  
Since the early 1980s, successive Indian governments had tried to reach out to Rangoon, 
which responded with the sound of silence or diplomatic platitudes about the bonds of 
history and the Buddha.486 Indian diplomats posted in Rangoon, with the mission to 
make new inroads, thus complained about bilateral relations being in a “frozen state,” 
Burmese ministers being unresponsive to any Indian proposals, and their efforts thus 
leading to “minimal outcomes”.487  
T. P. Sreenivasan, who served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Rangoon between 1983 
and 1986, recalls relations being so stagnant that the only mission he received from his 
Foreign Secretary when departing New Delhi was to close the poultry farm which the 
                                                
485 Apr. 9, 1985: deputy EAM, K. A. Khan, responding to parliamentarian G. G. Swell’s reproach that 
India treated Burma as a “fire brigade,” only when it mattered: MEA, "FAR 1985," 100. 
486 E.g. in 1985, the Burmese FM U Chit Hlaing visits India, and quotes from King Alaung's prayer, etched 
in the Golden Cave Pagoda of Pagan: MEA, "FAR 1985," 159-61. 
487 S. Devare, posted in Rangoon as counselor with the “task to find ways to further the relationship,” 
(1980-82) recalls: “much was tried to re-open the closed contacts between Burma and India though without 
much progress … Burmese leaders were not so keen and were also inactive. … it was India that seemed to 
seek a closer relationship. On our side, there was a thought that we must pay greater attention to Burma.” 
http://www.associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/Vol6/6.3/6.3%20ORAL%20HISTORY.pdf 348 
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Indian ambassador kept at his residence, to the annoyance of Burmese authorities: 
“There was nothing one could do on the political side, given Ne Win’s policy of 
distancing Burma from its neighbors” and this was “frustrating as we made no headway 
with the host government on any of the issues that interested us.”488Foreign diplomats 
shared the assessment, expressing particular surprise at Burma’s lack of response to 
India’s repeated overtures.489 
A further obstacle came with the death of PM Indira Gandhi, in 1984, and the end of her 
excellent personal rapport with General Ne Win, first established in the 1960s.490 Taking 
over power to succeed his mother at the young age of 40, Rajiv Gandhi’s energetic 
attempts to renew bilateral relations seemed to annoy the 73-year old senior Burmese 
general who, in 1984, advised him “not to bulldoze his way forward in his youthful zeal, 
for India is also an ancient land where the elders must also be respected even though they 
might appear to him to be slow and out of date.”491 
But Rajiv Gandhi persisted in “his desire to put some life into India-[Burma] relations,” 
and after several delays on Rangoon’s side, he finally visited the Eastern neighbor on 
                                                
488 T. P. Sreenivasan, Words, words, words: adventures in diplomacy (New Delhi: Longman, 2011), 60. 
489 The U.S. ambassador D. O’Donohue recalls Burma as “backwaters” in the 1980s: “what struck me was 
how devoid of substance Indian-Burmese relations were. This seemed to reflect a deliberate attitude by the 
Burmese.” http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/O%27Donohue,%20Daniel%20A.toc.pdf 141 
490 I have correspondence between them in my possession, indicating a very close rapport, particularly in 
the early 1970s. Indira Gandhi had been to Burma in Dec. 1964, on a private visit at Ne Win’s invitation. 
R. D. Katari, A sailor remembers (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), 141. 
491 Quoted by Burmese President Maung Maung, referring to Ne Win’s Nov. 1984 visit to India, to pay his 
delayed respect to I. Gandhi after missing her funeral. Despite expressing his preference for a simple, sober 
and “private visit,” he was given all honors, with the Indian President, PM R. Gandhi and his wife 
receiving him at the airport. Maung recalls that the Indian President “entrusted” R. Gandhi to Ne Win’s 
care: “You are a friend of the family, please regard Rajiv as a nephew” and the Burmese general took “his 
role as uncle seriously,” Maung, 1988 Uprising, 255-6. K. N. Singh also recalls that during R. Gandhi’s visit 
to Burma in 1988, Ne Win kept speaking in a “patronizing” tone, repeatedly and nostalgically mentioning 
events during Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s period, “while you were just a kid” (Interview 075). 
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December 15, 1987 – the first of an Indian Prime Minister in almost twenty years.492 He 
put in much work to prepare, taking along a 15-member delegation, several symbolic 
gifts, and a myriad of proposals to foster regional and economic links: his speech 
underlined the importance to foster “cooperation in South Asia, whose natural … 
frontiers extend from Afghanistan … to Burma.”493  
But to his “great disappointment” the visit was marked by what his deputy minister of 
External Affairs described as one of his diplomatic career’s most “bizarre” experiences: a 
meeting of just thirty minutes with Ne Win, who in an “avuncular tone” and to the 
Indian Prime Minister’s “controlled indignation” brushed off all Indian proposals, from 
opening a tourist office to increasing trade, technical exchanges and counter-insurgency 
cooperation.494 The Indian outreach ended after a little more than 24 hours, as “a bold 
but failed attempt to revitalise the relationship.”495 
The visit’s failure was more than just symbolic, because it came just as the authoritarian 
regime faced an unprecedented crisis after Ne Win’s abrupt demonetization policy in late 
1987. Rajiv Gandhi saw this as a window of opportunity, hoping the visit would help to 
nudge the old general into embracing political and economic reforms with India’s helping 
hand. In New Delhi’s assessment, the measures had initiated an irreversible mass 
                                                
492 Singh, Walking, 124. The MEA’s Joint Secretary in charge of Burma at the time, K. Sahdev, recalls that 
R. Gandhi was committed to going but that since “getting to him [Ne Win] was difficult,” the visit was 
postponed several times and only confirmed “last-minute” (Interview 013, also 075). 
493 http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS87-12.pdf.  
494 K. N. Singh further notes that “Rajiv Gandhi kept his cool. … It was, to say the least, a frustrating 
experience.” Singh, Walking, 125-6. K. Sahdev recalls: “Strange meeting” as Ne Win worried about possible 
sanctions, increasing isolation, suffering from petrol shortages. Instead of responding to RG’s bold 
proposals, he kept talking about his personal plans to design a new gas-to-petrol plant, waving at an 
engineering map, discussing technical issues, asking for assistance. R. Gandhi was “worried and kept asking 
us: ‘why is he so focused on that little issue’?” (Interview 013). Ne Win did not receive, nor send off the 
Indian delegation at the airport. 
495 Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 123. K. Sahdev: “an underwhelming visit” (Interview 013). R. Gandhi’s main 
foreign policy adviser, R. Sen, refers to it as “nothing special: no real meeting of minds” (Interview 081). 
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movement of popular discontent, which indeed led to a wave of student protests, riots, 
and violence during the Spring of 1988.496 In April, A. S. Suu Kyi returned to her 
motherland to become the movement’s iconic leader, in June the Buddhist joined hands 
with the students, and in late July Ne Win resigned after a quarter of a century in power. 
As the old, non-cooperative regime collapsed, New Delhi looked forward to change.497 
 
The Tatmadaw’s counter-insurgent unwillingness and incapacity    
Geostrategically, Myanmar straddles an area which dominates our security perceptions in more 
than one dimension.498 
 J. N. Dixit, Indian Foreign Secretary, 1991-1994. 
A second assessment that determined India’s pro-democracy posture in 1987 related to 
the Burmese Army’s persistent unwillingness and incapacity to render cross-border 
cooperation to Indian counter-insurgency efforts in its Northeastern border regions. 
Since the 1960s, the Indian state had become entangled in a low-intensity war against 
dozens of insurgent groups fighting for secession in its semi-enclaved Northeast, a 
chronically underdeveloped region surrounded by China, East Pakistan (Bangladesh after 
1971), and Burma. Since then, Beijing had trained, armed, funded and hosted thousands 
of these insurgents to combat the Indian state, both indirectly through East Pakistan and 
                                                
496 Assessment of the Indian ambassador at the time, in Singh, "India-Burma Relations," 7-10. V. Sood, at 
the time representing India’s external intelligence agency (RAW) in Rangoon, recalls sending a note to New 
Delhi in May, 1988: “something eerie, too quiet, something is about to happen, trouble brewing” 
underlining the devastating effect of Ne Win’s recent economic policies, and referring to newly-arrived A. 
S. Suu Kyi as “the totem pole the [pro-democracy] activists were waiting for” (Interview 032). 
497 Indian diplomat R. Bhatia, who worked on Burma at the time and would go on to be posted as 
ambassador there in the 2000s, sums this assessment up cogently: “In 1988, democracy seemed likely to 
descend on Burma; in 1992, the army rule was assessed to be well entrenched [so] India had to return to its 
traditional policy to do business with whosoever wielded power.” Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 102. 
498 J. N. Dixit, India's foreign policy and its neighbours (New Delhi: Gyan, 2001), 238. 
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directly in Southwestern China, accessed with the assistance of insurgents in Northern 
Burma.499 While China curtailed direct support in the mid-1970s, Indian military and 
intelligence continued to monitor links through this Burmese corridor with heightened 
concern throughout the 1980s.500 
After formal Chinese support ceased and the Indian Army stepped up its counter-
insurgency operations, insurgents became increasingly dependent on fallback positions in 
Northern Burma, in connivance with their co-ethnic groups across the border. Within 
India’s territory, conflicts had stabilized after a successful mix of counter-insurgent force 
and political inducements led to a series of cease-fires and peace accords in the 1980s.501 
But new splinter groups moved across the border into Northern Burma, where they 
linked up with local insurgents fighting Rangoon and profited from a strategic location on 
one of the main routes of the booming Golden Triangle’s heroin trade. 502 India’s 
                                                
499 Chinese support peaked between 1966 and the late 1970s. In East Pakistan, e.g. “China-Pakistan 
Coordination Bureau” established in 1969, and around 5000 Nagas and 7000 Mizo insurgents trained until 
1971. Several NNC, MNF and PLA batches were also trained in Yunnan, which they accessed with KIA 
support through Northern Burma. After 1970s, limited contact, as China rejects insurgents’ requests for 
further training, despite indications of proxy use for intelligence gathering: Lintner, Great game, xviii, 157-60, 
336-45; Subir Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's Northeast (New Delhi: Sage, 2009), 157-63. 
500 P. Heblikar, who was deployed for RAW in the Northeast border states in the late 1980s, rejects 
Beijing’s argument that such support was, at the time, by renegade or retired PLA officers, and notes that 
there were clear indications that China kept its outreach to the insurgents for intelligence (Interview 047). 
501 R. N. Ravi (ex-IB director) on how Naga insurgency changed in the 1980s, becoming a “fratricidal” 
fight among its various tribes: “By the 1980s, ultra-radical nationalists were pushed to the margins of the 
Naga political space. … The Naga issue began inching towards a sort of Chekhovian resolution.” 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/nagaland-descent-into-chaos/article5607599.ece The 
Indian government created various special administrative councils to respond to grievances under the 
Constitution’s 6th schedule. 1986: Peace agreement with the MNF ending two decades of insurgency in 
Mizoram. 1988: Peace agreement with the TNV, ending insurgency in Tripura. See Swarna Rajagopalan: 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ps046.pdf  
502 Leading, for example, to the creation of the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary Front (IBRF) in 1989, 
composed of the NSCN-K, ULFA, United Liberation Front of Bodoland, Kuki National Front (KNF) (all 
from India) and the Chin National Front (Myanmar): 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/ULFA2009.htm. The mid-
1980s heroin boom in the Golden Triangle spread to India after Thailand and Laos enforced stricter laws 
in 1983 to ban acetic anhydride, which starts to be sourced from India. 
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domestic security in the Northeast therefore increasingly relied on denying these 
insurgents mobility and safe havens in Northern Burma.503 
However, despite New Delhi’s repeated attempts throughout the 1980s to reach out and 
increase defense and counter-insurgency cooperation, the Burmese Army (the Tatmadaw) 
remained fateful to Ne Win’s principled isolationism, refusing coordinated or joint 
exercises with neighboring countries and any type of foreign military support.504 This 
became apparent again in 1986, when Gen. K. Sundarji paid the first official visit of an 
Indian Army chief to Burma in several decades, only to see his offers of military assistance 
and greater counter-insurgency cooperation “turned down with characteristic Burmese 
courtesy.”505  
Rangoon also manifested a concerning lack of capacity to destroy the insurgents’ safe 
havens in the North and to deny them capacity to strike in India.506 In 1988, Burma’s 
unwillingness and incapacity to support Indian counter-insurgency efforts had thus 
become a liability for domestic security in the Northeast, as noted by M. K. Narayanan, 
who directed the Intelligence Bureau at the time: 
                                                
503 For example, in Apr. 1988 the NSCN splits into Muivah and Khaplang hostile factions. With the latter 
mostly based in Myanmar, Indian intelligence thus starts supporting NSCN-K to pressure NSCN-IM: 
Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's Northeast, 99. On India’s intelligence games across the Indo-
Burmese border in the 1988-1992 period, see also B. B. Nandy, "Security of the north-east Himalayan 
frontier: challenges and responses," in Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic, ed. K. 
Warikoo (London: Routledge, 2009), 172-4; Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's Northeast, 175-7.  
504 For example, in 1984, the Indian Defence Mininister had offered military training and assistance to 
modernize the Burmese Army, as well as joint operations, all of which were “politely declined,” Singh, 
"India-Burma Relations," 8; Sreenivasan, Words, 63.  
505 Singh, "India-Burma Relations," 8. K. Sundarji visited to monitor the Tatmadaw offensive against the 
NSCN in Northern Burma, initiated in December 1985. Saw Maung recalls that the Indian Army Chief’s 
offer of mountain artillery was refused by Burma: http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS91-05.pdf, and 
Lintner, Great game, 261. 
506 Noted by P. Heblikar, posted in Mizoram at the time for RAW (Interview 047). As an Army intelligence 
officer posted in Nagaland, Ajay Shukla recalls a late 1980s mission against the NSCN, and linking up with 
the Burmese Army in its Sagaing province: “our officers were surprised at how embattled the Tatmadaw unit 
was, and how relieved at the prospect of Indian collaboration” 
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2015/06/squandering-away-myanmar-advantage.html. 
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“[there was in New Delhi a] general revulsion towards the [Burmese] military, which in any case 
was not helping us with dealing with the insurgencies on their side, which were helping our 
[India-based] insurgencies. So there was nothing very much going forward. … they were most 
unhelpful in the 1980s, so there was no particular reason why we should be supporting them. … 
we did not see the [Burmese] Army in any way as favorable.”507 
 
Rising China and the geo-economic link to Southeast Asia 
We regard Burma as a country in our ‘immediate’ neighbourhood – within the first of the 
concentric circles in our foreign policy parameters.508 
 S. Devare, former Indian Secretary (East), 1998-2001. 
India’s supportive posture towards liberal regime change in Rangoon was also motivated 
by a geostrategic assessment about China’s expanding presence in Burma clashing with 
Indian attempts to link up with the high-growth economies of Southeast Asia. 
After Burmese liberalization attempts faltered in the early 1990s and the country’s 
authoritarian regime entrenched itself, New Delhi’s allegedly “idealist” stance in 1988 is 
often castigated for having pushed Rangoon into Chinese hands.509 Indeed, Beijing 
immediately accelerated its outreach to the isolated SLORC generals, who started to rely 
almost exclusively on Chinese trade, investment and military supplies to consolidate their 
grip.510 But the Sino-Burmese rapprochement had begun much earlier, after Deng 
                                                
507 Interview 077. 
508  http://www.associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/Vol6/6.3/6.3%20ORAL%20HISTORY.pdf 
p. 341 
509 For example: “[the] strategic consequence of this [1988] decision has visibly not been assessed by New 
Delhi’s strategists. It was only in hindsight that certain thinkers and decisionmakers became conscious of the 
ominous effects of this break … [as] Yangon found itself in China’s arms,” Egreteau, Wooing the generals: 
India's new Burma policy, 196. See also Sikri, Challenge and strategy: rethinking India's foreign policy, 68. 
510 After 1989, China become Burma’s major economic and military partner, starting with a trade 
agreement in Oct. 1989, followed by major defence acquisitions in the early 1990s: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1119/MR1119.appa.pdf p50. 
Khin Maung Win, in charge of Asia at the Burmese Foreign Ministry at the time, recalls that 1989 marked 
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Xiaoping’s 1978 visit, leading to flourishing economic and security relations in the 1980s, 
in stark contrast with India’s failed outreach attempts surveyed above.511  
Commenting on this, the U. S. Ambassador in Burma recalls that, already in the mid-
1980s, “China figured quite differently [from India] with the Burmese [as] there was a 
much more ‘active’ policy vis-a-vis China, in an effort, at a minimum, to counter Chinese 
interest in supporting the Sino-Burmese communist insurgency.”512 So, when in 1988 the 
authoritarian and military regime wavered, Beijing naturally kept quiet and hoped this 
would not affect its plans to transform Burma into one of its strategic access routes to the 
Indian Ocean.513  
From New Delhi’s perspective, however, as Ne Win’s regime collapsed and a military 
government took over to promise a new constitution and to hold the first free multiparty 
elections in thirty years (won by the NLD in 1990), the country seemed likely to embrace 
massive political, economic and geostrategic changes that were expected to benefit India.  
In late 1988, New Delhi thus noted that it was “aware of the regional and international 
ramifications of the present developments in Burma” and accordingly adopted a liberal 
posture because of the China factor, and not despite of it.514  In the view of one of Burma’s 
                                                                                                                                            
a “turning point,” with Beijing emerging as “the only friend” since the generals had “no other door to 
knock on for help” (Interview 017). 
511 With China’s “open-door” policy to foreign trade and investment after 1978, including new Special 
Economic Zones in the border province of Yunnan, Sino-Burmese bilateral trade shot up from US$10-20 
m. in the late 1970s to US$40m in the mid-1980s. In the mid-1980s China also terminated support for the 
Communist Party of Burma insurgents, denying them mobility across the border and offering its top cadres 
inducements to retire. Lintner, Great game, 260-2. Relations were therefore already strong and thriving before 
1988. See also Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948 (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), esp. 100. 
512 P. O’Donohue: http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/O%27Donohue,%20Daniel%20A.toc.pdf p. 142. 
513 For China’s reluctant response to the 1988 events, first mobilizing the PLA on the border, and then 
backtracking to support the SLORC, see Myoe, Pauk-Phaw, 107. On China’s strategic plans to develop an 
“Irrawady Corridor” to access the Indian Ocean, see Garver, Protracted Contest, 263-70, 91-6. 
514 Dec. 5 1988, EAM P. V. N. Rao to parliament: MEA, "FAR 1988," 405. 
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most experienced analysts, B. Lintner, supporting the students and monks on the streets 
was therefore “not for altruistic reasons alone; it was thought to have been India’s way of 
countering China’s influence in Burma.”515  
The China factor was compounded by early Indian attempts to reform its economy in the 
late 1980s, and the need to link up with the high-growth economies in Southeast Asia by 
fostering regional economic cooperation across the Bay of Bengal. In the mid-1980s, 
India had even attempted to bring Burma into the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation.516 While only formalized after 1991, India’s “Look East policy” emerged 
under PM Rajiv Gandhi and increased Burma’s strategic importance in Indian 
assessments, as highlighted by the objectives of the 1987 visit to Rangoon.517 Reflecting 
the centrality of such Indian attempts, the last official interactions between both 
governments before the revolutionary summer of 1988 included bilateral talks on trade 
and, just two weeks before General Ne Win resigned, the visit of India’s Minister of State 
for Finance.518 
In New Delhi’s assessment, Ne Win had not performed on two key and related strategic 
objectives: to contain Sino-Burmese rapprochement and to develop a strategic economic 
link to Southeast Asia. Continued military authoritarianism presented a further obstacle, 
                                                
515 Lintner, Great game, xxiii. 
516 During visit of Burmese FM Chit Hliang, in May 1984, but Burma rejects this: Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 
97, fn. S. Devare also recalls Foreign Secretary M. K. Rasgotra’s 1982 decision to create a new BSM 
(Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar) division, which he heads, replacing the old “Southern Division” and 
giving an early organizational expression to the “look East” policy and BIMSTEC initiative: 
http://www.associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/Vol6/6.3/6.3%20ORAL%20HISTORY.pdf 341. 
517 On the early roots of the Look East Policy, see Amar N. Ram, ed. Two Decades of India's Look East Policy: 
Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Prosperity (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 2012), esp. chapters 
by P. M. S. Malik and S. D. Muni.  
518 Jan.-Feb. 1988: Burmese Trade minister and delegation visited India to follow up on trade talks 
announced during R. Gandhi’s Dec. 1987 visit to Rangoon. Followed in July (11) by the deputy Indian 
Finance Minister to Yangon: MEA, "FAR 1988," 29. 
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while democratization promised to deliver on India’s external security and economic 
interests, strengthening its capacity to escape the South Asian regional straightjacket.519 
* 
Recalling the reasons behind India’s coercive posture to support pro-democracy forces 
after the 8-8-88 protests erupted to bloody the streets of Rangoon and its own embassy, a 
diplomat looking after Burma in India’s Ministry of External Affairs at the time, notes 
that it was an “almost unanimous decision of the system … not a personal whim of Rajiv 
Gandhi, because [while] we don’t sponsor pro-democracy, when it comes up we look 
favorably to it, that’s our natural inclination.”520 This decision was based on a three-fold 
strategic assessment: 1) Ne Win’s regime had been unresponsive to repeated Indian 
attempts to increase cooperation since the early 1980s, and was seen as isolated and 
collapsing internally; 2) India’s Northeastern insurgents had established safe havens in 
Northern Burma, but the Burmese Army proved unwilling and incapable of rendering 
crucial support to India’s cross-border counter-insurgency objectives; and 3) Rangoon 
had engaged in an Sino-Burmese rapprochement from the late 1970s onwards, and 
Beijing’s embrace threatened to accelerate if the regime survived and thus impede Indian 
plans to transform Burma into a strategic link country with Southeast Asia. 
 
                                                
519 This liberal dimension in Indian strategic assessments is discussed in detail in Part II of this dissertation, 
particularly in Chapter 6. 
520 K. Sahdev (Interview 013). Opposing view, for example, from Vikram Sood, at the time the RAW 
representative in Rangoon, who recalls getting “angry calls” from the Burmese intelligence service (DDIS) 
about India’s posture, and thus warns New Delhi: 1) “[military] regime will survive, is lonely, needs friends, 
has more power to damage us than we do them. [Unlike India] West[ern countries] can afford to walk out, 
Chinese will move in and lock, stock and barrel;” 2) “even if regime democratizes, it will be pro-West, not 
pro-India, because A. S. Suu Kyi is a Western phenomenon;” and therefore 3) “either we should have the 
capability to knock them off, which we don’t, or deal with them as they are” (Interview 032). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined the strategic assessments that drove India’s coercive posture 
during regime crises in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma in the late 1980s: in each case, India 
denounced the existing political dispensation and supported democratization or 
liberalization. In Nepal, it facilitated regime change in the Spring of 1990, ending thirty 
years of royal absolutism. In Sri Lanka, after failed mediation attempts, India coercively 
intervened with its military, in 1987, to enforce constitutional changes and attempt to 
solve the ethnic conflict. Finally, in Burma, it sided with, and even assisted pro-democracy 
forces in their 1988 uprising against continued authoritarian and military rule. 
Such proactive involvement has often been interpreted either as an ideological impulse to 
support the liberalization of neighboring regimes, or as a reflexive hegemonic attempt to 
consolidate regional predominance by destabilizing and undermining its small neighbor 
states. Beyond such simplistic explanations, the three case studies examined in this 
chapter demonstrate that India’s coercive postures, favoring regime change, were driven 
by strategic assessments about how each specific crisis and domestic balance of forces in 
the neighboring country affected India’s domestic and external security priorities.521 
While the broader pattern of these assessments is analyzed in the conclusion of Part 1 of 
this dissertation, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn from this period, in specific: 
1. Security over ideals: India’s coercive postures were not reflexively determined by 
ideological preferences for regime liberalization. Instead, the main motivating assessments 
                                                
521 Deputy EAM, K. N. Singh, for example, recalls PM R. Gandhi’s orders on Nepal and Burma, in mid-
1988: “let’s put the heat on” (Interview 075). Following the military intervention in Sri lanka, in 1987, this 
suggests a common approach to all three countries, with India pursuing a coercive mode to compel existing 
regimes into cooperation, or alternatively make way to change. 
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focused on decreasing incentives in engaging the existing (illiberal) regimes, which were 
either weak and isolated or pursuing policies detrimental to India’s security. 
2. Cost-benefit analysis: In each case, the final (coercive) posture is the outcome of a cost-
benefit analysis based on assessments weighing the impact of the specific regime crisis on: 
a) the existing regime’s relative strength and attitude towards India (uncooperative 
in all three cases), and the prospects of an alternative and pliable regime favoring 
Indian interests (present in Nepal and Burma, absent in Sri Lanka);  
b) the neighboring country’s internal stability, especially in case of high levels of 
political violence (civil war in Sri Lanka, insurgencies in Burma) and possible 
repercussions on Indian domestic security; 
c) the neighboring country’s geostrategic situation and alignment, in particular 
with regard to China (in the cases of Nepal and Burma) and to the United States 
and Western countries (in the case of Sri Lanka). 
3. Extra-regional adaptation: Despite popular accounts about conflicting Indo-American 
zones of influence in the subcontinent during the 1980s, the three cases demonstrate that 
the relationship with the United States across South Asia was stable, as Washington 
deferred to, or even tacitly supported India’s regional primacy and coercive postures.522 
Conversely, building on gradually since the late 1950s, China rose to become the main 
focus of Indian threat assessments, especially in Nepal and Burma.  
                                                
522 Howard Schaffer, as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, in 1988-89, thus recalls: 
“Our policy in general was not to object to what seemed to many - including me - Indian efforts to create 
hegemony over the smaller countries of the region. We were mildly interested in what the Indians were 
doing in their relations with their smaller neighbors.” 
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Schaffer,%20Howard%20B.toc.pdf pp. 118-19 
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4. Conflict internationalization: the case of Sri Lanka reflects the importance of the concerned 
Indian assessment that conflicts in its periphery are prone to undergo rapid 
internationalization. Competing extra-regional involvement in such conflicts is negatively 
associated with risk of escalation and with decreased Indian leverage to facilitate or 
impose conflict resolution. 
5. Expectation of privilege: given vulnerable geographic conditions, internal and external 
security threats, and its open or porous borders, Indian policy-makers expect neighboring 
regimes to pursue an “India first” policy and to keep privileged channels of 
communication open, especially during crises periods. India’s assessments thus focus on 
the regime’s willingness (intent) and capacity to collaborate with India, or at least address 
its concerns, which is particularly apparent in the case of Nepal. 
6. Illiberal exhaustion and the promises of liberalization: While India’s posture was determined by 
immediate security considerations, the assessments in each case also indicate an Indian 
concern that illiberal neighboring regimes had exhausted their capacity to foster domestic 
order and stability and were thus no longer able to deliver to Indian (internal and 
external) security. Regime liberalization in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma was thus 
identified positively as contributing to greater order, stability, security and cooperation 
towards India. This “liberal link” in strategic assessments is addressed in greater detail in 
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CHAPTER 4: CALIBRATING ENGAGEMENT AND COERCION (2005-09) 
 
The Maoist insurgency in Nepal has seriously disrupted the political equilibrium between 
constitutional Monarchy and multi party democracy in that country. In Sri Lanka, the peace 
process is in extreme danger of being derailed by political opportunism and extreme positions. In 
both these countries, India has been trying to encourage the emergence of corrective impulses, so 
that political solutions are found, which accord with [India’s] long-term national interests.523 
 B. Mishra, National Security Adviser (2004) 
 
By euphemistically mentioning India’s attempts to “encourage the emergence of 
corrective impulses” in Nepal and in Sri Lanka in the quote above, India’s National 
Security Adviser B. Mishra was, in fact, offering a rare definition of New Delhi’s policy of 
neighborhood involvement, whether through inaction or intervention, engagement or 
coercion: a strategy to ensure an outcome in which local “political solutions” (regimes) 
“accord with” (support) India’s “long-term national interests” (order and security). While 
India’s leverage in Myanmar was far less than in these two countries, the same approach 
guided New Delhi’s policy and posture towards Yangon. 
Building on this approach, the three cases analyzed in this chapter – Nepal’s democratic 
regime change in 2006, Sri Lanka’s military offensive and defeat of the Tamil insurgency 
in 2009, and the failed Burmese pro-democracy uprising in 2007 – offer valuable insights 
on the strategic nature of Indian crisis assessments because of the variation in posture: 1) 
in Nepal, India moved towards full coercion in 2005, actively facilitating the formation of a 
regime alternative to the King’s direct rule, which succeeded in ending the civil war with 
                                                
523 At the Munich Security Conference, Feb. 8, 2004: Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 
2004 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2005), 129. 
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the Maoists; 2) in Sri Lanka, India adopted a posture of conditional engagement after 2006, 
supporting the regime in its military offensive against the LTTE insurgents, in exchange 
for a special relationship and Colombo’s assurances that it would also deliver on the 
political track to solve the ethnic conflict; and 3) in Myanmar, India pursued all-out full 
engagement, as the bilateral relationship had witnessed  an unprecedented expansion and 
the military regime promised to continue delivering to India’s security, economic and 
geostrategic interests.  
While the cases examined in Chapter 2 (1950s-60s) focused on postures that privileged 
engagement, and the cases in Chapter 3 (1980s) focused conversely on postures that 
privileged coercion, the three postured examined in this period (2000s) thus diverge 
(coercion in Nepal, engagement in Sri Lanka and Myanmar). More importantly, there 
are also puzzling differences with the past: in Myanmar, unlike in 1988, New Delhi 
pursued engagement in 2007; and in Sri Lanka, unlike in 1987, New Delhi also focused 
on cooperating and supporting the existing regime.  
Such variations offer a perfect background to test the continuity and salience of Indian 
strategic assessments over any other type of factors (whether regime type or personality), 
and also to disprove that particular posture types are related to specific historical periods 
– for example, the temptation to infer that India was inclined to exclusively pursue 
“idealist” engagement under PM J. Nehru in the late 1950s, and conversely biased 
towards coercive “hegemonic” strategies under PM R. Gandhi in the 1980s.  
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1. Nepal 2006 
In April 2006, Nepal’s King Gyanendra stepped down, paving the way to end 238 years 
of continued monarchy and ten years of civil war against a Maoist insurgency. This 
regime change would not have happened without India’s involvement, which included 
targeted pressure on the monarch and secret facilitation of an agreement that brought the 
political parties and Maoists on a joint opposition platform. Such a coercive posture was 
the corollary of three strategic assessments: 1) The escalating civil war was spilling over 
into India, affecting domestic security; 2) The increasingly activist King Gyanendra 
proved to be non-cooperative by undermining parliamentary democracy, the prospects 
for conflict resolution, and by taking over direct power in 2005; and 3) In pursuit of a 
military solution, the monarch’s subsequent attempts to rope in Chinese, American or 
Pakistani assistance signaled a hostile security posture, threatening to further 
internationalize the conflict.  
* 
On April 21, 2006, dozens of thousands of Nepalese converged around Kathmandu’s 
Narayanhiti Palace to oppose King Gyanendra’s emergency rule and demand a return to 
multi-party democracy. His security forces had killed over a dozen demonstrators over 
the previous two weeks, and violence threatened to escalate as Maoist insurgents joined 
the protests.  
Inside the palace, the Indian Prime Minister’s special envoy tried to convince the 
monarch to accept a limited constitutional role, while India’s top diplomat warned the 
Royal Nepalese Army Chief about an impending bloodbath: “if you follow the [royal] 
order to fire [on the protestors], the King you’re trying to protect will be hanging from a 
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lamp post. Are you His Majesty’s army or the army of the people of Nepal?”524 After 
three more days of Indian pressure and violent protests, the king finally stepped down and 
transferred power to the political parties.525  Uncertainty prevailed on the streets: could 
the Nepalese state survive without monarchy? Would the Maoists take over and plunge 
the country into anarchy, after ten years of civil war?  
The alarmed U.S. Ambassador noted that the Maoist objective of a “violent revolution” 
in the preceding days had only failed because a providential hailstorm dispersed the 
protestors, but that the insurgents were preparing for a “second revolution (ala the 
Bolsheviks’ October Revolution).” 526  New Delhi, however, seemed nonplussed and 
immediately welcomed the King’s announcement to step down and hand over power.527 
Indian officials had good reasons to believe that the Maoists had not been deterred by 
meteorological conditions alone and would support a peaceful transition: five months 
earlier, in November 2005, the Indian government had secretly facilitated an 
understanding between the democratic parties and the Maoists, creating a joint platform 
that opposed the King and provided a roadmap for regime change. Set into motion after 
the king backed down, this plan led to a historical peace agreement that ended civil war: 
                                                
524 Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, who notes that the Nepalese Army Chief P. J. Thapa was initially 
unwilling, but eventually acquiesced (Interview 028). King Gyanendra’s advisor P. Rana says that during 
their private meeting, the special envoy (Karan Singh) gave the monarch a sealed enveloped whose contents 
remain unknown but allegedly included assurances about his safety (Interview 050). Indian Army Chief J. J. 
Singh recalls calling his counterpart with “friendly advice” to emulate the Indian Army: “to further the duly 
elected government as per the constitution, remain neutral, apolitical and professional,” and thus avoid 
confrontation with the Maoists, who were “focused only on removing the King” (Interview 045). 
525 http://un.org.np/unmin-archive/downloads/keydocs/2006-04-24-Proclaimation_of_HM_King.pdf  
526 Amb. Moriarty, May 19: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KATHMANDU1287_a.html 
527 Apr. 24: Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2006 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2007), 757. 
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the insurgents agreed to disarm, joined multi-party democracy, and then proceeded to 
win the country’s first-ever elections for a Constituent Assembly.528  
Why did India adopt a coercive posture towards King Gyanendra, facilitating regime 
change in 2006? Since 2001, different individuals and organizations had disagreed in 
New Delhi on how best to implement India’s Nepal policy, but based on three 
assessments, in 2006 they converged to the necessity to compel Kathmandu into change. 
 
Neighbor on fire: the spillover effects of an escalating civil war 
[the] growing influence and grip of Maoists throughout [Nepal], particularly in the Terai areas 
bordering India, and their links with left extremist outfits in parts of India, are a cause of serious 
concern.529 
Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2003-04. 
At the root of all Indian assessments was the threat of a rising Maoist insurgency 
engulfing the neighboring kingdom in a protracted civil war and affecting India’s 
domestic security, especially through left-wing extremist links across the border.  
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency had begun in 1996, and after an initial phase of limited 
guerilla-warfare, it developed into a full-blown insurgency to control more than half the 
country and to severely expose the Royal Nepalese Army’s fighting capability.530 In 
                                                
528 Results of April 2008 elections for a Constituent Assembly: CPN-Maoist (220), Nepali Congress, (110), 
and CPN-UML (103), which India’s EAM welcomes as a “success”: Bhasin, IFR 2008, 1253 fn1. On May 
28, Nepal is declared a republic and on Aug. 15 former Maoist insurgent leader “Prachanda” is elected 
Prime Minister. 
529 Quoted from the Indian Ministry of Defence, 2003-04 annual report, in Bhasin, IFR 2004, 362. 
530 The Maoists began their insurgency with a first attack on a police post, on Feb. 13, 1996. On their rise 
up to 2005, see Aditya Adhikari, The bullet and the ballot box: the story of Nepal's Maoist revolution (New York: 
Verso, 2014); Ashok K. Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: meeting the Maoist challenge (New Delhi: Rupa, 2005); 
Prashant Jha, Battles of the new republic: A contemporary history of Nepal (New Delhi: Aleph, 2014), 1-157. 
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November 2001, a few months after taking over power from his assassinated brother, 
King Gyanendra declared a nation-wide emergency and promised military victory by 
modernizing the armed forces.531 Over the next five years, the Royal Nepalese Army 
(RNA) doubled in size to 90,000 men and the government’s military expenditure trebled. 
As the war escalated after 2002, the average annual death toll spiraled from less than 100 
to almost 5,000, and the conflict expanded to all but two of the country’s 75 districts.532 
India’s threat assessments therefore increased, no longer seeing the conflict as a mere 
“irritant” to Nepal’s domestic order, nor restricted to the police domain.533 Three specific 
domestic security concerns informed this strategic assessment.  
First, the Maoists identified the Indian government as Nepal’s main external enemy, 
accusing it of supporting the interests of the “feudal” monarchy or the “bourgeois” 
political parties. Their revolutionary pursuit to take over power threatened to create 
either a hostile regime or a protracted civil war, both of which could spill over across the 
open border of 1,900 km.534 The Maoists found particular support among Nepal’s 
Indian-origin population in the lowland Terai region, which shared strong ethno-
linguistic bonds with the Indian border states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.535  
                                                
531 Declared on Nov. 23, after the Maoists launch coordinated attacks in 42 districts. The government 
approves the Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention and Control) Act and creates a Unified 
Command to pool military, police and intelligence resources to go on the offensive. 
532 Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., eds., Nepal in transition: from people's war to fragile peace (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 20-21. Mehta, Royal Nepal Army, xviii. 
533 Jha, Battles, 82-5. 
534 Jha, Battles, 17-24. In early 2002, India became the world’s first country to deem the Communist Party 
of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) a terrorist organization. 
535 For a background on these cross-border links, see Frederick H. Gaige, Regionalism and national unity in 
Nepal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). India also hosts several million of Nepalese, including 
around 40,000 Gorkhas serving in the Indian Army, half of which are Nepalese citizens, in 41 different 
battalions. An estimated 150,000 have retired in Nepal: Mehta, Royal Nepal Army, 4-5. 
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Despite a change in government, in May 2004, the Indian government’s chief concern 
about the Nepalese insurgency persisted unaltered. Speaking in 2003, External Affair 
Minister Y. Sinha emphasized such concern: “we cannot say that we are apathetic to 
whatever is happening in Nepal [because] we still have, an open border (…) and if we 
remember that we are two of the closest neighbours, then our security interests are bound 
to converge.”536 Exactly a year later, his successor K. N. Singh, echoed such warnings, 
emphasizing that the “grave challenge posed by [the] Maoist insurgency [in Nepal], is 
also a threat to India’s security.”537  
Second, after 2002, the Nepalese Maoist leadership started to settle permanently in 
India.538 This allowed the insurgents to create safe zones from RNA offensives and 
develop an underground network for financing and arms acquisitions.539 Several Maoist 
leaders were thus arrested by Indian authorities and deported to Nepal, and in 2003 both 
countries reached a bilateral extradition agreement.540  
When King Gyanendra declared emergency rule, in 2005, Nepal’s instability further 
threatened to spillover, with also a rising number of refugees from the political parties 
                                                
536 Dec. 12: Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2003 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2004), 429, 
31. India’s ambassador to Nepal, S. Saran, quotes Defence Minister G. Fernandes: “the fight against the 
Maoists is also India’s fight.” https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03KATHMANDU2366_a.html  
537 Dec. 22, in parliament: Bhasin, IFR 2004, 423.  
538 Mostly in the states of Bihar and West Bengal, but their network allowed them to circulate across the 
country, including in New Delhi, and even abroad: Jha, Battles, 29; Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 1152. 
539 Dec. 2003, EAM Y. Sinha in response to reports about a meeting in India between CPN-UML General 
Secretary, M. K. Nepal, and Maoist leader Prachanda: “We feel embarrassed … [but] for somebody from 
Nepal to sneak into India, or for the Maoist leaders to operate from bases in India are two entirely different 
things. (…) India provides no sanctuary to these elements from Nepal. Whenever we have had information, 
we have not only arrested these people, we have even repatriated them to Nepal or we have held them in 
prison in India.” Bhasin, IFR 2003, 436. 
540 Arrests begin in Feb. 2002: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02KATHMANDU1408_a.html. 
Indian Ambassador to Nepal, S. Saran, notes that in response to Maoists complaints about the arrests, the 
Indian government had passed on the message that “if you break the law in India you will get arrested”: 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03KATHMANDU427_a.html Arrests in include C. P. Gajurel 
(Aug. 2003) and M. Vaidya “Kiran” (March 2004). After Sept. 2003, increased security cooperation with a 
new RNA-IB hotline: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03KATHMANDU1870_a.html  
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joining the Maoists in exile in India.541 One day after the coup, the Indian government 
thus expressed concern that “any increase in violence in Nepal will have its fall out in 
India. It has already had a fall out in India in terms of the very large exodus of ordinary 
Nepalis escaping violence and economic deprivation from Nepal. So, it stands to reason 
that if there is intensification of violence in the country it will have its impact on India.”542 
Finally, and of greatest concern, were Nepal’s Maoist links with Indian left-wing 
extremists, including organizational cooperation and coordination on logistics and 
weapon supplies.543 Rejecting Nepalese allegations that India was supporting and training 
the Maoist insurgents, the Minister of External Affairs, in 2003, intuitively underlined 
that “if we were to encourage the Nepalese Maoists, then we would be encouraging the 
the PWG and the MCC [Maoist insurgents] in India.”544 The possibility of a “Compact 
Revolutionary Zone” linking Nepal to Southern India through a “red corridor” of Maoist 
insurgents thus emerged as one of India’s main security concerns.545  
The National Security Adviser after 2004-05, M. K. Narayanan, recalls: 
Clearly, the [Nepalese] Maoists we had problems with, there were strong connections on our side 
with [the] red corridor. (…) Maoists in India and Nepal were extremely close. Point is not about 
                                                
541 March 2, deputy EAM Ahmed: “several Nepalese citizens, including political leaders, have crossed over 
to India following the imposition of emergency in the country.” In late March, the SSB (Armed Border 
Police) registered a rise in infiltrations and detention of Maoists and called for new border identification 
system. In June, Home Minister S. Patil notes that refugee inflows from Nepal duplicated since the coup: 
Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2005 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2006), 504, 08-11.  
542 MEA statement Feb. 2, 2005: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 494. 
543 This leads to the creation of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South 
Asia, in 2001, whose founding statement vows to “condemn the servile role of the reactionary governments 
of this region, including India, (…) who dance to the tune of U.S. imperialism in the name of countering 
terrorism.” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/documents/papers/CCOMPOSA.htm. Various 
Indian officials mentioned the CPN-M imported weapons from India, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. 
544 Bhasin, IFR 2003, 436.  
545 L. K. Advani, Home Minister until 2004, referred to the “well-known link between the Maoist 
insurgents in Nepal and Naxal outfits in India,” calling them “twin brothers” L. K. Advani, My country my 
life (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2008), 738-39. 
	  
	   211	  
[whether they cooperated operationally on] blowing up bridges etc. (…) Maoists were certainly 
not promising [for India in the] long-term because we [in the Intelligence Bureau] know their 
thought process and ideas. I don’t mind dealing with Maoists in Fiji, but in Nepal [we were] not 
prepared. We didn’t see it as to our advantage to have a Maoist regime in Nepal [because] it 
would have repercussions on India, [through] links, red corridor, and arms supplies.546 
Despite differences about the intensity of this threat, all organizations consensually agreed 
on the assessment of a protracted Maoist insurgency in Nepal as a liability for India’s 
domestic security. 547 These concerns were particularly strong in the Intelligence Bureau, 
which focused on the domestic security angle. Even in late 2006, when the Maoists had 
agreed to lay down their weapons, the former IB director A. Doval cautioned India not to 
lower its guard:  
The CPN (Maoists) becoming equity shareholders in Nepal’s new power dispensation also has 
implications for India’s internal security particularly in view of their known linkages with Indian 
Left Wing Extremists. … [CPN-M may be using parties tactically to get rid of monarchy, so 
once] the monarchy is out and only two power centers are left in Nepal, the Maoists may not 
remain an easy commodity for the political parties to deal with. A new power struggle may ensue 
in which Maoists may display greater stridency and possibly revival of its revolutionary 
agenda.548 
New Delhi’s 2002 decision to respond to a secret Maoist outreach effort to PM A. B. 
Vajpayee and establish a channel of communication with the insurgents was therefore 
because of, and not despite this threat, as sometimes erroneously argued.549 India had to be 
prepared for any scenario in Nepal, and this also required an open link to monitor and 
                                                
546 Interview 077. 
547 The MEA articulated this concern cogently: “[The] growth of Maoist insurgency in Nepal is a matter of 
serous concern to India because of its adverse fall-out for India due to the open and unregulated border as 
well as the links between Nepal’s Maoists and the Indian Naxalite groups,” MEA, "Annual Report 2004-
05," (New Delhi 2005), 14. 
548 He retired in Jan. 2005: http://ajitdoval.blogspot.com/2008/09/intelligence-in-indias-internal.html  
549 Channel established under National Security Adviser B. Mishra, in mid-2002, and then facilitated by the 
external intelligence agency RAW: Jha, Battles, 90; S. D. Muni, "Bringing the Maoists down the Hills: 
India’s role," in Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace., ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David 
Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). In 2003, Mishra 
acknowledged this channel in interactions with Nepalese officials such as Defence Minister B. B. Thapa and 
King Birendra’s adviser P. Rana, to signal that the Indian government was keeping all options open 
(Interviews 038 and 050). See also Nov. 2003 discussion between Indian and American ambassadors in 
Nepal: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03KATHMANDU2366_a.html. 
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assess whether the Maoists were amenable to being mainstreamed and co-opted into a 
liberal democracy. 
 
Royal overreach: King Gyanendra’s non-cooperation on conflict resolution 
The second, and also most important assessment driving India’s coercive approach in 
2005-06 related to King Gyanendra’s non-cooperative attitude: his increasing political 
activism and military strategy clashed with New Delhi’s focus on the importance of the 
democratic parties and political inducements to end the civil war. 
India’s cardinal objective to promote order in Nepal was seen to be contingent on 
preserving both the monarchy and the political parties as the country’s two inter-
dependent foundations. Speaking to the parliament in late 2004, PM M. Singh thus 
reiterated that India would continue its “traditional policy of support for multi-party 
democracy and constitutional monarchy as the twin pillars of the Nepalese 
Constitution.”550 The “twin pillars” had been the bedrock of India’s Nepal policy since 
the early 1990s. 551 
In other words, New Delhi would support constitutional monarchy and provide military 
assistance to pressure the insurgents, as long as King Gyanendra also delivered to 
strengthen multi-party democracy as an incentive for the Maoists to agree to a negotiated 
settlement.552 Indian decision-makers sometimes differed on how best to calibrate such 
                                                
550 Dec. 21: Bhasin, IFR 2004, 414. 
551 For its applicability in the late 1990s: Krishna V. Rajan, "Darkness at noon," in The Ambassadors' club: the 
Indian diplomat at large, ed. Krishna V. Rajan (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012). For a similar definition of 
the “twin pillars” principle, by President A. P. J. Kalam, see Bhasin, IFR 2003, 89. 
552 Interviews 026, 028 and 075, respectively with S. Saran (Indian Ambassador to Nepal until 2004, 
Foreign Secretary thereafter), R. Rae (JS for Nepal in 2004-05), and K. N. Singh (EAM 2004-5). 
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military pressure and political inducements.553 But they agreed consensually both on the 
pivotal importance and the objectives of this dual strategy: any deviation from it would 
strengthen the Maoist insurgency, weaken Nepal’s domestic order, impinge on India’s 
security, and therefore require revising support for the royal regime.554 This was India’s 
only red line, but the monarch kept dangerously approaching it by pursuing an activist 
role after 2001, which set off repeated alarms in New Delhi.555   
First, King Gyanendra played off different political parties and factions against each 
other, thus not only maximizing his own power and reducing the prospects for legitimate 
governments, but also feeding the Maoist rhetoric about the unsustainability of 
parliamentary democracy.556 India’s discontent thus gradually rose after the monarch 
dissolved the elected parliament in 2002.557  
                                                
553 According to various interviewees, two broad approaches: 1) MEA, RAW, and liberal political parties 
and activists committed to actively pushing for an alternative and a possible regime change with the 
Maoists, and 2) the IB, conservative political leaders and ministers, and sectors of the Indian Army 
favouring stability under continued royal rule. PM M. Singh seemed to fall somewhere in the middle, but 
gradually shifted towards the first approach in early 2005. 
554 E. g. as early as June 2002, on the occasion of King Gyanendra’s visit to New Delhi, “PM Vajpayee 
made it clear that India would support any and all measures to deal with the insurgency as long as two 
elements remained: the constitutional monarchy and a multi-party system.” 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02KATHMANDU1314_a.html. This is also the account of 
Nepalese ambassador to India at the time, B. B. Thapa, who recalls that Indians drew their red lines very 
clearly behind closed doors (Interview 038). 
555 As noted by the Indian ambassador at the time of his enthronement, in 2001, India’s diplomats were 
already predisposed to being “cagey” about King Gyanendra he was the “baby king” crowned by the 
Ranas in the 1950-51 crisis, and as head of the Palace’s intelligence, he had taken on a hostile approach 
towards India in 1988, during the crisis with Chinese weapon imports. (D. Mukharji: Interview 056, see 
also Singh, Walking, 122-23. For an alternative view, see: 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jun/11inter.htm. 
556 For example, in 2002, King Gyanendra instigated a rift in Nepal’s main political party – also the one 
seen as more friendly towards India – by appointing a Prime Minister form his favorite faction. The NC rift 
between G. P. Koirala and S. B. Deuba had happened in 2001, over the continuation of emergency to fight 
the Maoists, leading the latter to form a new party: Nepali Congress (Democratic). This concerned India, as 
it weakened the prospects of a stable government to find a conflict resolution mechanism for the Maoists: 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02KATHMANDU575_a.html  
557 On May 22, 2002, Gyanendra dissolved the Parliament and called for elections in November. In 
October, however, to India’s surprise he dismissed the interim government and postponed elections 
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Second, in August 2003, it also became clear that the monarch was not committed to a 
party-led peace process after he deployed the RNA to end a cease-fire and scuttle an 
imminent agreement negotiated by Nepalese PM S. B. Thapa. 558 Of even greater 
concern was the monarch’s decision to indefinitely postpone parliamentary elections and 
appoint or dismiss interim governments at his prerogative. 559  
Finally, by late 2004 it became clear to New Delhi that the military conflict had evolved 
into a stalemate, and that “if the Maoists are not strong enough yet to take on the RNA 
neither is the RNA in any position to wipe out the Maoists.”560 The insurgents had thus 
returned to guerilla tactics and economic blockades to achieve maximum disruption.561 
To India, this further demonstrated the RNA’s incapacity to achieve success in its 
counter-insurgency mission.562 So when King Gyanendra announced a new military 
offensive in 2004, India conditioned its assistance on his ability to simultaneously deliver 
on the political front, for example by holding parliamentary elections.563  
                                                                                                                                            
indefinitely: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02KATHMANDU1964_a.html and 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03KATHMANDU552_a.html 
558 B. B. Thapa, who served as a minister at the time, recalls 2003 as a tipping point, as it became apparent 
that King Gyanendra was undermining attempts to build a string government or reinstitute parliament. In 
a friendly overture towards India, he appointed S. B. Thapa as PM, but as soon as the government began 
to show initiative by exploring a cease-fire with the Maoists (January 2003) to further the peace process, in 
June, he undermined it launching an RNA offensive in August: “He was … relying only on RNA inputs 
while the civilian government was only for [public and international] show,” (Interview 038). Indian 
reaction by NSA B. Mishra, on Nov. 24: “[the RNA offensive] has upset the equilibrium between 
constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy in Nepal,” Bhasin, IFR 2003, 362. 
559 See EAM Y. Sinha in a press interview, Dec. 12, 2003: Bhasin, IFR 2003, 428-9. 
560  V. Sood, former director of India’s external intelligence agency, RAW, in May 2005: 
http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/2007/05/handle-with-care.html  
561 Jha, Battles, 58-62; Mehta, Royal Nepal Army, 21-4. 
562  Some of the problems Indians identified in the RNA include: a) its ceremonial profile and lack of 
combat experience; b) excessive focus on conventional UN peacekeeping operations, hardly any experience 
in domestic counterinsurgency; c) absence of regimental system, and overlapping military/policing 
functions; d) unaccountable to government, responsible only towards the King: Mehta, Royal Nepal Army, ix-
x. 
563 In Apr. 2004, for example, India’s Ambassador S. Saran and his American and British counterparts 
tried to persuade Gyanendra to initiate a secret outreach to the political parties: 
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New Delhi’s assessment was that a purely military strategy was bound to fail and required 
a complementary political track to bring the parties on board and lure the Maoists into 
dialogue.564 Throughout 2004, this message was urgently and publically conveyed to 
Kathmandu, beckoning the monarch to reactivate the democratic process. In September, 
the Foreign Secretary thus emphasized that “any pursuit of a peace settlement must be 
within the parameters of the preservation of multiparty democracy in Nepal and also 
within the parameters of Constitutional Monarchy.”565 While the former “parameter” 
was a signal to the king, the later one was directed at the Maoists.566  
As time passed, New Delhi’s concerned suggestions quickly morphed into prescriptions, 
pushing the monarch to engage the political parties and the Maoists to reach a “political 
settlement” and end the civil war.567King Gyanendra, however, did exactly the opposite, 
delivering the final death blow to Nepal’s crumbling constitutional monarchy on 
February 1st, 2005, when he assumed direct control of government, detained party 
                                                                                                                                            
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04KATHMANDU692_a.html. India pressed for “mutual 
understanding and cooperation between all the constitutional forces in the country in particular between 
the institution of Constitutional Monarchy and the political parties,” Bhasin, IFR 2004, 582. 
564 Jul05 outgoing AMB Saran to US AMB:  “complete military victory over the Maoists was not possible 
… Until the Maoists were forced to realize they could not win, they would not be willing to make any 
meaningful concessions. Maintaining military pressure on the Maoists and avoiding political 
factionalization --that could give the Maoists something to exploit -- was critical”.  
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04KATHMANDU1319_a.html 
565 Bhasin, IFR 2004, 612. 
566 Speaking to parliament on Dec. 22, the EAM K. N. Singh emphasized: “we have started efforts to bring 
all political parties together on a national platform, and, on the other, encourage the monarchy and the 
political parties to work together” even while extending “all possible assistance to the Royal Nepalese Army 
and security forces in Nepal in order to raise their capabilities in dealing with the complexities of counter-
insurgency warfare” … “our determination and resolve to safeguard India’s interest and at the same time 
support Nepal to preserve multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy” Bhasin, IFR 2004, 423-4. 
567 See e.g. Foreign Secretary S. Saran’s statement in September “a political settlement in which the 
Maoists are ready to come in as a legitimate political entity, abandon violence, take part in a free and fair 
elections, that is something which we believe perhaps the people of Nepal [and India] would welcome.” 
Bhasin, IFR 2004, 613. As recalled by P. Rana, one of Gyanendra’s key advisers, the King had two options: 
a) reach out to the political parties to revive the parliamentary process, or b) deal with the Maoists directly, 
in political or military terms. India’s advice was to opt for a) and then proceed to b), but the fact that 
Gyanendra took over power instead, on Feb. 1, 2005, shows that he “was not weighing the consequences” 
(Interview 050). 
	   216	  
leaders under emergency provisions, and announced a three-year moratorium on 
elections.568 For New Delhi, this was “a serious setback to the cause of democracy in 
Nepal [and] a cause of grave concern to India.”569  
Over the following days, the Indian government took severe measures to express its 
discontent.570 Policy differences emerged on how hard India should take on the King, the 
Minister of External Affairs, for example, cautiously reassuring Kathmandu that India 
had “infinite patience”.571 But having irreversibly crossed India’s only red line, and 
obstinately persisting in his view that “they [India] must say what they must say, and we 
[Nepal] must do what we must do”, King Gyanendra gradually lost all remaining support 
in New Delhi over the following months.572  
A tipping point has been reached: by boxing himself into a corner, the King activated 
India’s coercive mode, forcing it to consider an alternative constellation of power in 
                                                
568 See http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/50218/nepalnews0406_2.pdf. P. Rana says India “may have 
known” about the King’s plan, but did not give permission: “consultation does not mean green light” 
(Interview 050). R. Rae, at the time in charge of Nepal at the MEA, says Gyanendra felt confident because 
“he may have pinged parts of GoI but got bad advice,” (Interview 026). 
569 Feb. 1 statement, see also Feb. 2 statement: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 487-88, 90. 
570 On Feb. 2, India cancelled its participation, and thus forced postponement of the SAARC summit 
scheduled for Feb. 5-6 in Bangladesh. On Feb. 3, the new Indian Army chief cancelled his customary visit 
to Nepal after taking charge. On Feb. 9 the meeting of the India-Nepal Joint Security Group is cancelled, 
and all military assistance suspended. On Feb. 13, the government recalled its ambassador: Bhasin, IFR 
2005, 345. See also http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2594, and Muni, "Bringing the Maoists," 323. 
571 Apr. 8, 2005, interview to the media: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 55. As Foreign Secretary at the time, S. Saran 
recalls that “some people [were] not comfortable with [our] pressure on King [Gyanendra], including old 
royalists [and] some in the security establishment.” (Interview 028), see also 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03KATHMANDU2366_a.html. 
572 National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan: “[the King] shot himself in the foot, so we had to abandon 
him.” (Interview 077). EAM K. N. Singh: “before, we kept asking ourselves, ‘what’s the substitute for this 
chap?’” but the fact that “he dealt so badly with the situation, misled by advisers and courtiers”, forced 
India to “consider alternatives.” He had “poor leadership” skills, and the coup was “foolish,” because India 
had warned him against it but “he didn’t listen” (Interview 075). On organizational differences, the Indian 
ambassador S. Mukherjee recalls: “[the] King’s take-over resolved all internal differences” (Interview 056). 
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Kathmandu that could end the civil war and deliver to its security interests.573 In May, 
2005 the former director of India’s external intelligence agency thus predicted that “the 
Maoists will have to be brought to the negotiating table and they will eventually accept a 
constitutional role.”574 In subsequent months, India thus facilitated rapprochement and 
served as an external guarantor to an agreement reached in New Delhi between the 
political parties and the Maoists, without (and against) the King, which paved the way for 
the April 2006 regime change.575  
Beyond ideological proclivity or naïve trust, India was willing to work with, and not 
merely against the Maoists, because it identified a unique window of opportunity to reach 
a peace agreement, based on three assessments about the insurgents: 1) they had reached 
out to New Delhi, in 2002, promising not to take any hostile posture towards India; 576 2) 
they had also engaged the political parties in Kathmandu, in a series of secret talks;577 and 
3) their internal balance of forces favored the gradual emergence of a moderate current, 
seeking reform and inclusion into parliamentary politics.578 
                                                
573 In the words of an Indian official, the coup was a “turning point … [because] we realized [that] 
convincing the King was not going to work. Instead of the Maoists being the main problem, we realized the 
king was the main problem. He had dug himself in a deeper hole” quoted in Jha, Battles, 97.  
574 V. Sood: http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/2007/05/handle-with-care.html. 
575 On India’s role in facilitating the agreements, see Jha, Battles, 85, 95-102. For a Maoist account on 
India’s role in the agreement, by its chief ideologue B. Bhattarai, see Tripathi, Nepal in transition. India’s role 
and motivations are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
576 Reaching out to the Indian PM via NSA B. Mishra, in 2002, the CPN-M “assured the Indian leaders 
that they wanted the best of relations with India and would not do anything to harm its critical interests”. 
Muni, "Bringing the Maoists," 320-1. A RAW official recalls 2005-06: “[the] real surprise was Prachanda 
… [who] was a mysterious type of figure. But we found him to be very balanced; he seemed to be a man of 
vision. And that was the tilting factor for us,” quoted in Jha, Battles, 67. 
577 The Maoists started a secret outreach to various political parties after 2002, a channel that accelerated 
after the Seven Party Alliance was formed to oppose the King: Jha, Battles, 51-2. CPN-UML leader M. K. 
Nepal recalls a series of eight meetings just in 2005 as a confidence-building measure facilitated by the 
Indian government, which lead to the 12-Point Understanding of Nov. 2005 (Interview 054). 
578 The CPN-M was torn between its Chairman Prachanda, more inclined towards continuation of the 
armed insurgency, and its chief ideologue B. Bhattarai who favored peace talks and political integration. 
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By taking initiative to facilitate the possibility of an alternative regime in Kathmandu, in 
2005, New Delhi also increased its leverage over King Gyanendra to either perform or 
risk losing power.579 However, as violence took over the streets of Kathmandu in the 
spring of 2006, it soon became apparent that the institution of monarchy had become the 
weakest, and therefore also the most dispensable link in Nepal’s triangular stalemate.580 
 
Internationalizing conflict: Kathmandu’s desperate balancing games 
A final assessment leading India to embrace regime change in Nepal related to the risks of 
the conflict internationalizing, driven by King Gyanendra’s eleventh-hour attempts to 
escape Indian pressure by developing extra-regional links with China, the United States 
and even Pakistan. 
With civil war escalating after 2001, New Delhi’s concern about possible encroachment 
by external actors such as China heightened, and it warned Kathmandu that it would not 
tolerate any third-party involvement.581 The main threat assessment, however, related to 
Nepal’s military modernization and the risk of competing American, Chinese and other 
                                                                                                                                            
The latter prevailed after Apr. 2005 as the Maoists commited “to democracy instead of orthodox capture of 
state and primary anti-Indianism”: Jha, Battles, 51-2, 94. See also Adhikari, Bullet and ballot, 151-81, 205  
579 U.S. Ambassador’s notes on meeting the Indian Foreign Secretary S. Saran, Dec. 2005, in Katmandu, 
who reports to have passed on the Indian PM’s message that “the King had to move, and fast, to reconcile 
with the political parties,” and that “monarchy would [not] survive unless the King acted,” because the  
“Maoists and political parties had gone too far with each other to break apart easily”: 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KATHMANDU2793_a.html. See also similar points made 
by Amb. S. Mukherjee: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KATHMANDU138_a.html and 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KATHMANDU566_a.html. 
580 Former Indian ambassador to Nepal, D. Mukharji, describes India’s 2005 coercive policy as a corollary 
to prior assessments of Kathmandu being torn between three power poles (the King, the parties and the 
insurgents), and that this would persist “until any two joined forces to terminate the third.” (Interview 056). 
581 In March 2003, for example, Gyanendra’s adviser P. Rana recalls NSA B. Mishra warning him that the 
Indian government would “absolutely would not tolerate any involvement of third parties, either as 
facilitators or mediators,” https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03KATHMANDU552_a.html  
	  
	   219	  
suppliers reducing India’s leverage over Gyanendra to perform on the political front.582 
The RNA had to be strengthened, but only up to the point of a stalemate that compelled 
the insurgents to pursue a settlement under Indian supervision.  
However, Gyanendra’s post-2005 attempts to secure extra-regional assistance indicated 
his unwillingness to abide by this strategy and, instead, his plans to launch a military 
offensive while keeping democracy in suspension. With the United States, for example, 
the Nepalese Foreign Minister R. N. Pandey accused India of training the Maoist 
insurgents and threatened with Nepal’s rising reliance on China.583 While he professed 
Nepal’s interest in a “special, very close relationship with the U.S.,” Washington refused 
assistance and kept pressuring the King to deliver on reinstituting democracy.584  
Similarly, building on a gradual expansion of Sino-Nepalese relations since the early 
2000s, Kathmandu played the China card to balance Indian pressure.585 Less than two 
months after the royal coup of 2005, the Chinese Foreign Minister thus became the first 
high-level foreign official to visit Nepal, Beijing, which was seen as a clear indication of 
support for King Gyanendra.586 As the bilateral crisis with India escalated throughout the 
                                                
582 See e.g. in May 2004, EAM K. N. Singh: “The situation there [Nepal] is frightening for them as well as 
for us. [If its not solved], others will come and intervene,” Bhasin, IFR 2004, 172. On Indian fears of about 
competing American and Chinese involvement in the conflict, see Muni, "Bringing the Maoists," 320. 
583See https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KATHMANDU409_a.html. Pandey also expressed 
Nepal’s opposition to India’s bid to join the UNSC as a permanent member, and suggests that India was 
training Maoists: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KATHMANDU1267_a.html. Pandey also 
alluded to India’s 1975 annexation of Sikkim: “calling for a constituent assembly is a way to achieve the 
Sikkimization of Nepal,” https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KATHMANDU2565_a.html  
584 Dec. 15, 2005: FM Pandey says the United States took a “wrong” policy of pressure, instead of 
engagement: https://archive.org/stream/05KATHMANDU2811/05KATHMANDU2811_djvu.txt  
585 Just ten days before the coup, in a possible quid pro quo, the Nepalese government had shut the Tibetan 
Refugee Welfare Office in Kathmandu and imposed more restrictions on Tibetan refugees: Bhasin, Nepal-
India v.1, 3338. 
586 The visit of China’s FM Li Zhaoxing began on March 31, and the official statement makes no reference 
to the domestic situation: http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/xwlb/t190201.htm.  Nepalese 
FM R. N. Pandey visited China in August, followed by RNA Chief P. J. Thapa in October, but were not 
able to get extra support: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lang=en&id=107734.   
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year, however, Beijing rebuffed Kathmandu’s requests for greater involvement to 
counter-balance New Delhi’s pressure.587  
Finally, King Gyanendra courted Pakistan in a desperate attempt to circumvent Indian 
and American pressures.588 At the regional SAARC summit in late 2005, India’s Foreign 
Secretary S. Saran thus recalls Kathmandu as “[being] very nasty, opposing every Indian 
move, playing games, and working with Pakistan to prevent Afghanistan from joining 
[the organization], and proposing China instead.”589 
Given the limited success of these balancing strategies, New Delhi was concerned but not 
alarmed. Despite tactical differences on arms supplies and on the utility of negotiation 
with the Maoists, India and the United States had developed a firm dialogue on the 
common strategic objective to ensure stability in Nepal.590 Similarly, New Delhi and 
Beijing kept communication channels open, and their positions broadly converged.591 
                                                
587 The RNA chief P. J. Thapa recalls his 2005 visit to Beijing: “China always insisted in a peaceful Nepal in 
a stable South Asia and that we should look towards India first. They focused on economic connectivity, 
but as long as no anti-China activities in Nepal and the monarchy survived, it let India to have free hand” 
(Interview 007). A Feb. 2005 U.S. Embassy cable notes that “over the course of the past year the PRC has 
moved from stressing the importance of support for the King to saying that it is in contact with opposition 
parties to now saying that the Gyanendra is just ‘one of many forces’ in Nepal,” 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BEIJING2778_a.html. 
588 Aug. 2005, FM R. N. Pandey visited Pakistan, followed by RNA Chief P. J. Thapa in December. On 
Pakistan as an alternative: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KATHMANDU2811_a.html  
589 (Interview 028). For the official Indian reaction: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 419.  
590 In 2004, PM M. Singh noted that the United States “supported India’s approach” in Nepal: Bhasin, IFR 
2004, 1178. S. Saran recalls: “[the] Americans [were] not always happy about Indian outreach to Maoists, 
but allowed us to take a lead … [U.S. Ambassador] Moriarty may have had occasional reservations, but 
[Washington] DC trusted our judgment” (Interview 028).  
591 Amb. S. Mukherjee refers to an agreement “to coordinate and share information” about Nepal: 
http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2594. Nepal was also discussed during March visit of Foreign 
Secretary S. Saran to Beijing: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 512; Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 3360-64. See also 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KATHMANDU2389_a.html.  
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Indirectly, however, Nepalese attempts to internationalize the conflict backfired because, 
to New Delhi, they signaled balancing as a belligerent strategy.592  
However limited in its success, Kathmandu’s 2005 shift from non-cooperation to open 
defiance threatened to reduce Indian leverage, prolong the window of uncertainty in 
bilateral relations, and reduce incentives for the Maoists to disarm. This final assessment, 
about Nepal’s hostile foreign policy after 2005, thus confirmed New Delhi’s long-held 
suspicion that King Gyanendra was not only an immediate obstacle to conflict resolution, 
but also a long-term liability for India’s security interests.  
* 
Reacting to the King’s emergency rule in 2005, Vikram Sood, a former director of India’s 
external intelligence organization, had cautioned that “it is less important if Nepal is ruled 
by an absolute monarch, a constitutional monarch, a parliamentary democracy or a 
[Maoist] peoples’ democracy so long as it has India’s security interests in mind.”593 Such 
“security interests” were reflected in three assessments: 1) the escalating civil was spilling 
over to affect India’s domestic security; 2) King Gyanendra failed to pursue New Delhi’s 
two-track approach to the insurgents, complementing military pressure with a strong 
democratic process as a political inducement; and 3) Kathmandu started to balance and 
threaten India’s regional security influence by seeking assistance from third parties, 
internationalizing the conflict. India’s coercive approach in 2005-2006 to facilitate regime 
change was therefore, above all, a targeted response to remind Kathmandu of its security 
interests. Failing to respond, Gyanendra’s royal overestimation – about the RNA’s 
                                                
592 An Indian government official reflects this: “[it] really irritated us. Here was someone who had trampled 
on democracy, deepened the conflict in his own country. And now, he was playing strategic games that 
directly impinged our interests,” quoted in Jha, Battles, 101. 
593 http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/2007/05/handle-with-care.html  
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capability to achieve a military victory, about his political support within the Government 
of India, about Beijing or Washington’s willingness to support him, and about the 
differences between the democratic parties and the Maoist insurgents – eventually proved 
fatal to his regime. 
 
3. Sri Lanka 2009 
Unlike in 1987, in 2009 India supported the Sri Lankan government’s successful military 
offensive against the Tamil insurgents, which ended almost three decades of civil war. 
Colombo would not have succeeded without New Delhi’s assistance, which was based on 
a triple strategic assessment inducing its cooperative posture: 1) President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa pursued a risky military offensive but continuously engaged and reassured 
India, both on security and political issues, and promised to deliver on the political track 
to solve the ethnic conflict; 2) Conversely, the LTTE’s intransigent separatism threatened 
to prolong the conflict and spillover to affect India’s domestic security, and 3) India’s 
geopolitical predominance required insulating the Sri Lankan government from extra-
regional influence, mitigating Colombo’s strategic reliance on China, on the one hand, 
and protecting it from Western liberal-interventionist pressures, on the other hand.  
* 
On the morning of May 19th, 2009, the body of T. V. Prabhakaran was found floating in 
a bloody ditch near Nanthi Kadal, a sweet-water lagoon in Northeast Sri Lanka. Under 
his leadership, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had thrived as one of the 
world’s most powerful insurgent groups, controlling up to a third of the island in their 
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quest for a separate Tamil state. On that day, however, the Tigers and their iconic leader 
succumbed to the fire of the Sri Lankan Army, marking the end of a war that had killed 
almost 100,000 people since the 1980s.594 President M. Rajapaksa thus declared “victory” 
and the country to be “completely freed from the clutches of separatist terrorism.”595 
While many Western capitals were still drafting condemnatory statements or UN 
resolutions calling for inquiries into possible human rights abuses by the Sri Lankan 
Army, less than 48 hours after the last rounds of fire had been shot, India’s National 
Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan and Foreign Secretary S. S. Menon arrived in 
Colombo to congratulate President Rajapaksa. New Delhi’s first statements were 
cautious, reiterating the need to address the “root causes” of the ethnic conflict by 
pursuing a political process to integrate the Tamil minority.596 But when the two envoys 
and President Rajapaksa emerged from their meting shaking hands and smiling, India’s 
immediate focus was apparent: it would continue to privilege engagement and 
cooperation.597 
Indeed, the Sri Lankan government would not have won the war without India’s support: 
unlike in 1987, this time New Delhi not only refrained from taking any action against the 
military offensive on the LTTE, but even rendered crucial assistance. During the 
preceding years, India had expanded defense cooperation and ended a weapons 
                                                
594 Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, 2012: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf  
595 Speaking before Parliament, partially in Tamil: http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090519_04  
596 On May 23, EAM S. M. Krishna: “With the conventional conflict in Sri Lanka coming to an end, this is 
the moment when the root causes of conflict in Sri Lanka can be addressed.” Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's 
Foreign Relations - Documents 2009 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2010), 123. 
597 After the May 21 meeting, NSA S. S. Menon emphasized: “we have to let emotions die down first.” 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Lanka+to+give+India+LTTE+chief's+death+certificate/1/43205.ht
ml. Various Indian government officials involved recalls that the overall focus was on engagement. 
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embargo, offering ships, helicopters, radars and ammunition.598 The Indian Navy gave 
operational support and intelligence that helped destroy the LTTE’s “floating weapons 
warehouses,” cutting the insurgents’ off their key oceanic weapon supply routes.599 
Thousands of Sri Lankan military personnel, including hundreds of officers, received 
training in India throughout the final phase of the war.600 On the diplomatic front, India 
helped Sri Lanka to fend off international pressure, especially at the United Nations.601 
The Indian government kept much of this support secret, conditioned by liberal and 
domestic factors, which are examined in Part II of this dissertation.602 But President M. 
Rajapaksa himself acknowledged the importance of subcontinental support, underlining 
that “we will never forget that in the defeat of the LTTE, India was a major factor.”603 
                                                
598  After 2004, such military assistance included: a) Sale, lease and renovation of Off-Shore Patrol Vessels to 
the Sri Lankan Navy; b) Renovation of the Palaly base for the Sri Lankan Air Force; c) Indra 2 and other 
aerial radar systems; d) Anti-air artillery; e) Mi-17 transport helicopters. For details see Bhasin, IFR 2007, 
1463-3; Nitin A. Gokhale, Sri Lanka, from war to peace (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2009); Bhasin, IFR 2006, 897; 
Bhasin, IFR 2008, 1462. On the Indian naval assets as a “major deterrent” against the Sea Tigers, see C. A. 
Chandraprema, Gota's war: the crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka (Colombo: n/a, 2012), 295-6, 380-
81. 
599 The first SLINEX joint exercise was held in Dec. 2005, after which Sri Lanka also began participating in 
India’s multilateral MILAN naval exercises. India’s Navy Chief at the time, Adm. A. Prakash, recalls: “We 
gave them a sympathetic shoulder … Given political constraints, we did everything we could to help them 
in terms of assistance, intelligence, maritime reconnaissance missions, cordons to impede LTTE resupply 
routes” (Interview 016). On rise in coordinated naval patrols after 2006: Bhasin, IFR 2006, 888. On India’s 
specific role in destroying the LTTE’s floating warehouses, see Chandraprema, Gota's war, 367-73. 
600 2006-2009: India the second-largest arms supplier to Sri Lanka ($US41 million, 16% of total): 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background. 2005-06: Training for 310 Sri Lankan naval 
officers and sailors, more than 75% of total foreign personnel trained: Ministry of Defence, "Annual Report 
2005-06," (New Delhi2006), 51. By 2011-12, a total of 820 Sri Lankan military officers had been trained in 
India: http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.com/2012/12/india-sri-lanka-defence-ties-appraisal.html. 
601 On Western pressures at the UN, a senior Sri Lankan diplomat recalls India being cooperative with 
Colombo: “[India] did not actively support bringing [the] issue up at [the] UNSC and wanted the LTTE to 
go” (Interview 082). Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative at the UNHRC recalls “solid support” from 
India (Interview 037). On India’s support as the USA delayed IMF loans, in early 2009: 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09COLOMBO523_a.html, Chandraprema, Gota's war, 464. 
602 An exception by EAM P. Mukherjee, on March 19, 2008 in parliament: “We would like to give you [Sri 
Lanka] all assistance which you require [to destroy the LTTE], which you want, and, actually, we are doing 
it,” Bhasin, IFR 2008, 111. 
603 In a 2014 interview to The Hindu: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/we-will-not-allow-an-
external-probe-says-sri-lankan-president-mahinda-rajapaksa/article6398175.ece. The semi-official 
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Why did New Delhi support the Sri Lankan Army offensive, despite internal and 
international pressure to coerce Colombo into suspending military operations or restart 
negotiations? One explanation is that India was merely reacting and adapting to 
changing circumstances, desperately cooperating to remain influential. 604  A closer 
examination, however, indicates that its support was more strategic, rooted in three 
evolving assessments about the conflict since the early 2000s. 
 
Colombo calling: hawkish but cooperative  
The most important factor driving India’s supportive posture was based on a dual 
political assessment, after 2005: President Rajapaksa was preparing a military strategy 
that exposed the LTTE’s operational weaknesses and tilted the war in Colombo’s favor; 
but while pursuing this, he proactively cultivated a cooperative relationship with New 
Delhi, vowing to respect Indian security interests.  
After being elected on a hardline and majoritarian Sinhala alliance, in November 2005, 
M. Rajapaksa immediately disowned the 2002 peace process under Norwegian 
mediation, and then gradually implemented an offensive strategy skillfully combining 
political, diplomatic and military means to split, isolate and weaken the LTTE.605 
Enjoying a parliamentary majority, he appointed a hardliner as his Prime Minister, two 
                                                                                                                                            
biography of Defence Secretary G. Rajapaksa emphasizes that despite “tremendous pressure … [the] 
Government of India took the flak and shielded Sri Lanka.” Chandraprema, Gota's war, 476. 
604 E.g. Sandra Destradi, Indian foreign and security policy in South Asia: regional power strategies (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), Ch. 4. 
605 In early September, M. Rajapaksa announced his presidential coalition campaign with support of the 
extremist JVP, promising a complete renegotiation of the cease-fire agreement (CFA), a re-examination of 
the role of the Norwegian facilitators, opposition to any measure that could weaken the “unitary” state, and 
his opposition to the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). This lead to a rift with 
the President C. B. Kumaratunga, from his own party: Chandraprema, Gota's war, 260-77.  
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of his brothers as key advisors, and implemented an unprecedented military 
modernization program.606 As the last round of peace talks failed, in October 2006, it 
thus became apparent in New Delhi that the conflict was escalating and that, under these 
new conditions, a full-blown war would favor Colombo.607  
While in public India responded with its mantra about non-violence and the need for a 
“negotiated political settlement”, it privately welcomed Rajapaksa’s hardball approach as 
a way to pressure the LTTE to return to the negotiation table.608 Eventually, as the Army 
kept striking victories that exposed the insurgents’ weaknesses, a new best-case scenario 
started to emerge: a total defeat of the LTTE.609 Depending on their respective access to 
ground intelligence and to Rajapaksa’s decision-making circles, after 2007 Indian officials 
therefore slowly converged towards the recognition that the scenario of an LTTE 
elimination was not only increasingly likely, but also desirable.610 Four factors contributed 
                                                
606 Between 2006 and 2009 the Sri Lankan Armed Forces’ size increased by almost 80%, up to 300,000 
men. On improvements in defence production and acquisition of equipment, inter-service coordination, 
strategic and operational reviews, reviving the Deep Penetration Units etc. see Ahmed Hashim, When 
counterinsurgency wins: Sri Lanka's defeat of the Tamil Tigers (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013), 46, 137, 63-5, 80-96.  
607 P. Heblikar, India’s external intelligence agency (RAW) representative in Colombo (2002-06), recalls 
that by 2006 the military balance favored the government (Interview 047). N. Rao, Indian High 
Commissioner in Colombo at the time of the elections, recalls “it was clear [to New Delhi] that Rajapaksa 
was planning to change the terms of the war and develop a military strategy to defeat the LTTE” (Interview 
023). 
608 EAM P. Mukherjee in parliament, Dec. 2006: MEA, "Annual Report 2005-06," (New Delhi 2006), 18. 
An official of the MEA working on Sri Lanka at the time recalls India’s triple objectives as: a) Protect 
territorial unity and integrity of SL “ at all cost;” b) Military solution not desirable because of potential 
human cost, so preference for a “peaceful dialogue;” and c) Implementation of constitutional amendment 
“13A” (Interview 020).  
609 S. Saran, who served as Foreign Secretary until late 2006, recalls: “it was immediately not apparent to us 
that the LTTE could be destroyed so quickly. [The] idea was that military pressure would force [the] 
LTTE to come back to table and accept some form of regional autonomy” (Interview 028). Several officials, 
including the Indian High Commissioner (A. Prasad) and a key Sri Lankan Army Commander (Maj. Gen. 
G. A. Chandrasiri), recognized that, at least until late 2007, even Colombo did not expect such a quick 
collapse of the LTTE and consequent victory (Interviews 006, 008, 047, 078). 
610 NSA M. K. Narayanan recalls: “[M. Rajapaksa] represented an aggressive line. … [but] we were 
actually quite happy that there was a hawk so he would deal with them [LTTE]” (Interview 077). Indian 
High Commissioner A. Prasad recalls the Army’s successful Sampur offensive in Aug. 2006 as a “tipping 
point” (Interview 008). FS S. S. Menon notes that while it may not have always agreed on the methods, the 
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to this assessment, all of which reflecting New Delhi’s satisfaction with Colombo’s 
cooperative attitude.  
First, President M. Rajakapsa informally adopted an “India first” policy on all security-
related issues. His visit, and that of Defence Secretary G. Rajapaka (his brother) to New 
Delhi, in 2005 and 2006 respectively, served to request Indian support for Sri Lanka’s 
military modernization plans.611 While India only agreed to deliver a few of the items on 
their “shopping list”, this worked as a confidence-building measure, signaling Colombo’s 
intent not to cross any Indian red lines.612 New Delhi thus reciprocated in a cooperative 
mode, for example by lifting the arms embargo and sharing crucial intelligence to 
undermine the LTTE.613 
Second, as the military offensive accelerated in 2007, at Colombo’s suggestion both 
governments established a high-level troika that facilitated bilateral coordination and 
insulated dialogue from domestic political pressures.614 The special envoys met regularly 
from 2008 onwards, providing New Delhi with a direct channel to Colombo and an 
                                                                                                                                            
Indian government after 2007 was “comfortable” with the increasing likelihood of an LTTE operational 
defeat (Interview 078). Despite being critical of the “manner” in which the Sri Lankan Army proceeded, 
minister P. Chidambaram recognizes that the LTTE’s defeat was seen to be inevitable after 2007 (Interview 
036). 
611 In 2006, G. Rajapaksa visits New Delhi to present a briefing to the Indian PM and NSA entitled 
“Military assistance required from the government of India”. He was “squaring very frankly with the 
Indians and telling them that the LTTE was preparing for all out war and that [Sri Lanka] had to be 
prepared” so military assistance was “sough to meet such an eventuality”: Chandraprema, Gota's war, 295-6.  
612 FS S. S. Menon on meeting G. Rajapaksa and Sri Lanka’s military “shopping list”: “Very friendly 
consultations, we appreciated [that they] consulted India first, to avoid surprises” (Interview 078). 
613 In May 2007 G. Rajapaksa meets all service chiefs in India: “[The] Indian Navy chief assured Gota that 
Indian resources would continue to be diverted for surveillance duties as and when requested by the SLN” 
Chandraprema, Gota's war, 428, see also 367-73. Sri Lankan Navy Chief at the time, V. Karannagoda, 
recalls 10 LTTE vessels were sunk in 2007, against only 4 in the preceding four year: 
https://lrrp2.wordpress.com/2012/09/07/war-on-terror-revisited-karannagoda-speaks-out/. 
614 On G. Rajapaksa’s initiative to set up this troika: a “line of communication … a ground breaking 
arrangement” which “kept the Indian government informed [and] by 2007, the relationship was on a good 
footing” and “no major problems”, see Chandraprema, Gota's war, 427-8. The Indian side included NSA 
M. K. Narayanan, FS S. S. Menon, and Defence Secretary V. Singh.. 
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informal setting to frankly exchange views on a variety of issues, from military operations 
to the diplomatic context.615 Indian participants recall the troika’s crucial role during the 
final months of the war, allowing both countries to communicate mutual concerns, 
coordinate action and overcome occasional disagreements.616  
Third, even while pursuing its offensive, Colombo acknowledged India’s advice that 
defeating the insurgency militarily was not tantamount to solving the ethnic conflict.617 
Sri Lankan officials signaled their understanding that India’s support for a “military 
victory” against the LTTE was contingent on their capacity to implement a “political 
solution” after the war ended.618  
Beyond just reassuring promises, Colombo was also acting on two fronts. On the one 
hand, after 2005, the government co-opted an LTTE splinter group into its coalition, 
which indicated that M. Rajapaksa was willing to accommodate Tamil leaders, even if 
                                                
615 M. K. Narayanan recalls that the troika was “very good; I used to have excellent conversations with Gota 
and Basil [Rajapaksa], sometimes they were tough, sometimes nice. … 2009 was probably the best year we 
had” (Interview 077). FS S. S. Menon says it served as a “very important, informal consultation channel,” 
without note takers, minutes or agenda, thus allowing for a “frank exchange” of views (Interview 078). 
616 Indian priorities, in order of importance: a) no surprises, keep India in the loop on all operations; b) limit 
civilian casualties, avoid employment of heavy weaponry; c) pursue political solution and reforms as soon as 
possible to assuage Tamil minority and solve the ethnic conflict, preferably by implementing 13th 
amendment based on 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka agreement; d) consider timeline of Indian legislative elections 
(April-May 2009) and pressure of regional parties in Tamil Nadu on New Delhi. Conversely, some of the 
Sri Lankan priorities: a) avoid or limit cease-fire; b) no return to negotiations; c) no exile for LTTE 
leadership; (Interviews 008, 077, 078, and Chandraprema, Gota's war, 476-82; Gokhale, Sri Lanka, XX-XX.) 
617 E.g. in response to NSA M. K. Narayanan’s Aug. 2008 statement that “they [Sri Lankan government] 
haven’t got the Tamil population on their side,” the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary’s emphasized: “nothing 
negative … He has only put in different words what our president has been saying, that we need to defeat 
terrorism but the [ethnic] problem needs to be resolved [politically]. …I understand him [Narayanan] very 
well,” quoted in M. R. Narayan Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's story (New Delhi: Sage, 2010), 134-5. 
618 Jan. 2009 statement by the EAM: “military victories offer a political opportunity to restore life to 
normalcy in the Northern Province and throughout Sri Lanka,” Bhasin, IFR 2009, 1514; see also MEA, 
"Annual Report 2008-09," (New Delhi 2009), 15. Sri Lankan diplomat D. Jayatilleka cogently defines the 
approach: “[when India opposed a] military solution … it did not mean that Sri Lanka should cease 
operations and talk to Prabhakaran. It meant that the political track should keep pace with the military 
track,” Dayan Jayatilleka, Long war, cold peace: Sri Lanka's north-south crisis (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2014), 334. 
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only to explore the insurgents’ internal divisions.619 On the other hand, in May 2008, the 
government held the first free elections in the Tamil-majority Eastern Province in more 
than two decades.620 While skepticism remained, both developments seemingly reassured 
New Delhi sufficiently to adopt a wait and watch policy.  
A final factor related to President Rajapaksa’s policy of giving India exclusive access to 
provide humanitarian assistance in the “liberated” Northern war zones. After late 2008, 
Indian military teams operated on the ground to provide aid to internally displaced 
Tamils.621 The Sri Lankan government also granted India a privileged role in post-war 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and political reform plans.622  
Together, these assessments about a cooperative Colombo determined India’s supportive 
posture, reflected from early 2008 onwards in unprecedented statements supporting Sri 
Lanka’s right to seek a “military victory” against the “terrorist” LTTE.623  
 
                                                
619 In 2004, the government induced the LTTE’s Col. Karuna to defect and then cultivated him to join 
democratic politics: he formed a new party (TMVP), which won the Eastern Province’s 2008 elections in 
alliance with the UPFA, and became a minister in 2009: Chandraprema, Gota's war, 274, 358-60. 
620 G. Rajapaksa responding, in Feb. 2008, to Indian advice that the Tamils must be given “a fair deal”: this 
“was exactly what they [government] were trying to show by the implementation of the provincial council 
system and the holding of elections in the eastern province.” He also shared his strategy to “mainstream” 
former insurgents: Chandraprema, Gota's war, 359-60, 429. A 2006 U.S. Embassy cable reports Indian 
officials saw “Karuna as an emerging political force to counter LTTE influence in the east …  [and] as an 
evolving democratic politician,” https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06COLOMBO721_a.html.  
621 After October 2008, including several field medical units, 62 people, including a dozen Army officers, 
which treated 50,000 IDs in India’s largest humanitarian operation since the 2004 Tsunami: MEA, 
"Annual Report 2009-10," (New Delhi 2010), 17; Narayan Swamy, Tiger Vanquished, 142-3. 
622The total aid package amounted to over US$100 million (at 2009 rates). For project details, see 
http://www.cgijaffna.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/FINAL_DC_BROCHURE.pdf and MEA, "AR 09-10," 
17. NSA M. K. Narayanan mentions this was expected as a reward, but not a key factor:  “[Formally] we 
only had one demand: ‘13A+, please implement that’” (Interview 077).  
623 Jan. 13, 2008, in an interview, EAM P. Mukherjee: “India’s position in respect of terrorism is ‘zero 
tolerance’. Therefore, any country which takes action against the terrorists is free to do so within its legal 
system,” Bhasin, IFR 2008, 30. An Oct. 26 joint statement emphasizes that “both sides agreed that 
terrorism should be countered with resolve,” http://www.mea.gov.lk/index.php/media/news-
archive/1458-india-sri-lanka-joint-press-release.  
	   230	  
“Terrorist Tigers” as a rising domestic security threat 
“[The] decimation of the LTTE was something … good.”624 
 PM M. Singh, 2011 
In contrast with the positive assessment about a cooperative Colombo, New Delhi’s 
supportive stance in 2009 was also based on a negative assessment about the LTTE’s 
intransigent secessionism and its increasingly radical war fighting tactics, which 
threatened to prolong the conflict and spillover to affect India’s domestic security. 
India saw the LTTE with default hostility: after 1987 the Tigers had turned against India, 
first by inflicting thousands of casualties on its peacekeeping mission and then by 
assassinating former Prime Minister R. Gandhi while he campaigned for re-election.625 
But New Delhi could not ignore that the Tigers had, over the years, succeeded in 
establishing a parallel state on a third of the island.  
However skeptical, in 2002 India was therefore willing to give the peace process a chance 
because its officials recognized that as long as the LTTE remained in control over the 
Tamil civilian population, it was indispensable to a political settlement and could possibly 
be “mainstreamed” by disarming and reforming into a democratic party.626 As a senior 
                                                
624 June 29: Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2011 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2012), 660.  
625 NSA M. K Narayanan therefore calls 1991 a “turning point,” after which the LTTE was banned and 
declared an “enemy of the Indian state” (Interview 077). See also J. N. Dixit, ed. External affairs: cross-border 
relations (New Delhi: Lotus, 2003), 92-93. 
626 Explanations for India’s support for the peace process were two-fold: a) the LTTE “needed to be 
securely tied to a peace process in order to de-fang it,” and b) even if it failed, it should expose the widening 
gap between the LTTE’s military strategy and the merits of the legitimate Tamil cause. While it had no 
direct links with the LTTE, India signaled its involvement via Norwegian mediators: Narayan Swamy, Tiger 
Vanquished, xxix. On the 2002 cease-fire agreement’s objectives of “de-escalation”, “socialization” and 
“politicking” of the LTTE towards “competitive politics” (esp. articles 1.11 and 1.12, possibly with Indian 
influence), see Austin Fernando, My belly is white (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2008), 294-332, 59-416.  
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official in charge of Sri Lanka at the time, R. Abhyankar defined the Indian approach 
cogently: “to let Norway take the lead [but] preserve its options on a final settlement.”627  
Over the following years, however, three factors confirmed India’s negative assessment 
about the LTTE as an insurmountable obstacle to conflict resolution and as an increasing 
threat to Indian domestic security.628 First, the LTTE’s lack of commitment to the peace 
process after 2002 soon vindicated Indian latent suspicions about its duplicitous nature.629 
The Tigers were not only using negotiations tactically to build up their military 
capabilities, but also repeatedly violated the cease-fire and continued their targeted 
assassinations.630  
According to Indian officials following the peace process, New Delhi was further put off 
by the LTTE’s a) persistent unwillingness to disarm; 631  b) resolute adherence to 
secessionism as the only acceptable solution;632 c) claim to be the exclusive representative 
                                                
627 in Srikanth Paranjape and Rajendra M. Abhyankar, eds., India and Sri Lanka: future imperfect (New Delhi: 
G B Books, 2014), 25. 
628 N. Deo, the Joint Secretary for Sri Lanka at the time, recalls that by 2005 India saw the “LTTE as the 
problem, not the solution.” In the same vein, former Foreign Secretary N. Rao notes that in 2009 “not too 
many tears shed in GOI after their [LTTE] defeat” (Interviews 061 and 023). 
629 An Indian diplomat working on Sri Lanka at the MEA recalls: “we used to tell Solheim ‘do not 
underestimate LTTE, look at our experience.’ … [but] they felt [confident] because they saw themselves, 
unlike India, to be strictly neutral and unbiased” (Interview 020). As early as Sept. 2003, the Indian High 
Commissioner N. Sen confides to his American counterpart: “The LTTE needs to see only sticks, not 
carrots” https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03COLOMBO1546_a.html  
630 The RAW chief in Colombo, P. Heblikar (2002-06), recalls: India was “supportive, but reticent … 
[because] negotiations soon reflected [the] LTTE’s radicalization, convincing us that it was not a 
trustworthy interlocutor to solve the conflict at its root” (Interview 047).  Senior editor N. Ram summarizes 
the Indian thinking at the time: “major obstacle was that the LTTE was never serious about substantive 
talks, only involved in talks about talks or as strategy to play tricks” (Interview 044). N. Rao, former High 
Commissioner to Colombo, emphasizes the LTTE’s assassination of Foreign Minister L. Kadirgamar, in 
2005, as a “major blow-back” to residual Indian hopes about the LTTE reforming (Interview 023). 
631 See e.g. Indian High Commissioner N. Sen’s 2003 assessment, as reported by a U.S. Embassy cable: 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03COLOMBO189_a.html  
632 New Delhi was vexed by T. V. Prabhakaran’s negative reaction to the Oslo Communiqué of Dec. 5, 
2002, in which his strategist A. Balasingham had indicated LTTE’s willingness to consider a solution within 
a federal Sri Lanka. In his Nov. 27, 2006 speech he committed to fight for “an independent state”: 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/29nov2006.htm. 
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of the “Tamil cause;”633 d) continued anti-India stance and rhetoric;634 e) tactical move to 
support M. Rajapaksa’s election in 2005; 635  and f) lacking involvement by T. V. 
Prabhakaran in the peace process.636 T. V. Prabhakaran was therefore seen as boxing 
himself into a corner, failing to explore the peace process as a last window of opportunity 
to reassure India, reform his organization, and negotiate a settlement within a united Sri 
Lanka.637  
Second, on top of the death of two of his more moderate advisers, Prabhakaran’s all-or-
nothing strategy was also weakening and dividing the organization.638 This led to a 
devastating split ending the LTTE’s control over the East, in 2004, when a key Tiger 
commander defected to work with the Sri Lankan government.639  India saw this as the 
                                                
633 See e.g. May, 2005 U.S. Ambassador’s report noting the Indian DCM’s concerns about the post-
tsunami aid distribution mechanism (PTOMS): “allocating the only slots reserved for Tamils at the national 
and regional level to the LTTE reinforces the Tigers’ claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil 
people”. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05COLOMBO888_a.html 
634 In a 2006 interview, A. Balasingham made an unprecedented apologetic reference to the LTTE’s 
assassination of former Indian PM R. Gandhi, in 1991, as “a monumental historical tragedy for which we 
deeply regret,” and appealing India to be “magnanimous and put the past behind.” Within days, however, 
he was overruled by T. V. Prabhakaran, who refused to express any responsibility or regret:  
http://tamilnation.co/intframe/india/060627anton.htm.  
635 It is widely believed that the ban enforced by the LTTE in its areas of control during the 2005 
Presidential elections contributed decisively to the victory (by just two percentage points) of the “hawkish” 
M. Rajapaksa over the R. Wickremesinghe, who seemed committed to continue the peace process. Some 
Indians interpreted this as LTTE’s preference for a military escalation.  
636 A. Balasingham represented the LTTE in all but one of the peace process rounds, from 2002 to 2006. 
NSA M. K. Narayanan recalls this was problematic: “You had to contact with Prabhakaran [directly], no 
interlocutor possible. … He doesn’t believe in anyone else [so Norwegian attempt to engage him via 
representatives was a “shot in the dark”]” (Interview 077). 
637 NSA M. K. Narayanan recalls that, by 2006, “there was no point [anymore] you could reason with him. 
[At the same time] No way that you could talk to any of the moderate Tamils, who we would have put in 
peril. So we were in a stalemate” (Interview 077). Thereafter, there are indications that Prabhakaran may 
have attempted some belated outreach efforts to India, up to 2008, for example via B. Nadesan, but New 
Delhi “remained unmoved”: Narayan Swamy, Tiger Vanquished, lii-liii. 
638 S. Pathmanathan left the organization in 2003; Anton Balasingham died in Dec. 2006; and his successor 
S. P. Thamilselvan died in a SLAF strike in Nov. 2007. On these splits, particularly apparent after 2003-
2003, see Fernando, My belly, 525-47. 
639 Discussed in detail in the previous section. Col. Karuna defected from the LTTE, together with almost 
1,000 insurgents, in March 2004, and then settled in India, indicating a possible Indian role. See 
Chandraprema, Gota's war, 274, 358-60; Narayan Swamy, Tiger Vanquished, 15. 
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most positive, even if unintended effect of the peace process: while persisting in his radical 
quest for sovereignty through force, the leader faced the rising dissent of younger 
insurgents who were willing to lay down arms in exchange for political assurances.640  
Finally, New Delhi was also concerned about the impact of the LTTE’s strategy to 
expand both its operations on Indian domestic security. First, the insurgents increased 
their conventional naval and aerial operations in and around Sri Lanka, threatening 
Indian fishermen, shipping lanes and air space.641 Second, they persisted in their non-
traditional capabilities, including suicide and cyber attacks. 642  Third, they relied 
increasingly on support from India’s border region, in Tamil Nadu, after their 
international support network began suffering from tighter counter-terrorist 
cooperation.643 In its weakness, the LTTE was growing increasingly desperate, setting off 
an alarm bell in New Delhi: it was now of paramount importance to terminate the Tigers 
as “quick and cleanly” as possible, denying them the option to fall back – and affect the 
order and security – on Indian soil.644 
                                                
640 The RAW official in Colombo at the time, P. Heblikar, recalls that as an Easterner, Karuna had been 
deprived of the LTTE’s leadership roles concentrated among Northerners, and also represented a new 
generation that was fatigued by two decades of war and thus responsive to “inducements” (Interview 047). 
641 In 2003-04 the Air Tigers built a new runway in the Vanni jungle and weaponized small civilian 
aircrafts that launched bomb attacks on Colombo after 2007. The Sea Tigers destroyed Sri Lankan Navy 
vessels, hijacked merchant ships in international waters, and also attacked Indian fishermen in the Palk 
Straits. Indian Navy Chief A. Prakash (2004-06) recalls Indian concerns that the Sea Tigers were becoming 
a “non-state, terrorist naval threat” and specific attempts to train its personnel against them (Interview 016). 
642 In 1997, the Internet Black Tigers launched their first cyber-attack on Sri Lankan embassies abroad: 
http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main41.asp?filename=Ne230509coverstory.asp. P. Heblikar recalls that 
India’s rising concern at the LTTE’s suicide squads, aerial and naval operations reflecting “growing 
desperation” and possible transformation into a non-conventional force (Interview 047). 
643 By 1997 the LTTE had offices or cells in 42 states, and despite post 9/11 controls, its international 
organizational network continued to grow, including in India’s border state of Tamil Nadu: Rohan 
Gunaratna, "Impact of the mobilized Tamil diaspora on the protracted conflict in Sri Lanka," in Negotiating 
Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures, and Lessons ed. Rupesinghe Kumar (Colombo: Foundation for Co-
Existence, 2006); Narayan Swamy, Tiger Vanquished, 81-7, 119-20. 
644 NSA M. K. Narayanan describes such scenarios: “There were reports about LTTE setting up bases in 
Tamil Nadu … you were now worried this would become the staging ground for militancy on our soil. … 
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A fine balance, between Chinese weapons and Western morality 
The third factor driving India’s supportive posture towards Colombo related to its 
objective to preserve geopolitical predominance in Sri Lanka by insulating the island from 
extra-regional influence, especially from China and the West. This required a fine 
balance between two contrasting assessments. 
In the first assessment, India had to counterbalance China’s inroads into Sri Lanka but 
any attempt to deny Colombo’s new reliance on Beijing would be either fruitless or 
counterproductive: engagement was thus paramount. 645 After 2006, M. Rajapaksa’s 
strategy for a military modernization and offensive required a massive supply of weapons, 
leading the government to increase its share in defense expenditure by 50%.646  
While New Delhi privately agreed with his plans, India’s military and intelligence 
assistance – however crucial to the outcome of the war – remained limited, because it was 
either unwilling or unable to deliver more.647 Colombo thus looked for an alternative in 
Beijing, which provided most of the required weapons until the end of the war.648  
                                                                                                                                            
The concern [about] radicalization of sections of Tamil masses, more atrocities, more people getting killed, 
people coming here” (Interview 077).  
645 Sri Lankan ambassador N. Rodrigo: “an abiding feature of every [Sri Lankan] government, whatever its 
political leanings, is that consistently sound bilateral relations have been maintained with China” Nihal 
Rodrigo, "Perspectives from Sri Lanka," in Emerging China: Prospects of Partnership in Asia, ed. Sudhir T. 
Devare, Swaran Singh, and Reena Marwah (London: Routledge, 2014), 246. On the China tilt before 
2005, to balance India and the West, see http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-
details&page=article-details&code_title=127007  
646 S. Selvanathan and E.  Selvanathan, "Defence expenditure and economic growth: A case study of Sri 
Lanka using causality analysis," International Journal of Development and Conflict 4, no. 2 (2014): 71. 
647 Unwilling because of domestic pressures (analyzed in Part II), and incapable because of deficiencies in 
the defence-export industry. To the Indian Navy’s chagrin, this delays the transfer of two OPVs to SLN in 
2006, according to the its Chief at the time, Adm. S. Mehta (Interview 079).  
648  China delivered 60% of Sri Lankan arms imports between 2006-2009: 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background. On relations with Beijing and NORINCO to 
	  
	   235	  
In order to assuage political opposition at home, Indian officials made occasional 
statements in public to express their discontent at such Chinese supplies.649 In private, 
however, New Delhi had, from 2006 onwards, cleared Sri Lanka’s requests to procure 
military assistance from China and elsewhere.650  
While it would ideally have preferred a different supplier, New Delhi was reassured by 
Colombo’s cooperative “India first” approach – giving it first right of refusal – and the 
capacity to monitor and minimize the strategic implications of Chinese assistance.651 
Paradoxically, in order to preserve its geopolitical influence and avoid pushing Sri Lanka 
further into China’s strategic orbit, New Delhi thus ended up outsourcing to Beijing the 
“dirty job” of assisting the Sri Lankan Army to eliminate the LTTE.  
In India’s second assessment, the escalating conflict was an open invitation to 
internationalization, especially as the post-9/11 United States had accelerated its 
“democracy promotion” spree by toppling regimes and as liberal principles of 
humanitarian interventionism gained ground at the United Nations and across the West: 
                                                                                                                                            
supply artillery-locating radars, Chengdu F-7G interceptors etc., see Chandraprema, Gota's war, 318-19, 88-
94, 422; N. Manoharan, "Enter the Dragon: China Factor in India-Sri Lanka relations," in India and Sri 
Lanka: Future Imperfect, ed. S. Paranjape and R. Abhyankar (New Delhi: G B Books, 2014), 103-13. The Sri 
Lankan ambassador in Beijing at the time, N. Rodrigo, recalls that China often delivered crucial short 
shelf-life ammunition in less than ten days (Interview 063). 
649 M. K. Narayanan on June 1, 2007, after meeting Chief-Minister M. Karunanidhi in Chennai: “We 
strongly believe that whatever requirements the Sri Lankan government has, they should come to us. ... We 
do not favour their going to China or Pakistan or any other country.” http://www.thehindu.com/todays-
paper/centre-considering-unified-command-for-armed-forces/article1850313.ece  
650 When first approached by Sri Lanka with its “shopping list” in 2006, India expressed its inability to 
deliver most items, and suggested Colombo procure them elsewhere. E.g in 2008, G. Rajapaksa attempted 
to import ammunition from India, but the “supremely pragmatic” Indian Defence Secretary V. Singh 
responds: “such equipment should be purchased from whoever is able to supply [them]” Chandraprema, 
Gota's war, 295-6, 428-30. FS S. S. Menon recalls: “We preferred Chinese weapons in Sri Lankan hands 
rather than in Chinese hands. We assisted Sri Lanka in [alternative] procurement.” (Interview 078).   
651 In the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary’s semi-official biography: “[Sri Lanka] turned to other countries 
[for weapons] only when India was unable to supply” and, in 2007, it had to assure New Delhi that it was 
paying for Chinese supplies: Chandraprema, Gota's war, 428-30. 
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India’s continued regional security predominance thus required insulating the island from 
such risks of interference.  
These concerns were first apparent in 2001, when New Delhi played a background role 
in setting up the peace process and chose Norway as the mediator.652 After the cease-fire 
agreement was signed, in February 2002, the mediators did attempt to respect India’s 
“special” security interests by keeping New Delhi in the loop.653 Despite this, after 2003, 
Indian officials started to reproach Western mediators for favoring the LTTE and for not 
heeding their advice on the insurgents’ devious tactics.654 Having opened the door to 
Scandinavian interlocutors and a military monitoring mission, Indian officials were 
particularly anxious that a spiraling extra-regional involvement, referred to internally as 
“mission creep,” could erode its security prerogatives and interests.655 
Such concerns intensified after the peace process faltered in 2006 and Western 
governments became increasingly hostile against Colombo’s military offensive. While 
                                                
652 Norway’s deputy FM V. Helgesen recalled that “we could not have achieved any [CFA] success without 
the active role played by India at every step of the negotiation.” On Indian involvement in drafting the 
cease-fire agreement (CFA), via its NSA B. Mishra and RAW, see Narayan Swamy, Tiger Vanquished, xxviii. 
On the criteria behind the choice of Norway, and Indian vetoes of France and the United Kingdom under 
EAM J. Singh, see Paranjape and Abhyankar, Future imperfect, 22. 
653 While not formally involved, India assumed, in practice, the external role of a veto-holding interested 
part. NSA J. N. Dixit recalls that the Norwegians were expected to keep India “fully informed,” Dixit, 
External Affairs, 89. Both the Norwegian mediators and Sri Lankan ministers thus made regular stopovers in 
New Delhi for “special briefs” to the PM, NSA, FS, or EAM. For 2006, see e.g. Bhasin, IFR 2006, 884, 90. 
654 Indian officials at the time on such concerns: 1) Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, N. Rao, recalls 
that the Norwegians had an implicit “empathy for Tamil cause as represented by the LTTE as freedom 
fighters;” the Joint Secretary in charge of Sri Lanka at the MEA, N. Deo, recalls that Norway was “seen as 
representing only Western interests, with an excessive focus on human rights;” and an Indian official 
dealing with the UNHRC, at the time, notes that the Norwegians shared “American missionary zeal” and 
had a “positive bias towards the LTTE” (Interviews 023, 061, 076). 
655 India stressed that the CFA Monitoring Mission should be composed exclusively of Nordic countries, 
opposed a stronger UN presence, and refused to join the Tokyo Donors Conference and the U.S./E.U.-led 
International Contact Group on Sri Lanka; an approach R. Abhyankar describes as “a classic case of 
preserving its options or ‘masterly inactivity’”: Paranjape and Abhyankar, Future imperfect, 23-4. When, in 
2002, Japan attempted to play a more active role in the peace process, according to Sri Lankan FM M. 
Moragoda, India’s NSA “[Brajesh] Mishra called the Japanese ‘artless’ and alleged that [Japan] was 
‘heedless’ of vital Indian security interests,” while EAM Y. Sinha asked “who is Japan to get involved in our 
region?” quoted in https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02COLOMBO2312_a.html.  
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New Delhi shared many of their liberal concerns about the need for a political settlement, 
it disagreed on the effectiveness of coercion.  
New Delhi feared that further external pressure on Colombo – through condemnatory 
resolutions, human rights inquiries, or economic and military sanctions – would have a 
triple negative effect on its security interests in Sri Lanka: 1) domestically, it would 
strengthen M. Rajapaksa’s conservative support base among the Sinhala majority and 
decrease his incentives to implement a political settlement, thus perpetuating the conflict; 
2) it would further increase Sri Lanka’s incentives to rope in China to counterbalance the 
West, thus augmenting Beijing’s strategic foothold in the region; and 3) it would turn Sri 
Lanka into an international pariah, subject to interventionist regime-change policies 
which risked plunging another Indian neighbor into chronic instability.656 
This assessment is reflected in India’s dialogue with the United States on Sri Lanka, 
which despite such concerns and disagreements reflected an extraordinary alignment of 
views and even occasional coordination until 2008.657 But in early 2009, under President 
B. Obama, Washington tilted towards the liberal-internationalist agenda, pressuring 
Colombo into halting its military offensive, return to the negotiation table, or respond to 
alleged human rights violations.658 The Indo-American separation thus took symbolical 
                                                
656 Interviews with various Indian officials who dealt with Sri Lanka after 2006, including NSA M. K. 
Narayanan (077), FS S. S. Menon (078), and Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, A. Prasad (008). 
657 Ambassador J. Lunstead (2003-06) recalls U.S.-India dialogue on Sri Lanka being marked by “openness, 
transparency, and a lack of suspicion. … This new atmosphere was bolstered by actions by both sides to 
share information and, to a lesser extent, to coordinate their policies,” Jeffrey J. Lunstead, The United States' 
Role in Sri Lanka's Peace Process, 2002-2006 (Colombo: The Asia Foundation, 2007), 25. His predecessor A. 
Wills (2000-2003) on a meeting in Feb. 2003 with his Indian counterpart N. Sen: “We were so much in 
accord that it was a little surreal.” https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03COLOMBO189_a.html. 
For this close dialogue and coordination, especially on delivering military assistance under Amb. R. Blake 
(2006-09), see e.g. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06COLOMBO2123_a.html. 
658 After 2006, the E.U. took a series of decisions and resolutions at the UN to denounce human rights 
abuses, to expand the UN presence in Sri Lanka, to impose fact-finding missions etc. which were opposed 
by Sri Lanka. The U.S.A. had supported these moves but adopted a leading role in early 2009, culminating 
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effect precisely on May 20th 2009: just as India’s two special envoys arrived in Colombo 
to congratulate and cooperate with President Rajapaksa, the local U.S. Ambassador, R. 
O. Blake Jr. – who had largely supported India’s policy and the military offensive – ended 
his posting and departed Sri Lanka, marking Washington’s leap onto the European 
bandwagon to condemn and coerce the Sri Lankan government. 
* 
The Sri Lankan government could not have won the war, in 2009, without India’s 
supportive posture, which oscillated between passive permissiveness and active assistance. 
Far from being reactionary, New Delhi’s cooperation was based on a triple strategic 
assessment that evolved since the early 2000s and accelerated after President M. 
Rajapaksa’s military offensive, launched in 2006: 1) The Sri Lankan government was 
firmly in power and kept all channels of communication open and adopted a cooperative 
“India first” posture on both security and political affairs; 2) India’s hostility to the LTTE 
was reinforced as the insurgents remained intransigent about a separate Tamil state and 
used the peace process to expand their military capabilities, which threatened India’s 
domestic order and stability in the bordering state of Tamil Nadu; and 3) any type of 
Indian coercion was expected to reduce its geopolitical predominance on the island: it 
would accelerate the Sri Lankan outreach to China and subject the Rajapaksa regime to 
increasing Western regime-change pressures. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
in pressures to include Sri Lanka in the formal agenda of the UNSC and also in a UNHRC special session, 
on May 26. Indian and Sri Lankan officials recall the hostile tone of such initiatives. For 2007, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Session11/Pages/11thSpecialSession.aspx; 
also https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09COLOMBO322_a.html, Jayatilleka, Long War, 284-313. 
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3. Myanmar 2007 
In September of 2007, the streets of Yangon were once again covered in the blood of pro-
democracy protesters, as the military regime refused to back down. However, despite 
extraordinary domestic and international pressure, the Indian government stood firm in 
its resolve to continue engaging Myanmar’s generals. This cooperative posture, 
contrasting with its pro-democracy coercive stance in 1988, was rooted in three 
assessments: 1) the regime was firmly in power and gave India unprecedented access to 
Myanmar, with a revolutionary improvement in bilateral relations ongoing since 2000; 2) 
by largely succeeding in its own counter-insurgency strategy, as well as coordinating and 
cooperating with the Indian Army against cross-border security threats, Myanmar’s Army 
played an indispensable role in stabilizing India’s border states in the Northeast; and 3) 
the generals’ attempt to rope in India to decrease their reliance on China and avoid 
Western pressures offered New Delhi a geostrategic window of opportunity to expand its 
regional security umbrella and link up with Southeast Asia. 
* 
“Deora, don’t go for gas, go for democracy!” Despite such banners in New Delhi, on 
September 23rd 2007, India’s Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas, M. Deora 
departed to Myanmar in pursuit of its precious hydrocarbons.659 The timing could not 
have been more symbolic of India’s policy of engagement towards its Eastern neighbor, as 
the military junta there – formally the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – 
faced the largest pro-democracy protests in twenty years, also known as the “Saffron 
Revolution” in reference to the mass participation of Buddhist monks. So just as the 
                                                
659 “Explaining India’s silence over Burma,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7013975.stm 
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Indian minister signed an energy agreement to explore deep-water oil and gas blocks, 
Myanmar’s ruling generals were preparing to crack down on almost 100,000 protesters 
gathering in the streets and pagodas across the country.660  
As demonstrations escalated over the next days, with dozens killed and thousands 
detained, the Indian government came under increasing domestic and international 
pressure to denounce the military’s atrocities and reconsider its “business as usual” 
approach.661 The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and other officials thus reacted 
swiftly to “express concern” and urged the SPDC to accelerate its “broad-based” political 
reforms with the participation of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.662  
Such appeals were not just an expression of cynic diplomacy to placate pressure: for 
several years, both in public and in private, India had repeatedly beckoned the generals to 
liberalize their regime in order to avoid popular unrest and political instability.663 In 
2004, for example, the PM Singh had assured his parliamentarians that “we conveyed 
that while India did not wish to interfere in Myanmar’s internal affairs, we would 
                                                
660 Report of the U. N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro: 
http://burmalibrary.org/docs4/HRC2007-12--SRM-A-HRC-6-14-en.pdf. For details on the energy 
cooperation agreement: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=31405  
661 Assessment by the U.S. mission: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07RANGOON974_a.html. The 
U.N. Secretary-General’s representative for Myanmar, I. Gambari, visited India several times in 2007 to 
persuade New Delhi to take on a more vocal posture. On domestic pressure, see e.g. 1) Editorial of India’s 
largest English-language daily, The Times of India: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/Raise-the-
Pitch/articleshow/2426699.cms; 2) Statement by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which supported 
the governing coalition: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/cpim-concerned-at-myanmar-
incidents/article1920156.ece; 3) Protest rally attended by opposition leaders and former Prime Ministers: 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/peace-rally-for-democracy-in-myanmar/article1921909.ece.   
662 EAM P. Mukherjee, on Sept. 26: “Myanmar’s process of national reconciliation initiated by the 
authorities should be expedited,” Bhasin, IFR 2007, 1665, 300. Hosting Myanmar’s FM U Nyan Win, in 
Jan. 2008, the Indian PM “stressed the need for greater urgency in bringing about political reforms and 
national reconciliation in Myanmar.” MEA, "Annual Report 2007-08," (New Delhi 2008), 12. 
663 See e.g. Oct. 29, 2004, joint statement after the visit of SPDC Chairman T. Shwe to New Delhi: “[The] 
Indian side … expressed support for national reconciliation and early transition to democracy in 
Myanmar.” Bhasin, IFR 2004, 955. 
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welcome early realization of the goal of multi-party democracy based on national 
reconciliation and an inclusive approach.”664 
In practice, however, beyond such public statements and friendly advice, New Delhi’s 
decision-makers persisted with their engagement policy and refused to join Western 
efforts to pressure Myanmar, including through what it defined as “counter-productive,” 
“intrusive,” “country-specific” and “condemnatory” UN resolutions. 665  Alluding to 
India’s geographic proximity, Foreign Secretary S. S. Menon also rejected economic 
pressures, noting that “the desire for sanctions” was “directly proportional to the distance 
from Myanmar of the country demanding it.”666 Over the following months, India-
Myanmar relations therefore not only survived, but also thrived with a series of high-level 
visits further expanding political, economic and military links.667 
What led the world’s largest democracy to adopt this cooperative posture in 2007 towards 
authoritarian Myanmar? Why did the Indian government brush off pressures attempting 
to shame it into curtailing ties with an isolated and repressive military regime?  Three 
strategic assessments drove New Delhi to privilege engagement. 
 
                                                
664 Dec. 21: Bhasin, IFR 2004, 414. For a similar statement, see Bhasin, IFR 2005, 785-6. 
665 Sept. 14, 2007, EAM P. Mukherjee: “It is for the people of the country to decide what form of 
arrangement they want (…) we have lived with military regimes in our neighborhood for quite some time.” 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/eoiAQL1wvBc0z7mmEXxAdP/India-set-to-engage-Myanmar-to-try-
and-snag-more-gas-supply.html. Response to UNHRC resolution 5-S1, adopted in early Oct.: India 
“regrets … unhelpful tone” and calls for a resolution that is “forward looking, non-condemnatory and seeks 
to engage the authorities in Myanmar in a constructive manner” Bhasin, IFR 2007, 1667-8. See also Indian 
explanation of vote against UNGA Third Committee’s resolution A/C.3/62/L.41, Nov. 20: 
https://www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/66252ind1397.pdf  
666 Feb. 11 2008: Bhasin, IFR 2008, 1646. 
667 Myanmar visits to India for wide-ranging consultations: Foreign Minister (Dec. 31 to Jan. 4), deputy FM 
(Dec. 11-14 and  Jan. 23-26), and the SPDC Vice-Chairman M. Aye (Apr. 2008). In Feb. 2008, FS S. S. 
Menon visited Myanmar, opposed sanctions, welcomed the SPDC’s intent to hold a referendum, 
implement a new constitution, and organize parliamentary elections by 2010: Bhasin, IFR 2008, 1646. 
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Unprecedented access to a robust regime 
We cannot make our relationship with Myanmar conditional upon [its] internal questions.668 
K. Sibal, Indian Foreign Secretary, 2003 
India’s supportive stance in 2007 was primarily based on a dual and positive assessment 
about the regime’s robustness and cooperative nature. Lacking leverage to influence the 
domestic balance of forces in Myanmar, New Delhi decided to preserve its 
unprecedented access to the generals. 
First, despite mass pro-democracy protests, the military regime was assessed to be firmly 
entrenched, unlikely to collapse or accept any imposed change. The leader of the 
National League for Democracy (NLD), Aung San Suu Kyi, remained under house 
arrest, while the SPDC had consolidated its pervasive control, running an economy that 
grew above 10% for over a decade. In India’s view, the “Saffron Revolution” could 
therefore, at best, serve as a timely alarm to remind the generals about the need to 
liberalize their regime, but in itself it would not pose a challenge to what New Delhi saw 
as the existing “power centers.”669  
Having ruled the country for more than half a century, the Tatmadaw remained an 
indispensable actor to initiate regime change, and until it did so voluntarily, New Delhi 
would have to cooperate with it.670 Any Indian or external pressure would at best be 
                                                
668 Oct 21, 2003: Bhasin, IFR 2003, 575. 
669 According to interviews with FS S. S. Menon (078) and NSA M. K. Narayanan (077). For a summary of 
these reasons, see Routray, "India-Myanmar Relations: Triumph of Pragmatism," 308-10. 
670 In 2006 e.g. the U.S. mission chief quotes the Indian Ambassador B. K. Mitra as saying that “[change] 
can happen in ten years or tomorrow” and expressing New Delhi’s preference for a gradual transition: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RANGOON612_a.html.  
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ineffectual, and at worst be counterproductive by affecting India’s interests and even 
further entrenching the regime. 
Second, and most importantly, after 2000 India’s relations with Myanmar had expanded 
and reached unprecedented strength, superior even to the Indo-Burmese extraordinary 
engagement of the 1950s, under Nehru and U Nu. The SPDC was proving to be all-out 
cooperative, taking the initiative to reach out and engage India across different sectors, 
from economic to military cooperation. New Delhi saw this a window of opportunity, 
especially given the difficult past: after India supported pro-democracy forces in 1988, the 
generals had placed New Delhi in the “enemy camp” and rebuffed its normalization 
attempts throughout the 1990s.671 The relationship had thus remained conflicted, with 
ups and downs, progressing via “fits and starts” for almost a decade.672  
However, in January 2000, Yangon finally responded positively to an Indian outreach 
initiative led by its Army Chief, Gen. V. P. Malik – a rare and successful example of 
Indian defense diplomacy. The discrete meetings in each country were held outside 
capital cities, insulating bilateral talks from political pressures, and paved the way for 
normalization at the highest level.673 While Yangon saw this as a confidence-building 
                                                
671 Interview with S. Saran (028), former ambassador to Myanmar (1997-2000). He recalls that, upon his 
arrival in Yangon, relations were marked by “frigidity”: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-
page/The-Virtue-Of-Pragmatism/articleshow/6266602.cms. His predecessor, L. T. Pudaite (1995-97), 
recalls various bilateral projects delayed because “the Myanmar authorities were at times frustratingly 
cautious and slow to respond” Lal T. Pudaite, Mizoram and look east policy (New Delhi: Akansha, 2010), 47. 
Similar view by Amb. G. Parthasarathy (1992-95), who recalls a “strained relationship” (Inteview 080). 
672 R. Bhatia, Joint Secretary in charge of Myanmar in the early 1990s (Interview 004). U Wynn Lwin, 
Myanmar’s ambassador in India (1992-1999), recalls warning Indian officials: “you can have either 
democracy or security in Myanmar, not both” (Interview 060). The domestic pressures and liberal factors 
that hindered this normalization are respectively analyzed in chapters 5 and 6.	  
673 Gen. Maung Aye, SPDC Vice-Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar’s Army, visited India 
on Jan. 7-8, 2000, invited by Indian Army Chief, Gen. V. P. Malik, who had been to Myanmar in the 
preceding days. The Indian delegation included two ministers (commerce and power). India’s Ambassador 
in Yangon at the time, S. Saran, recalls the pivotal importance of these talks, their discrete location in 
Shillong (Meghalaya) allowing for an “ice-breaker” effect which paved the way for the first high-level 
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measure signaling India’s intent to engage without any ideological strings attached, New 
Delhi was reassured that, in exchange, the generals were willing to deliver on India’s 
economic and security interests.674  
Yangon thereafter kept the initiative, pushing for a greater Indian presence in Myanmar 
and granting it extraordinary access.675 Indian officials welcomed this, and were often 
surprised at the sudden transformation of the relationship, which was moving “from 
strength to strength.”676 Even External Affairs Minister K. N. Singh, who had been 
skeptical about engagement, recalls that the SPDC regime was “much more forthcoming 
and friendly than in the past” when he first visited Myanmar, in March 2005.677 
A series of key bilateral visits cemented this engagement, including Myanmar’s first head 
of state visit to India in 25 years (2004), and the first-ever visit of an Indian President to 
Myanmar (2006).678 This revolutionary change gave India an unprecedentedly large 
                                                                                                                                            
bilateral visit since 1987: in November, Maung Aye was received in New Delhi with full honors  (Interview 
028). See also Ved P. Malik, "Reflections on Indo-Myanmar Relations," Scholar Warrior Fall(2012): 4-7. 
674 N. Deo, in charge of Myanmar at the time at the MEA, recalls: “[despite] recognition that Myanmar’s 
Army was not a model army, there was an overall wish to have a ‘working relation’” (Interview 061). The 
Director-General in Myanmar’s Foreign Ministry at the time, N. M. Shein, recalls that it “ushered in a new 
chapter”: Nyunt Maung Shein, "India-Myanmar Relations after 2010 Elections," (Hong Kong 2012), 5.  
675 Myanmar’s ambassador to India, Brig.-Gen. U Kyi Thein (2003-07), recalls his two main missions: a) to 
convince India to invest in Myanmar; and b) to explain his country’s complex domestic political situation 
and plans for liberalization. He recalls that the “normalization period” was only possible because India 
engaged, e.g. by hosting Than Shwe in Nov. 2004, which he describes as “a very important confidence-
building measure,” and because of Amb. S. Saran’s role as a “pioneer” (Interview 030). 
676 Interview (004) with R. Bhatia, Indian ambassador in Yangon 2002-05. NSA M. K. Narayanan recalls: 
in the early 2000s, “we developed a much better equation with Myanmar” (Interview 077).  
677 Interview 075. 
678 Gen. Than Shwe’s visit to India, in Nov. 2004, was the first bilateral interaction at the level of head of 
state/government in 17 years. His delegation included three other SPDC Generals and eight cabinet 
ministers. Myanmar’s FM visited India thrice in 2004-05. In the opposite direction, India’s President visited 
Myanmar in March 2006, following on India’s Vice-President visit in 2003, the first high-level visit to 
Myanmar since 1987. India’s EAM visited in 2002, 2005 and 2007. 
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footprint in Myanmar: within just a few years, its loans and aid duplicated, the number of 
new agreements signed increased three-fold, and bilateral trade rose five-fold.679  
Booming military relations played a vital role in normalization. Complaining in 1999 
about political obstacles, an Indian general in charge of the country’s Eastern Command 
had suggested that “India should leave its Burma policy to the Army.”680 Indeed, after its 
successful experiment in defense diplomacy in 2000, New Delhi’s bureaucrats recognized 
the benefits of deputing India’s top brass to Yangon, which facilitated engagement, 
opened new channels of communication and increased mutual trust. 681   By 2007, 
Myanmar was sending dozens of Tatmadaw officials for training in India and, for the first 
time in more than half a century, accepting military assistance from New Delhi.682  
Just a few days into his new appointment as Indian Army Chief, in early October 2007, 
Gen. D. Kapoor, thus naturally brushed off the crisis in Myanmar as an “internal 
                                                
679 Agreements from 11 (1993-2000) to 32 (2001-2008), with a peak of eight in 2004 alone: Bhatia, India-
Myanmar, 231-5. Bilateral trade increased from US$206 million (1999-2000) to US$995 million (2007-08): 
Khriezo Yhome, "India-Myanmar relations (1998-2008): A decade of redefining bilateral ties," in Occasional 
Paper 10 (New Delhi: ORF, 2009), 6. Loans and aid volume duplicated between 2001-04 and 2004-07, 
peaking in 2006-07 at 3% of India’s total: http://www.iilj.org/newsandevents/documents/mullen.pdf, 
Yhome, "India-Myanmar," 11.  
680 Lt.-Gen. H. R. S. Kalkat, in charge of Indian Army’s Eastern Command, in an Oct. 1999 talk: “We are 
soldiers, they [Myanmar’s SPDC] are soldiers and our blood is thicker than the blood of bureaucrats,” 
quoted in Subir Bhaumik, "Guns, drugs and rebels," Seminar, no. 550 (2005): XX. 
681 2004-07: Six high-level visits, including Indian service chiefs of the Air Force (Nov. 2004 and Nov. 
2006), Army (Oct. 2005), and Navy (Jan. 2006, May 2007), and the Defence Secretary (Sept. 2006). Several 
interviewees involved at the time underscore the pivotal influence of such excellent military-to-military 
relations: Adm. A. Prakash (016), Adm. S. Mehta (079), Gen. J. J. Singh (045) and Myanmar’s ambassador, 
Brig.-Gen. U Kyi Thein (030). On his visit to Myanmar, in 2008, the chief of the Indian Army’s Eastern 
Command recalls that “[the] Myanmarese were far more comfortable talking to a military delegation.” V. 
K. Singh, Courage and conviction: an autobiography (New Delhi: Aleph, 2013), 276-7. 
682 In 2006-07, India allotted Myanmar 36 slots for defence training, the 3rd largest quota among 36 
countries: MEA, "Annual Report 2006-07," (New Delhi 2007), 205. In 2006, Myanmar’s Navy also 
participated for the first time in India’s multilateral MILAN naval exercises. Indian defence supplies in 
2006-07 included:  a) 105 mm artillery guns + ammunition; b) a new IT cell for the Military Academy; c)  4 
Islander aircrafts. Other assistance considered: T-94 tanks, Dhruv light helicopters, and a Foxtrot-class 
submarine: Interviews 016, 045, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/tyagi-in-myanmar-to-push-arms-
offer/17045; http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/myanmar-gets-india-s-maritime-
aircraft/article1-222174.aspx; and Bhasin, IFR 2007, 1662. 
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matter,” underlining that India had “a good relationship going [on] with Myanmar” and 
would surely “try to maintain that”.683 Similarly, Foreign Secretary S. Saran recalls that 
by 2006 India was finally “back in the [neighbor’s] picture” and beginning to reap the 
benefits of its engagement policy.684 By denouncing the regime and supporting the pro-
democracy protests in September 2007, New Delhi would have terminated the generals’ 
trust and cut itself out of Myanmar, once again.  
 
Brothers in arms: cross-border cooperation in counterinsurgency  
We value our growing military relations with Burma685 
 Gen. J. J. Singh, Indian Army Chief, September 2007 
The second assessment driving India’s cooperative posture during the 2007 crisis related 
to domestic security concerns: Myanmar’s military regime had provided unprecedented 
assistance, which was seen as indispensable to ensure the continued success of India’s 
counter-insurgency strategy in its Northeastern border states. 
For the first time in more than half a century, the situation in India’s border region had 
stabilized since the early 2000s, especially in the states of Nagaland, Manipur and 
Mizoram, after several cease-fires and declining levels of violence.686 But rather than 
ending the concerns of Indian security officials dealing with the region, this only shifted 
                                                
683 Quoted in http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1905543/posts  
684 FS S. Saran (Interview 028). 
685 Quoted in late Sept. 2007: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7013975.stm  
686 The Indian government signed cease-fires with the two main factions of Naga insurgency, the NSCN-
IM (1997, extended indefinitely in July 2007), and the NSCN-K (in 2001). Between 2001 and 2006, 
according to official figures: a) violent incidents stagnated around 1,300/year; b) fatalities of security 
personnel decreased from 175 to 76; and c) civilians fatalities decreased from 660 to 309: Sanjoy Hazarika 
and V. R. Raghavan, eds., Conflicts in the Northeast: internal and external effects (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011), 11. 
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them across the 1,600 km-long and porous border, to Northern Myanmar, which hosted 
an increasing number of insurgent splinter groups that refused to engage in negotiations 
with New Delhi.687 India was also increasingly troubled about the region’s pivotal role in 
a flourishing network of transnational crime, especially in arms and narcotics trafficking, 
and as a staging ground for Islamic terrorism.688 
New Delhi thus saw the security in its border regions to depend on regime stability in 
Myanmar and, in particular, on the Tatmadaw’s capacity to extend control along its side of 
the border.689 Accordingly, India’s main concern was that an abrupt regime change or 
collapse in Myanmar would weaken state capacity – especially the Army’s – and that the 
consequent instability could spillover to India.690  
At the height of the 2007 crisis, PM M. Singh thus cautioned that Myanmar had an 
“important bearing on our own country as a number of insurgent groups take advantage 
of the instability in Myanmar to indulge in unlawful activities in our North East,” and 
that “therefore we have a strong interest in a stable, prosperous and peaceful 
                                                
687 In June 2006, a U.S. cable thus quotes India’s DCM in Yangon, M. Bharti: “India’s chief concern is that 
insurgent groups maintain camps in Burma from which they conduct cross-border actions in India.” 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RANGOON777_a.html. See also March 2005 visit by EAM K. N. 
Singh: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05RANGOON379_a.html. 
688 See e.g. role of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in Myanmar and Bangladesh: Bhaumik, 
Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's Northeast, 182-203. On arms trafficking into India, after the United Wa 
State Army begins manufacturing replicas of PLA rifles in Eastern Myanmar, see Lintner, Great game, 163-
70. After 2001, Indian officials were also increasingly concerned about Islamic extremist organizations 
using the Myanmar-Bangladesh-Assam hub to operate in India, according to the former RAW 
representative in Burma, P. Heblikar (Interview 047), and NSA M. K. Narayanan (077). 
689 Myanmar’s ambassador to India, Brig.-Gen. U Kyi Thein, recalls this drove Indian officials’ approach, 
based on “overlapping areas of security interest” between both countries (Interview 030). 
690 For earlier definitions of the link between Myanmar’s regime stability and Indian security, see Dixit, 
Neighbours, 330; I. P. Khosla, "Myanmar: Cohesion and Liberalism," Strategic Analysis 21, no. 1 (1998). For 
concerns about a sudden regime change in 2006, see Indian ambassador B. K. Mitra as quoted by the U.S. 
CdA: “India fears chaos on its borders, especially if [abrupt regime] change results in a chain of ethnic 
mini-states along India's border,” https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RANGOON612_a.html.  
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Myanmar.”691 More than a lethargic refusal or inability to embrace change, New Delhi’s 
2007 decision to engage the regime was thus rooted in three strategic assessments about 
the SPDC’s positive impact on Indian domestic security.  
The first positive impact was assessed to be indirect, deriving from the regime’s successful 
counterinsurgency strategy. Despite continued challenges, a vast military modernization 
program in the 1990s had improved the Tatmadaw’s training and equipment, allowing it 
to gain the upper hand on a myriad of ethnic insurgencies and non-state armed groups 
hitherto operating freely.692 Simultaneously, after 1989 the generals had also developed a 
variety of political inducements, which resulted in a series of cease-fires that successfully 
disarmed, demobilized, and rehabilitated 35 out of 40 insurgent groups.693 While New 
Delhi remained skeptical about the SPDC’s capacity to promote “national reconciliation” 
through a constitutional convention initiated by the generals in 2004, it was comforted by 
the domestic security returns it derived from unprecedented stability in Myanmar, and 
was also encouraged by the prospects of a wider peace process.694  
The second, and more important, positive impact of the military regime’s continuity in 
2007 was deemed to be direct: Yangon was increasingly willing to cooperate and 
                                                
691 Nov. 20: Bhasin, IFR 2007, 395. 
692 Myanmar’s Army had launched various offensives on the NSCN-K in recent years, especially in the 
Spring of 2007. For a good overview, see Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar armed forces 
since 1948 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009).  
693 For a good overview of Myanmar’s counter-insurgency strategy and the peace process since the 1990s: 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/Catalyzing_Reflections_2_2014_
online.pdf 11-12. In Jan. 2007, the Army signed a ceasefire with a breakaway KNA faction, and in March it 
began the first-ever talks with CNO/Chin rebels: http://unpo.org/article/6418, both of which seen as 
positive indications in India. 
694 See e.g. the Indian DCM’s recognition, in 2007, that cross-border security was a chief concern in 
relations: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07RANGOON135_a.html. The Indian Army was thus the 
main advocate for engagement. This emphasized the Myanmar Army’s expansion from 5 to 32 infantry 
battalions, many of which deployed to the Indian and Bangladesh borders, as “a positive development,” 
according to D. Banerjee, "Myanmar and Indian Security concerns," Strategic Analysis 19, no. 5 (1996): 698. 
Indian Army Chiefs V. P. Malik and J. J. Singh recall the informal influence their assessments had on 
India’s posture (Interviews 059 and 045). 
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coordinate with India to counter cross-border security challenges, and proved to be a 
reliable partner. Embryonic attempts to increase coordination in border patrolling and 
counter-insurgency operations had been made after 1994, but mostly failed due to a mix 
of Myanmar’s deep-rooted isolationism and India’s democratic politics.695  
The breakthrough came with strategic normalization in 2000, after which the Indian 
Army and Tatmadaw started to cooperate more regularly.696 While this collaboration was 
kept secret, New Delhi publically signaled its satisfaction and expectation of continuity, 
PM M. Singh, for example, noting in 2005 that he had been personally “assured [by Tan 
Shwe] that [the] Myanmar Government will fully cooperate with India and not allow its 
territory to be used by insurgents.”697 
 
Look East and counter China 
The third and final assessment driving India’s supportive stance towards the military 
regime in Myanmar related to a dual geostrategic imperative: to connect with Southeast 
Asia and to counterbalance China. While Indian officials dealing with Myanmar since the 
1990s have been described as “obsessed” with China, allegedly suffering from an 
                                                
695 Aug. 1993: agreement on border patrolling,. May 1994: B. C. Joshi the first Indian Army Chief to visit 
Myanmar since 1986, which led to a coordinated cross-border operation in May 1995. Aug. 1995: 
agreement on cross-border cooperation against insurgents and trafficking. Feb. 1998, “Operation Leech”: 
India kills six and arrests 36 Myanmar insurgents on the Andaman & Nicobar islands: Nandita Haksar, 
Rogue agent: how India's military intelligence betrayed the Burmese resistance (New Delhi: Penguin, 2009). 
696 This started at the Shillong talks, in Jan. 2000: V. P. Malik recalls sharing intelligence on NSCN-K 
camps in Northern Myanmar with the SPDC’s no. 2, Maung Aye, and the Tatmadaw raided the camps two 
weeks later: Malik, "Indo-Myanmar," 4-7. The Tatmadaw launched regular offensives thereafter, e. g.  in 
2001 on Manipuri PLA insurgents: Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's Northeast, 177. India started 
fencing the border with Myanmar in 2003: Bhasin, IFR 2003, 779. Insurgency and other cross-border 
security challenges were also addressed at the bi-annual Army Border liaison meetings, or the annual 
dialogue of Home Secretaries: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 940-1. 
697 Dec. 14, after talks with Than Shwe: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 785. See also MEA, "AR 07-08," 10. 
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“encirclement syndrome,” a closer examination indicates that New Delhi’s China focus in 
Myanmar was not myopic nor reactionary, but based on three strategic assessments and 
objectives.698 
In the first assessment, after India embraced economic reforms in the 1990s, Myanmar 
assumed a pivotal role as a link to the high-growth economies of Southeast Asia.699 While 
China was arguably driving India’s consequent Look East policy, it was also based on the 
recognition that Myanmar’s economic liberalization could have a stabilizing impact on 
India’s semi-enclaved Northeastern states.700 Indian policymakers therefore identified 
Myanmar as the pivot of their new geoeconomic reorientation strategy.701  
Speaking in Bangladesh, in 2005, India’s senior-most diplomat in charge of this new 
policy, thus emphasized that “Myanmar and the Northeast Region provide the 
geographical contiguity for overland connectivity between India and ASEAN.” 702 
Similarly, the “Vision 2020” strategy of the Ministry of Development of the North 
Eastern Region, emphasized that “it is in North East India that South-East Asia begins 
                                                
698 Egreteau, Wooing the generals: India's new Burma policy, 192. The Indian Ambassador S. Saran (1997-2000) 
recalls: “India had to focus on its comparative advantage, and waited to explore its window of opportunity 
in 2000s, when Myanmar reached out, saturated with China and under American pressure” (Interview 
028). 
699 See e.g. Finance Minister M. Singh’s first major speech on reforms, in Oct. 1991, in Singapore: Sunanda 
K. Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West: Lee Kuan Yew's Mission India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2009), 260. 
700 On the China and Myanmar factors in India’s “Look East” policy, see Ram, Two Decades. On the specific 
role of India’s Northeastern states and Myanmar, see B. G. Verghese, Reorienting India: the new geo-politics of 
Asia (New Delhi: Konark, 2001).  
701 The 1990s saw a gradual economic opening of the country, starting in 1993, when foreign banks were 
first allowed to operate. Arriving in 1997, the Indian ambassador recalls that “there was change in the air,” 
as Myanmar was about to enter ASEAN, and “a general expectation that Myanmar too, would, in time 
graduate to the Southeast Asian model of liberal economy and mild political authoritarianism,” Shyam 
Saran, "Re-Engaging the Neighbouhood: A personal perspective on India’s look east policy," in Two Decades 
of India's Look East Policy: Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Prosperity, ed. Amar N. Ram (New Delhi: Indian 
Council of World Affairs, 2012), 131. 
702 May 31, R. Sikri (Secretary, East), in Dhaka: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 84. See also MEA, "AR 04-05," 12. 
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and, as such, it is for the North East to be enabled to play the arrow-head role in the 
further evolution of this policy.”703 
From the mid-1990s, New Delhi persistently tried to strengthen this connectivity. It 
pushed for greater commercial exchanges and the opening of new overland trade 
routes.704 It invested massively in new road and transportation projects, seeking to 
facilitate mobility across one of the Asia’s most isolated borders.705 It unveiled ambitious 
gas and oil pipeline projects, via Bangladesh, to integrate their energy markets.706 And on 
the diplomatic front, it encouraged Myanmar to join a variety of multilateral initiatives 
for regional integration.707 Economic connectivity thus drove strategy, and strategy, in 
turn, dictated continued engagement with the military regime. 
India’s second geostrategic assessment saw Myanmar’s increasing anxiety about excessive 
reliance on China as an opportunity to expand its footprint. India had natural security 
concerns about China.708 However, rather than reflecting an obsessive quest to compete 
with Beijing, as often argued, New Delhi’s post-2000 rapprochement was driven by an 
                                                
703 http://www.mdoner.gov.in/sites/default/files/silo2_content/ner_vision/Vision_2020.pdf p. vi-vii. 
704 The border trade agreement was signed in 1994, with the first overland route opened in Apr. 1995. 
While total bilateral trade increased, its share remained insignificant, at US$10 million (0,9%) in 2008: 
Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 174-9. Contrast with China: US$1.2 billion (50%), Myoe, Pauk-Phaw, 158. 
705 In Feb. 2001, EAM J. Singh inaugurated the India-Myanmar Friendship Road, part of the Trilateral 
Highway Project with Thailand, formalized in 2002. Negotiations were ongoing for the Kaladan 
Multimodal Transit Transport Facility negotiated, leading to an MoU in 2008. India also expressed interest 
in exploring the Dawei deep sea port and building a cross-border rail link Bhasin, IFR 2007, 1663. 
706 In 2005, EAM N. Singh, compared the India-Bangladesh-Myanmar pipeline project to the Mughal 
construction of the Grand Trunk Road across India, “to link our region and set up a new paradigm in 
regional cooperation and friendship” Bhasin, IFR 2005, 18, 432-4. See also MEA, "AR 04-05," 12. 
707 In 1992, it rejoined the Non-Aligned Movement with Indian support. In 1997, Myanmar joined BIMS-
TEC at India’s invitation.  In 2000, at India’s behest, Myanmar became a founding member of the Mekong 
Ganga Cooperation Initiative. Finally, in 2007, under India’s presidency, Myanmar expressed interest in 
becoming a SAARC observer state (formalized in 2008). 
708 R. Sikri, MEA’s Secretary (East, 2004-06) recalls: “should Myanmar get irreversibly locked in China’s 
tight economic and strategic embrace, this would pose serious security dangers to India”. Sikri, Challenge and 
strategy: rethinking India's foreign policy, 66. 
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understanding that Myanmar was finally ready to recalibrate its Sino-Indian balancing 
strategy.709  
On his arrival as India’s ambassador in Yangon, in 1997, S. Saran recalls:	   
There was a strong urge [by the SPDC] to reduce its overwhelming dependence on China (…) 
They were keen to regain a degree of strategic autonomy (…) From having been largely on the 
sidelines since 1989, India was able to deal itself back into reckoning in a strategically important 
neighbouring state within the space of just a few years. By providing room for manouvre to the 
generals in Yangon, we were able to expand our own.710 
From the late 1990s onwards, Indian officials thus observed a persistent concern by 
Myanmar’s military regime to rope New Delhi in to balance China, whether by allowing 
India to re-open its consulate in Mandalay or grating it privileged economic access in the 
borderlands West of the Irrawaddy or Chin rivers.711 By 2004, even Khin Nyunt, the 
SPDC’s No. 3 and most pro-China figure, was seen by New Delhi as a “changed man … 
going out of his way to woo India.”712 After he was ousted in a purge later that year, 
India’s Foreign Secretary K. Sibal confirmed: “Myanmar is keen to balance its external 
relationships and India has vital long term interest in increasing Myanmar’s strategic 
options.”713 
                                                
709  A former Myanmar Foreign Affairs director-general on the historical driver behind Yangon’s 
rapprochement after 2000: “For a small nation like Myanmar wedged between two giant neighbors there is 
little choice but to engage them in a balanced manner,” Shein, "India-Myanmar Relations after 2010 
Elections," 18. In an undated brief on “our interest” while he served as Myanmar’s ambassador to India 
(2003-07), Brig.-Gen. U Kyi Thein refers to his country as “a bridge between India and China …  situated 
in the strategic location geo-politically and economically” (shared with the author). This is shared by his 
predecessor, Amb. U Wynn Lwin (1992-1999), who noted that Myanmar had been deprived of this second 
axis after India took on a pro-democracy posture in 1988 (Interview 060). 
710 Saran, "Re-Engaging," 135. 
711 On the consulate, opened despite Chinese opposition, see Saran, "Re-Engaging," 135-6. Several Indian 
officials interviewed recall implicit SPDC attempts to divide Indian and Chinese zones of influence, along 
those two rivers, leaving the Eastern areas to China: interviews with Army Chiefs V. P. Malik (059) and J. J. 
Singh (045), Ambassador R. Bhatia (004), and Foreign Secretary S. Saran (028). 
712 Foreign Secretary S. Saran, quoted in Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 109. 
713 Jan. 23, 2003: Bhasin, IFR 2003, 75. Three months after going on his eight visit to China in seven years, 
signing 12 agreements, the SPDC’s No.3 Khin Nyunt is arrested in October, five days before a major state 
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In India’s third and final geostrategic assessment, growing American and European 
pressure against Myanmar would drive the regime even further into Chinese hands. 
Conversely, New Delhi expected its continued engagement to be rewarded with greater 
leverage over an increasingly isolated regime. After 2003, the SPDC generals began 
expressing acute concern about the need to escape rising pressure from the West and the 
consequent need to diversify their strategic relations.714  
Yangon had good reasons to worry. The USA tightened sanctions, opposed Myanmar’s 
entry into ASEAN, and in 2005 its Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, reviled 
“Burma” as an “outpost of tyranny.”715 The European Union, unusually led by the 
United Kingdom, intensified its economic and diplomatic coercion.716 And together, after 
2005, Western states brought up Myanmar more regularly at the United Nations, both at 
the Security Council and the Human Rights Commission.717  
In late 2005, India’s Ambassador in Yangon, B. K. Mitra, recognized that “in principle, 
India can’t take exception to the U.S. and E.U. policies of applying pressure on the 
                                                                                                                                            
visit by Than Shwe and Maung Aye to India. On how this purge was expected to favor India, see Bhatia, 
India-Myanmar, 109, 201; Egreteau and Jagan, Soldiers and Diplomacy 185-202, 51-2. 
714 See e.g. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03RANGOON167_a.html. On Khin Nyunt’s particular 
concern about the United States: “in order to prevent our country from getting into trouble and make it 
stable, we have to associate with the Kala [Indians] and the Chinese,” Dec. 2003 quoted in  
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04RANGOON647_a.html  
715 Jan. 2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4186241.stm. See also her May 29, 2006 speech: 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/67045.htm. American pressures included a “visa ban” in 
1996, prohibition of new investment in 1997, and diplomatic pressure against Myanmar taking on the 
ASEAN chairmanship, in 2005. In Oct. 2005, the U.S. CdA notes that the “promotion of democracy in 
Burma is this mission's top priority,” https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05RANGOON1177_a.html.  
716 The EU first adopted a Common Position on Burma in 1996, which was revised and strengthened in 
2004, with continued restrictions on visas and development assistance, denial of GSP privileges, and a total 
arms embargo. In 2004, it also opposed Myanmar joining the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/81897.pdf  
717 In Dec. 2005, the United States first attempted to include Myanmar on the UNSC’s formal agenda, 
which it succeeds in doing in Sept. 2006 with recourse to a controversial procedural vote, despite Indian 
opposition: http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/derekonunsc.htm. See also the Jan. 2007 attempt to adopt 
a UNSC resolution condemning Myanmar: http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8939.doc.htm.    
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Burmese regime.”718 However, in practice, it was equally clear that given its security and 
economic interests, India could not afford the Western luxury of a moral stance.719 New 
Delhi’s chief concern was that such pressures were proving to be counterproductive and 
that sanctions, in particular, would hurt its attempts to pre-empt China from getting “free 
access” to Myanmar.720  
Indian officials were therefore privately puzzled by the question “whether the US denied 
[neglected], or deliberately chose to ignore the strategic importance of Myanmar in 
Southeast Asia,” and “whether it cared at all that its [coercive] policy would drive Burma 
closer into China’s arms”.721 However, while in public Washington often berated New 
Delhi’s engagement policy, it privately acknowledged that it “may serve U.S. interests in 
terms of providing a counterbalance to China’s increasing influence in Burma.”722 
* 
Looking back at the revolutionary changes in India-Myanmar relations over the 
preceding decade, Foreign Secretary R. Mathai hinted in 2012 at a sense of glee and 
vindication: 
When you are a neighbouring country you do not have the choice [to disengage] (…). You remain 
engaged irrespective of the situation. (…)  this [India-Myanmar] relationship has continued 
                                                
718 Quoted in U.S. Embassy cable: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05RANGOON1199_a.html. 
719 India’s FS (until Sept. 2006), recalls that in India’s view, the United States was pursuing a “low cost 
policy of moral high-ground” (Interview 028). An Indian official dealing with the UN at the time recalls: “[it 
was] easy for the West to adopt a strong position on Myanmar. If something similar happened in Namibia, 
I could also afford to take a strong moral stance, [but] you can’t choose your neighbors.” (Interview 076). 
720 FS S. S. Menon (2006-09): interview no. 078. 
721 R. Bhatia, Ambassador in Yangon (2002-05): Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 65. 
722 U.S. Chief of Mission Martinez, in 2003, after talking to the Indian Ambassador: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03RANGOON1117_a.html. India’s FS S. Saran recalls his interaction 
on Myanmar with U.S. NSA S. Hadley, in Dec. 2005: “[he gave me a] lecture, on ‘how can you do this, be 
in bed with generals, you can’t do this as a democracy’ (…) so I gave him a tutorial on Indian interests, 
border security, ASEAN link, Bay of Bengal. And you talk about China being a major concern in MY, but 
we’re in there. … they realized India’s interests after that, and while rhetoric continued, [they] never 
pressured us to change our policy” (Interview 028).  
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through history. So, this is a matter on which we were very consistent. We may have had 
differences but we wanted always to be able to continue a dialogue as friendly, constructive 
partners.723 
The 2007 “Saffron Revolution” posed the most significant challenge to the Indian 
government’s “consistency”, given the tremendous domestic and international pressures 
on the world’s largest democracy to denounce the military regime. Beyond moral 
considerations, however, New Delhi pursued continued engagement, based on a triad of 
strategic assessments: 1) the SPDC remained firmly in power, and promised to continue 
granting India unprecedented access to Myanmar, which revolutionized bilateral 
relations; 2) for the first time in over half a century, the increasingly capable Tatmadaw 
had gained the upper hand over its myriad of ethnic insurgencies, and by actively 
cooperating with the Indian Army against cross-border security threats, it proved 
indispensable to the stabilization in India’s Northeaster border states; and 3) in order to 
reduce dependence on China and fend off Western pressures, the generals were 
cultivating India, which offered a geostrategic window of opportunity for New Delhi to 




This chapter examined the assessments that drove India’s different postures during 
regime crises in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar in the 2000s: in Nepal, New Delhi 
pursued a coercive strategy against King Gyanendra’s illiberal royal regime, supported 
pro-democracy forces and facilitated regime change, which in 2006 ended ten years of 
                                                
723 May 25: Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2012 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2013), 1173-4. 
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civil war with a Maoist insurgency; in Sri Lanka, faced with an escalating civil war, New 
Delhi engaged the existing political dispensation, under President M. Rajapaksa, 
supporting his military offensive that defeated the separatist Tamil insurgency in 2009; 
and in Myanmar, New Delhi fully engaged the SPDC military regime while its generals 
crushed pro-democracy forces in 2007. 
As highlighted in the case of Nepal, India did not just spontaneously engage each regime, 
irrespective of its political system or specific circumstances, despite what its policymakers 
often seem to profess in public: New Delhi’s different postures were the outcome of 
evolving strategic assessments about each specific crisis and about the expected effect 
engagement or coercion would have on India’s future influence and security interests in 
the neighboring country. While the broader patterns of these assessments is analyzed in 
detail in the following conclusion to Part 1, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn from 
this period, in specific: 
1. As in the preceding six cases examined in the 1950s and 1980s, India’s posture during 
neighboring regime crises in the 2000s was determined by strategic assessments that 
focused on maximizing political influence and security, rather than on ideational 
inclinations or hegemonic reflexes. The following three assessments prevail: 
a) The relative strength of the prevailing regime and its attitude towards India, 
whether cooperative (cases of Sri Lanka and Myanmar), non-cooperative or hostile 
(case of Nepal): “Work with, not against us” is a common and cardinal appeal from 
Indian officials to neighboring governments, especially during crises. The extent to 
which India’s engagement policy was shaped by Sri Lanka’s “India first” policy 
after 2006 contrasts with the extent to which New Delhi’s coercive policy was 
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shaped about the converse assessment about Nepal’s balancing attempts, especially 
after 2005, to reduce and escape Indian influence. 
b) The internal crisis dynamics in each country, this being the first time in its history 
that the Indian government faced high levels of political violence (civil war, 
insurgencies) simultaneously in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, all of which 
having a cross-border impact on domestic security, particularly in India’s border 
regions. The risks of escalation or stalemate, and the quest for stability and order, 
induced India into supporting different conflict resolution strategies (negotiation in 
Nepal, force in Sri Lanka). India’s foreign posture and policy therefore often reflect 
its domestic counter-insurgency objectives and strategy. 
c) The geostrategic context of each regime crisis, in particular the alignment of the 
political dispensation (cooperative towards India, or seeking to balance India via 
extra-regional powers) and also the postures of other great powers (especially 
China, the United States and other Western states) towards the crisis state. China’s 
new inroads into South Asia during the 2000s assume particular salience, 
decreasing India’s incentives to coerce the regimes in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, 
which were able to increasingly rely on support from Beijing. Engagement thus 
became of paramount geostrategic importance to counter China, except in cases 
(such as Nepal) where geographic conditions and predominant capabilities 
preserved India’s coercive power. 
2. While strategic assessments were primarily driven by the quest for political influence 
and security, there are also significant indications that Indian policymakers recognized 
the importance of a regime fostering liberal and democratic political processes to solve 
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domestic conflicts, whether in the case of Nepal’s Maoist, Sri Lanka’s Tamil or 
Myanmar’s Kachin insurgencies. In all cases, India’s assessments thus focus on the 
existing regime’s capability to adequately implements India’s prescribed dual counter-
insurgency track, calibrating military force and political inducements, and the outcome 
on the country’s domestic stability, order and security. Conversely, as reflected in the 
divergent cases of Nepal (Maoists willing to cooperate and join the democratic process) 
and Sri Lanka (LTTE unwilling, instead persisting in violent secession), India’s 
assessments also evaluate the insurgents’ posture towards conflict resolution, as well as 
towards India and its domestic security concerns. 
3. The three cases in the 2000s furthermore reflect the rising salience of economic 
concerns in India’s assessments, as traditionally introvert security considerations are 
linked to, or are subject to extrovert geo-economic priorities: particularly in the case of 
Myanmar (and to a certain extent also Sri Lanka), India’s crisis posture is influenced by 
the new, extrovert nature of its liberal economy, requiring greater connectivity with 
Southeast Asia (and other neighboring regions), which in turn is incompatible with 
chronic lawlessness and insecurity in cross-border regions. 
4. Finally, despite public rhetoric often suggesting otherwise, India’s geostrategic 
assessments in the 2000s indicate an unprecedented degree of dialogue, coordination and 
even cooperation with the United States during regime crises in Nepal, Sri Lanka and 
even Myanmar (where New Delhi and Washington’s postures clashed more intensely). 
However, as reflected in the cases of Sri Lanka and Myanmar, American and Western 
liberal-interventionist agendas and coercive postures have often forced India to pursue a 
extraordinarily fine balance, seeking to preserve its own leverage to nudge neighboring 
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regimes towards political change, even while forced to compete with China’s 
unconditional, long-distance, and “no-strings-attached” support for illiberal regimes.  
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CONCLUSION TO PART I: PATTERNS OF INVOLVEMENT  
 
Safeguarding these [Indian liberal democratic] values for one seventh of humanity is far more 
important than to be in agreement with our smaller neighbours at some cost to our system.724 
K. Subrahmanyam, 1981 
 
In order to “safeguard” the survival of its democratic system in a volatile, mostly 
authoritarian, and at times also hostile neighborhood, the Indian state has compromised 
on every possible principle and employed a variety of strategies. The nine case studies 
examined in this first part of the dissertation (chapters 2, 3 and 4) illustrate this crudely 
pragmatic strategic culture: depending on the circumstances of each crisis, while New 
Delhi sometimes responded with inaction, it often also violated the norm of non-
interference to get involved, whether by micromanaging its neighbors’ internal politics or 
through coercing regime change, including through military intervention.  
As illustrated in Table 6, democratic India’s posture does not appear to be directly 
correlated to the formal regime type (democratic or autocratic) in the crisis country: 
depending on the circumstances of each crisis, New Delhi has at times engaged and 
supported deeply authoritarian regimes, and at least in one instance (Sri Lanka 1987) 
coerced a formally democratic regime. 
 
Table	  6:	  Regime	  type	  and	  Indian	  posture	  
Crisis	   Regime	  type	   Indian	  posture	  
                                                
724 Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," 261. 
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Nepal	  1960	  
Authoritarian	  
(incoming:	  royal	  rule	  after	  coup)	   Engagement	  
Ceylon	  1956	   Democracy	  
(contested:	  declining	  pluralism)	  
Engagement	  
Burma	  1962	   Authoritarian	  
(incoming:	  military	  rule	  after	  coup)	  
Engagement	  
Nepal	  1990	   Authoritarian	  
(contested:	  pro-­‐democracy	  uprising)	  
Coercion	  
Sri	  Lanka	  1987	   Democracy	  
(contested:	  declining	  pluralism)	  
Coercion	  
Burma	  1988	   Authoritarian	  (contested:	  pro-­‐democracy	  uprising)	   Coercion	  
Nepal	  2006	  
Authoritarian	  
(contested:	  pro-­‐democracy	  uprising)	   Coercion	  
Sri	  Lanka	  2009	  
Democracy	  
(contested:	  declining	  pluralism)	   Engagement	  
Myanmar	  2007	  
Authoritarian	  
(contested:	  pro-­‐democracy	  uprising)	   Engagement	  
 
The findings also do not indicate any clear temporal patterns, dismissing popular 
narratives about the evolutionary transformation of an initial “soft” Indian state of the 
1950s, favoring non-interference and engagement, into a “hard” Indian state of the 
2000s, favoring greater involvement and coercion: Chapter 2 (1950s-60) shows that the 
supposedly “idealist” PM J. Nehru pragmatically engaged the authoritarian or illiberal 
regimes of royal Nepal, ethno-nationalist Ceylon and praetorian Burma; Chapter 3 
(1980s), in turn, suggests that the coercive involvement of PM R. Gandhi in the three 
neighboring states was driven by concerns about regime stability and regional security; 
and, finally, Chapter 4 (2000s) indicates a mixed approach, under PM M. Singh, with 
engagement in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, and coercion in Nepal. 
Finally, the nine case studies do not indicate the determinant influence of any of the other 
factors frequently employed as simplistic single-cause explanations of India’s 
neighborhood policy: 1) India’s relative capacity to interfere or coerce has not changed 
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dramatically over sixty years, remaining high in Nepal, medium Sri Lanka, and limited in 
Myanmar; 2) Organizational differences within or between the government’s various 
branches matter occasionally, but more on degree of involvement, than on the rather 
consensual crisis assessments and objectives of India’s posture; 3) Political parties like to 
publically claim grand ideological differences, but when in power they have pursued 
common objectives through identical strategies; 4) Similarly, the role of Prime Ministers 
and their idiosyncrasies is frequently overrated, when individual leadership has, in 
practice, never played a determinant role in India’s crisis assessment and posture. 
If not all these, what factors, then, determine India’s posture during a neighboring state’s 
regime crisis? In the introduction to this part of the dissertation, the objective was to 
unpack the usual short and broad answer of reflexive “security interests” overriding 
“moral values.” What specific concerns shape the direction and degree of each and every 
Indian crisis posture? India’s assessments in all nine case studies converge around three 
determinant types: 1) Regime strength and attitude (dispensation); 2) Conflict spillover 
risk (order); and 3) Extra-regional influence (geopolitics). Table 7 offers a summary. 
 
Table	  7:	  Assessment	  types	  influencing	  crisis	  posture	  	  




1.	   Regime	   strength	   and	  
attitude	  (dispensation):	  
Regime	   capability	   and	  
attitude	   towards	   India;	  
eventual	  alternatives.	  
2.	   Conflict	   spillover	   risk	  
(order):	  
Conflict’s	   cross-­‐border	  
effects	   on	   Indian	   domestic	  
security.	  
3.	   Extra-­‐regional	   influence	  
(geopolitics):	  
Geopolitical	   environment	  






-­‐	  Democratic	  regime	  
fragmenting,	  less	  capable	  
and	  cooperative	  
-­‐	  Rising	  political	  activism	  of	  
King	  Mahendra	  as	  an	  
inevitable	  alternative	  
-­‐	  Communism	  (limited)	  
	  
-­‐	  Rising	  threat	  assessment	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Ceylon	  1956	  
(Engagement)	  
-­‐	  Outgoing	  UNP	  deemed	  
conservative	  and	  
unfavorable	  to	  India	  
-­‐	  Incoming	  SLFP	  deemed	  
progressive	  and	  
cooperative	  towards	  India	  	  
-­‐	  Stateless	  “Plantation”	  
Tamils	  of	  Indian	  origin	  
(limited)	  
	  
-­‐	  SLFP	  re-­‐association	  with	  
India	  and	  non-­‐alignment,	  
tilt	  away	  from	  USA/West	  
	  
Burma	  1962	  
(Engagement)	   -­‐	  U	  Nu	  and	  democratic	  
government’s	  growing	  
isolation	  and	  incapability	  
-­‐	  Rising	  influence	  of	  Gen.	  
Ne	  Win	  and	  the	  Army,	  
positive	  assessment	  of	  his	  
caretaker	  govt.	  
-­‐	  Burmese	  Army	  more	  
willing	  and	  capable	  to	  
counter	  cross-­‐border	  
insurgencies	  




-­‐	  Rising	  threat	  assessment	  





-­‐	  King	  Birendra	  hostile,	  cuts	  
down	  channels	  of	  
communication	  	  
-­‐	  Democratic	  parties	  
favoring	  Indian	  influence	  
-­‐	  Rising	  unrest	  and	  political	  
protests	  (limited)	  
-­‐	  King	  Birendra’s	  extra-­‐
regional	  balancing	  strategy	  
(especially	  China)	  
Sri	   Lanka	  
1987	  
(Coercion)	  
-­‐	  Pres.	  Jayawardene	  non-­‐
cooperative,	  rejects	  Indian	  
advice	  and	  pursues	  military	  
offensive	  	  
-­‐	  No	  credible,	  pliant,	  
reformist	  government	  
alternative	  	  
-­‐	  Conflict	  escalation	  and	  
spillover	  effect	  on	  Tamil	  
Nadu	  
-­‐	  Colombo’s	  extra-­‐regional	  







-­‐	  Ne	  Win’s	  regime	  isolated,	  
weak,	  and	  non-­‐cooperative	  
-­‐	  Pro-­‐democracy	  parties	  
favored	  India	  	  
-­‐	  Burmese	  Army’s	  
incapability	  and	  
unwillingness	  to	  cooperate	  
in	  counter-­‐insurgency	  
operations	  
-­‐	  Rangoon’s	  rising	  
alignment	  with	  China	  and	  
disinterest	  in	  regional	  
economic	  integration	  	  
Nepal	  2006	  
(Coercion)	  
-­‐	  King	  Gyanendra	  non-­‐
cooperative,	  refuses	  Indian	  
advice	  and	  hostile	  post-­‐
2005	  
-­‐	  Democratic	  parties	  and	  
Maoist	  insurgents’	  
outreach	  to	  India	  
-­‐	  Maoist	  insurgency’s	  cross-­‐
border	  links	  with	  Indian	  
Left-­‐wing	  extremists	  
-­‐	  Risk	  of	  conflict	  escalation	  
and/or	  chronic	  stalemate:	  
instability	  	  
-­‐	  King	  Gyanendra’s	  extra-­‐
regional	  balancing	  strategy	  
(China,	  USA),	  esp.	  post-­‐
2005	  
Sri	   Lanka	  
2009	  
(Engagement)	  
-­‐	  Colombo’s	  cooperative	  
“India	  first”	  initiative,	  
commitment	  to	  deliver	  	  
-­‐	  Intractable	  and	  hostile	  
LTTE,	  rejects	  peace	  process,	  
committed	  to	  secessionism	  	  
-­‐	  Spillover	  threat	  of	  
radicalizing	  LTTE’s	  military	  
tactics	  and	  post-­‐defeat	  
strategy	  	  
-­‐	  Risk	  of	  continued	  conflict	  
and	  chronic	  disorder	  	  
-­‐	  Limited	  Chinese	  military	  
support,	  monitored	  
-­‐	  Counter-­‐productive	  
Western	  pressure	  and	  risk	  




-­‐	  SPDC	  regime	  entrenched,	  
cooperative,	  delivering	  
-­‐	  Post-­‐2000	  revolutionary	  
improvement	  in	  bilateral	  
relations	  in	  progress	  	  






-­‐	  Balance	  Chinese	  presence,	  
Indian	  Ocean	  access	  
-­‐	  Expand	  geo-­‐economic	  
links	  to	  Southeast	  Asia	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Dispensation: regime strength and attitude 
This is the most typical crisis assessment influencing India’s posture, reflecting far more 
sophistication than a reflexive engagement of any political dispensation (regime). 
• Definition: Assessment of the balance of power in the crisis country, based on 
prevailing regime’s strength (robust/weak) and attitude towards India 
(cooperative/hostile). 
• Policy-maker questions: How strongly entrenched is the existing regime, and what is 
the likelihood of it surviving the crisis and remaining in power? Does it cooperate and 
address Indian concerns, or at least attempt and promise to do so? Are there credible 
alternatives (internal factions, opposition) for a regime change that would favor India’s 
interests and political influence? 
• Influence on posture: India tends to engage regimes that are strong and/or 
cooperative, and tend to coerce regimes that are weak and/or hostile. Particularly 
during crises periods, New Delhi will verge towards coercion when neighboring 
regimes a) persistently fail to accommodate Indian concerns, close down channels of 
communication, reject normalization attempts, or mobilize popular support against 
India; and b) are weak and contested, with a credible regime alternative offering India 
greater guarantees of cooperation and influence. 
• Cases: Myanmar 2007 (strong regime: engagement), Myanmar 1988 (weak regime: 
coercion); Nepal 1990 (hostile regime: coercion) and Sri Lanka 2009 (cooperative 
regime: engagement).  
• Change: This is a key Indian assessment reflecting persistent continuity during every 
neighboring regime crisis, from the 1950s until today. While the instruments 
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employed to pursue different postures have changed, the typical cost-benefit 
assessment of a neighboring country’s political dispensation remains the same. 
 
Order: conflict spillover risk 
This typical assessment reflects a strategic understanding that India’s domestic security, 
order and stability are intrinsically tied to that of its neighbors.   
• Definition: Assessment about the neighboring country’s crisis/conflict risk of 
escalation and cross-border repercussions of such disorder/instability on Indian 
domestic security (low / high). 
• Policy-maker questions: What is the likelihood of the crisis/conflict affecting 
India’s domestic security, stability and order, in particular in its border regions? 
How intense are cross-border ties (ethnic solidarity, political and financial support, 
insurgent and criminal operations)? How is the crisis expected to influence the 
neighbor’s domestic order and stability? Will a regime change exacerbate or 
mitigate the neighbor’s internal conflict? Will it hamper or help Indian efforts to 
counter cross-border security threats? 
• Influence on posture: When facing a neighboring crisis (especially a militarized 
conflict) with a high-risk spillover effect on India’s domestic security, decision-
makers prioritize stability and order. Coupled with the first typical assessment 
(dispensation) on the existing regime’s relative strength and attitude towards India, 
New Delhi will therefore tend to a) engage a regime that commits to counter 
cross-border security threats, deliver on stability and conflict resolution in 
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cooperation with India; and b) coerce a regime that is incapable and/or unwilling 
to cooperate with India in addressing cross-border security threats, deliver on 
stability and conflict resolution. 
• Cases: Myanmar 1962 and 2007 (high risk  + cooperation = engagement); Sri 
Lanka 1987, Myanmar 1988, Nepal 2006 (high risk + non-cooperation: coercion) 
• Change: a) from territorially-based insurgent groups towards greater emphasis on 
non-traditional security threats (transnational terrorism, crime) taking advantage 
of disorder in neighboring countries to operate in and against India; and b) from 
border states as vulnerable buffers required to protect the autarchic economic 
order from external trade and influences (up to the 1980s), to an extrovert focus 
on border regions as connecting hubs that promote regional integration and 
economic linkages (e.g. with South East Asia, Indian Ocean after the 1990s). 
 
Geopolitics: extra-regional influence 
This typical assessment reflects the subjection of all neighboring states’ internal affairs to 
India’s geostrategic objective of insulating the region from hostile and rival powers.  
• Definition: Assessment about the neighboring regime’s geopolitical alignment and 
the risk of hostile/competing extra-regional powers exploiting the crisis to expand 
their leverage (high / low).  
• Policy-maker questions: Does the crisis result from, or propitiate greater 
involvement from extra-regional powers, particularly hostile ones, such as China? 
Will competing/rival extra-regional influences internationalize and escalate an 
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existing conflict, and thus reduce India’s influence and leverage to end it? What is 
the existing regime’s geopolitical alignment, and does it respect Indian 
geostrategic and external security concerns? 
• Influence on posture: Coupled with the first and second typical assessment 
(dispensation and order), New Delhi will tend to a) engage a regime that it sees as 
cooperatively aligning its foreign policy to India’s external security concerns, or at 
least committed not to override them; and b) coerce a regime that it sees as either 
neglecting Indian geostrategic concerns or actively seeking to balance India by 
roping in the support from extra-regional powers. 
• Cases: Sri Lanka 1987 and Nepal 1990 (Balancing policies/internationalization 
risk = coercion); Sri Lanka 1956, Myanmar 2007, and Sri Lanka 2009 
(cooperative alignment = engagement). 
• Change: This typical geopolitical assessment reflects strategic adaptation to 
different countries and to changes in the regional and global security 
environment. For example: a) in the late 1950s, Indian threat assessments focus on 
China in Nepal and in Burma, and on the United States/Western influence in 
Ceylon; b) as the threat assessment from China intensifies, from the late 1950s 
onwards, India’s relation with the United States in third countries in South Asia 
gradually move from passive hostility (1960s-70s), to mutual respect and non-
interference (1980s) and finally to unprecedented dialogue, coordination and 
cooperation (2000s). 
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Dispensation (regime strength and attitude), order (effects on domestic security) and 
geopolitics (extra-regional influence): together, these three typical strategic assessments 
examined in this first part of the dissertation reflect a clear and continuous pattern of how 
India responds to regime crises in its neighborhood. Together, these three assessments 
guide Indian policymakers to set objectives, take decisions and determine India’s crisis 
posture, whether one of inaction or intervention, engagement or coercion. More than any 
other factor, dispensation, order and geopolitics serve as the only key to decode when, 
why and how New Delhi gets involved in a neighboring state’s crisis. 
Returning to the broader, theoretical objective of this dissertation, we are now also in a 
position to conclude that the patterns in India’s crisis assessments and posture reflect a 
distinct strategic culture. It is important to recall that while examining India’s decision-
making in the nine case studies we refrained from taking the benefit of hindsight, thus 
refusing to either justify or legitimize India’s posture  or, on the other hand, to condemn 
its limited success or failure in achieving desired outcomes.  
Part I identified and described an Indian strategic culture of crisis response and 
involvement in its neighborhood, determined by three typical assessments (political 
dispensation, order, and geopolitics) serving the quest to preserve and maximize India’s 
influence and security.  
Part II proceeds to examine to what extent this strategic culture is also influenced by the 
democratic quality of the Indian political system and by a liberal approach to regime 
types. Rather than seeing democracy, and its associated liberal values and principles, as 
an opposite pole to strategy, Part II thus evaluates whether India’s crisis assessments also 
reflect any causal relation between liberal democracy and security.   
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PART II – DEMOCRACY AS SECURITY: THE LIBERAL DIMENSION 
 
India’s “unilateral adherence to morality [non-interference] is neither desirable nor practical if 
another [neighbor] country deliberately indulges in policies which are immoral [illiberal] and 
which, at the same time, pose a [security] threat to you. In such a situation, practical corrective 
action has to be taken.725 
J. N. Dixit, former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor 
 
Part I identified and described an Indian strategic culture of regional crisis response and 
involvement determined by three typical assessments (dispensation, order, and geopolitics). By 
themselves, these three factors regulate the degree and direction of India’s involvement in 
all nine case studies examined, across three different time periods. 
However, in several cases, particular during the 1980s, such assessments also reflected an 
Indian understanding of how more or less liberal regime types can affect Indian interests 
in a cooperative relationship, domestic order and security, and geopolitical alignment of 
the neighboring country. For example, as apparent in the case of Sri Lanka (1987, in 
Chapter 3), Colombo’s non-cooperative attitude, its persistent attempts to pursue a 
military solution to the ethnic conflict, and the gradual internationalization of the conflict 
were associated to the regime’s illiberal identity, based on structural ethno-nationalism. 
Similarly, in the case of Nepal (2006, in Chapter 4) Indian assessments linked the return 
to royal autocracy to the regime’s declining strength and increasing hostile attitude 
towards India.  
                                                
725 Dixit, Across borders: Fifty years of India's foreign policy, 163. 
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Part II of this dissertation thus moves on to examine when, why and how India’s three 
cardinal strategic assessments take into account the particular regime type of the crisis 
country. For example, do Indian assessments recognize liberal democratic regimes as 
being more cooperative towards India, more capable to solve domestic conflicts, and less 
inclined to play extra-regional balancing games? Conversely, do Indian assessments see 
illiberal or authoritarian regimes in the neighborhood as more reliable counterparts, 
delivering more efficiently on India’s domestic security concerns and geostrategic 
interests? Or is there a temporal trade-off, and Indian assessments caught in a dilemma 
between the short-term advantages of engaging illiberal regimes and the long-term 
promises of necessary liberalization?  
As suggested by J. N. Dixit’s quote above, India’s propensity for regional involvement 
increases when a neighboring country “deliberately indulges in policies which are 
immoral [illiberal] and which, at the same time, pose a [security] threat to you.” However 
euphemistic, the consequent “corrective action” Dixit suggests, is perhaps the closest 
definition of an Indian doctrine of liberal intervention.  
To examine the liberal dimension in Indian strategic assessments and posture, Chapter 5 
offers a broad overview of the role of democracy in Indian foreign policy, and then 
proceeds to examine to what extent India’s exceptionalist identity and liberal domestic 
environment influence decision-making indirectly. Chapter 6 then offers the key 
argument of this dissertation, by linking liberal democracy to security and setting out 
under what short- and long-term conditions regime type influences India’s assessments 
and posture towards neighboring crises.  
  
	  
	   271	  
CHAPTER 5 – LIBERAL EXPERIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT: THE 
DOMESTIC ROOTS 
 
When we look at our extended neighbourhood we cannot but be struck by the fact that India is the 
only open pluralistic democratic society and rapidly modernizing market economy between the 
Mediterranean and the Pacific. This places a special responsibility upon us not only in the defence 
of our values but also in the search for a peaceful periphery.726 
Prime Minister M. Singh (2006) 
 
How is India’s strategic thought towards the region shaped by its own trajectory and 
experience as a liberal democracy? Does its domestic environment, with freedom of 
expression and electoral competition, influence Indian strategic practice? This chapter 
offers an introduction to the domestic and liberal dimension in Indian foreign policy by 
examining to what extent Indian decision-makers focus on regime type when making 
assessments about crises in neighboring countries. The chapter is divided in two parts. 
The first part provides an overview of the liberal dimension in Indian strategic thought. 
Beyond just moral righteousness, when Indian leaders express their principled support for 
democracy abroad, they do so for causal reasons, associating liberal regimes with greater 
stability and security. Reflecting their country’s own successful trajectory in preserving 
territorial integrity and achieving economic development despite an ethno-linguistic and 
religious diversity, Indian leaders and decision-makers thus emphasize that their country’s 
representative, decentralized and inclusive institutions are the best model to govern 
heterogeneous societies, and that political liberalization is therefore inevitable. While 
                                                
726 Oct. 18 at the Combined Commanders’ Conference, quoted in Baru, Accidental PM, 169. 
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present since 1947, the influence of this causal link on Indian strategic thought has grown 
with time, fueling a rising sentiment of Indian exceptionalism in the region. 
The second part of this chapter then proceeds to examine how India’s domestic 
environment, with representative institutions, electoral competition, and a vibrant civil 
society, influences Indian strategic practice. A brief re-examination of our case studies 
from this angle indicates that there are various channels through which India’s 
democratic society indirectly affects policy-making processes towards neighboring 
countries. While not determinant, such pressures play an auxiliary role by either 
accentuating or moderating the government’s posture, for example by delaying a bilateral 
normalization process with an authoritarian regime or, conversely, accelerating a coercive 
posture that favors a democratic regime change. 
 
1. Liberal Experience: the Exceptionalist Core of Strategic Thought 
Indian officials frequently make broad statements in favor of liberal democracy, human 
rights and political freedom, and also exude a sense of exceptionalism, as indicated by PM 
M. Singh’s introductory quote to this chapter. The fact that this preference does not 
always affect India’s posture, nor is always clearly articulated in public, is often mistaken 
for its inexistence or irrelevance in decision-making. However, whether India coerces 
democracies or engages authoritarian regimes in the neighborhood, its officials always 
identify instinctively with democratic forces and even describe political liberalization as a 
teleological inevitability.  
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a) Principled support and its causal sources 
Despite Western criticism and while not always translated into practice, Indian leaders 
have never shied away from identifying with liberal forces abroad, nor from assuming 
their ideological preference for democracy. In 1990, for example, India’s External Affairs 
Minister I. K. Gujral referred to Nepal’s successful democratization earlier that year as an 
example of how Indian leaders were “not merely the practitioners of realpolitik,” but also 
concerned “with the grand visions or great ideas of remolding societies and restructuring 
inter-state relations.”727  
 In 2003, while coming under American pressure for not supporting the invasion of Iraq 
and its global quest for “democracy promotion,” India’s Foreign Secretary K. Sibal took 
a jibe at Washington by implicitly referring to military-ruled Pakistan and, at the same 
time, reiterated his country’s principled preference for democratic regimes: “leav[ing] 
aside what the Americans may or may not wish to see happen on the ground, it would be 
a good thing [for India] if there were liberal, reformist, democratic governments not only 
in the Arab world but everywhere else, including in our neighbourhood.” 728  This 
principled preference was also articulated by his successor, Shyam Saran, who in 2005 
would stress that, under any circumstances, in the region “our sympathy will always be 
with democratic and secular forces.”729  
More than forty years earlier, while declaring independence on August 15, 1947, PM J. 
Nehru had referred to India as “the star of freedom in the East,” and the country’s 
constitution itself, adopted in 1949, invested the state with various global responsibilities, 
                                                
727 Speaking in Kathmandu, Aug. 6: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 812. 
728 Oct. 21, 2003 on SAB TV: Bhasin, IFR 2003, 575. 
729 Feb. 14, speaking on “India and its neighbours,” Bhasin, IFR 2005, 335. 
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including to “promote international peace and security.”730 Indian leaders have thus 
developed a well-deserved fame for their moral foreign policy speeches, reflecting an 
idealist sense of exceptionalism and mission to transform world politics, in which the idea 
of inter-democratic peace always prevailed.  
Less attention, however, has been devoted to understand the causes driving such 
principled stances: why do Indian leaders and officials come out in defense of liberal 
democracy abroad, whether in South Africa or in Sri Lanka? Addressing the Indian 
parliament, in early 1950, on the dangers of the Kingdom of Nepal remaining as one of 
the world’s most isolated and autocratic countries, PM J. Nehru emphasized that beyond 
just moral righteousness, Indian support for democratization there was also anchored in a 
causal understanding of liberalization as being practically more beneficial and necessary, 
both for its neighbor and for itself: 
We are interested of course in the development of freedom in all countries, more especially in Asian 
countries. We are interested in the abstract and we are interested in that as a practical and 
necessary step today in the context of Asia, because if it does not come it creates and encourages 
those very forces which ultimately may disrupt freedom itself.731 
This definition of interest in the development of freedom reflects the understanding that 
beyond principled motives, which Nehru calls the “abstract” interests, India’s support for 
democracy is also based on a utilitarian view of such regimes as being more efficient and, 
therefore, inevitable in the long-term – the “practical” and “necessary” in Nehru’s 
nomenclature. A closer look at these causal roots of India’s principled preference reveals 
                                                
730 For his full speech, see: http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1947nehru1.html. Article 51 of the 
Indian constitution mandates that the “State shall endeavor to: (a) promote international peace and 
security; (b) maintain just and honorable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for international law 
and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and (d) encourage settlement 
of international disputes by arbitration.” 
731 Speaking on Nepal, March 17: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 84. 
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how its officials classify their own political system as an exceptional success, and therefore 
as a benchmark for its neighbors. 
 
b) Model India as a benchmark for the “victorious march of democracy”  
“Freedom,” “pluralism,” “liberal,” “reformist,” and “secular” – these concepts are used 
interchangeably in the sample statements above, which hinders a clear definition of what 
Indian leaders have in mind when they refer to “democracy.” Common to all such 
descriptions of ideal government abroad, however, is the self-centered image of India’s 
own political system, and the country’s success in preserving its territorial integrity despite 
tremendous internal diversity and external challenges. The trajectory of India’s liberal 
politics, addressing extraordinary demographic diversity through pluralist, secular, and 
federal institutions, is thus used as benchmark for how best to preserve independence, 
ensure domestic stability, pursue economic development, or engineer social reforms.  
India’s decentralized and parliamentary democracy is thus seen as the best – and often 
also the only feasible – state-building strategy to peacefully govern a large population 
marked by extraordinary diversity.732 Beyond formal, institutional, legal or procedural 
criteria, Indian officials further tend to emphasize the substantive and liberal dimension 
of Indian democracy, in that it seeks to integrate minorities through the politics of 
inclusion and, conversely, reject the politics of majoritarian exclusion – whether based on 
                                                
732 See Kohli, The success of India's democracy. 
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ethnicity, language, class, caste, ideology, religion or any other differentiating 
denominator.733   
Similarly, as Nehru underlined repeatedly in the 1950s, an infant democracy’s capacity to 
survive a transition from colonialism or authoritarianism also relied on its ability to 
deliver on development by implementing long-term socio-economic reforms. Speaking in 
Colombo, in 1950, he emphasized: 
 If you have a democratic structure which does not bring that [economic] advance, then that 
democracy has failed just as much as any other political structure which fails to give political 
freedom to people would also have failed. (…) Achievement of political freedom is a great thing, 
but I have always thought of this freedom in the social and economic sense also.734 
Nehru’s causal understanding of democracy as an advantage, in particular for India to 
achieve a “peaceful socio-economic revolution,” is also apparent in his rising skepticism 
about the illiberal nature of the Chinese and Soviet models after their interventions in 
Tibet and Hungary, respectively. 735  As noted by Tanvi Madan, the Indian Prime 
Minister expected the long-term dividends of democratic rule to outweigh its short-term 
disadvantages.736 
India’s principled defense of democracy abroad is therefore anchored in its own 
experience, underlining the causal benefits of a liberal regime as the most effective 
political system to address the specific challenges faced by South Asia’s developing, 
diverse and post-colonial countries. Strategist K. Subrahmanyam thus underlined that 
                                                
733 An Indian High Commissioner who served in Sri Lanka in the 1970s, reflects this thinking: “if ethnic 
and linguistic differences [were] irrelevant to the issues confronting a modern state, [then] the claim for 
absolute rule by the majority would be entirely valid,” Coelho, Palk Straits, 156. 
734 Jan. 15: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 5. 
735 See his letter to the Chief-Ministers in Indian states, “The Basic Approach,” July 13, 1958 in Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Vol. 43, Second Series (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 
2011), 3-11. 
736 Madan, "Eye to the East," 190-4. 
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India “adopted secularism, democracy and parliamentary institutions because only it is 
through them that the unity and integrity of this multi -religious, multi-lingual and multi-
ethnic society can be sustained,” and that, accordingly, India’s foreign policy should be 
driven by the “pursuit of enlightened national interest,” that promotes this model 
abroad.737  
This is in no measure an exclusively liberal or Nehruvian view, but permeates the thought 
of leaders from all ideological and partisan backgrounds. For example, addressing the Sri 
Lankan parliament, in 1978, India’s first Prime Minister from outside the Congress Party, 
M. Desai, reflected this utilitarian approach while speaking in Sri Lanka: 
I can state with confidence that our [Indian] way ha[s] indeed proved its superiority in ensuring a 
better life for every citizen while still preserving his freedom and independence. Our pursuit of 
economic growth and social justice is continuous, sustained and yet subject to public opinion and 
pressures and cannot therefore be derailed by the cycles of extremism and violence that are 
inevitable when we follow the false prophets who tell us that an authoritarian system provides a 
better environment for rapid growth and modernization and will usher in the utopia of many 
foolish dreams.738 
Desai’s practical understanding of the benefits of democracy as “our way” reflects the 
earlier thinking of J. Nehru who, in the late 1950s, had underlined that “wrong means 
will not lead to right results,” and that that was “no longer merely an ethical doctrine but 
a practical proposition.”739 Similarly, the first Prime Minister from the BJP, A. B. 
Vajpayee, emphasized that democracy should be seen as an “effective instrument for 
fulfilling people’s aspirations and resolving conflicts and contentious issues [because] 
                                                
737 Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," 249-50. 
738 Feb. 6, 1978, in Colombo: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 127. 
739  Nehru, SWJN SS v43, 3-11. 
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history has proved time and again that free and democratic societies are the ones that are 
creative, self-corrective and self-regenerative.”740  
While not so prevalent, Indian leaders also associate an open political system with more 
growth and equitable distribution of wealth, leading in turn to greater political stability. 
This narrative link between democracy and sustainable development has been gaining 
ground in the last two decades, as Indian scholars and leaders have started to compare 
the impact of their democratic model to that of autocratic China. Speaking in Sri Lanka, 
in 2007, for example, Finance Minister P. Chidambaram noted that “absent democracy, 
whatever growth that may be achieved in short spells may turn out to be iniquitous 
growth and may exacerbate the social and economic disparities in the society.”741  
While this utilitarian approach to democracy always informed Indian thinking, there are 
indications that it has grown stronger with time as its political system survived and 
thrived. In 1955, India’s Ambassador to the UN, V. K. Krishna Menon, had stressed the 
distinctiveness of his country’s political system, noting that “[w]e have emerged [as] the 
largest democracy in the world.”742 But in line with the larger philosophy of non-
alignment, Indian leaders at the time also recognized that democracy could assume a 
variety of shapes: the Indian one – parliamentary and liberal – was therefore one out of 
many possible and equally legitimate “democratic ways” to achieve the common 
objectives of social reform and economic progress. Speaking in Moscow, in 1955, Nehru 
                                                
740 Jan. 22, 2003, at International Parliamentary Conference to mark the Golden Jubilee of the Parliament 
of India: http://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9009.  
741 Nov. 11, L. Kadirgamar Memorial Lecture: Bhasin, IFR 2007, 1238. See also EAM Rao’s speech on 
Aug. 5, 1990, in Nepal:  “Democracy, human dignity and human rights are objectives which deserve to be 
pursued for their own sake. At the same time, they are the preconditions for peace, prosperity and 
development.” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 807. 
742 China’s population was larger than India’s at the time. Jun. 24, 1955, addressing the UN’s 10th 
anniversary commemoration, San Francisco: MEA, "FAR 1955," 122. 
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noted that “whatever shape that [socialistic] pattern [of progress] or democracy might 
take, it must lead to open access to knowledge and equal opportunity to all.”743  
This early, cautious and relativist identification with liberal democracy gradually gave 
way to a more confident approach, as many of the “other ways” collapsed at the global 
and regional levels over the following decades, even as India’s parliamentary and liberal 
model survived, successfully adapting to internal and external conditions. Over time, this 
incentivized more Indians to abandon the idea of democracy as a mere accident of 
history, and instead recognize a causal link between the specific nature of their pluralist 
institutions and the survival of their polity.  
Different claims have been made about the causes of this success, depending on 
ideological proclivities and different readings of history. After the late 1970s, however, 
democracy became increasingly Indian, as leaders started to refer to the model as having 
native roots on the subcontinent that pre-dated the British colonial period. While 
particularly prevalent in nationalist circles, this bold claim of democracy as a distinct 
Indian civilizational trait reflected the rising popularity of the system. In 1978, PM M. 
Desai thus emphasized that “long before the democracies of Ancient Greece, democratic 
states existed in Ancient India.”744 In 1990, the External Affairs Minister N. Rao referred 
to “our ancient democratic traditions” and to the “democratic republics that existed in 
                                                
743 MEA, "FAR 1955," 133. See also Vice-President of India, S. Radhakrishnan, while welcoming Soong 
Ching-ling, the Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China, to 
New Delhi on Dec. 17, 1955: “In 1911 Sun Yatsen …  formulated three principles – of nationalism, 
democracy and national solidarity, rights of the people and employment and opportunities for all. These 
ideals are accepted by us and we are trying to achieve them through parliamentary forms and processes.” 
MEA, "FAR 1955," 238.  
744  Feb. 6, 1978 in an address to the Sri Lankan parliament: “One of our ancient scriptures, the Rig Veda, 
outlines how a ruler was to be elected (…) The realization that every man has the right to freedom has been 
deeply ingrained in our people (…) The Greek concept of democracy embraced only the elite,” Bhasin, 
India-Sri Lanka v.1, 126. 
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this part of the world when Buddha as born and preached.”745 And in 2003, PM A. B. 
Vajpayee noted that “democracy has deep roots in India’s national ethos and our ancient 
culture, which teaches respect for divergent and even dissenting points of view.”746 
Whichever causes are privileged, the “idea of India” as a free and open society, anchored 
in a representative, parliamentary, federal and secular democracy, has been adopted as 
an uncontested article of faith by virtually every line of political thought, including by the 
Communist parties. The rising confidence with which Indian leaders and officials thus 
express their principled support for liberal democracy abroad is anchored in their 
experienced and exceptionalist recognition that India survived and thrived not in spite of, 
but because of this regime type.747  
Particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian leaders therefore started to 
boldly characterize liberal democracy as an inevitable system for all countries. In 1990, 
speaking in Kathmandu after Nepal had re-embraced multi-party democracy after more 
than 30 years, External Affairs Minister N. Rao thus observed that “one of the clearly 
discernible trends of the global changes has been the assertion by peoples of their 
fundamental democratic urges – their powerful desire to move on in the direction of 
multi-party systems of governance.”748  
This revived the dormant Nehruvian approach from the 1950s about humanity’s 
inclination to “freedom” and the long-term inevitability of political liberalization, as 
                                                
745 Speech at Nepal’s Council for World Affairs, Aug. 6, 1990: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 814. 
746 Jan. 22, 2003, at International Parliamentary Conference to mark the Golden Jubilee of the Parliament 
of India: http://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9009. 
747 In one of his last essays, strategist L. Subrahmanyam underlines this difference: “India, of roughly equal 
population to China, has proved that a developing country can grow rapidly without sacrificing either 
democracy or pluralism.” http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/907157/    
748 Aug. 6 1990: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 813. 
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reflected in Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee’s speech on the occasion of the celebration of 
the Indian parliament’s golden jubilee, in 2003: 
Just as the international community has cherished India’s successes along the path of democratic 
development since our Independence, we too have greatly valued the victorious march of democracy 
around the globe. The closing decades of the last century have seen totalitarian systems collapse. 
The dogmas that sustained dictatorships of various stripes, and advertised their superiority over 
democracy in development and human welfare, have crumbled. Coups, bloody power struggles and 
military take-overs have come to be seen as anathema to the ethos of our times.749 
India was now seen to have led the way in the “victorious march of democracy” 
worldwide. Reflecting such rising self-confidence and driven by a geopolitical 
rapprochement with the United States, India in the 2000s joined a variety of multilateral 
initiatives.  
In February 1999, the U.S. government-funded National Endowment for Democracy 
organized an international conference on “Building a Worldwide Movement for 
Democracy,” in New Delhi, leading to the foundation of the “World Movement for 
Democracy,” which was attended by the Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, External Affairs 
Minister J. Singh, Defense Minister G. Fernandes, and several other former Prime 
Ministers and ministers from different political parties.750 In June 2000, India along with 
United States became one of eight co-founders of the Community of Democracies, later 
also joining its Democracy Caucus. Finally, in July 2005, a joint proposal from India and 
the United States led to the creation of the United Nations Democracy Fund, of which 
New Delhi became a top contributor in subsequent years.751 
                                                
749 Jan. 22, 2003: http://archivepmo.nic.in/abv/speech-details.php?nodeid=9009. 
750 For the full event report, see “Global Movement for Democracy Launched,” in "News and Notes." 
Journal of Democracy 10, no. 2 (1999): 184-187. 
751 For a detailed overview of these initiatives, see Kate H. Sullivan, "Democracy Promotion and the 
Problem of Peaceful Coexistence: Exploring the ‘Democratic Diplomacy’ of India," in The Democratic 
Predicament: Cultural Diversity in Europe and India, ed. Jyotirmaya Tripathy and Sudarsan Padmanabhan 
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Similarly, the Indian government also geared its foreign policy to promote greater 
international dialogue on specific issues such as multi-party parliamentary procedures, 
managing free electoral systems, or decentralization through competitive federalism.752 
No longer seeing their democratic system as a burden or anomaly, Indian leaders began 
to refer to it as a superior and inevitable form of government for all countries. Prime 
Minister M. Singh, for example, thus noted in 2005 that “liberal democracy is the natural 
order of political organization in today’s world” and that “all alternate systems, 
authoritarian and majoritarian in varying degrees, are an aberration.”753 One year later, 
while addressing Parliament, he further emphasized that  “all nations of the world ...  will 
one day function on these very principles of liberal and pluralistic democracy.”754  
On the foreign policy front, this reinvigorated the liberal link that Nehru had traced 
between democracy, international security and peace. India’s strategic thinker K. 
Subrahmaniam had presciently noted, in 1981, that “the emergence of democratic India 
as a power in the international system would mean greater democratisation of that system 
and a shift of the global balance of forces in favour of liberal democratic values.”755 Such 
bold assumptions about the merits of a liberal order based on an inter-democratic peace, 
                                                                                                                                            
(London: Routledge, 2014); C. Raja Mohan, "Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with 
Democracy Promotion," The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2007). 
752 Many of these existed since the 1950s, e.g. parliamentary exchanges. But in the 2000s, the MEA began 
to use these more systematically as a foreign policy and soft power instrument to reach out to emerging 
democracies, assisting their transition processes. E.g. in 2007, the Indian government hosted the 4th 
international conference on federalism, for the first time in Asia, and in 2011 its Electoral Commission 
instituted the India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management: 
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/current/IIIDEM_Project_Document.pdf.  
753  Feb. 25, 2005, while speaking at the annual India Today conclave, in New Delhi: 
http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/content_print.php?nodeid=73&nodetype=2.  
754 May, 12, 2006: quoted in Baru, Accidental PM, 172. Similarly, EAM P. Mukherjee while speaking on PBS 
to Charlie Rose, on Oct. 2, 2007, referring to Myanmar: “I do believe no power can prevent the desire of 
the people. It may be delayed, but at some point of time, it will assert itself.” Bhasin, IFR 2007, 329. 
755 Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," 261. 
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and India’s interest in it, are now being increasingly articulated in Indian approaches to a 
variety of security issues, from freedom of navigation to the Internet as a public good. 
 
c) Neighborhood exceptionalism: the city in a swamp 
While India’s domestic experience and utilitarian understanding of democracy shape its 
perceptions of political structures in neighboring countries, this is not always clearly stated 
in public, depending on the specific country and state of bilateral relations. For example, 
when an overall positive relationship is in place with an authoritarian regime because of 
superior reasons of state, Indian officials will take special care to express their general 
preference for democracy in coded language, for example as “moderate regimes.”756  
Conversely, when Indian security interests are assessed to depend on a neighboring state’s 
political liberalization, favoring regime change there, leaders will bluntly refer to their 
own system as a superior model to be followed. For example, in 2007, as the Sri Lankan 
Army accelerated its military offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
Finance Minister P. C. Chidambaram underlined such exceptionalism in a lecture 
delivered in Colombo: 
In multi-cultural and plural societies, there is no model of governance better suited to reflect and 
respond to the needs and aspirations of the people than democracy … [it is important that the] 
political system recognizes the geographical or linguistic or ethnic divisions among the people and 
creates political institutions that will accommodate these differences … [but] the countries of 
South Asia, barring India, have still not resolved the fundamental question of the model of 
                                                
756 “moderate” as in democratic. Jan. 11, 2006 lecture by FS S. Saran, in Shanghai: “it is our belief that 
India’s national security interests are better served if our neighbours evolve as viable states with moderate 
and stable political and social environment and robust economies.” Quoted in Atish Sinha and Madhup 
Mohta, eds., Indian foreign policy: challanges and opportunities (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), 116. 
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governance that is suited to each of them; consequently, the [democratic] political institutions in 
these countries have not yet taken firm roots.757 
Whether expressed this candidly or more diplomatically, such an understanding is deeply 
ingrained in the Indian approach to the neighborhood, including among the most 
conservative and security-oriented sections in its military or intelligence apparatus. A 
senior retired official of the external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, 
who worked for decades in the neighborhood, thus notes: 
Unlike the pressure cooker effect in [the] USSR, [or] Yugoslavia, which eventually led to their 
fragmentation, India’s approach has proved sustainable because [it is] less hegemonic and 
dominant, more open, democratic, pluralist, [which] is reflected in the 6th, 7th and 8th Schedule of 
the Constitution of India  [providing various levels of autonomy for ethno-linguistic groups and 
tribal minorities]. Secularism and legal pluralist approach [are] a key issue in India’s success, 
and both Sri Lanka and Myanmar, and other neighbors, have been unable to understand this.758  
As laid out in detail in the following chapter (6), given the myriad of cross-border ethnic 
and cultural linkages in South Asia, Indian officials understand their own country’s 
security and domestic stability to be intrinsically tied to the willingness and capacity of 
neighboring states to replicate the Indian model: this means to achieve integration by 
embracing diversity and accommodating difference, instead of discriminating against it. 
Beyond just Indian security, political liberalization is therefore also broadly linked to 
regional security, as expressed in Foreign Secretary S. Saran’s 2005 observation that 
“democracy would provide a more enduring and broad-based foundation for an edifice of 
peace and cooperation in our sub-continent.”759  
                                                
757 Nov. 11: Bhasin, IFR 2007, 1238. 
758 P. Heblikar (Interview 047). For J. Prasad, who served as Indian ambassador to Kathmandu (2011-13), 
federalism in India facilitated a) social reform, b) decentralization, and c) ethnic integration. “But this is not 
always the case in neighboring countries, where majoritarianism and centralization prevail” (Interview 058). 
759 Feb. 14, speaking on “India and its neighbours,” Bhasin, IFR 2005, 335.  
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The reality since 1947, however, dictated that India has been mostly – and during long 
periods of time also exclusively – surrounded by illiberal neighboring regimes, whether 
military autocratic, royal absolutist, or ethno-nationalist majoritarian (Chapter 1 details 
this statistically). Scholar S. D. Muni underlines that as “each of India’s neighbors drifted 
into strategies of building a more sectarian state” this lead to “strong divergence between 
India and each of its neighbours with regard to state-building strategies.”760  
As a democratic city in an illiberal swamp, New Delhi’s policy-making circles faced a 
continuous security dilemma: engagement of such illiberal regimes could come at the 
price of cross-border unrest, while converse support for ethnic minorities or pro-
democracy forces across the border risked affecting relations with the prevalent regime. 
Referring to this quandary, strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam thus presciently 
observed, in 1986, that “either the Indian values of democracy, secularism, federalism 
and linguistic autonomy are going to make a headway in the neighbouring territories or, 
in the alternative, India is going to be [negatively] affected by the [illiberal] values in her 
neighbourhood.”761  
Part 1 of this Dissertation ascertained that India’s posture during crises in the periphery is 
based on strategic assessments focusing on the strength and attitude of the neighboring 
regime (dispensation), the country’s domestic stability (order) and its external alignment 
(geopolitics). However, as this chapter and the following one demonstrate, such assessments 
also focus on the neighboring country’s regime type, as India favors liberal regimes in 
principle, depending on a cost-benefit analysis in the short- and long-term. While it may 
                                                
760 Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 24-25. 
761 K. Subrahmanyam, "India and its Neighbours: a conceptual framework of peaceful co-existence," in 
India and its Neighbourhood, ed. U. S. Bajpai (New Delhi: Lancer, 1986), 123. 
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be an exaggeration to note that “India’s ideological coordinates as a multi-ethnic, multi-
religious, secular, democratic and plural state have guided its [foreign policy] behaviour” in 
the region, there are significant indications that these coordinates have at least influenced 
Indian behavior.762  
Looking back at his career as Foreign Secretary, M. Dubey recalls that this causal 
preference is anchored in a vital concern about India’s own security: 
What happens to any of the pluralistic societies in its neighbourhood seriously affects India’s 
ability to hold its own pluralistic society together. India should [therefore] make every possible 
effort to ensure that the pluralistic character of society is preserved in its neighbourhood. …[For 
example], secular forces in neighbouring countries should receive India’s full support.763 
The liberal dimension in Indian strategic thought thus being apparent, the question arises 
to what extent it also affects Indian strategic practice. Under what conditions does India’s 
principled and causal preference for liberal regimes influence its assessments and posture 
during crises in the neighborhood? The following chapter (6) examines the main source of 
such influence – governmental decision-making processes – by returning to our case 
studies. The remaining part of this chapter goes on to examine a secondary, indirect 
source of influence: the socio-political environment in which decision-making operates. 
 
2. Liberal Environment: Open Society’s Indirect Influences 
Before re-examining whether and how the liberal dimension in India’s strategic thought 
directly affects involvement in neighborhood crises (Chapter 6), we turn to the domestic 
environment in which decision-making operates. Does India’s open society – with its 
                                                
762 Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 26. 
763 Muchkund Dubey, India's Foreign Policy: Coping With The Changing World (New Delhi: Pearson, 2013), 47, 
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freedom of expression and democratic institutions – indirectly influence the government’s 
assessments and posture? The state-society division adopted here is artificial but 
heuristically necessary to understand whether the liberal dimension in strategic thought is 
strictly endogenous to Indian bureaucratic and other elites, or if it has wider roots in civil 
society.764 Three domestic processes appear conducive to influence India’s foreign policy.  
First, even when New Delhi abstains from taking a liberal posture, illiberal regimes in the 
neighborhood are bound to perceive the Indian state’s democratic identity as a threat, 
affecting their own assessments and postures. A large number of democratic and minority 
leaders across the region have, right from the anti-colonial freedom struggle, been 
inspired by India and its democratic model, including the Nepali Congress in Nepal, the 
Federal Party and Tamil United Liberation Front in Sri Lanka, or Burmese leaders like U 
Nu and Aung San Suu Kyi.  
Similarly, ethno-linguistic minorities in Nepal (Madhesis), in Sri Lanka (Tamils) and in 
Myanmar (Chin and Nagas) have often looked up to their co-ethnics on the Indian side of 
the border for inspiration. Over the decades, India has attracted an extraordinary 
diversity of political refugees and turned into the default safe haven for persecuted 
dissenters from across the region.765 Ambassador Arvind Deo, who served in Nepal in the 
                                                
764 For an overview of the role of parliament, public opinion, and the media in foreign policy-making 
during 1970s, see chapters 6 and 7 in Tharoor, Reasons of state: political development and India's foreign policy under 
Indira Gandhi, 1966-1977. 
765 Besides Tamils from Sri Lanka, democrats and other minority activists from Burma and Nepal, such 
refugee populations hosted by India also include Tibetans, Afghans and Hindus from Bangladesh. In the 
1980s, Pakistani activists of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy also found refuge in India. For 
India’s refugee law, in particular affecting Chinese Tibetans and Sri Lankan Tamils, see Mike Anderson, 
"The Role of International Law in Defining the Protection of Refugees in India," Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 33, no. 1 (2015).  
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late 1990s, thus notes that the “intricate maze of [cross-border ethnic] relationships is at 
once a source of strength as, at times, a cause for complications in our bilateral context.766  
Commenting on the consequent fear of “Indian contamination,” strategic analyst K. 
Subrahmanyam observed that “when our neighbours use the terms hegemony and 
expansionism they are in reality expressing their fears about the ideas of representative 
Government, federal structure, linguistic autonomy and secularism spreading to their 
states.”767 In the 1980s, as India was exclusively surrounded by illiberal states, scholar 
Nancy Jetly exhorted New Delhi to recognize such concerns, however unfounded: 
India’s relative internal stability, underscored by its secular federal democratic polity, is an 
exception in the region … [and, therefore, India is seen as] a source of threat for the regimes in 
these countries which are facing problems of political legitimacy … Increasing demands for 
democratization from their own organized political parties leads the ruling elites to perceive 
India’s democratic structure itself as being a destabilizing factor in their internal politics. This 
fear – real or perceived – would remain regardless [of Indian action]. … the degree of anti-
Indian hysteria tends to vary in direct proportion to the degree of suppression of democratic urges 
within these countries768 
Despite adopting a restrained position of engagement, Indian governments are therefore 
often still targeted by illiberal regimes that rake up anti-India sentiments to consolidate 
their support base. Referring in 2005 implicitly to Nepal, which had just witnessed a 
coup, Foreign Secretary S. Saran qualified it as “unhelpful” when the “display of narrow 
nationalism based on hostility towards India … becomes a cover for [a neighboring 
government’s] failure to deliver on promises made to their own peoples.”769 
                                                
766 Arvind Deo, "South Asian Neighbours," World Focus 12, no. 143-144 (1991): 29. 
767 He goes on to predict that the “appeal of the Indian democratic model and the success of its experiment 
in pluralism … [will] hurt the parochial interest of the elites holding power in those [neighbouring] 
countries.” Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," 244-5, 48. 
768 Nancy Jetly, "India and the Domestic Turmoil in South Asia," in Domestic Conflicts in South Asia: Political 
Dimensions, ed. Urmila Phadnis (New Delhi: South Asia Books, 1986), 67-8. 
769 Feb. 14: Bhasin, IFR 2005, 335. 
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Second, India’s civil society plays an increasingly influential role in foreign policy 
decision-making, lobbying the government to support democratization or minority rights 
in neighboring countries.770 While the political salience of India’s “external relations” 
remains overall low, the booming private media sector since the 1990s has drawn new 
attention to India’s foreign policy, most notably by increasing incentives for political 
parties to address high-visibility issues, whether it is the plight of Tamil minority in Sri 
Lanka, in 2009, or that of the protesting monks in Myanmar, in 2007.771 Given the rising 
role of the media in influencing Indian foreign policy, N. Sarna, the longest-ever serving 
spokesperson of the MEA, in the 2000s, refers to it as a “behemoth [that] needs to be fed 
with information at regular intervals. It cannot go hungry. If one party does not feed it, 
the other will.”772 
Finally, the rising role of regional parties in India’s new era of coalition politics has 
emerged as another channel of indirect influence on the Indian government to adopt 
more liberal postures. While such regional pressures are not entirely new, and were often 
reflected internally within the governing Congress party until the 1980s, their 
formalization gave them an unprecedented leverage – and even veto-power – on Indian 
foreign policy since the 1990s.773 S. Baru, a former media advisor to the Indian Prime 
                                                
770 See chapter by Paul Staniland, Vipin Narang, and Rudra Chaudhuri on parliament, states, elections, 
coalitions, of Rajiv Kumar  on the private sector, of Manoj Joshi  on the media, and of Devesh Kapur, 
Amithabh Mattoo and Rory Medcalf on universities, think tanks, and public opinion in David Malone et 
al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 205-311. 
771 On “the low electoral salience of foreign policy and the high encapsulation of the central foreign affairs 
and defense bureaucracies” see Narang and Staniland, "Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign 
Security Policy." On the MEA’s new public diplomacy efforts: Ian Hall, "India's New Public Diplomacy," 
Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (2012). 
772 Navtej Sarna, "Media and diplomacy," in Indian foreign policy: challanges and opportunities, ed. Atish Sinha 
and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), 1147. 
773 On the 1950s, for example, Nehru’s tradition to brief regional chief-ministers through fortnightly letters 
on foreign policy matters should be seen more as a voluntary and pedagogic effort, rather than attempt to 
pre-empt their pressures: Madhav Khosla, ed. Letters for a nation: from Jawaharlal Nehru to his chief ministers, 
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Minister, thus observes that “with the decline of large pan-Indian national political parties 
and the emergence of fractured coalitions, [the] difference between political parties on …  
foreign policy, is bound to grow.”774 
How have these domestic forces and processes influenced India’s strategic practice 
towards its neighboring countries? Unlike with strategic thought in decision-making 
(examined in the following chapter), their effect is indirect and, therefore, more difficult to 
measure. A cursory examination of our case studies reveals, however, reveals a 
considerable influence. 
 
a) Nepal: civil society and political activism across an open border 
India’s policy towards Nepal has been profoundly shaped by deep and historic 
connections between both countries’ civil societies. Nepal’s main party – the Nepali 
Congress (NC) – was founded in 1947, in India, where most of its leaders were inspired 
by the Indian National Congress and participated in its freedom struggle against British 
colonialism. Since the early 1940s, NC leaders such as B. P. Koirala maintained close 
links to progressive Indian leaders such as Jayaprakash Narayan and Rammanohar 
Lohia. In 1947, contravening the Indian government’s decision not to support the NC’s 
rebellion against the Rana autocracy, Indian activist such as Biju Patnaik assisted rebels 
                                                                                                                                            
1947-1963 (New Delhi: Penguin, 2014). See also Appadorai, The domestic roots of India's foreign policy, 1947-
1972; Nalini K. Jha, Domestic Imperatives in India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: South Asian, 2002). 
774 Sanjaya Baru, "The Influence of Business and Media on Indian Foreign Policy," India Review 8, no. 3 
(2009): 282. For a critical view on how “India’s federal structure and the contemporary reality of coalition 
governments ensures that decisions are not outcomes of a rational calculation by the Indian government, 
but political resultants of the interplay of stakeholders’ interests”: Pai, The Paradox of Proximity: India's Approach 
to Fragility in the Neighbourhood, 13. 
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with weapons sent by Burmese Prime Minister Aung San.775 By offering their Nepalese 
counterparts support and pressuring their own government, Indian political parties and 
activists played an influential role in Nepal’s liberalization of the 1950s. 
After the royal coup of 1960, there are significant indications that Indian domestic 
support for Nepalese democrats strained Nehru’s attempts to engage King Mahendra. 
Referring in parliament to the former PM B. P. Koirala, who had begun a hunger strike 
under detention, Nehru underlined that Indians were “distressed for the larger reason 
that wherever such a thing occurs we would be distressed, and for some personal reasons 
also, personal in the sense that Shri Koirala was a comrade of ours in our own Indian 
struggle for independence.”776  
As the Nepali Congress went into exile across Northern India to pursue an armed 
struggle against the monarchical regime, New Delhi soon proved unable to curtail its 
activities, which delayed bilateral normalization with Kathmandu. The Indian Prime 
Minister faced continued pressure, including from his own party, to support the NC 
rebels with weapons, ammunition and logistics in their quest to return the kingdom to 
democratic rule. 777  J. P. Narayan thus wrote two “strong letters” expressing his 
“displeasure” at Nehru’s lack of support for NC rebels and dismissed Nehru’s 
pragmatism: “to support a democratic movement which is struggling for the end of 
dynastic rule in foreign nation is just and natural.”778 
                                                
775 Bimal Prasad, "Jayaprakash Narayan and Nepal," in Nepal in transition: a way forward, ed. D. P. Tripathi 
(New Delhi: Vij 2011), 134. 
776 MEA, "FAR 1961," 124. 
777 See parliamentary debates and specific demands in Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 423-28.  
778 Quoted in Prasad, "Jayaprakash," 135-6. 
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When the Nepalese government accused India of instigating and arming the rebels, 
Nehru retorted with a professed incapacity to reign them in, given India’s democratic 
system: “It is a little difficult for other countries, which have not got the rule of law, to 
understand this [Nepalese rebels operating under Indian law], just like the Chinese who 
seem to imagine that we can issue orders to all our newspapers to do this or that – which 
is ridiculous – because they can do so”.779  
Beyond incapacity, however, internal assessments indicate that the Indian government 
may also have been partially unwilling to take stronger measure against the Nepalese 
rebels, possibly in order to deflect domestic pressures and to also use them as leverage in 
negotiations with the Nepalese regime.780 It is difficult to ascertain the intensity of the NC 
rebels as spoiler effect in bilateral relations, but they were significant enough for King 
Mahendra to remain concerned even after they called off their armed struggle, in 1962.781  
While aligned with New Delhi’s posture favoring a liberal regime change during the crises 
of 1990 and 2005-06, Indian domestic activism played a facilitating role. As the pro-
democracy Jana Andolan movement took on to the streets of Kathmandu, in early 1990, 
several members of the Indian parliament, including from the ruling coalition, rushed to 
Nepal to join the protests in a competitive expression of solidarity. In January 1990, for 
example, the Nepali Congress held a major pro-democracy convention, in open defiance 
of King Birendra, which was attended by prominent Indian political leaders, including 
                                                
779 See also deputy EAM L. Menon before parliament, on March 16, 1962: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 427-8. 
780 See also the internal brief by Joint Secrretary K. L. Mehta, on Feb. 12, 1962, to all heads of mission: “as 
long as the Nepalese activities in India remain peaceful and within the purview of our laws, we could not 
proceed against them,” NAI, MEA HI/1012(27)/63 pp. 254-56. 
781 In Nov. 1964, King Mahendra complains to the Indian ambassador, during their first meeting. The 
ambassador then proceeds to meet the Governors and Chief-Ministers of the border states of Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal to seek their support in curtailing the NC rebel activities: Narayan, India 
and Nepal, 6-7. 
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Chandra Shekhar (Janata Dal) and Subramanian Swamy (Janata Party), both from the 
ruling coalition, as well as H. Singh Surjit (CPI-M), M. Farooqi (CPI), and M. J. Akbar 
(INC), from the opposition.782 In the most ironic twist, the retired Indian General S. K. 
Sinha had also planned to attend but cancelled and then changed his supportive stance 
after being invited by PM V. P. Singh to become India’s ambassador to Nepal.783 
Despite governmental efforts to normalize the bilateral relationship, and to convince its 
coalition parliamentarians not to get involved, such informal links emboldened the 
Nepalese democratic movement and reduced the Indian government’s legitimacy to 
support King Birendra. PM V. P. Singh and EAM I. K. Gujral thus managed to convince 
Finance Minister Madhu Dandavate not to visit Kathmandu, but failed to do so with 
Chandra Shekhar, who saw this as an opportunity to demarcate his position from the 
government’s engagement policy.784  
Finally, during the 2005-06 crisis, Indian parliamentarians and political leaders, especially 
from the Communist parties, who were then part of PM M. Singh’s coalition 
government, played an important role in Nepal’s regime change by facilitating an 
understanding between the democratic parties and the Maoist insurgents. 785 
                                                
782  Parajulee, Democratic Transition, 205-6. D. P. Tripathi recalls he visited Nepal as R. Gandhi’s “special 
envoy,” with a letter of support for G. Man Singh and K. P. Bhattarai: Tripathi, Nepal in transition, 183. 
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political liberalization in Nepal, expecting this to benefit bilateral economic relations and commercial 
interests in their constituencies close to the border Bhasin, Nepal-India v.3, 2008 and following. 
783 Sinha, Soldier Recalls, 341-2. 
784 Muni, India and Nepal, 166-7. On Nepalese perception of this Indian support, see PM K. P. Bhattarai’s 
speech, in June 1990, while being conferred an honorary doctorate by Delhi University: Bhasin, Nepal-India 
v.1, 793. 
785 S. D. Muni recalls the particular influence of D. P. Tripathi (NCP), Sita Ram Yechury (CPI-M), and 
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Parliamentarian D. P. Tripathi (NCP), for example, created the “Nepal Democracy 
Solidarity Committee” with representatives from all major parties except the BJP, and 
recalls attending an opposition conference in Kathmandu, in July 2005, where he 
declared support on behalf of the Indian government because his party supported the 
ruling coalition. As a friend of Maoist leader B. Bhattarai since their student days at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, in New Delhi, Tripathi and others enabled meetings 
between Nepalese and Indian Communist parties, on the one hand, and also with the 
Nepalese Maoists, on the other hand.786 
However, while the large majority of Indian political parties and activists consistently 
supported Nepal’s democratization during each of these crises, there have also been 
contrary influences from conservatives supporting the preservation of a Hindu monarchy 
in the neighboring country. After the 1960 coup, for example, King Mahendra received 
the visits of M. Digvijaya Nath (All-India Hindu Mahasabha) and M. S. Golwalkar 
(Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), who expressed their support for the “world’s only 
Hindu kingdom.”787 Similarly, during the 2005 crisis, the BJP refused to condemn King 
Gyanendra’s coup, with Vishwa Hindu Parishad leader Ashok Singhal visiting 
Kathmandu to express support for the isolated “Hindu monarchy.”788 This suggests that 
while mostly liberal, India’s civil society can occasionally also exert significant illiberal 
pressures to support autocratic or ethno-nationalist regimes abroad. 
                                                
786 Tripathi, Nepal in transition, 184-5. 
787 See the concerned Indian Embassy report from Kathmandu, Feb. 1963: NAI, MEA HI/1012(27)/63 
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b) Sri Lanka: ethnic solidarity and electoral competition 
Regional influences on India’s decision-making process are particularly visible in the case 
of Sri Lanka, where right from the 1950s New Delhi’s posture was shaped by electoral 
competition in its bordering state of Tamil Nadu. In the late 1950s, for example, PM J. 
Nehru was repeatedly forced to address criticism from Tamil parliamentarians about the 
fate of the stateless Tamils in Ceylon, both from within his party as well as from 
opposition and regional parties.789  
Despite being firmly in power in the state of Madras (renamed Tamil Nadu in 1969), first 
under Chief Minister K. Kamaraj (1954-63), and then under M. Bakthavatsalam (1963-
67), the Indian National Congress (INC) faced the rising opposition from the regionalist 
opposition party DMK. In the early 1960s, its leader C. N. Annadurai began referring to 
Ceylon to criticize the Indian government and distinguish his party as the prime defender 
of Tamil culture. This was often done in opposition to the governing INC, which he 
accused of neglecting South India, and the Tamils, in particular. In one such instance, in 
1964, the EAM S. S. Singh did not mince words in denouncing Annadurai’s electoral 
motives: “the distinguished leader of a group like the D.M.K. … may have his eyes on the 
General Elections and he may be thinking of using this [Tamils in Ceylon] as a big lever 
for his election campaigns in Madras State but as a member of the Government, I have to 
take a more realistic view.”790  
                                                
789 See e.g. parliament debate, Dec. 9, 1958: MEA, "FAR 1958," 319. 
790 Dec. 23, in parliament: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1964," (New Delhi 1965), 312-3. 
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The 1980s illustrate how the domestic environment constrained the Indian government 
to take on a more liberal posture in its foreign policy towards Sri Lanka. Beyond 
determinant strategic assessments (analyzed in Chapters 3 and 6), there are strong 
indications that PM I. Gandhi’s decision to pressure Sri Lanka after the 1983 ethnic riots 
was influenced by domestic compulsions, given that both general and state elections were 
scheduled for late 1984 in Tamil Nadu.  
The two rival regional parties in the state had, from the late 1970s onwards, competitively 
championed the cause of their Tamil co-ethnics in Sri Lanka. For example, after ethnic 
riots in August 1977, the Tamil Nadu Assembly had passed a unanimous resolution 
expressing its “rude shock” and asking the Indian government to send a representative 
and start an inquiry in Sri Lanka.791 Such competition spiraled quickly out of control: in 
the early 1980s, CM M. G. Ramachandran confessed both his inability and unwillingness 
to close down training camps for Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents located in his state, 
because he feared that his opposition rival M. Karunanidhi could exploit such move as a 
“betrayal” of the Tamil cause.792 
When the “Black July” riots engulfed Sri Lanka, in 1983, it therefore became paramount 
for New Delhi to express solidarity and support in order to pre-empt any accusations of 
neglect and to achieve electoral success. On July 27, 1983, as it convened for the first time 
after the riots, the Indian parliament was thus immediately taken over by a shrill debate, 
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with representatives from all parties asking the government to take punitive actions 
against Colombo, including a possible military intervention.793  
Parliamentarian Subramanian Swamy demanded that the Indian Army prepare an 
expeditionary force to rescue the Sri Lankan Tamils, while others exhorted the Indian 
government to take the issue up at the United Nations, to call back the Indian High 
Commissioner to Sri Lanka, to expel the Sri Lankan High Commissioner from India, or 
to approve a condemnatory resolution. The cross-partisan consensus was indicated by 
support even from Leftist parliamentarians, with Chitta Basu denouncing Colombo’s 
“pro-Western” policies, amidst repeated references to a “massacre”, “genocide” and 
“holocaust” of Tamils in Sri Lanka.794 
The Sri Lankan High Commissioner in New Delhi at the time, B. Tilakaratna, recalls 
that the Indian government’s reaction was shaped by electoral considerations, as PM 
Indira Gandhi’s “greater concern was appeasing Tamil Nadu.”795 The riots’ specific 
timing did, indeed, serve PM I. Gandhi’s immediate political interests, but as India got 
involved in Sri Lanka as a mediator over the following year, domestic demands soon also 
veered towards criticism, accusing her of not doing enough in defense of the Tamil 
minority.796  
In 1984, the Sri Lankan President Jayewardene thus recalls the Indian Prime Minister 
suggesting that “it might be a good idea to stretch the [Sri Lankan] negotiations until 
                                                
793 For the parliament debates from July 27 until late August 1983, see Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1468-557. 
794 Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1470, 81, 83. 
795 Bernard Tilakaratna, "The Sri Lanka Government and peace efforts up to the Indo-Sri Lanka accord: 
Lessons and experiences," in Negotiating peace in Sri Lanka: efforts, failures, and lessons, ed. Rupesinghe Kumar 
(Colombo: Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006), 50. 
796 See e.g. the parliament debate on May 7, 1984. V. Gopalsamy to EAM N. Rao: “your humanitarian 
flag was flying sky high in 1971. What happened to this humanitarian flag? Why it is a half-mast now?” 
Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1589. 
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after the Indian elections,” until later that year or early 1985, to avoid controversial 
decisions that may affect the campaign in Tamil Nadu.797 Even while no longer alive to 
witness it, Indira Gandhi’s electoral calculus eventually paid off, as the Indian National 
Congress government won an unprecedented majority in the national elections of 
December 1984, and also emerged victorious to form a regional coalition government in 
Tamil Nadu.798   
However, in the long term, her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi would become 
profoundly constrained by these domestic forces. Emboldened by PM I. Gandhi’s 
assertive stance after 1983, Tamil Nadu’s regional government and political parties 
became more actively involved in shaping India’s Sri Lanka policy, whether by hosting 
various Tamil insurgent groups, facilitating negotiations between them, or pressuring 
New Delhi to escalate its involvement.799 Despite its parliamentary majority, after 1985 
the Indian government thus came under increasing attack from Tamil and other 
representatives. Parliamentarian S. S. Veghela (BJP) denounced that “it is not the Rama 
of Ramayana [Jayewardene] who set Sri Lanka on fire, but the wrong policies of 
[inactivity of] this Government,” while Tamil parliamentarian J. Jayalalitha (AIADMK) 
emphasized that “we act not like doves of peace but like lame ducks” and “should give a 
proper military chastisement to Sri Lanka and teach them a lesson once and for all.”800  
                                                
797 De Silva and Wriggins, Jayewardene v.2, 759. 
798 State elections held on Dec. 4, 1984: M. G. Ramachandran re-elected with victory of the AIADMK and 
INC alliance, which secures an absolute majority of 195 out of 234 total seats in the regional assembly. 
799 Apr. 1984: Opposition DMK leader M. Karunanidhi invites representatives of the five main Tamil 
organizations to Chennai to form a common front, after which the EPRLF, EROS and TELO announce 
the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF): http://www.sangam.org/articles/view2/?uid=819. On Apr. 
23, 1985, and all-party Tamil Nadu delegation led by its Chief Minister, M. G. Ramachandran, meets PM 
R. Gandhi to pressures him to support Tamil insurgents. 
800 March 14, 1985: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 200-3. On Feb. 27, 1986, J. Singh (BJP), called the Indian 
government “responsible for the deteriorating situation in SL” because it “contributed towards the 
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Beyond immediate electoral compulsions, India’s foreign policy towards Sri Lanka 
gradually turned into a domestic issue, on which the government could not even afford 
the mere appearance of backtracking. When, in May 1987, the Tamil Nadu government 
publically announced a large funding package for two Tamil insurgent organizations, the 
Indian government thus kept mum.801 
The salience of this regional dimension is further highlighted by the Tamil Nadu 
government’s crucial role in facilitating Indian outreach efforts and negotiations with the 
insurgent organizations, without which the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka agreement could not 
have been reached.802 Just three days after it was signed, PM R. Gandhi thus travelled to 
Tamil Nadu, reassuringly observing that its provisions “went well beyond the initial 
demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils … [giving them] regional autonomy comparable to 
state governments in India.”803  
The regional parties’ increasing leverage, and even veto-power in the era of coalition 
governments, further constrained the Indian government in 2009, as Sri Lanka launched 
a military offensive and finally defeated the Tamil insurgency. There are significant 
indications that India’s posture of engagement towards Colombo, supporting its military 
                                                                                                                                            
imposition of a ceasefire during which firing never actually ceases,” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 1714. In 
May, 1987, parliamentarians reiterated demands for military action: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1886-9.  
801 On May 26, 1987, Tamil Nadu’s Chief-Minister M. G. Ramachandran extended a financial grant of Rs. 
4 crore to Sri Lankan insurgent organizations LTTE and EROS. Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 91-2. His 
minister P. Ramachandran recalls that a special fund was set up to administer this grant, which was 
publically announced in order to mobilize political support for the regional government (Interview 031). 
Another estimate notes that M. G. Ramachandran may have disbursed a total Rs. 20 crore to various 
insurgent organizations between 1983 and 1987: Gunaratna, Indian intervention, 418. 
802 This influence is recalled by P. Ramachandran, at the time a minister in the regional government led by 
M. G. Ramachandran, serving as the contact person for several Prime Ministers and other central 
authorities seeking to bring Tamil Nadu on board. He prepared and also partially attended the crucial 
meetings between PM R. Gandhi and LTTE leader T. V. Prabhakaran, in July 1987, as well as some of the 
Cabinet Security Committee meetings on Sri Lanka (Interview 031). 
803 Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.4, 1979. 
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offensive and the defeat of the LTTE, was constrained by the regional party DMK’s vital 
support to the ruling UPA coalition after 2004. The DMK also held power in Tamil 
Nadu after 2006, under Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi, who was continuously briefed 
on India’s Sri Lanka policy by the Indian National Security Adviser and Foreign 
Secretary, who shuttled between New Delhi, Chennai and Colombo.804  
Competitive politics between the DMK and the AIADMK, at the regional level, and the 
DMK’s effective veto-power on the governing coalition in New Delhi, exerted 
considerable pressures during the final phase of the war, in 2008-2009.805 Foreign 
Secretary S. S. Menon thus recognizes that while India did not formally request the Sri 
Lankan government to delay its final offensive until after elections were held in Tamil 
Nadu, on May 13, 2009, “that expectation was naturally understood and followed by Sri 
Lanka.”806 One day after the election results were announced in India, returning the 
Indian National Congress to power, the Sri Lankan Army launched its final military 
offensive, which killed the LTTE leader T. V. Prabhakaran, on May 19. 
 
c) Burma/Myanmar: civil society’s deep reach into the state 
The extent to which domestic forces affected India’s foreign policy posture is also 
reflected in New Delhi’s conflicted attempts to normalize relations with Myanmar in the 
early 1990s. Despite the Prime Minister’s clear instructions, in 1991, to engage the 
                                                
804 See e.g. Bhasin, IFR 2006, 895-6. 
805 For specific instances, see Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1874; Narayan Swamy, Tiger Vanquished, 160-2. 
Indian Express editor S. Gupta also alludes to these pressures, alleging that T. V. Prabhakaran was killed with 
Indian assistance only after elections were held: http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1192670/ 
806 Interview 078. 
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neighboring military junta, the Indian state virtually split on the issue, as many cabinet 
members and state officials continued to support Burmese pro-democracy forces. 
Right after the pro-democracy protests of 1988, Indian civil society organized to support 
political liberalization in Burma, with the participation of several political leaders, both 
from the ruling coalition and the opposition. The ruling party’s All India Congress 
Committee adopted resolution in support of Burmese democratic movement and later 
that year, former diplomat and future President K. R. Narayanan became the first 
chairperson of the India-Burma Friendship Society. The attendees of its June 20, 1990 
meeting, just after the Burmese military had overruled its parliamentary election result, 
reflects the organization’s wide and cross-partisan support base: P. N. Haksar (former 
adviser to PM I. Gandhi, from the INC), George Fernandes, Jaswant Singh and 
Yashwant Sinha (all parliamentarians and future ministers of defence and external affairs 
of the BJP), Chandra Shekhar (parliamentarian of the ruling coalition and future Prime 
Minister), and also several leaders of the Communist parties.807  
Besides ideological motivations, such support was often widely rooted in personal 
experiences, as many participating leaders had been born in colonial Burma but forced to 
leave after the Burmanization policies of the 1950s, or expelled after the military regime 
took over in 1962. Several crucial personalities in the Indian lobby thus had personal links 
to Burma, and sometimes evoked these when publically supporting democracy in Burma: 
President R. Venkataraman’s wife had been born and raised in Burma; Communist 
leader Prakash Karat (CPI-ML) had been born in Burma and left in 1957; and Vice-
                                                
807IDEA, Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses (Stockholm: 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001), 109. 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/the-doublespeak-spin/210508, 
http://www.burmanet.org/bnn_archives/1995/bnn052395.txt  
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President K. R. Narayanan (1992-1997, then President until 2002) was married to a 
former Burmese citizen.808 These “Burmese Indian” returnees and their associational 
networks thus served to mobilize support and played, at the least, an irritant role in the 
bilateral relationship.809 Several examples demonstrate how deep this social network 
reached into India’s state institutions, and how it managed to sabotage the government’s 
efforts to improve relations with Myanmar’s military junta.  
First, in 1992, President R. Venkataraman ignored diplomatic protocol to publically 
chastise Myanmar’s generals while reluctantly accepting the credentials of their new 
ambassador to India.810 The declarations were seen in Yangon as a “very bad move”, 
hampering the envoy’s mission to normalize and “heal the relationship”.811 Myanmar’s 
ambassador, U Wynn Lwin, recalls he felt like “a sitting duck in a [political] tsunami,” 
with regular demonstrations held in front of his embassy and his almost complete 
isolation from Indian authorities.  
Second, influential voices of the ruling party, the Indian National Congress, kept 
attending public meetings in support of democracy in Burma throughout the 1990s, 
which was not well received in Yangon. For example, in 1992, the future minister of 
External Affairs, K. N. Singh, attended meeting of India-Burma Friendship Society, and 
                                                
808 Compiled from various open sources and interviews. 
809 For their associational life, see Renaud Egreteau, "Burmese Indians in contemporary Burma: heritage, 
influence, and perceptions since 1988," Asian Ethnicity 12, no. 1 (2011). 
810  Feb. 3, 1992: http://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/1992/02/07/indian-president-
urges-myanmar-government-to-restore-democracy&post_id=40701, see also  
http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199805/msg00229.html  
811 Myanmar’s ambassador in New Delhi, U Wynn Lwin (Interview 60). 
	  
	   303	  
spoke in favor of recalling the Indian ambassador and cutting diplomatic relations with 
Myanmar.812  
Third, civil society pressures also succeeded in delaying prosecution against two Burmese 
pro-democracy activists who had highjacked a Thai aircraft to India.813 Burmese exiled 
pro-democracy activists were supported by Indian government members and politicians, 
and, in 1992, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma was allowed to 
open a representation in New Delhi despite being outlawed in Myanmar.814  
Finally, in 1995, the lobby pulled its greatest coup, forcing the Indian government to 
deliver its Jawaharlal Nehru Prize for International Understanding to pro-democracy 
icon A. S. Suu Kyi (of the NLD), then under house arrest in Yangon.815 The Award 
commission was headed by Vice-President K. R. Narayanan, who went on to attend the 
public conferral ceremony, in November.816 Officially, the announcement underlined 
Suu Kyi’s “brave, non-violent and unyielding struggle for freedom, democracy and 
human dignity.817 Interviews with various government officials reflect that the May 
announcement caught the Indian Prime Minister by surprise. At the same time, 
Myanmar’s junta was also taken aback, as expressed in a blunt media interview by its 
                                                
812 Nov. 6: Soe Myint, Burma File: a Question of Democracy (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), 514-5.  
813  For details, see http://www.burmanet.org/bnn_archives/1995/bnn052395.txt. For the Indian 
government’s official statement: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1990," (New Delhi 1991), 235-6.   
814 By 1993 there were an estimated 14,000 Burmese “political exiles” in India: Rita Manchanda, 
"Diplomacy: Reasons of state," Far Eastern Economic Review 156, no. 18 (1993). On Indian governmental 
support, see Myint, Burma file, 250-90; Haksar, Rogue agent, 150-8. 
815 The Award (for 1993) was announced on May 8. The Award is managed by the Indian Council for 
Cultural Relations, part of the Ministry of External Affairs. 
816 Nov. 14, in New Delhi. His speech refers to Suu Kyi as an “authentic heroine of freedom and 
democracy”: http://krnarayanan.in/html/speeches/others/democracy_14nov1995.htm  
817 MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1995," (New Delhi 1996), 116. 
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ambassador to India, U Wynn Lwin.818 The deliberate timing of the announcement also 
lead Myanmar to pull out of a joint counter-insurgency operation across the border, to 
Indian military officials’ great discontent 819  
Recalling the impact of such domestic pressures, R. Bhatia, then in charge of the 
Myanmar desk at the Ministry of External Affairs, recalls that the government was forced 
to adopt a conflicted “two-track track” policy, seeking to “extend moral and political 
support to the democratic forces and leaders, and … also engage [the] military 
government in order to improve and upgrade government-to-government relations.” 
Bhatia recalls co-authoring a policy paper with G. Parthasarathy, J. N. Dixit, and P. M. 
S. Malik, which was cleared by the Prime Minister: “a calibrated and complex initiative 
to balance principles, values, interests and geopolitical realities.”820 However, despite such 
balancing attempts to accommodate domestic criticism, he recalls that this dual policy 
was subjected to continued “pressures and counter-pressures” from an internal “liberal 
lobby and supporters of democracy,” on the one hand, and “realists [that pressed] for 
giving up the pro-democracy track,” on the other hand.821  
India’s domestic lobby for democracy in Burma would continue to hamper the 
government’s effort to normalize relations throughout the 1990s. In early 1993, Foreign 
Secretary J. N. Dixit (1992-96), the greatest advocate of normalization, made the first 
                                                
818 K. N. Singh, who was part of the Award selection committee at the time, recalls that K. R. Narayanan 
made the announcement without consulting the Prime Minister, which lead to tensions between both, as 
PM N. Rao was “visibly upset [because] he was caught by surprise” (Interview 075). For Myanmar 
Ambassador U Wynn Lwin’s reaction:   http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/more-importance-
has-been-attached-to-the-prize-to-suu-kyii-than-bilateral-rela/200484 
819 Egreteau, Wooing the generals: India's new Burma policy, 152-3; Shailendra K. Agnihotri and B. Datta-Ray, 
eds., Perspective of security and development in North East India (New Delhi: Concept, 2002), 289. 
820 Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 101-2. 
821 Bhatia, India-Myanmar, 102. While at the MEA’s Policy Planning Division (1992-95), Deb Mukharji 
recalls writing a note suggesting quick normalization with Myanmar’s Junta, which, however, was received 
with little enthusiasm (Interview 056). 
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official outreach visit to Yangon. Reflecting concern about internal pressures, the 
Ministry of External Affairs made efforts to keep the visit as confidential as possible.822  
The pro-democracy lobby’s deep reach into state institutions was also personified by G. 
Fernandes, who despite becoming Defence Minister in 1998, continued to support 
Burma’s pro-democracy movement and harbor its exiled activists at his official residence, 
in New Delhi. Even as part of the ruling government coalition, in 1998, his party thus 
vowed “to support the democracy movement in Burma in all forms and aspects ... there 
will never be any change in that in so far [to] our commitment to support Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the battle for restoration of democracy there”.823  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided an introductory overview of the liberal dimension in Indian 
strategic thought and practice. The first section of the chapter illustrated how, beyond just 
moral righteousness, Indian leaders express their principled support for democratic forces 
abroad because they causally associate liberal and pluralist regimes with greater stability, 
order and security.  
Reflecting their country’s successful trajectory in preserving territorial integrity and 
achieving economic development despite an extraordinarily diverse population, Indian 
leaders perceive their own system as a model for other demographically diverse countries, 
                                                
822 Manchanda, "Diplomacy: Reasons of state." See also Satya Sivaraman, recalling his coverage of FS J. N. 
Dixit’s 1993 visit to Myanmar, for the IANS: http://www2.irrawaddy.com/print_article.php?art_id=3294. 
823 Sept. 27, for his Samata Party. Also in 1998: 75 members of the Indian parliament joined the NLD’s 
“Campaign August’98,” demanding the 1990 parliament to be reinstated. Signatories were from the CPI-
M, Janata Dal, BJP and Samata Party, with the latter two being part of the governing coalition: Myint, 
Burma file, 270, 51-2. 
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especially in South Asia. Mirroring India’s exceptionally successful experience with its 
pluralist political system, this strand in strategic thought has grown stronger with time, 
and in the 2000s Indian Prime Ministers thus portrayed liberal democracy as being both 
necessary and inevitable.  
But how does this liberal strand in Indian strategic thought and speech affect strategic 
practice? Are India’s strategic assessments and postures, examined in Part I of this 
dissertation, somehow influenced by a preference for liberal regimes? This direct influence 
is addressed in the following chapter (6).  
Chapter 5, in turn, proceeded to address the indirect influence of India’s domestic 
environment on decision-making, by examining to what extent the country’s political 
parties and civil society activism influenced Indian governmental postures towards Nepal, 
Sri Lanka and Myanmar. A cursory re-examination of the most significant case studies 
leads to the following four conclusions: 
1. Pressures are mostly liberal: Reflecting the democratic, diverse, open and pluralist nature of 
Indian society, and its political system, domestic forces generally influence the Indian 
government to take on a liberal posture, favoring neighboring country’s democratization 
or greater liberal accommodation and inclusion of its minorities. In rare circumstances, 
these pressures can, however, also be illiberal, as exemplified by the Hindu nationalist 
support for monarchy in Nepal. 
2. Liberal pressures influence: While liberal pressures are never determinant, they play an 
auxiliary role by either accentuating or moderating the government’s posture. These 
influences can, for example, delay a bilateral normalization process with an authoritarian 
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regime (Nepal after 1960, and Myanmar after 1988) or, conversely, accelerate a coercive 
posture favoring a liberal regime change (Sri Lanka in the 1980s). 
3. Multiple pressure channels: India’s democratic system and environment are conducive to a 
variety channels through which civil society influences the government’s foreign policy 
posture towards neighboring countries. Besides formal channels, in particular regional 
parties during coalition governments (Sri Lanka 1980s), activist lobbies and pressure 
groups are particularly adept at informally exploring India’s deep state-society 
embeddedness (Nepal 1990 and 2006, Myanmar in the 1990s). 
4. Instrumentalization of pressures: Finally, while the domestic influence of India’s democratic 
system and its pressure groups on policy-making is significant, it is often also exaggerated, 
as the Indian government will, at times, deliberately invoke and strengthen such forces to 
gain leverage in negotiations or disputes with neighboring regimes. 
* 
Having established the existence of a liberal dimension in Indian strategic thought, and 
described the extent to which India’s democratic system and open society can indirectly 
influence the government’s foreign policy postures, the following Chapter (6) focuses on 
the key question of how regime type directly influences Indian assessments and posture. 
  
	   308	  
CHAPTER 6 – TOWARDS LIBERAL SECURITY: REGIMES IN THE SHORT- 
AND LONG-TERM 
 
[In] multilingual, multiethnic, multi-religious [countries] it should be the primary concern of the 
decision making elite … not to alienate the minority. … Discrimination backed up by force will 
only result in, first militancy and terrorism, and then separatism [with a negative cross-border 
impact on India] … that minority is [then] bound to seek assistance from foreign sources, who are 
inimical to your country … [So it is] an open invitation to external interference, if we do not 
structure our own society on principles of fair play and justice to the minority.824 
J. N. Dixit, as High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (1989) 
 
If, at least in principle, Indian officials identify with democratic regimes in the 
neighborhood; if they recognize their positive impact on Indian domestic stability and 
security; and if they sanction them as a necessary and inevitable system for all diverse 
countries in the region; then why does India not always adopt foreign policy postures 
favoring regime liberalization?  
Part I, for example, shows that India has, at times, engaged illiberal regimes to support 
their continuity, especially in the 1950s, and also in Myanmar, in 2007. If one focuses 
only on India’s posture, and takes on a simplistic, zero-sum approach that sees “interests” 
and “values” as incompatible, we’ll be tautologically forced to conclude that India’s 
strategic culture of crisis response is always based on an objective pursuit of Indian 
“interests,” and therefore immune to “idealist” considerations about regime type. 
                                                
824 New Delhi, March 10, 1989, at the United Services Institution: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.4, 2346-53. 
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Defending liberal democracy abroad would, in this perspective, come as an expense to 
Indian security and be tantamount to an altruistic “sacrifice” or idealist “luxury”.825  
If, however, one focuses on India’s assessments instead, and considers the possibility that its 
implied objectives are also defined in relation to the regime type in each neighboring state, 
the possibility of a liberal dimension in India’s strategic culture arises. As suggested in the 
previous chapter (5), this assumes that India’s “interests” and “values” are not necessarily 
incompatible but, instead, mutually constituted: this is reflected, for example, in the 
understanding that India’s domestic security is maximized by a pluralist regime in a 
neighboring country, which recognizes and includes its ethnic or religious minorities, 
instead of alienating them and thus creating conditions for conflict, disorder and 
instability with negative cross-border repercussions on India. 
Following on the discussion of the sources of liberal thought in Chapter 5, this chapter re-
visits the case studies of Part I of the dissertation to evaluate how regime type influences 
Indian strategic assessments and posture. While referring specifically to the case of Sri 
Lanka in the 1980s, J. N. Dixit’s introductory quote to this chapter suggests such a causal 
link between an illiberal regime’s incapacity to develop an inclusive political dispensation 
to integrate an ethno-linguistic minority, and the consequent conditions for conflict with 
negative repercussions for Indian security. This causal link – and the associated cost-
benefit calculation on whether to push for liberalization – may have been relatively clear 
                                                
825 For the limits of such a binary approach, see e.g. former Indian ambassador I. P. Khosla definition of 
“three variants of the balance between the ethical [preference for democracy] and the expedient [security 
interests]” in India’s relations with its neighbours: 1) “ineluctable tension”: clash between preference and 
interests, which affects relations; 2) “no tension”: preference and interests match; 3) “uncertain stalemate” 
or “adaptive” transition period: when “the language of the moral is [still] present, but a decision has already 
been taken that we can no longer cultivate this luxury,” I. P. Khosla, "India and Myanmar," in Indian foreign 
policy: challanges and opportunities, ed. Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 
2007), 611-12. 
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and consensual at the time on Sri Lanka, and may also appear particularly sensible in 
hindsight, but it is rarely as simple because of conflicting short- and long-term horizons.  
In their strategic assessments about crisis response and posture in the region, and in 
particular about the liberal nature and trajectory of their neighboring regimes, Indian 
decision-makers are thus often confronted with a dilemmatic trade-off between present 
expediencies and future possibilities. For example, how does regime type affect a 
neighboring country’s attitude towards India, its capability to foster domestic order and 
stability, and its geostrategic alignment, both in the immediate context and in the distant 
future? Are liberal regimes always in India’s interest, or only under certain conditions, for 
example in the short- or long-term? Similarly, beyond expediency, are there are other 
factors incentivizing India to engage illiberal regimes, especially in the short-term? How 
soon will an expected regime change take place, whether it is the collapse of an exhausted 
authoritarian system, or the gradual debilitation of a liberal polity? These are some of the 
policy-making questions affecting Indian assessments and posture. 
The following three sections re-evaluate our case studies to understand if, when, and how 
India’s three typical assessments (dispensation, order, and geopolitics) are influenced by the 
neighboring country’s regime type. This unearths an additional time dimension, reflecting 
Indian decision-makers’ faculty to run complex cost-benefit analyses on the short- and 
long-term benefits of more or less involvement, and of engagement or coercion.  
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1. Nepal from Monarchy to Maoism: small steps towards liberal democracy 
India’s assessments on Nepal reflect a persistent dilemma between immediate geopolitical 
priorities and long-term concerns about the adverse effects of illiberal rule, especially by 
monarchical absolutism and conservative elites.  
 
a) 1960: The perils of democratic transition force “a step backward”  
In Chapter 2, we saw how India’s posture of engagement after King Mahendra’s 1960 
coup was driven by a pragmatic and short-term assessment to ensure Nepal’s cooperation 
in case of a conflict with China. Immediate geopolitical priorities thus dictated 
involvement with an authoritarian regime led by an absolutist King that declared 
democracy unsuitable for Nepal, banned political parties and detained its leaders, many 
which had been India’s allies.826  
One day after the coup, on December 16, 1960, PM J. Nehru thus stood before the 
Indian Parliament expressing that it was “a matter of regret to all of us that a democratic 
experiment or practice that was going on [in Nepal] suffered a setback.”827 His choice of 
words, however, betrayed his view that, while the King would prevail in the short-term, 
                                                
826 Speaking on Apr. 20, 1963, in New Delhi, the King argued that “parliamentary democracy” is not 
suitable to many Asian countries, at least in the short-term, which therefore explained Nepal’s failed 
democratic experiment in the 1950s, and therefore a necessary “period of transitional state guidance” 
under his leadership: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 433-39.  
827  Dec. 16: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 409. Commenting on King Mahendra’s early 1963 visit to Delhi, 
Foreign Secretary M. J. Desai confides to Ambassador Narayan in Kathmandu that “there is no question of 
his restoring parliamentary democracy in Nepal” (Apr. 23, 1963): NAI, MEA HI/1012(27)/63 p. 20.  
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the democratization of Nepal was a long-term inevitability and that therefore, sooner or 
later, “the step backward will have to be retraced.”828 
Nepalese democrats were naturally upset in the following years at Nehru’s realism and 
short-termism. Seven years after the coup, the ousted Prime Minister B. P. Koirala, 
remained under detention. In his prison diary, he complained:  
India is too weak and demoralized to play any effective role in international politics. A weak 
state, like a demoralized individual, is prone to misunderstand its own interest and act adversely 
to it. … India is bankrupt and it would be a fatal mistake to depend upon her to be of any use to 
Nepali democrats.829 
In his bitterness, however, Koirala ignored that, had it not been for India, he would never 
have become Nepal’s first democratically elected Prime Minister. Throughout the 1950s, 
as surveyed in Chapter 2, India had taken the lead to change and change one of the most 
isolated countries in the world, playing a crucial role to democratize it. This was not 
because of naïve ideology or idealism, but due to a strategic link the Indian establishment 
traced between democracy, stability and security – at least in the long term. 
Exactly ten years before the coup, in December 1950, Nehru had first articulated this 
Indian view about Nepal’s political liberalization being in the long-term interest of Indian 
security. Commenting on the decision to interfere in Kathmandu to assist a pro-
democracy rebellion against the Rana’s feudal rule, Nehru recalled his earlier warnings 
about the inevitability of democracy to ensure domestic stability and external security:  
Three years ago [in 1947], we assured Nepal of our desire that she should be strong, independent 
and progressive country. In the nature of things, we stood not only for progressive democracy in our 
                                                
828 Jan. 18, 1961: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 414. S. D. Muni notes that Nehru’s reaction was “indeed an 
emotional outburst, howsoever undiplomatic and unguarded [but] it was also an articulation of Nehru’s 
concern for the prospects of political instability in the strategically placed Himalayan Kingdom at a time 
when tensions were deepening in Sino-Indian relations,” Muni, India and Nepal, 43. 
829 Aug. 6, 1967, quoted in Tripathi, Nepal in transition, 20, 54. 
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own country but also [in Nepal] … We pointed out in as friendly a way as possible, that the 
world was changing rapidly and if Nepal did not make an effort to keep pace with it, 
circumstances were bound to force her to do so.830 
In 1949, he had emphasized that democratization was inevitable to avoid destabilization 
and “overwhelming” effects, pointed to developments in China, and warned against the 
changes in Tibet: “[the] Government of Nepal is allowing valuable time to slip by (…) 
problems will not be of military character so much as an invasion of ideas and dangerous 
ideas at that. This invasion can only be met by internal changes brought about in 
time.”831 Such concerns had been articulated directly, for example by warning Nepalese 
Prime Minister M. S. J. B. Rana repeatedly about the need to reform, arguing that 
beyond a mere “negative approach” of combating Communism, countries also needed a 
“positive programme” of political liberalization to ensure long-term stability.832  
In 1950, such circumstances had finally arrived. As the aristocratic regime refused to heed 
India’s “friendly” advice, Nehru decided in 1950 to invest in facilitating regime change 
because, following the annexation of Tibet, it had become imperative to inoculate the 
Kingdom against the possibility of destabilizing influences from Chinese Communism.  
In Nehru’s view, “progressive democracy” in Nepal thus reflected the best guarantee to 
protect India’s own security, leading New Delhi to hastily press for political change 
throughout the 1950s.833 While committing tremendous resources to democratize Nepal, 
                                                
830 Speaking to parliament, Dec. 16, 1950: quoted in Muni, India's foreign policy: the democracy dimension (with 
special reference to its neighbours), 25. Two years earlier, in 1948, when asked about India’s policy priorities in 
Nepal, Nehru listed “to promote political and economic reform and progress in Nepal” as the second of 
four objectives: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 62. 
831 Sept. 10, 1949, in a letter to Amb. C. P. N. Singh: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 79. 
832 Letter of June 9, 1949: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 70. 
833 For India’s role in the 1950-51 regime change, see Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 103-75. 
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and thus secure India, Nehru was, however, mindful that transition was fraught with 
short-term risks and costs. He thus presciently warned King Tribhuvan, in 1951: 
Democratic changes, after a long period of autocratic and authoritarian rule, release many 
suppressed forces which tend to be indisciplined in the early stages, and a sense of responsibility, 
which is essential for ordered freedom, takes time to grow. Thus there is always a danger that the 
new freedom might lead to growth of indiscipline and even endangering the freedom gained.834 
Similarly, writing two years later to Prime Minister M. P. Koirala, he cautioned that 
democracy “did not exist in the air” and “envisaged certain conditions,” without which 
“the new-found liberty could and would lead to license and disintegration.”835  
Indeed, over the next decade, Nepal went through revolutionary changes, with a new 
constitution finally adopted in 1958, which reactivated conservative resistance.836 In their 
reformist impetus, Nepalese democrats often looked up in awe to China as a model, even 
while Nehru reminded them that each political system had its own costs and benefits.837 
Eventually, as Nehru had feared, the benefits of freedom took an increasing toll on Indian 
interests: competitive nationalism fed on “anti-India” stances and rapprochement with 
China, Nepalese parties factionalized, political instability became chronic, and the 
regime’s growing incapacity risked disorder and instability.  
                                                
834 Oct. 3, 1951: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 187. 
835 Aug. 15, 1953: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 308. 
836 L. Rose and B. Joshi elaborate on the causes of this failure after 1951: “[regime change] occurred in 
Nepal under the diplomatic midwifery of the Indian government [and was a] total change … a brand-new 
innovation whose basic system linkages were with the emerging political structure in independent, 
democratic India.” The 1951 Interim Government of Nepal Act was therefore a “hastily prepared 
adaptation of the Indian Constitution” and failed as conservative forces reacted with the King’s support: 
Bhuwan L. Joshi and Leo E. Rose, Democratic innovations in Nepal: a case study of political acculturation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1966), 487-8, 510-13. 
837 For example, after Nepal’s PM B. P. Koirala returns from Beijing, in 1960, enthusiastic about Chinese 
mega-dams, Nehru emphasized “that is only possible in a dictatorship, where 20 lakh labourers can be put 
to work. It is not possible in a democracy,” quoted by Koirala, Atmabrittanta, 224. 
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When the first elected Nepalese government took charge, in 1959, the Indian Prime 
Minister noted that “we welcome this [democratic] change, because we felt that it was the 
right thing for Nepal to develop on democratic lines and thereby come nearer to us in our 
general outlook.”838 However, while Nepal’s democracy was seen as inevitable and also 
favorable to India in the long-term, it was also apparent that its infant fragility risked 
turning into a security liability for India, prompting Nehru to recognize and privilege the 
short-term benefits of a return to authoritarian order. 
 
b) 1990: the promises of liberalization and a “bond of shared democratic values” 
Nehru would probably not have guessed that it would take Nepal three long decades of 
twists and turns to revive multiparty democracy. As examined in Chapter 3, when the 
bilateral crisis first flared up, in 1987, New Delhi was not pursuing, and in many ways 
also opposed to regime change.839 But as tensions escalated, Indian strategic assessments 
gradually converged to see King Birendra’s authoritarian rule as the cause for the 
conflict, as an obstacle to its resolution, and thus hindering Indo-Nepalese normalization.  
As S. D. Muni, one of India’s top Nepal experts described, while for almost three decades 
Indian officials agreed that the “democratic system in Nepal may not be necessarily an 
ideal alternative for India to work for” the crisis in the late 1980s made it apparent that it 
was “in India’s enlightened long-term interests to see that liberal, democratic forces in 
                                                
838 1960, during PM B. P. Koirala’s visit to New Delhi: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 405. The joint communiqué 
noted that Nehru expressed “India’s sympathetic interest in … the social and economic regeneration of 
Nepal by democratic means,” MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1960," 14. 
839 But the Indian government had been sympathetic to liberalization attempts since the 1970s, and had 
welcomed the constitutional referendum of 1980, in which voters preferred the prevailing representative 
system (54%) over a return to multiparty democracy (46%): For the official reaction see Bhasin, Nepal-India 
v.1, 701-8. See also Urmila Phadnis, "Nepal: The Politics of Referendum," Pacific Affairs 54, no. 3 (1981). 
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Nepal are strengthened and this is done without causing any major political and social 
disruption.”840  
India’s deputy Minister of External Affairs at the time, K. N. Singh recalls that New 
Delhi had always seen Nepalese kings surrounded by “inspired intriguers, dedicated 
sycophants and conscientious frauds [who] ill-advised their unsuspecting masters who, 
alas, always missed the pulse of time” and that, in 1989, a line was crossed, as PM R. 
Gandhi had had enough of the “imaginary grievances of the [royal] Nepali 
establishment.” 841By 1989, Indian decision-makers thus started to shift their focus, 
increasingly valuing the long-term advantages of regime liberalization.  
The strategic nature of this policy assessment was further confirmed by the fact that it 
survived a change in government, in late 1989. Despite its electoral campaign promises to 
change Indian policy, de-escalate and normalize relations, the new Government of PM 
V. P. Singh swiftly embraced and even intensified the coercive posture of its predecessor 
within a few weeks of coming to power, publically noting that Nepal would have to 
inevitably adjust to “a fresh wind blowing across the planet, bringing new hopes of 
liberalization, freedom and democracy”.842  
As the Spring of 1990 witnessed the rise of mass pro-democracy protests, clogging and 
bloodying the streets of Kathmandu, New Delhi saw political liberalization as being both 
inevitable, and also necessary to defuse the risks of radicalization, violence and disorder. 
The newly-arrived Indian ambassador, retired general S. K. Sinha, thus recalled his main 
                                                
840 Muni, India and Nepal, 105. 
841 Singh, Walking, 121. 
842 Speech by EAM I. K. Gujral, on Jan. 3, 1990, welcoming Nepalese FM S. K. Upadhyaya: “Old barriers 
are tumbling down, and the sprit of liberty, of equality, of human dignity, is spreading far and wide. It is 
our earnest hope that this new ethos will contribute to greater understanding, trust and cooperation … also 
in our region,” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 780. 
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mission as to “impress on King the need to soon come to terms with the forces of 
democracy” because the protestors’ demands “may escalate to a republic” and because 
“an Army cannot fight its own people forever.”843 
India’s domestic security, in particular, was seen to depend on the capacity of a 
democratic regime to persuade Communists to abstain from an armed struggle and, 
instead, embrace parliamentary democracy. Several Communist Parties of Nepal, 
especially the CPN-ML, had engaged in anti-India rhetoric and actions, even advocating 
armed resistance and stronger links with Indian Maoist insurgents, until the early 1980s. 
While disarming thereafter, they maintained their radical stances, favoring a 
revolutionary path towards a republic, which was often based on hostility against India.844  
In early 1990, the External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral thus expressed New Delhi’s 
crucial support for a regime change: 
The Government’s attitude to the current mass movement in Nepal, with the stated aim of 
reestablishing a multiparty democractic system under a constitutional monarchy is determined by 
the fact that as a major democracy, we cannot but feel committed to the cause of democracy, of 
equality and human dignity. Today, when momentous changes are taking place all over the world 
and global politics are democratized, we cannot be averse to such aspirations.845  
Less than two weeks later, Gujral welcomed King Birendra’s indications that he would 
transfer power to the people as “a victory for peace, prosperity, development, democracy 
and happy relations with India.”846 Indian leaders and officials repeatedly underlined the 
                                                
843 Sinha, Soldier Recalls, 358. 
844 In 1990, the two main factions (CPN-ML and CPN-M) joined six other parties to create the United Left 
Front and supported the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which was welcome by India. 
On the Communist angle in Indian assessments, see Lok Raj Baral, "The return of party politics in Nepal," 
Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 130-31; Krishna Hachhethu, "Nepal's India Policy under Communist 
government in Nepal," Contributions to Nepalese Studies 26, no. 2 (1999). 
845 March 30, in parliament: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 784-5. 
846 EAM I. K. Gujral in parliament, on Apr. 9, 1990: “…The winds of liberalization, freedom and 
democracy have been blowing across our planet. India is a democracy and our people are committed to 
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new “bond of shared democratic values” as a positive development that would facilitate 
and strengthen bilateral relations, thus suggesting India’s causal preference for a liberal 
regime in Kathmandu.847  
While hosting the new Nepalese Prime Minister in June, 1990, in New Delhi, India’s 
Prime Minister V. P. Singh thus proclaimed that “today, Nepal and India come together 
once again”.848 One year later, External Affairs Minister M. S. Solanki reiterated that 
“our bonds have been further strengthened when, in 1990, the people of Nepal secured 
for themselves a new political order based on their own political will and aspirations  […] 
Given India’s abiding commitment to the values of democracy, these developments 
brought us closer to each other.”849 
The 1987-90 crisis therefore decisively tipped the Indian decision-makers’ assessment 
scale in favor of regime change, exposing the limits of monarchical authoritarianism. At 
the same time, it reflected Indian expectations that regime liberalization would foster 
domestic order, economic growth, and geostrategic alignment with India. With an eye on 
the failed transition of the 1950s, however, Indian officials also cautioned that the long-
term sustainability of Nepal’s infant democracy relied on more than just formal elections.  
Quoting from a 16th century North Indian epic while on a visit to Kathmandu, in August 
1990, External Affairs Minister N. Rao noted that “a King whose subjects are in pain, 
deserves hell,” thus presciently cautioning King Birendra not to overstep his 
                                                                                                                                            
democratic values. We are full of hope and faith in the aspiration of our Nepalese brethren for a liberal and 
truly democratic polity,” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 787. 
847 EAM N. Rao in Kathmandu, Aug. 6, 1990, who also calls the 1987-90 crisis an “aberration in India-
Nepal relations,” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 813. 
848 Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 797. See also MEA, "Annual Report 1990-91," (New Delhi 1991), iii. 
849 Dec. 4, 1991: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1991," (New Delhi 1992), 236. In its annual report, the 
Ministry of External Affairs also refers to a “qualitatively new era of relations” between both countries: 
MEA, "Annual Report 1991-92," (New Delhi 1992), ii. 
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constitutional role, even while he also defined the democratic leaders’ “momentous task” 
as the “consolidation of the democratic process” in order to overcome the “challenges of 
the future” such as “the conquest of hunger, poverty, illiteracy and unemployment.”850 
Failure to deliver on either of the two fronts would embolden illiberal forces, whether 
conservatives calling for a return to autocratic royal rule, or revolutionaries promising an 
ideal republic through violence. 
 
c) 2006: Completing an unfinished task and pressing on 
If he were still alive then, the 2005-06 crisis in Nepal would have confirmed Rao’s worst 
expectations: fifteen years later, Kathmandu was torn between a resurgent King who had 
taken over power through a coup, and Maoist revolutionaries who had plunged the 
country into a deadly civil war affecting India’s domestic security.  
Chapter 4 examined the strategic assessments that led India to adopt a coercive posture 
against King Gyanendra, who had sidelined the political parties, suspended democracy, 
pressed on a military offensive against the insurgents, and adopted a hostile attitude 
towards India while cozying up to China. Such assessments were influenced by the 
broader Indian view that the 1990 transition had faltered but not failed, and that only 
further regime liberalization would deliver a strong and cooperative political dispensation, 
conflict resolution and order, as well as geopolitical realignment.851 Even more than in 
                                                
850 In Kathmandu, on Aug. 6 1990, from Goswami Tulsidas’ 16th century Ramcharitmanas Awadhi epic: 
“Jasu raaj priya praja dhukihani, So nrip avsi narak adhikari.” Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 806, 14. 
851 For example, Deb Mukharji, India’s ambassador to Nepal in 2000-01, notes that in 1990 King Birendra 
had “given in but not completely,” notably by inserting constitutional clauses that bestowed the monarch 
with significant powers, which he and his successor (Gyanendra) made use of tactically to reassert their role. 
(Interview 056). 
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1990, Indians clearly identified pluralism as the only sustainable state-building strategy 
for Nepal, as either monarchical or Maoist rule presaged further conflict and instability. 
Reflecting this long-term view that the civil war was only a symptom of a larger malaise, 
India’s External Affairs Minister Y. Sinha observed as early as 2003, that his country’s 
concern was “not merely about the Maoist problem, which is an immediate problem” but 
that India was instead “interested in the stability of Nepal … in a democratic Nepal.”852 
Officials reiterated this causal understanding of liberal democracy as the best system to 
promote stability in Nepal incessantly over the next years, underscoring that conflict 
resolution and economic development required more, not less political freedom as 
advocated by King Gyanendra. Speaking at the height of the 2006 crisis, Foreign 
Secretary S. Saran thus reiterated that “it has always been our wish to seek peace and 
prosperity in Nepal because stability in Nepal is in the best interests of India [and] 
democracy in Nepal is the best guarantee of such stability.”853  
As examined in Chapter 4, New Delhi saw the Maoist insurgency as a manifestation of 
broader popular discontent with the centralized, elitist and conservative nature the 
Nepalese state. By sidelining the democratic parties and pursuing a military offensive the 
King was thus further legitimizing the rebels’ cause, expanding their popular support, and 
perpetuating the war. Accordingly, Foreign Secretary S. Saran observed in 2004 that 
“any pursuit of a peace settlement must be within the parameters of the preservation of 
multiparty democracy” and that India “would welcome” a settlement “in which the 
                                                
852 In a media interview, Dec. 12, 2003: Bhasin, IFR 2003, 437. 
853 Apr. 26: Bhasin, IFR 2006, 743. 
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Maoists are ready to come in as a legitimate political entity, abandon violence, [and] take 
part in a free and fair elections.”854  
King Gyanendra’s coup on February 1st, 2005, however, decisively shifted India’s 
assessments towards liberal regime change as a precondition to conflict resolution and 
return to order in Nepal. The first official statement, on the same day, was crystal clear:  
[Emergency] constitutes a serious setback (…) India has consistently supported multiparty 
democracy and constitutional monarchy enshrined in Nepal’s Constitution as the two pillars of 
political stability in Nepal … [India] will continue to support the restoration of political stability 
and economic prosperity in Nepal, a process which requires reliance on the forces of democracy. 855 
With an eye on Nepal’s past democratic reversal (1960) and limited success (1990), in 
2005-06 a rising number of Indian officials saw the institution of monarchy as irreversibly 
linked to authoritarianism, conservatism and anti-Indianism, and therefore incapable to 
deliver in the long-term. The Indian Joint Secretary in charge of Nepal at the time, Ranjit 
Rae, thus recalls that King Gyanendra wrongly assessed that “he could get away doing 
the same as King Mahendra in 1960” by following the old “Mahendra mythology of the 
King as the only savior capable of protecting Nepal against Indian expansionism”, and on 
the “myth of monarchy as the only guarantee of Nepal’s stability and unity.”856  
In India’s view, the new dispensability of monarchy was thus buttressed by memory, as 
well as by the identification of a historic window of opportunity to permanently lock in 
                                                
854 Bhasin, IFR 2004, 612. The Indian government had set out similar conditions as “red lines” to the CPN-
M while the 12-Point Understanding was reached in New Delhi, on November 22, 2005. FS S. Saran 
recalls these as a written commitment of intent to “join multiparty democracy, abandon exceptional status, 
lay down weapons, and integrate in regular Army through phased and negotiated political settlement, 
normalize as a non-violent political party” (Interview 028). 
855 Bhasin, IFR 2005, 487-8. 
856 Interview 026. Similarly, FS S. Saran recalls that King Gyanendra “had been warned [but] overstepped 
our red line. Right until the very end [of January 2005] we told him ‘don’t’ do this [coup], because it will be 
the end of monarchy’. But he did. That is when we moved into an active posture of contacting with 
Maoists” (Interview 028). 
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Nepal’s floundering liberal experiment since 1947 on two crucial fronts. On the one 
hand, the Maoist insurgents had secretly signaled their commitment to lay down their 
weapons and join electoral politics. Its leader Prachanda had, as early as 2002, written to 
the Indian Prime Minister, to the UN Secretary General and other international leaders 
to emphasize his party’s [CPN-M] commitment to “universal democratic values and 
principles”.857 On the other hand, based on an extraordinary multi-party platform, the 
Seven Party Alliance created in 2005, the expanding youth base of the democratic parties 
transformed the Spring 2006 anti-King protests into an unprecedented mass movement 
cutting across age, class, ideology and caste.858 
It is important, however, to underline that India’s long-term view, seeking Nepal’s 
liberalization by mainstreaming the Maoists, was in no way consensual, both 
internationally and internally. The U.S. Ambassador J. Moriarty, for example, 
reproached the Indian government for “analyzing the situation through slightly rose-
colored glasses.”859 Similar skepticism was also widely prevalent in Indian governmental 
organizations dealing with domestic security, especially the Intelligence Bureau. NSA M. 
K. Narayanan explains: “[at the time] I thought [that] we had our natural constituency in 
                                                
857  Muni, "Bringing the Maoists," 320-1. The Maoist’s transformation and assurances are analyzed in 
Chapter 4. 
858 On the young and encompassing character of the Jana Andolaan II protests, in the Spring of 2006, as a 
pro-liberal and national movement see Jha, Battles, 62-5. For India’s endorsement of the creation and 
demands of the 7-Party Alliance, in May 2005, see Bhasin, IFR 2005, 526. 
859 Dec. 13, 2005 after meeting Indian Foreign Secretary S. Saran, in Kathmandu: they “appear to be 
trying to convince themselves that the Maoists have genuinely changed,” in 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KATHMANDU2793_a.html. Also, in early February, 2006: 
“supporting Maoists is not the way to achieve our [US-India] mutual goal of restoring democracy to Nepal” 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KATHMANDU450_a.html.  
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[the] Nepali Congress, the democratic parties; these should be the ones we should sort of 
help out, strengthen. From my perspective, [the] Maoists were the least acceptable.”860  
This only corroborates the perspective that, more than a mere leap of faith or moral 
impulse, New Delhi’s assessment of 2005-06 was guided by a farsighted understanding 
that Indian interests required a stable and peaceful neighbor, and that this, in turn, 
depended on further liberalization of its democratic regime to co-opt the insurgents and 
end civil war.861 Claiming the transition’s success as being in India’s long-term national 
interest, in 2008 External Affairs Minister P. Mukherjee emphasized with a sense of 
vindication that “with our suggestions, with our advice to the political parties, it has been 
possible to bring a hardcore militant, believer in violence, organisation in the mainstream 
of the democratic politics of Nepal.”862  
Accordingly, the transition of 2006 was welcome as a positive development for bilateral 
relations, based on the understanding that the progress of democracy in Nepal would 
further deepen the links with India: “[the] restoration of democracy in Nepal provided a 
historic opportunity for a qualitative enhancement of bilateral relations between the two 
countries, which rest on … shared faith in democracy, freedom and the rule of law; and 
pursuit of peace, stability and prosperity.”863 
Beyond such optimism, however, Indian officials also echoed Nehru’s pragmatic view 
from the 1950s, that despite being on an inevitable trajectory towards pluralism, Nepal’s 
                                                
860 Interview 077. 
861 See, for example, the Sept. 9, 2006, speech by FS S. Saran at the Indian Council for World Affairs, in 
New Delhi: “in retrospect, by aligning ourselves with democratic forces in Nepal, by supporting the 
transformation in progress, we have done rather well.” Bhasin, IFR 2006, 675. 
862 Speaking on March 19, 2008, just before Nepal’s elections for a Constituent Assembly: Bhasin, IFR 
2008, 1252. 
863 June 9, 2006, joint statement after Nepalese PM G. P. Koirala’s visit to India: Bhasin, IFR 2006, 764. 
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road to democracy remained long, with several obstacles still ahead. This liberal, long-
term view thus also persisted to influence New Delhi’s subsequent posture, after 2006, to 
support a federal system as a measure to increase domestic stability by decentralizing the 
state and enhance its representativeness, especially among ethno-linguistic and religious 
minorities, whether in the Himalayan highlands or in the Terai lowlands.  
More than half a century earlier, Nehru had warned against a Nepali Congress monopoly 
in the government and insisted in decentralization through an all-party, diverse, and 
more representative cabinet to reflect the country’s ethnic and geographic diversity: 
“There is far too much of a tendency to think in terms of Kathmandu and rather to 
ignore the hill people and, more especially, the Terai. This is very unwise and is bound to 
trouble in the future.”864 
Once again, the “Indian model” became a comparative benchmark, as expressed in the 
2008 speech of S. Saran, then serving as the Indian Prime Minister’s special envoy: 
…a plural democracy like India has learnt to celebrate its diversity and counts this as one of the 
pillars of its democracy. It is my hope that Nepal will do so, too, because only a more inclusive, a 
more accommodative approach is required for a stable and enduring democracy.865 
While not analyzed here in detail, New Delhi’s coercive posture during subsequent crises 
in Indo-Nepalese relations, especially in 2007-08 and in 2015-16, further indicates a 
growing salience of this long-term liberal view in its strategic assessments. Two Indian 
ambassadors who recently served in, and are intimately familiar with Nepal, reflect this 
approach. For Ambassador J. Prasad (2011-13): 
                                                
864 Letter to the MEA’s Secretary General, Oct. 28, 1951: Bhasin, Nepal-India v.1, 193. 
865 Apr. 26, 2008, at a seminar organized by the MEA in Patna, India: Bhasin, IFR 2008, 1260. 
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Nepal [was always a] traditionally a unitary state, so federalism [is] a new issue and anathema 
to centralization. Opposition to federalism reflects interests and profile of Kathmandu’s traditional 
elite: upper-caste, hill, isolated, conservative and non-representative. [They oppose federalism 
because it] would shift power away from this traditional center.866 
Similarly, his successor, Ambassador R. Rae (in Kathmandu since 2013), emphasizes: 
[the] nationalist slogan of ‘ek bhasha, ek bhesh, ek dharma, ek desh’ [one language, one dress, one 
religion, one country] started in the 1950s, but remains ingrained in [Nepal’s] state structure. 
Federal and decentralized constitution [is] important because it addresses issue of diversity through 
inclusive representation. [This is a] larger social reform process, which India went through, but 
[ist] still incomplete in Nepal. [It is] in India’s interest not because it weakens Nepal, but because 
it strengthens it through stability.867 
 
2. Sri Lanka: the liberal formula to stability and security in diversity 
Indian strategic assessments during crises in democratic Ceylon/Sri Lanka have been 
persistently influenced by a concern about the regime’s illiberal ethno-nationalism and its 
long-term consequences on the country’s stability. As a consequence, India’s domestic 
and regional security is perceived to depend on Sri Lanka’s capacity to develop a pluralist 
and inclusive system to accommodate its Tamil minority and mitigate conflict.868 
 
a) 1956: Early alarm set off by a liberal eye on the future  
Chapter 2 demonstrated how India’s short-term strategic assessments prevailed in 1956, 
leading to a posture of engagement towards the new regime, which politicized the island’s 
latent ethnic divide and, in 1958, precipitated the country’s first mass riots since 
                                                
866 Interview 058. 
867 Interview 026. 
868  For a similar argument, see Chapter 7 and the concept of India’s “relational control” in its 
neighborhood policy, in Chadda, Ethnicity, Security. 
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independence. New Delhi’s cooperative attitude was driven by the new government’s 
socio-economic progressive leadership, its geopolitically reorientation from the West 
towards Indian non-alignment, and the need to preserve political influence on the island. 
However, even while Indian policymakers pragmatically engaged Colombo, their 
assessments disclose a clear recognition of the regime’s illiberal tilt, cautioning Ceylonese 
leaders about the risks of its long-term, negative ramifications in terms of a spiraling 
radicalization, conflict, and effects on India.  
While welcoming the 1956 election of Solomon Bandaranaike as the new Prime Minister, 
the acting Indian High Commissioner M. M. Nair thus observed that “the seeds of 
discord were also sowed” and that the new government’s language policy “completely 
alienated the Tamil community” and “bitterly split a population that had hitherto lived at 
peace.”869 V. Coelho, who would serve as a High Commissioner in the 1970s, thus 
recalled that “for the unity of the country this [Sinhalization] may well have been a 
retrograde step, namely the development of a political ethos comprising of religious, 
linguistic and economic discontent.”870  
Similarly, B. N. Chakravarty, the Indian High Commissioner who had served in 
Colombo until 1956, presciently warned about the consequences of these policies: 
…a religious and cultural revivalism among the Sinhalese, of a reactionary type leading to the 
language controversy and an increasing conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils. (…) The 
[Plantation and stateless] ‘Indians’ having been disposed of, the attack has now begun on the 
Ceylon Tamils by denying parity between the Sinhalese and Tamil languages. (…) [Muslims 
and Christians should also be concerned] but these minorities do not realize that their turn would 
come next [as] Communalism and Buddhist fanaticism are both gaining ground.871 
                                                
869 NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 p. 1. 
870 Coelho, Palk Straits, 80. 
871 NAI, MEA 3(8)-R&I/57 pp. 1-3. 
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By “Indians,” Chakravarty was referring to the “Plantation Tamils”, a community of 
around one million laborers in the island’s highland tea plantations, which had migrated 
there since the 19th century, while by “Ceylon Tamils” he referred to the autochthonous 
religious (Hindu) and linguistic minority of around 10-20%, mostly concentrated on the 
Northern and Eastern coastal areas.872  
The island’s future conflict would involve the Ceylon (or Sri Lankan) Tamils, starting in 
1956, but India’s causal concern about the long-term impact of the island’s illiberal 
regime can be traced back to the late 1940s, when Colombo first started to pass 
discriminatory laws against the Plantation Tamils, refusing to grant them citizenship and 
thus rendering them stateless. On Ceylon’s new Indian and Pakistani Residents 
(Citizenship) Act, Nehru this expressed his “great disappointment:” “The Government of 
India cannot regard as satisfactory any attempted resolution of the problem which would 
… enable the Ceylon Government to discriminate against citizens of Indian origin.”873  
After a first bilateral agreement failed in 1954, India and Ceylon would get entangled in 
protracted negotiations over the next decades to regulate the fate of this deprived 
community. To Nehru, Colombo’s persistent focus on the technicalities of numbers and 
its hostile attitude betrayed a worrisome illiberal posture towards non-Sinhala minorities 
as rightful citizens of the new state.874 Instead of harking on deportation, he thus 
                                                
872 For a background on these “Plantation Tamils,” see Hugh Tinker, Separate and unequal: India and the 
Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920-1950 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1976). 
873 In a note to Sri Lankan PM D. S. Senanayake, Nov. 13, 1949: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.2, 232. On the 
Plantation Tamils being disenfranchised from electoral rolls in 1952, Nehru refers to the act as “a mistake 
[because] the Indians there … are citizens of Ceylon today, and not citizens of India,” May 1, 1952, in New 
Delhi: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.2, 587, 99. 
874 Referring to Nehru’s view as prescient and as still valid today, Indian Minister P. Chidambaram notes 
that “we [Indian government] always spoke about Tamils as covering both populations [Plantation and Sri 
Lankan Tamils], because they are connected and both suffer under the same problem of Sinhala 
nationalism” (Interview 036). 
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beckoned S. J. Kotelawala and D. S. Senanayake in October of 1954, “you should get 
their support,” because “you should not create even an impression that in future you are 
going to penalize them [but instead] you [should] deal with these people directly, win 
them over”.875  
While New Delhi’s position was influenced by constraints to absorb hundreds of 
thousands of migrants, it also reflected its liberal discomfort at the Ceylonese state’s rising 
ethno-nationalist profile and its exclusivist obsession to compel a minority into forced 
exile. Speaking to parliament in 1957, Nehru this underlined that “we do not accept any 
persons who came under compulsion, who are compelled [to leave].”876 This was a 
“human problem” and would have long-term effects, Nehru warned: 
…if there are people here who lived for some years, I cannot just push them out. I cannot 
discriminate against them. [Whatever the number of Plantation Tamils who will eventually 
remain in Ceylon] do you want that large number to be, apart from the human aspect, more or 
less satisfied with life or it should become more and more dissatisfied, rebellious and troublesome 
with all those consequences?877 
Ten years later, coming in defense of a second bilateral agreement signed in October 
1964, External Affairs Minister S. S. Singh reflected this Nehruvian approach, arguing 
that it would be impossible to just “leave them  [Plantation Tamils] there and expose 
them to all the legislative measures, Ceylonisation of employment and Ceylonisation of 
trade and the like and then let them go helter-skelter.”878  
                                                
875 Oct. 10 talks, in New Delhi: Nehru, SWJN SS v27, 152. 
876 Dec. 12: MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1957," 255. The Plantation Tamil’s preferred to remain in 
Ceylon, but by 1959 the Ceylonese government had only accepted slightly more than 100,000 out of 
850,000 citizenship applications. By 1964, more than 971,000 remained stateless: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka 
v.2, 805, 50. 
877 Oct. 9, 1954: Nehru, SWJN SS v27, 166. 
878 MEA, "FAR 1964," 283. 
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While the two Tamil communities had distinct profiles and demands, they were both at 
the receiving end of Colombo’s ethno-majoritarian policies and rising polarization, 
leading their representative organizations to identify with each other and cooperate. For 
example, the main organization of the Plantation Tamils, the Ceylon Workers Congress, 
spoke out in 1956 to condemn the new language policies, its acting president, K. 
Rajalingam referring to it as an “unfair law.”879  
India’s prescient advice did not determine its posture during the 1956 crisis, but it 
influenced its negotiations with Ceylon and reflected a liberal and farsighted dimension in 
its strategic assessments. After the Sri Lankan Tamils mobilized for language parity in 
May 1961, Nehru thus noted that the Tamils of the North and East “are as much 
Ceylonese as anybody else … it is an entirely internal question [but] we are [also] 
interested for a variety of reasons, especially people in the South [and] where possible, we 
wish to help and take steps without any kind of interference”.880 While in the 1950s 
pragmatism dictated the prevalence of short-term imperatives and engagement, such 
long-term Indian assessments would rise in salience over the next two decades as the 
neighboring island gradually sunk into conflict. 
 
b) 1987: prescribing liberalization “in principle and for our own security” 
By the early 1980s, Nehru’s foreseen “consequences” of continued discrimination 
potentially leading to a “dissatisfied, rebellious and troublesome” minority had realized in 
                                                
879 June 30, 1956: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.2, 782-3. Similarly, the main organization of the Ceylon Tamils, 
the Federal Party, lobbied for the Plantation Tamils’ demands, as a part of the larger Tamil cause, 
especially after the 1954 and 1964 bilateral agreements with India. Both the CWC and the FP eventually 
merged into the Tamil United Front in the early 1970s: Wilson, Chelvanayakam, 47-51, 64, 105-7.  
880 May 5, before parliament: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.2, 815-6. 
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the form of a latent civil war, with a radicalized generation of Tamil insurgents fighting 
for secession. In just 15 years, from 1956 to 1970, the discriminatory Sinhalization 
policies had transformed Tamils (around 12% of total population) from an 
overrepresented to an underrepresented community, with its share in Sri Lanka’s 
administrative services, for example, falling from 30% to 5% and in clerical services from 
50% to 5%.881 As a consequence, the moderate and non-violent generation of Tamil 
autonomists under the banner of the Federal Party and its leader S. J. V. 
Chelvanayakam, mainly form an urban intelligentsia from the upper-caste Vellala, gave 
way to a younger, militant, rural and lower-caste Karaiyar generation, which embraced 
violence, targeting the Sri Lankan Army, Sinhala civilians and moderate Tamils.882 New 
Delhi responded with a coercive posture after the 1983 riots, culminating in the Indo-Sri 
Lanka Agreement of 1987 and an Indian military presence to enforce conflict resolution.  
Chapter 3 examined the strategic assessments that drove this intervention, chiefly among 
which were Colombo’s non-cooperative attitude (dispensation), the dangers of the island’s 
spiraling instability spilling-over into India (order), and the conflict’s creeping 
internationalization (geopolitics). All three assessments were, however, influenced by a 
causal link that Indian decision-makers traced between the illiberal and ethno-nationalist 
nature of the Sri Lankan regime, on the one hand, and the escalating conflict and its 
security risks for India, on the other hand. In no other crisis response is the liberal and 
long-term focus in India’s strategic thinking and posture so apparent, effectively aligning 
with short-term priorities and determining its posture. 
                                                
881 DeVotta, Blowback, 126. 
882 See Wilson, Chelvanayakam, 84 and following. On May 14, 1976, the Tamil United Liberation Front 
called for secession and Tamil Eelam: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1070. 
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India’s assessments were based on an extraordinarily consensual diagnostic of Sri Lanka’s 
spiraling strife as a symptom of the ethno-nationalist malady plaguing successive Sri 
Lankan governments since 1956. Whatever their background, Indian officials widely 
agreed with J. N. Dixit’s assessment that the “rise of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka was the 
result of [the Sinhala majority’s] systematic, orchestrated and deliberate, discrimination 
against the minority”. 883  This diagnostic was in no way restricted only to Indian 
diplomats. Army Gen. Harkirat Singh, who oversaw the first deployment of the Indian 
Peacekeeping Force in late 1987, recalls that the “seeds of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka 
can be traced to the policy of successive governments in systematically sidelining the 
Tamil minority population.”884 The same views prevailed in the internal and external 
intelligence agencies.885 
Beyond just principled preoccupation, Indian decision-makers were chiefly concerned 
about the practical effects on their country’s domestic and regional security interests. In her 
annual speech on India’s independence day, on August 15, 1984, PM I. Gandhi 
reiterated her commitment to non-interference in principle, but emphasized that “the 
manner in which a particular community is being attacked for the last so many years has 
                                                
883 March 10, 1989, in New Delhi: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.4, 2345. For another official view from the 
period, see deputy EAM K. A. Khan’s statement to Parliament in April 1985: “unfortunately, as a result of 
the accumulated frustration, they asked for a separate homeland in 1976” MEA, "FAR 1985," 98, see also 
114-5. For views of diplomats who served in Sri Lanka in the 1970s and 1980s, see Coelho, Palk Straits, 103, 
49; Abraham, "Emergence of the LTTE," 20; Rajendra M. Abhyankar, Stuff happens: an anecdotal insight into 
Indian diplomacy (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2013), 48. 
884 Harkirat Singh, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 20. 
885 For a domestic intelligence view, by a former IB director, see Narayanan, "Role of Intelligence," 117-8. 
For an external intelligence version, by a former RAW director, A. K. Verma, see: 
http://m.indiatoday.in/technology/story/research-and-analysis-wing-south-indians-lobby-suffers-a-set-
back/1/337446.html. 
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come in the way of restoration of peace. … [which concerns India because] we want our 
neighbouring countries to be stable and friendly towards us.”886  
Sri Lanka’s discriminatory policies were thus no longer seen as detrimental merely to the 
Tamils, but now also directly harming India. India’s deputy head of mission in Colombo 
in 1983, R. Abhyankar, thus recalls that after the race riots, New Delhi began seeing the 
policies of the Sri Lankan government “no longer as only anti-Tamil, but also anti-
India.”887 This did not mean, however, carving out a separate state – in fact, India’s 
involvement was driven precisely by the quest to ensure the island-country’s long-term 
territorial integrity.888 
Referring to India’s involved role, in 1984 External Affairs Minister N. Rao described it 
as an apprehensive “neighbor” providing good offices, “between a witness and a 
participant”:  
[we are] ready and willing to help them … so that they get over their own problems because their 
problem … becomes our problem. There is really no difference on the likelihood of their problem 
becoming our problem. It is just like two adjacent houses.889 
To protect India from the fire across the Palk Straits, New Delhi thus felt compelled to 
interfere, underlining that its respect for Sri Lanka’s sovereignty depended on Colombo’s 
capacity to keep its own house in order and deter nuisance. Three year later, in 1987, as 
violence escalated on the island, Rao’s deputy, K. N. Singh, thus gave an early definition 
                                                
886 MEA, "FAR 1984," 237. Foreign Secretary M. K. Rasgotra recalls India’s main message around 1983-
84: “don’t fear our intervention, but you [Government of Sri Lanka] created an issue that is [now] affecting 
us, [so] we expect you to deal with your problem” (Interview 040). 
887 Interview 001 and Abhyankar, Stuff happens, 54-61. 
888 The former IB director M. K. Narayanan recalls: “At no point India had an interest in a conflict or war 
with or in Sri Lanka, because we had enough problems on our borders, [in the] Northeast, [and in] 
Kashmir, so we realized that we needed to ensure that these [Tamil] people tapered their ambitions in a 
way which gave them all the benefits they required … without carving out a separate state” (Interview 077). 
889 May 7, before parliament: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1601. 
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of an Indian doctrine of humanitarian or liberal interventionism, noting that “even in 
International Law actions of one State which have repercussions on the affairs of another 
State cannot be strictly termed ‘exclusive concern’ of that State.”890 Domestic security 
took precedence in Indian assessments and was, in turn, seen as depending on a liberal 
regime change in Sri Lanka.  
In 1985, PM R. Gandhi’s had accordingly instructed his outgoing Ambassador J. N. Dixit 
to make the Sri Lankan government “responsive to India’s security and strategic 
interests” and to facilitate the quest for a mutually acceptable political system that would 
“ensure the maximum fulfillment of legitimate Tamil aspirations,” even while “not 
disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of a small neighbor.”891 In fact, as the 
insurgents expanded their operations across the island’s Northeast and strengthened their 
secessionist claims, the latter aspect of PM R. Gandhi’s instructions also hid a second and 
equally important mission to “bring an end to separatist Tamil terrorism.”892 As Dixit 
would recall later, “the LTTE’s objective of creating a separate political entity, purely on 
the basis of [Tamil] language, ethnicity and religion, would be a challenge to the plural 
multi-dimensional democratic identity of India.”893  
Serving in the Intelligence Bureau at the time, M. K. Narayanan recalls that New Delhi’s 
approach to the conflict and advice to Colombo, was a mirror image of India’s own state-
                                                
890 “… Inevitably no solution can be found without our good offices.” March 19, 1987, before parliament: 
MEA, "FAR 1987," 94. The Joint Secretary on charge of Sri Lanka at the time, K. Sahdev, also recalls 
India’s favorable view of Sri Lankan minister Gamini Dessanayake’s statement supporting Indian 
involvement because “sovereignty does not consist of making trouble to neighbours,” (quoted in by Sahdev 
in Interview 013). 
891 Dixit, Assignment, 4-5. For an overview of Indian objectives in Sri Lanka up to 1987, see p. 45. 
892 Quoted as a main aspect of the mission, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, in Dixit, Assignment, 214. 
893 Dixit, Assignment, 154. See also Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 51, 60. 
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building experience, successfully anchored in a 1956 constitutional change that 
reorganized its semi-federal states along ethno-linguistic lines: 
The Sanskrit-Tamil [linguistic and civilizational] difference and potential for dispute is 
extraordinary, and [in India] we kept it together. Nehru had understood this historical [Tamil] 
dimension, and making English [India’s] official language was part of this strategy behind the 
Indian ethos [and its success]. … if you have a strong linguistic minority, which has every right to 
claim independence, you got to play your cards and bring them in. That’s the lesson we were 
passing on to Sri Lanka, both in principle and for our own security.894 
Throughout the 1980s, Indian officials therefore kept reminding their Sri Lankan 
counterparts that implementing liberal decentralization to respond to Tamil demands 
would strengthen Sri Lanka and preserve its territorial integrity, instead of weakening it as 
feared by many within the Sinhala majority.  
Such prescriptions did not suddenly fall out of the sky, as often suggested by those arguing 
that the Indian government cynically instrumentalized (or even engineered) the conflict to 
weaken its neighbor and consolidate its alleged hegemonic ambitions. As noted in the 
previous section, and also alluded to in Chapter 3, India’s approach was a mirror-view of 
its own experience in successfully defusing Tamil separatism, most notably by basing the 
1956 States Reorganisation Act on ethno-linguistic criteria. Speaking in Jaffna in 1979, 
exactly four years before the “Black July” riots, the Indian High Commissioner T. 
Abraham had thus emphasized that “in a pluralist society such as in India and Sri Lanka, 
it is all the more necessary to ensure that such [language, creed, religious faith] differences 
                                                
894 Interview 077. See also EAM Bhagat, on March 24, 1986, in parliament: “It should be the duty of any 
wise government to accommodate their own people. You see our own example, how we have tried to 
accommodate the various sections.” MEA, "FAR 1986," 72. 
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… are resolved through free discussion of ways and means, and not allowed to develop 
into divisive forces.”895 
However, while Colombo did formally cooperate after 1983, New Delhi’s strategic and 
long-term view kept clashing with President Jayewardene’s tactical and “short-sighted” 
approach.896 After 1985, PM R. Gandhi thus denounced Colombo’s obstinate quest for a 
military solution, which could only be “temporary measure” to “suppress the problem,” 
and instead emphasized the importance of a “peaceful” and “negotiated” solution 
because “we must not look just to one or two years or five years [but] much further 
ahead, and see that the atmosphere is retrieved to an extent that the Tamils feel safe and 
confident.”897 
Finally, on July 29, 1987, after flying in to Colombo to sign the bilateral agreement, the 
Indian Prime Minister offered the most cogent definition of the causal link between 
democracy and security, which motivated Indian intervention on the island: 
Where there is discrimination and discord, a nation’s security becomes fragile. Unity cannot be 
imposed. It has to arise from a sense of common belonging, common participation, common 
endeavour and a common destiny. Both our countries have had the vision to choose democratic 
forms of government. Democracy is both the rule of the majority and the security of the minorities. 
No society can be wholly free of tension and friction. But democracy resolves them through 
discussion and accommodation.898 
                                                
895 June 20, 1979: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.1, 134. On July 23, 1983, PM I. Gandhi in her first official 
reaction to the “Black July” riots: “In societies like ours, civil liberties, in particular the rights of the 
minorities and respect for and promotion of these rights, assume special importance.” Bhasin, India-Sri 
Lanka v.3, 1467-8. 
896 Expression used by C. Garekhan (Interview 034). 
897 March 4, 1987 and April 9, 1985, in parliament: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1844; MEA, "FAR 1985," 
102. In a letter to Jayewardene, on May 7, 1985, R. Gandhi emphasizes: “we have to think of a solution 
which will hold good not only for the immediate future but at least for the next fifteen to twenty years,” 
Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.3, 1678-9. 
898 In Colombo, on Sri Lanka’s public TV broadcaster. See also his July 31 statement: MEA, "FAR 1987," 
259, 52.  
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However, beyond good intentions, over the next 32 months India’s involvement with a 
peak military deployment of 52,000 men failed catastrophically to disarm the insurgents 
and implement regime liberalization.899  
Just a few days after the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) withdrew, in early 1990, 
Tamil Tiger leader T. V. Prabhakaran gloated about a “grand victory to our struggle,” 
and referred to the Indian involvement as a “Himalayan blunder.”900 On the other 
extreme, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister R. Wijeratne boasted that “one of our soldiers is 
equal to ten IPKF men [Indian soldiers],” and hinted at an impending conflict 
resolution.901 As expected by New Delhi, however, the cease-fire between the government 
and insurgents only lasted for a few more weeks: in July, Jaffna’s Tamils suffered an 
unparalleled bombing spree from the Sri Lankan Air Force, and less than one year later, 
in March 1991, the Tigers responded by assassinating minister R. Wijeratna.902 The 
Indians were finally gone, but the conflict raged on more viciously than ever. 
 
c) 2009: persistent pursuit of liberalization despite short-term adjustment 
The long-term, liberal and strategic assessments that determined India’s coercive posture 
in the 1980s remained firmly entrenched in the 2000s, as the Sri Lankan Army went on 
the offensive in 2006 to defeat the insurgents and end the civil war, in 2009. Unlike in 
1987, however, this time New Delhi engaged the Sri Lankan government, rendering both 
tacit and active assistance without which Colombo could not have achieved its military 
                                                
899 Around 1,200 were killed in action, and thousands injured: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.4, 1981; Bhasin, 
India-Sri Lanka v.5, 2444. 
900 Statement on April 1, 1990: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.5, 2586. 
901 Wijeratne was a retired Lt. Col. of the Army: Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.5, 2629, fn1. ISLR v5 p2629 fn1 
902 Wijeratne was killed by a bomb on March 2, 1991 along with five of his bodyguards and 13 civilians. 
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victory. Chapter 4 examined the Indian strategic assessments driving such engagement, 
including Colombo’s cooperative attitude contrasting with the insurgent’s obstinate 
separatism (dispensation), concern about the conflict escalating with devastating 
consequences across the border (order), and a balancing act between Chinese support and 
Western pressures (geopolitics).  
The change in India’s posture from the 1980s reflected adjustment to a new ground 
reality: T. V. Prabhakaran’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had virtually 
eliminated all rival organizations, established a de facto Tamil state in the North and East 
of the country, and subsequently refused to commit to any political solution short of 
secession, even while expanding his military capabilities. As this clashed with India’s 
political approach to conflict resolution, it became apparent that, however improbable or 
difficult, Sri Lanka’s regime liberalization required the prior elimination of the LTTE. 
Comparing the 1980s and the 2000s, M. K. Narayanan describes the adjustment: 
So it was [the] converse of what we had previously [in the 1980s]. Eliminating the LTTE 
[now] became an important part of the need to preserve the Indian state. Instead of the [long-
term] ideological or philosophical underpinnings we were worried of [in the 1980s], you were 
now first worried about [short-term] security implications of the LTTE for India, not so much in 
Sri Lanka. … [But] Our larger [long-term] interest continued … : take out the LTTE and 
implement 13A [constitutional amendments proposed by India in 1987].903 
In a 2008 interview, just as the LTTE defensive barriers collapsed under a formidable Sri 
Lankan Army offensive, the former director of India’s external intelligence agency, A. K. 
Verma, emphasized presciently that “if the concerns of the Tamils are not satisfied by 
mutual dialogue, even if militarily defeated, the old ghosts will rise again to torment [Sri 
Lanka] later [because] whether or not the LTTE is vanquished, these [Tamil] aspirations 
                                                
903 Interview 077.  
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have a life of their own and will keep looking for fulfillment.”904 So while India looked the 
other way or secretly supported the Sri Lankan military offensive, it also advised 
Colombo to implement “13A”, the acronymic mantra referring to the constitutional 
amendment enshrined in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987, which New Delhi had 
prescribed to satisfy Tamil demands.905  
While underlining that “the only way out is a negotiated, political settlement which meets 
the legitimate aspirations of all communities while respecting the unity, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka,” the Indian government was therefore signaling that a 
military victory on the operational front, against the LTTE, was not tantamount to a 
military solution of the conflict’s deeper roots, of which the insurgents were only an 
expression. Such a settlement should, therefore, “include, among other things, a credible 
and genuine devolution package and implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Sri 
Lankan Constitution.”906  
In early 2009, as the final offensive raged on, Foreign Secretary S. S. Menon clarified this 
distinction and stressed the urgency of what India variably referred to as a 
“comprehensive” political solution, understanding or settlement:  
There is no military solution to this problem, for instance, no matter how the military situation 
might fluctuate. One side might be up, down, today, tomorrow, whatever.  … [But] there is a 
political aspect which needs work because until there is a political understanding within the 
                                                
904 http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2008/10/old-ghosts-will-rise-again-if-sri.html.  
905 MEA, "AR 08-09," 15. Speaking after his Jan. 27, 2009 visit to Sri Lanka, EAM P. Mukherkee 
emphasized that “military victories offer a political opportunity to restore life to normalcy in the Northern 
Province and throughout Sri Lanka, after twenty three years of conflict,” and referred to 1987’s 13th 
amendment: Bhasin, IFR 2009, 1514. An Indian official working on Sri Lanka at the EAM at the time, 
recalls that India’s policy was based on two “articles of faith”: 1) to protect territorial unity and integrity of 
Sri Lanka “at all cost;” and 2) “13A as the only solution to tackle the conflict at its root”. (Interview 020) 
906 MEA, "AR 06-07," iv. This definition and sequence was also widely acknowledged as driving policy by 
various Indian officials interviewed. 
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framework of a united Sri Lanka, within which all the communities in Sri Lanka are comfortable, 
you cannot speak of a political solution of the situation in Sri Lanka.907 
After the end of the war, India was initially willing to give Sri Lankan President M. 
Rajapaksa the benefit of the doubt and concentrated efforts on assisting in massive relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.  
But as time went on, patience quickly ran out in New Delhi.908 The Foreign Secretary at 
the time, N. Rao (2009-11), thus recalls that “after 2011, it gradually became clear that 
[President] Rajapaksa was not delivering on the promise [of a political devolution 
package]” but that India persisted on engagement because “only India could really make 
the difference in Sri Lanka” by playing a “delicate game” in its “soft underbelly”: a) to 
ensure regime stability, given the controversial 2010 presidential elections, that could 
have led to a military coup by defeated candidate S. Fonseka; b) to impede the revival of 
LTTE or any other form of Tamil extremism; c) maintain good relations with the Sri 
Lankan government to preserve privileged access to relief, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction plans;  and d) fulfill the Tamil minority’s expectations about India, 
particularly after a “sense of betrayal” following the IPKF withdrawal in 1990.909 In 
2011, PM M. Singh thus reiterated that the “decimation of the LTTE was something 
                                                
907 Jan. 5, 2009 MEA Briefing: http://mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?5555. On March 1, EAM 
Mukherjee reiterated: “the Sri Lankan military success should be quickly followed by a political solution 
involving a credible devolution that will meet the legitimate aspirations of all communities, including the 
Tamils,” Bhasin, IFR 2009, 102; MEA, "AR 09-10," 17.  
908 M. K. Narayanan recalls: “In 2009, India was riding the crest, at least until the elections [in early 2010]. 
2009 was probably the best year we had. But once the Sri Lankan government got saddled, things changed 
… crux of the issue was 13A and at least as war went on we could say ‘OK, let’s wait’, but after that not 
much longer,” (Interview 077).  
909 Interview 023.  
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good … but the Tamil problem does not disappear, with the defeat of the LTTE” 
because “the Tamil population has legitimate grievances.”910  
Decreasing Indian patience would eventually lead to subsequent bilateral crises, not 
analyzed in detail in this dissertation, but which indicate the entrenched influence and 
salience of liberal and long-term thought in New Delhi’s strategic assessments, even while 
its posture’s specific policy calibration may vary. In March 2012, for example, India voted 
in favor of a country-specific UNHRC resolution, initiated and sponsored by the United 
States, which urged Sri Lanka to conduct an inquire into allegations about human rights 
abuses perpetrated by its Army in 2009.911  
And just three months after taking the oath of office as India’s 15th Prime Minister, in 
2014, N. Modi hosted a delegation of Sri Lanka’s Tamil National Alliance and “stressed 
the need for a political solution that addresses the aspirations of the Tamil community for 
equality, dignity, justice and self respect [and for] a political solution that builds upon the 
13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution.”912  
On his visit to the island in 2015, N. Modi became the first-ever Indian Prime Minister to 
visit the Tamil-majority city of Jaffna, and before the Sri Lankan parliament, implicitly 
prescribed his principle of “cooperative federalism:” 
All of us in this region, indeed every nation of diversity, have dealt with the issues of identities and 
inclusion, of rights and claims, of dignity and opportunity for different sections of our societies. 
We have all seen its diverse expressions. …. Each of us has sought to address these complex 
issues in our own ways. … Sri Lanka has lived through decades of tragic violence and conflict. 
You have successfully defeated terrorism and brought the conflict to an end. You now stand at a 
                                                
910 June 29, 2011 interaction with newspaper editors: Bhasin, IFR 2011, 660. 
911 Indian officials interviewed mention this was intended as a way to pressure President M. Rajapaksa to 
deliver on the political front and implement constitutional amendments: Foreign Secretary N. Rao (023), 
High Commissioner A. Prasad (008) and NSA S. S. Menon (078). 
912 Aug. 23: http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-receives-tamil-national-alliance-delegation  
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moment of historic opportunity to win the hearts and heal the wounds across all sections of 
society.913 
Commenting on this persistent thread in India’s Sri Lanka policy, former NSA M. K. 
Narayanan thus recalls that it “often looks bad in appearance but reflects continuity and 
is far from over.”914 
 
3. Myanmar: Between Authoritarian Allure and Democratic Promises  
India’s strategic assessments during crises in Myanmar reflect a varying but persistent 
focus on the comparative short- and long-term advantages of different regime types, 
mainly between liberal democracy emphasizing state building through pluralism and 
decentralization, and military authoritarianism emphasizing order and centralization. 
 
a) 1962: Acute authoritarian allure to ensure state survival, stability and security 
New Delhi’s assessments and engaging posture after the military coup of 1962, which 
marked the end of democratic rule and the advent of a new authoritarian order under 
General Ne Win, splendidly reflects Indian causal thinking on how, at least in the short-
term, illiberal rule can be both necessary and beneficial. While similar to the case of 
Nepal, where it also engaged the authoritarian regime of King Mahendra after his coup 
of 1960, India’s lesser leverage to shape events in Burma, however, makes its pragmatic 
and short-term focus more apparent, even while Indian officials also expressed their 
principled discomfort and skepticism about the regime’s long-term success. 
                                                
913On March 13, in Colombo: http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-pms-address-to-the-
sri-lankan-parliament. 
914 Interview 077. 
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Chapter 2’s detailed examination of these strategic assessments demonstrated how 
decision-makers recognized the declining capacity of Prime Minister U Nu’s democratic 
dispensation to exercise authority and solve internal rebellions as a liability for Indian 
domestic security (dispensation and order), which was compounded by the dangers of his 
geopolitical rapprochement to China (geopolitics). Indian assessments, however, pivoted on 
the issue of state capacity and stability: whether liberal or authoritarian, the Burmese 
state’s survival was immediately at stake given its tremendous domestic challenges, with a 
variety of secessionist insurgencies battling its armed forces.  
The primacy of such preoccupations about the neighbor’s stability was reflected in India’s 
positive response to the preceding “soft coup” of 1958, when democratic rule was 
interrupted for two years by a military caretaker government under General Ne Win. 
Despite domestic pressures, Nehru refused to classify it as a coup and referred to the 
takeover as being “in the interest of democracy.”915 The Indian Ambassador in Rangoon, 
L. Mehrotra, characterized the events as a “coerced abdication” and similarly legitimized 
the coup as being in the interest of domestic stability: 
Nobody is so naïve as not to admit that the passing of power into the hands of the army during 
peace time is by no means a very desirable thing. But it is equally admitted that the conditions in 
the strife-torn country had become so bad as to warrant this unusual step.916 
Two years later, as the military interregnum came to an end, another Indian diplomat 
would echo the same approach, giving an overall positive evaluation of the generals’ rule, 
as “their aims [are] praiseworthy and their results sometimes spectacular.”917  
                                                
915 NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/58 p. 111. 
916 NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/58 p. 110. 
917 NAI, MEA 3(12)-R&I/60 p. 93. 
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India’s decision to engage the authoritarian regime after the coup of March 1962 was 
therefore rooted in a dual assessment about military rule being not only inevitable, but 
also desirable. On the Indian Embassy’s inputs to PM J. Nehru just a few days after the 
putsch, the No.2 a the time, E. Gonsalves, recalls that “we were fairly confident that the 
Generals were going to remain and there would be no return to the democratic set up.” 
He went to reassuringly describe the Burmese Army as a “professional [organization], the 
main political force, like the Indian National Congress [ruling party] in India,” and 
therefore as an indispensable guarantor of stability after the democratic experiment had 
faltered and failed.918  
As bilateral relations gradually improved despite severe challenges over the next years, 
Indian assessments suggest a level of reassurance by Ne Win’s focus on order, “slowly but 
surely amalgamating all the territories of the Union into a single, highly centralized 
Unitary State.”919 The Indian Ambassador R. D. Katari, who began his posting in May 
1964, forwarded particularly positive assessments. As a retired Navy Chief, his views 
naturally placed greater emphasis on the benign effects of military rule, in particular on 
domestic stability and security, underlining the short-term benefits of greater Burmese 
internal order to India. Following Ne Win’s February, 1965 visit to India, he thus refers 
to a “positive” and “improving trend” in bilateral relations.920  
                                                
918 In Rana, "Oral History Record of Ambassador Eric Gonsalves," 33-34. The second quote is from the 
interview (070): “We didn’t think [at] that time that we could hold Burma to any higher standards than 
most of our other neighbors in Asia. Generals taking over [all around] was not a surprise and in trend with 
the time.” 
919 NAI, MEA HI/1012(12)/64-I p. 19.  
920 NAI, MEA HI/1011(12)65 p. 34. Katari was also critical of bureaucratic delays and reluctance to 
engage the regime: “Ne Win would have dearly liked some support and sustenance from India, even if only 
on the moral plane. He even made a personal effort to achieve this [1965 visit]. Unfortunately we were in 
no mood to give this.” Katari, Sailor, 137. 
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By 1965, relations had fully normalized.921 The issue of expatriate and stateless Indians in 
Burma had been largely resolved (discussed in detail in Chapter 2), and India also 
appreciated Burma’s neutral stance during its war with Pakistan, in September 1965.922 
Of greatest salience to New Delhi, however, was that the Burmese regime had been 
successfully sensitized to Indian concerns about its domestic security situation in the 
Northeast, which required cross-border counter-insurgency assistance from Rangoon and 
an eye on China.  
Speaking to U.S. Secretary of State D. Rusk, in late 1963, Burma’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs thus noted that the generals were “quite aware of Indian sensitivities [border 
security and China] and are being extremely careful on this score.”923 Ambassador R. D. 
Katari, in turn, recalled that after he shared specific evidence on Indian insurgents’ safe 
havens in the country’s isolated Northern regions, around 1964-5, “they [Burmese] woke 
up to their responsibility … [and] set to with vigour, but only with partial success, to 
mount operations against the Naga [insurgent] traffic (…) This was certainly of help to us. 
Even more helpful was the fact that they kept us fed with intelligence on the movement of 
the rebels.”924  
However, such support did not blind Indian assessments from recognizing the regime’s 
true colors. After 1962, Indian officials and leaders had refrained from making public 
statements criticizing Burma’s authoritarian system, either excusing themselves with non-
interference or by making contrived comments about the legitimacy of different political 
                                                
921 See e.g. EAM S. Singh, on Nov. 24, 1965, before parliament: “The relations with Burma have also 
shown considerable improvement over the last year and a half.” MEA, "Foreign Affairs Record 1965," 
(New Delhi 1966), 337. 
922 Katari, Sailor, 143-4. 
923 Quoted in https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d61.  
924 Katari, Sailor, 141, 46-7. 
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systems to achieve common objectives.925 In private, however, their assessments betrayed 
their liberal instincts, categorically abhorring and demarcating India’s parliamentary 
system from General Ne Win’s autocratic regime.  
In his annual report for 1964, just after arriving in Rangoon, Ambassador Katari thus 
refers to the “totalitarian” methods of the Revolutionary Council and to the generals as 
“people in a hurry,” and also deplores the militarization of administration by Army 
official.926 Reacting to a Burmese statement comparing and equating both country’s 
political systems, in early 1964, the Indian deputy chief of mission and senior-most 
foreign service officer in Rangoon, E. Gonsalves, thus noted sarcastically: “the fact that 
our socialism differed from Burmese socialism in that ours is democratic, was of course 
conveniently overlooked.”927  
More importantly, Indian assessments also expressed a causal skepticism about its long-
term sustainability. Commenting on a constitutional amendment that put Burma under 
single-party rule, E. Gonsalves, transmitted such pessimism rather candidly to New Delhi: 
The creation of the [Burmese] socialist dictatorship will now proceed unhindered from any source. 
[But] it remains to be seen whether the elimination of all vocal opposition and criticism and the 
substitution of artificial adulation for all Government action will provide a better atmosphere for 
correcting the mistakes that any developing country and inexperienced Governments are bound to 
commit in considerable measure.928 
 
                                                
925 See e.g EAM S. Singh, in Sept. 1964, to parliament: “The Burma Government now are engaged in a 
vast programme of socialisation for the purpose of achieving what they call ‘Burmese way to Socialism’. It is 
not for us to quarrel with the internal policies of the Burma Government; indeed we appreciate their efforts, 
and the success of such efforts, to adopt a socialist way of life,” MEA, "FAR 1964," 204. 
926 NAI, MEA HI/1011(12)65 pp. 19, 20-22.  
927 NAI, MEA HI/1012(12)/64-I p. 45. 
928  1964 letter of CdA Eric Gonsalves to N P Alexander, Deputy Sec MEA, Apr 3, 1964, NAI 
HI/1012(12)/64-I p27-28. Commenting on the National Solidarity Preservation Law, announced in 1964 
as a constitutional move to single-party rule under the Burma Socialist Programme Party. 
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b) 1988: The promises of liberalization overrule an exhausted autocracy 
As General Ne Win’s radical economic policies, international isolationism and inability to 
end insurgencies led the Burmese state onto a spiraling decline after the 1970s, E. 
Gonsalves’ long-term assessment of 1964 proved prescient: devoid of internal freedom, 
the “socialist dictatorship” soon proved unable to correct “the mistakes that any 
developing country and inexperienced [g]overnments are bound to commit.”929  
As examined in Chapter 3, given the regime’s isolation, weakness and non-cooperative 
attitude (dispensation), its inability to quell internal dissent and unwillingness to cooperate 
on counter-insurgency (order), and its rising alignment with China (geopolitics), Indian 
strategic assessments determined a posture of coercion, supporting regime liberalization 
during the 1988 crisis.  
Such assessments denote a dual Indian causal link, on the decreasing efficacy of the 
authoritarian regime, and conversely the attractive promises of democratization. L. 
Pudaite, who served as India’s ambassador to Yangon in the mid-1990s, recalled that 
while morally “bound to favour a democratic Myanmar”, India’s “vital interests compel 
active cooperation with whatever regime the country has.” 930  While broadly 
representative of India’s default posture, by pitting values against interests such a 
simplistic definition fails, however, to reflect the short- and long-term calculus in India’s 
changing posture (coercion in 1988, followed by engagement in 1991). 
Even before the revolt of 1988, Indian officials had diagnosed the long-term exhaustion of 
the authoritarian regime as an insurmountable obstacle to improvement in bilateral 
                                                
929 Apr. 3, 1964: NAI, MEA HI/1012(12)/64-I p. 27-28. 
930 Pudaite, Mizoram and look east policy, 47. 
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relations. S. Devare, who was sent to Rangoon as Counselor (1980-2) with the specific 
mission of improving relations recalls seeing “great opportunities in Rangoon, but the 
serious problems in Burma like the ethnic insurgency, complete military dominance and 
as a result the closed nature of the society etc. stood in the way.”931 T. P. Sreenivasan, 
who succeeded him in the mid-1980s, as deputy chief of mission, laments in a similar tone 
that “one of the early democracies in our neighborhood, with which India had fraternal 
relations, became the laboratory of a pseudo-socialistic megalomaniac.”932  
After repeated attempts to engage failed, the resignation of Ne Win and the possibility of 
free elections were thus naturally welcome in New Delhi. The Joint Secretary in charge of 
Burma at the time of the revolt, K. Sahdev recalls: 1) “We don’t sponsor or impose pro-
democracy, but when it came up [in Burma] we looked favorably to it, that was our 
natural inclination;” 2) The assessment was that the “democratic movement would 
succeed, reform the country and benefit India” and 3) The presence of Aung San Suu 
Kyi in Burma was a factor, because “we felt that she would be more favorable to us [than 
Ne Win].”933  
For the next two years, until 1990, India extended moral and logistical support to pro-
democracy forces in Burma, expecting that their success and a consequent inter-
democratic bond between both countries would have a positive effect on bilateral 
relations. As late as 1990, the Indian government kept emphasizing how normalization 
                                                
931 Sudhir T. Devare, "Oral History: India’s ‘Rediscovery’ of the East," Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 6, no. 3 
(2011): 340.  
932  Sreenivasan, Words, 58. 
933 Interview 013. See Chapter 3 for India’s principled posture, welcoming and supporting democratic 
change, and free elections in 1990. This continued up to 1991: e.g. on Feb. 18, 1991, the MEA’s official 
spokesperson expressed a “very natural sympathy that India has for the democratic aspirations of the 
people of Myanmar,” MEA, "FAR 1991," 24.  
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and improvement in the relationship were contingent on further political liberalization in 
Burma. Reacting to the election of May, 1990, the Ministry of External Affairs noted: 
The first genuine elections held in Myanmar after almost twenty-eight year s resulted in an 
overwhelming verdict in favour of democratic forces. Despite this clear verdict, power has not been 
transferred to the elected representatives of her people. We hope this will be done soon so that 
normalcy can return in the country, facilitating the revival and strengthening of our bilateral 
relations with Myanmar.934  
However, as it soon became apparent that the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) was firmly entrenching itself as a reformed autocratic avatar of Ne Win’s 
regime, the short-term focus once again took precedence in India’s assessments after 
1991. On becoming Foreign Secretary, in November 1991, J. N Dixit recalls Myanmar as 
reflecting a “dilemma [of] dealing with the contradictory demands of being supportive of 
democratic forces, and interacting with the de facto government”.935 He was, however, 
speaking in public, and thus exaggerating the dilemma for domestic consumption: over 
the next months, under PM N. Rao’s instructions, he developed a superbly pragmatic 
and semi-clandestine policy of engagement towards the Burmese junta, beginning with 
first official talks in the Spring of 1992.936 
Two areas reflect the Indian causal link on how Burma’s democratization was expected to 
benefit India’s domestic and external security. First, given Ne Win’s association with 
China in the 1980s, New Delhi foresaw that liberalization would lead to a geostrategic 
reorientation of Yangon away from Beijing and towards India and Southeast Asia. 
Commenting on this geopolitical driver of India’s pro-democracy policy, I. P. Singh, 
India’s Ambassador in Rangoon during 1988, recalls: 
                                                
934 MEA, "AR 90-91," ix. 
935 J. N. Dixit, My South Block years: memoirs of a foreign secretary (New Delhi: UBS 1996), 47. 
936 Dixit, Neighbours, 326. 
	  
	   349	  
Burma fits into China’s strategic design to have both the western and eastern flanks of India 
under the control of its close friends [the other one being Pakistan] … Thus, India has reason to 
have more than ideological interest in a democratic government coming to power in Burma. Seen 
from this angle, the people of Burma, while fighting for restoration of democracy in their country, 
are also indirectly fighting for India’s security.937 
But after 1992, as the SLORC junta consolidated its power after an internal purge and 
announced economic reforms and a gradual opening of the country, the long-term link 
between Myanmar’s democracy and India’s external security thus weakened, favoring 
short-term engagement instead.938  
Second, in terms of Indian domestic security (the strategic assessment about order in 
Myanmar), New Delhi’s assessments focused on what regime type could best enhance the 
neighboring state’s internal cohesion and pacification.939 In 1988, given the chronic 
shortcomings of Ne Win’s autocratic regime to strengthen cohesion since 1962, Indian 
assessments focused on liberalization through multi-party and electoral politics as an 
incentive for the ethnic minority insurgencies to join an inclusive and pluralist regime, 
which would, in the long run, foster stability and thus benefit the security of India’s 
Northeastern border states.  
The reasons were clear, as several ethnic insurgent groups supported the pro-democracy 
uprising of 1988, under the joint umbrella organization National Democratic 
Front/Democratic Alliance of Burma. The military crackdown of August, 1988, thus 
risked further destabilization and increasing incentives for the ethnic minorities to secede. 
For example, in September 1988, the Chin National Front sent a letter to PM R. Gandhi 
                                                
937 Singh, "India-Burma Relations," 11. 
938 For two security-centric views arguing for normalization after 1992 due to China and the changing 
geopolitical environment: P. Stobdan, "China's forays into Burma: implications for India," Strategic Analysis 
16, no. 1 (1993); Banerjee, "Myanmar and Indian Security concerns." 
939 Ambassador I. P. Khosla, who served in Myanmar, offers a comprehensive discussion on the primacy of 
state cohesion in India’s policy towards its Eastern neighbor, and the short-term limits and long-term 
strengths of a liberal regime in enhancing it: Khosla, "Cohesion and Liberalism." 
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“seeking merger [of Myanmar’s Chin areas] with the Indian Union”, its demands 
supported by thousands of protesting, co-ethnic Mizos in the Indian state of Mizoram.940 
Similarly, the Kachin Independence Army/Organisation offered crucial support to 
India’s external intelligence and counter-insurgency operations after 1989. B. B. Nandy, a 
senior operative for India’s external intelligence agency RAW, recalls that they did so 
“acknowledging New Delhi’s strong support to the democratic movement in Burma.941 
However, as the SLORC changed policies in late 1989, pursuing a massive military 
modernization program, liberalizing the economy, and implementing a new counter-
insurgency strategy that successfully calibrated force and political inducements, Indian 
assessments focused on the short-term benefits of engaging an autocratic regime that 
delivered unprecedented state cohesion.942 Such assessments were informed by Indian 
observations of other modes of gradual liberalization across Southeast Asia, in the 1990s, 
which tended to be state-managed and top-down, with the military often playing a crucial 
role, whether in Thailand or in Indonesia.943  
Looking back at his decision to focus on the short-term and engage the authoritarian 
regime in 1991, the Foreign Secretary at the time, J. N. Dixit recalls that it was driven by 
a “clinically rational factor” because it assessed that the military regime was deeply 
entrenched and augmenting Myanmar’s state stability. In any case, he notes, 
                                                
940 Lintner, Great game, 127-9. 
941 Nandy, "Security of the north-east Himalayan frontier: challenges and responses," 172-4. See also 
Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's Northeast, 175-7. And 
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=5644. 
942 The success of this new counter-insurgency strategy is examined in detail in Chapter 3. A retired Indian 
ambassador with experience in Myanmar and the region, notes that after 1992, Myanmar moved on to an 
“experimental and pragmatic mix” of authoritarianism with economic liberalization, so “for India, it [was] 
necessary to accept that in Myanmar … the liberal democratic paradigm will not automatically come about 
[in the short-term, but develop gradually instead].” Khosla, "Cohesion and Liberalism," 1640, 68-9. 
943 Retired Indian Army official D. Banerjee refers to the possibility of Myanmar following the “Indonesian 
model” of transition: Banerjee, "Myanmar and Indian Security concerns," 704. 
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democratization could be “risky” and India had no reasons “to unilaterally assume 
responsibility of creating democracies in other countries.”944 After retiring, he further 
predicted that that SLORC was “likely to remain in control in the foreseeable future [and 
that therefore] India should not have any hesitation in building on the relations that we 
have initiated [in 1992].”945 
While the influence of the long-term and causal link equating liberal democracy to 
security thus declined in strategic assessments about the neighbor in the early 1990s, it did 
not disappear, as indicated by Dixit’s cautionary note that engagement “does not imply 
any dilution of India’s commitment to democracy [in Myanmar],” at least in principle 
and in the long term.946  
 
c) 2007: long-term thought, short-term deeds 
J. N. Dixit’s expression of India’s principled “commitment” to democracy in Myanmar 
would be put to test in 2007, as the neighboring country’s military regime faced a massive 
pro-democracy uprising.  
Indian voices rose to pressure the government to take the long-term view on the 
advantages of political liberalization in Myanmar, analyst C. R. Mohan, for example, 
noting that New Delhi should not be debating “whether [to] intervene in favour of the 
pro-democracy movement, but how and on what terms,” while journalist S. Bhaumik 
beckoned officials to refrain from perceiving pro-democracy support as a moral “luxury,” 
                                                
944 Dixit, Neighbours, 326, 30. 
945 Dixit, My South Block years: memoirs of a foreign secretary, 171. 
946 Dixit, Neighbours, 328. 
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but instead as “a sound investment in securing [India’s] own position in the North East 
[border states].” 947  As examined in Chapter 4, however, the Indian government’s 
strategic assessments (on dispensation, order and geopolitics) ended up prioritizing the short-
term returns of engaging the autocratic regime and pursue the historic advance in 
bilateral relations since 2000. 
While the Indian government’s deeds betrayed such an immediate focus, its public 
statements kept expressing a principled commitment to democracy in Myanmar, qualified 
as a “secondary” but not irrelevant issue.948 This principled commitment did not start 
under the “liberal” UPA government, in 2004, but was present from the start of India’s 
normalization with Myanmar in 2000, under the preceding “nationalist” NDA/BJP 
government of PM A. B. Vajpayee. In 2003, the MEA’s spokesperson, N. Sarna, thus 
emphasized that “our policy remains that national reconciliation should be carried 
forward as should the movement towards democracy. We have called for the early release 
of Aung Sang Sui Kyi, who has been recognized by the world as a leader of the 
democratic movement.”949  
In the same vein, in late 2004, PM M. Singh underlined that “we would welcome [the] 
early realization of the goal of multi-party democracy based on national reconciliation 
and an inclusive approach.” 950  These were not just empty words for domestic 
consumption. Two months earlier, in October, the bilateral joint statement on occasion 
                                                
947  C. R. Mohan, “South Block’s Burma Shell,” The Indian Express: Sept. 28, 2007: 
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/south-block-s-burma-shell/221843/0; and Bhaumik, Troubled 
Periphery: Crisis of India's Northeast, 280. 
948 Indian Ambassador R. Bhatia, in 2004, to the U.S. Ambassador and other Western diplomats in 
Yangon: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04RANGOON1374_a.html.  
949 Interacting with journalists on Aug. 11, 2003: Bhasin, IFR 2003, 375. 
950 Dec. 21, 2004, in parliament: Bhasin, IFR 2004, 414.   
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of Myanmar head of state’s visit to India (Senior General Than Shwe) had reserved two 
substantial paragraphs on the issue of democratic reforms: “[the] Indian side noted the 
resolve of the Myanmar leadership to build an enduring democratic system in Myanmar 
and expressed support for national reconciliation and early transition to democracy in 
Myanmar.”951 Even if not determining posture, such expressions of support reflected the 
latent salience of regime type in Indian strategic thought, and how it viewed 
democratization of Myanmar as both desirable and inevitable in the long-term.952  
India’s causal regime preference was rooted in its expectation of how the political 
transition would unfold, which it communicated as advice to the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC), both in public and in private: formal democratization, 
through free elections, could only progress in tandem with a more “inclusive” 
liberalization, by bringing in banned parties such as the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) and by implementing a wider “national reconciliation” between the Burmese-
dominated central state institutions and the ethnic minority insurgencies.953 Responding 
to the 2007 crisis, PM M. Singh thus reiterated India’s position that “the reform process 
                                                
951 Oct. 29: Bhasin, IFR 2004, 955. See also MEA, "Annual Report 2003-04," (New Delhi 2004), 25-6. 
952 For a contrarian view: “India’s ‘Tower of Babel’ of perceptions, interests and voices much impedes the 
definition of a clear roadmap in Burma, including for a democratizing agenda,” Renaud Egreteau, "A 
passage to Burma? India, development, and democratization in Myanmar," Contemporary Politics 17, no. 4 
(2011): 480. It is, naturally, discussable how clearly these objectives were defined, but such a roadmap was 
ominously present in Indian strategic thought, even if only with limited influence on practice, due to 
contingent short-term requirements analyzed in Chapter 4. 
953 See e.g. the MEA’s Annual Report for 2007-08, noting in meetings with their respective counterparts, 
the Indian PM and EAM conveyed “that the national reconciliation and political reform process initiated 
by the Myanmar authorities should be broad-based and inclusive including Daw Aung Saan Suu Kyi and 
the various ethnic nationalities and should be carried forward expeditiously towards a satisfactory 
conclusion,” MEA, "AR 07-08," 11. See also the March 7, 2006 briefing by Foreign Secretary S. Saran: 
Bhasin, IFR 2006, 1402. 
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should be broad based, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi [of the NLD] and the various 
ethnic nationalities, and that it should be carried forward expeditiously.”954  
Indian officials recall that their dual mantra of “democracy” and “national 
reconciliation” at the time was not coincidental, but reflecting their view that being 
interdependent, both were equally necessary for a successful transition and sustainable 
liberal regime. R. Bhatia, India’s Ambassador in Yangon in the mid-2000s, thus recalls 
that “we realized that the civilian-military balance, democratization, and [ethnic] conflict 
between Burman majority and the minorities were linked, and that the latter was actually 
[the] more complex challenge.”955  
S. Saran, who dealt with Myanmar as ambassador in Yangon in 1997-99 and then as 
Foreign Secretary (2004-06) recalls that India packaged its advice to the SPDC carefully, 
cautioning it about the long-term need for greater regime liberalization and inclusiveness: 
“we only pushed the envelope a little, telling them ‘you yourself wanted 
democratization.’” India’s long-term objective was thus to help the SPDC “find [an] 
inclusive political dispensation to allow ethnic groups to be part and parcel of Myanmar’s 
political system.”956 His successor, S. S. Menon (2006-09), confirms: in Myanmar, India 
saw “regime stability and [its] inclusiveness as being interdependent.”957 
Not surprisingly, such thought was reflective of India’s own experience, as expressed by 
Foreign Secretary, R. Mathai in August 2012, just as Myanmar lifted media censorship 
for the first time in half a century: 
                                                
954  Nov. 21, 2007, on his return from Singapore, after meeting Myanmar’s Prime Minister there: 
http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=32897.  
955  Interview 004.  
956 Interview 028. 
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India remains committed to extending all possible assistance and support to the process of national 
reconciliation and the further strengthening of democracy in Myanmar. Our own experience is that 
in fact these processes are interlinked and democracy helps take national reconciliation forward 
both in the sense of bringing communities together and dealing with the gap between rich and 
poor.958 
Similarly, New Delhi’s repeated expressions of commitment to “non-interference” were 
more than just a smokescreen to hide short-term interests or to deflect Western pressures 
against engaging the military regime. Indian officials recognized that, however slowly, 
regime liberalization was advancing gradually and irreversibly since the late 1990s, 
through an unprecedented economic opening, a series of cease-fires with the ethnic 
insurgencies, and a constitutional process towards civilian rule.959  
Reflecting its experienced concern about the perils of regime transition, especially if 
induced or coerced from abroad, India feared that external pressure would risk a reversal 
into further autocracy, isolation and internal destabilization. As early as 2003, Foreign 
Secretary K. Sibal, had therefore emphasized that while India supported the “movement 
of Myanmar towards democracy, internal reconciliation solutions must be found from the 
inside … [and] there should not be a tendency to impose solutions from outside or try to 
accelerate artificially the process of internal reconciliation through sanctions and 
pressure.”960 This explains Indian officials’ insult and exasperation when, during his 
address to the Indian parliament, in 2010, U.S. President B. Obama implicitly criticized 
                                                
958 Aug. 17, 2012, in Imphal, in a keynote address on a conference on “India and her Neighbours,” Bhasin, 
IFR 2012, 818. Media censorship was lifted on August 20.  
959 The former RAW representative in Yangon, for example, recalls that, “[in the late 1990s] we were 
convinced that [the] regime would eventually reform, so we didn’t need U.S. emissaries to tell us what to do 
in Myanmar,” (P. Heblikar, Interview 047). Waving off American pressures to predict, In 2006, when 
democratization would happen, India’s Ambassador in Yangon, B. K. Mitra, is reported to have answered: 
“It can happen in ten years or tomorrow.”  https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RANGOON612_a.html.  
960 Bhasin, IFR 2003, 651. See also PM M. Singh’s statement, on Dec. 14, 2005, after meeting Myanmar’s 
SPDC leader: “the answer [on how to build democracy] has to be found by the people of Myanmar 
themselves. (…) it was not my purpose to advise him what political arrangements they should have,” 
Bhasin, IFR 2005, 785-6. 
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India’s engagement policy towards Myanmar, which had been clearly communicated to, 
and allegedly understood by Washington via bilateral dialogues since the mid-2000s.961 
When the SPDC generals finally opened up the regime in 2011, holding the country’s 
first free elections since 1960 and morphing into civilian and multi-party democratic rule, 
the Indian External Affairs Minister thus gleefully welcomed the “winds of change 
blowing through Myanmar” as a vindication of its policy of engagement, as well as an 
inter-democratic bond conducive to better bilateral relations.962  
As noted one year later by India’s top diplomat, it “certainly is a vindication of our policy 
of engagement that we have been able to keep a good dialogue with the Myanmar 
Government.”963 During President Thein Sein’s 2011 visit to India, the first of a civilian 
head of state from Burma/Myanmar in more than half a century, the Indian Prime 
Minister M. Singh thus “expressed readiness to share India’s own experiences in evolving 




                                                
961  This dialogue is analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 4. On Nov. 8, 2010, U.S. President B. Obama 
while addressing the Indian parliament, in New Delhi: “Faced with such gross violations of human rights, it 
is the responsibility of the international community - especially leaders like the United States and India - to 
condemn it.  And if I can be frank, in international fora, India has often shied away from some of these 
issues.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-
parliament-new-delhi-india.  
962 March 9, 2012, at the Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS, Singapore: “Our relations will therefore 
assume even greater prominence for mutual benefit.” Bhasin, IFR 2012, 23. 
963 May 25, 2012: Bhasin, IFR 2012, 1170. The most recent Indian Ambassador to Myanmar, G. 
Mukhopadhyay (2013-16), however, notes that while India’s morally “conflicted relation” with the 
authoritarian regime ended in 2011, the “irony is that [we] now finds ourselves facing great competition 
from other countries,” which suggests that liberalization has not immediately translated into direct benefits 
for India (Interview 048). 
964 Oct. 14 joint statement: Bhasin, IFR 2011, 1138. 
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Conclusion 
In the arc of unrest stretching along India’s periphery from Iran and Pakistan in the west to 
Bangladesh and Burma in the east, Indian leaders may yet find that democrats make better and 
more predictable neighbors than dictators.965 
 Daniel Twining, U.S. German Marshall Fund 
American analyst D. Twining’s conjecture on how India “may yet find that democrats 
make better and more predictable neighbors than dictators” is correct except for two 
issues, as illustrated in the cases analyzed in this chapter: 1) India already finds, and has 
found for at least half a century, that “democrats” make “better” neighbors, at least in 
principle and in the long-term; and 2) India’s practice and experience suggests that 
“dictators” are often not only necessary but also desirable because they make neighbors 
more “predictable,” at least in the short-term.  
Contingent demands have often required Indian decision-makers to focus on the short-
term, trading off the prospects of future liberalization for the guarantees of present order 
and security. Similarly, the illiberal reversals across the region in the 1950s-60s and the 
failed coercive involvement in Sri Lanka during the 1980s, in particular, have further 
ingrained a sense of pragmatism in Indian officials on how long and twisted the road to 
liberal democracy can be in their regional neighborhood.  
The following specific conclusions can be drawn from this chapter’s re-examination of 
India’s regime crisis response in nine case studies:  
1. Short and Long-term horizons: Indian assessments are influenced by a short/long-term and 
cost-benefit analysis on the neighboring country’s regime type. This may not always have 
                                                
965 Twining, "India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: “Rogue State” or Responsible Democratic 
Stakeholder?," 32. 
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a determinant effect, but it reflects Indian officials’ recognition that specific political 
systems (regime types) employ different state-building strategies, which, in turn, impact 
India’s domestic and external security.  
2. Principled and long-term liberal preference: Ideally, and especially in the long-term, India 
would prefer all its neighboring state’s to be liberal and pluralist democracies, because it 
favorably assess such regimes to be a) more inclined to cooperate with India given the 
inter-democratic bond (dispensation), b) more capable of providing sustainable stability and 
conflict resolution (order), and c) less given to extra-regional balancing (geopolitics).   
3. Short-term advantages of illiberal regimes: In principle, Indian officials morally abhor illiberal 
systems, but pragmatically recognize that illiberal (especially authoritarian and 
centralized) regimes can be both necessary and desirable in the short-term to a) accelerate 
decision-making capacity, reliability and celerity (dispensation), b) increase state cohesion 
and stability through force (order), and c) offer external security guarantees (geopolitics). 
4. Perils of regime transition, from infancy to maturity: The cost-benefit analysis in Indian 
strategic assessments (Table 7) also reflects a dynamic understanding of regime 
trajectories and their transition. The Indian strategic thought analyzed in this chapter 
suggests that, in the short term, liberal regimes will traverse a risky infant phases of 
instability that can be detrimental to India, but then gradually increase their beneficial 
effects as they mature, in the long term. Conversely, in the short term, infant illiberal 
regimes will often reinstitute order and state cohesion that can be beneficial to India, but 
then gradually increase their detrimental effects on India, in the long term, as they face 
growing internal dissent and instability. 
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5. The liberal dimension in strategic culture: Finally, the regime-centric analysis of Indian 
assessments and posture during regime crises in its neighborhood exposes a liberal 
dimension in the strategic culture identified in Part I of this dissertation. Reflecting 
extraordinary continuity, this culture also reflects a capacity to balance exigencies and 
preferences, and to navigate an extraordinary complex and illiberal neighborhood. The 
case of Nepal, in particular, indicates a persistent Indian push for liberalization there as 
being in its long-term interests – whether in 1950, 1960, 1990 or 2005.  
Far from impulsive or naïve, this liberal approach reflects pragmatism, patience and 
strategic acumen based on learning and experience, for example by accepting short-term 
illiberal reversals and refraining from tempting “quick-fix” interventionism, in the interest 
of long-term and more sustainable liberalization. This does not mean that India always 
“gets it right” – far from it – but reveals a culture of regional crisis response and 



























































































CONCLUSION TO PART II: THE LIBERAL DIMENSION IN INDIA’S 
STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
Part II of this dissertation examined the liberal sources and effects on Indian strategic 
thought and practice in the neighborhood. By eschewing the simplistic binary between 
“interests” and “values,” our case studies indicate that India’s regional involvement does, 
indeed, reflect a concern about the particular regime type of its neighboring states. The 
three typical strategic assessments (dispensation, order and geopolitics) thus reflect a concern 
about how particular systems of government – more or less liberal – lead to different 
attitudes towards India, state-building strategies, and geopolitical alignments.  
Chapter 5 offered an introductory view on 1) the principled Indians support for pluralist 
regimes abroad; 2) the causal sources of such principled support, based on India’s 
domestic experience with liberal democracy; 3) India’s sense of exceptionalism in the 
region, portraying liberal democracy as a necessary and inevitable system of government 
worldwide, particularly in countries with ethno-linguistic and religious diversity. It then 
proceeded to show how India’s democratic politics and liberal society indirectly influence 
the government’s posture towards neighboring states.  
Chapter 6 examined the regime-centric dimension in India’s regional strategy as a key 
indicator of the liberal component in its foreign policy. While India identifies with liberal, 
democratic and pluralist regimes in principle, and recognizes their distinct advantages in 
providing stability, order, and security, this does not always translate into strategic 
practice of supporting them.  
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The case studies re-examined illustrate the strategic nature of India’s cost-benefit analysis 
in the short- and long-term: India often choses to engage illiberal regimes in the short-
term, even while recognizing that liberalization is inevitable in the long-term. India tends 
to engage (and favor) illiberal regimes in the short-term to deliver more efficiently, and 
switch to a coercive pro-democracy stance once these regimes show decreasing capacity 
to deliver, whether on cooperation with India, or internally in terms of state cohesion and 
domestic order.  
CONCLUSION 
 
1. Summary and main findings 
This dissertation was driven by a puzzling variation in India’s degree and direction of 
involvement during crises in neighboring countries. In terms of degree, the Indian 
government’s response varies between the extremes of inaction and military intervention, 
with several intermediary modes of interference. In terms of direction, the Indian 
government’s posture has also varied: in some cases it engages and even supports 
autocratic regimes, while in other cases it supports pro-democracy forces and regime 
liberalization. What explains such change? 
In 2005, India’s Foreign Secretary, S. Saran emphasized that “while democracy remains 
India’s abiding conviction, the importance of our neighbourhood requires that we remain 
engaged with whichever government is exercising authority in any country.”966 India’s 
                                                
966 Bhasin, IFR 2005, 335. 
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strategic practice in the region shows that while engagement is, indeed, the default policy, 
it has also pursued various modes of coercive involvement in neighboring countries, 
which contradict its professed adherence to the principle of non-interference.  
To explain such variation in India’s behavior, and to also understand when and how it 
gets involved, the dissertation examined different regime crises in the three neighboring 
countries of Nepal, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and Myanmar (Burma), across three time periods 
(1950s-60s, 1980s, 2000s). In each of these nine crises, neighboring countries underwent a 
critical event or period of change (whether a coup, an uprising, or another form of 
instability), which affected, or threatened to affect Indian security. 
Chapter 1 offered a broad overview of the historical foundations and development of 
India’s regional strategy, and reviewed the literature and debates on the country’s 
strategic culture. It forwarded three propositions:  
• The Indian state’s democratic identity is exceptionalist, but its material weakness 
and geographically isolation constrain its capacity to conform to high expectations 
from its Western and other democratic peers. India is a proud but also weak and 
isolated democracy. 
• The popular allegation that India lacks a strategic culture is rooted in a wide 
divergence between Indian strategic practice and its exceptionalist rhetoric. Scholars 
tend to focus on the latter, given the lack of archival materials, the poverty of 
empirical studies, as well as ideological and political reasons. This myth is further 
perpetuated by Indian open society’s self-criticism and anxiety about China and 
other illiberal “threats”. The result is an ossified speech by Indian leaders and 
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officials, and scholarly narratives about India’s foreign policy being strategically 
deficient because allegedly driven by idealism.  
• Similarly, despite the revolutionary nature of independent India’s rhetoric on non-
interference and other exceptionalist principles after 1947, Indian practice in the 
region indicates extraordinary continuity from the colonial Raj, whether in terms 
of security, liberalism, or interventionism. This post-colonial divergence affects the 
literature, public debate and official discourse on India’s neighborhood policy, 
which oscillates between reflexive hegemonic bullying, on the one hand, and 
benign exceptionalism, on the other hand.  
Part I of the dissertation provides case study-oriented insights into the decision-making 
processes that drove Indian responses to the nine crises in the three neighboring states of 
Nepal, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Myanmar (Burma), across three periods. What specific 
factors and cost-benefit analyses determined India’s response, and its degree and direction 
of involvement in those crises?  
By reconstructing policy debates in the government, the case studies in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 suggest that India’s posture, degree and direction of involvement in each regional 
crisis is determined by a combination of three strategic assessments:  
• The neighboring regime’s relative strength and attitude towards India, and 
alternatives from opposition or feuding factions (dispensation)  
• The risk of the neighboring state’s crisis or internal conflict spilling over into 
India, affecting its domestic security (order); and  
• The neighboring regime’s external alignment, and the consequent risk of 
involvement by extra-regional powers at the expense of India (geopolitics).  
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Together, these three strategic assessments guide Indian policymakers to set objectives, 
take decisions and determine India’s crisis posture, whether one of inaction or 
intervention, engagement or coercion. Dispensation, order and geopolitics thus serve as a key 
to decode when, why and how India responds to a neighboring state’s crisis. Their 
determinant effect overrides alternative explanation based on ideology, leadership, or any 
other factor. The extraordinary continuity of these assessments across time, from at least 
the 1950s to the 2000s, forms the basis of India’s strategic culture towards the region. 
Part II of the dissertation proceeds to assess to what extent this strategic culture of crisis 
response and involvement in the region is also shaped by India’s liberal democratic 
identity. Do Indian decision-makers recognize that different regime types (democratic, 
autocratic, and more or less liberal) bring specific dividends and disadvantages, and if so, 
how does that shape the degree and direction of involvement in the neighborhood? 
Chapter 5 offers an introductory overview to the liberal dimension in Indian foreign 
policy. When Indians express their principled support for democracy abroad, they do so 
for causal reasons, associating liberal regimes with greater stability and security, based on 
India’s own experience since 1947. This utilitarian definition of liberal democracy has 
grown stronger over time, fueling a rising sense of exceptionalism that portrays 1) liberal 
democracy as the best system of government, which is presented as both necessary and 
inevitable for all countries in the world; and 2) India’s liberal, decentralized and pluralist 
democracy as a model that provides benchmarks to be followed by other countries with 
high ethno-linguistic, religious and other forms of diversity, especially in South Asia. 
The second part of the chapter then proceeds to show how India’s open society and 
democratic institutions exert an indirect liberal influence on the government’s policies 
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towards neighboring states. A cursory re-examination of the case studies indicates a deep 
state-society embeddedness, with influence operating through various informal channels, 
including cross-border civil society links, the Indian parliament, and regional political 
parties. While not determinant, such domestic pressures can complicate or facilitate the 
governments’ policy objectives, for example by a) delaying engagement with an 
authoritarian regime or, b) conversely, by accelerating engagement with forces that favor 
democratization. 
Chapter 6 presents the key finding of the dissertation, namely that India’s strategic 
culture of regional crisis response and involvement is directly influenced by its liberal 
democratic identity. By linking India’s three strategic assessments (dispensation, order, 
geopolitics) to different regime types – democratic, authoritarian, more or less liberal – the 
chapters re-examine the nine case studies to show that India’s posture is driven by a 
short/long-term and cost-benefit analysis. Such time-sensitive and regime-centric 
assessments reflect:  
• A principled preference for liberal and pluralist democracies, which are seen to be 
particularly favorable in the long-term as a) more inclined to cooperate with India 
given the inter-democratic bond (dispensation), b) more capable of providing 
sustainable domestic cohesion, stability and conflict resolution (order), and c) less 
prone to extra-regional balancing, especially with illiberal states (geopolitics);  
• A moral rejection of illiberal (especially autocratic) regimes as being unsustainable 
in the long-term, but a converse recognition that they can be both necessary and 
desirable in the short-term to a) accelerate decision-making capacity, reliability 
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and celerity (dispensation), b) increase state cohesion and stability through force 
(order), and c) offer external security guarantees (geopolitics).  
The cost-benefit analysis in Indian strategic assessments thus also reflects a dynamic 
understanding of regime trajectories and their transition: 1) In the short term, liberal 
regimes will traverse a risky infant phase of instability that can be detrimental to India, 
but then gradually increase their beneficial effects as they mature, in the long term; and 2) 
Conversely, in the short term, infant illiberal (and especially autocratic) regimes will often 
reinstitute order and state cohesion that immediately benefits India, but are then bound 
to gradually increase their detrimental impact on India, especially as they face growing 
internal dissent and instability, in the long term.  
By recognizing the short- and long-term benefits of different regime types, India’s 
strategic culture of regional crisis response and involvement is thus persistently marked by 
a dilemma of whether to engage or coerce regimes. Specific circumstances and strategic 
assessments will determine the exact posture, but the historical period analyzed suggests 
that Indian policy-makers are increasingly recognizing the benefits of a long-term focus 
on liberal democracy. 
 
2. Additional findings and trends  
a) Continuity and consensus  
The main conclusion relates to the extraordinary historical continuity of the assessments 
that determine India’s posture during each regime crisis. An excessive focus on principled 
speeches or the benefit of hindsight tends to encourage an evolutionary account of Indian 
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foreign policy, for example from “idealist” J. Nehru to more “realist” leaders after the end 
of the Cold War. In practice however, as demonstrated in the nine case studies examined 
across more than half a century, from the 1950s to the 2000s (with different leaders, 
governing parties and structural contexts), the types of strategic assessments and 
objectives remain mostly unaltered. This does not mean that there is also an underlying 
dynamic of change, for example in terms of the relative salience of each assessment, and 
by learning from past experience (discussed below), but this should be seen as indicating a 
capacity of strategic adaptation, and not rift. Similarly, while there are occasional 
organizational differences (also discussed below), these are mostly on procedural issues. 
Continuity and consensus in India’s strategic culture of regional crisis response and 
involvement should thus be seen as indications of a perennial raison d’État defined, in this 
specific issue area, as the quest for survival and security relying on the capability to pursue 
influence, order and stability in the periphery. 
b) Decision-making complexity and flexibility 
The existence of an Indian strategic culture of regional crisis response and involvement is 
also indicated by its patterned decision-making process, including a) cost-benefit and 
inter-temporal trade-offs, b) issue linkage, and c) flexible adaptation. This contradicts two 
popular accounts about India’s foreign or neighborhood policy: first, that it lacks 
structured, continuous, and strategic decision-making processes, and second, that its 
occasional security focus is an archaic obsession inherited from the colonial Raj. India’s 
specific crisis postures are accordingly described as “reactionary,” allegedly reflecting 
either lethargy and chance, or a reflexive and tactical impulse to control. The nine case 
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studies examined, however, all indicate at least three examples of the strategic quality of 
India’s decision-making in the region: 
• Cost-benefit and inter-temporal trade-offs: Indian decision-makers weigh the expected 
advantages and disadvantages of each possible posture (from cooperation to 
engagement), based on the relative salience of each assessment and on India’s 
short- and long-term interests. This requires trade-off decisions that, depending on 
different assessments and time horizons, lead to postures that are either more or 
less risk-averse.  
Examples: 1) Nepal 1960, where the expected external security benefits of 
engaging the royalist regime outweighed the benefits of coercion and supporting 
the ousted democratic forces; 2) Burma 1988, where the risks of a failed 
democratization outweighed the limited benefits of continued engagement with a 
non-cooperative military regime; 3) Sri Lanka 2009, where the costs of coercion 
and further expansion of Chinese interests outweighed the risks that Sri Lanka 
would not deliver on a post-war conflict resolution mechanism).  
• Issue linkage: the three ideal-type assessments (dispensation, order and geopolitics) are a 
simplified version of a more complex decision-making process that forces Indian 
officials to link various issues in order to determine the most beneficial posture. 
For example, Indian officials often oppose involvement of an extra-regional power 
in a neighboring country’s conflict based on the understanding that this would 
affect the local balance of power, order and stability and, in turn, have negative 
cross-border repercussions on Indian domestic security.  
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Examples: 1) Burma 1962, where the democratic governments’ domestic isolation 
was assessed to drive its geostrategic rapprochement with China to expand its 
counter-insurgency capabilities and expand electoral support; 2) Sri Lanka 1987, 
where President J. R. Jayewardene’s non-cooperation confirmed Indian 
assessments that the ethnic conflict on the island was caused by deeply-rooted 
discriminatory state structures, and its solution thus warranted regime change; 3) 
Nepal 2006, where King Gyanendra’s a military approach, while keeping the 
democratic process in suspension, was seen as increasing the incentives for the 
political parties to join hands with the Maoist insurgents to change the regime and 
end the conflict. 
• Flexible adaptation: decision-making processes also indicate strategic ability when 
Indian officials adapt their assessments and objectives to new circumstances. Such 
flexibility is often misconceived as policy “incoherence” or “contradiction,” when, 
in fact, it reflects decision-makers’ aptitude to recognize new conditions, update 
assessments, and accordingly adjust India’s posture.  
Examples: 1) Ceylon 1956, Nepal 1960 and Burma 1962, where India’s initial 
threat assessments about the USA/West are gradually replaced by a new focus on 
China after relations deteriorate with Beijing in the late 1950s; 2) Nepal 2006, 
where a changed domestic balance of power and reassurances from the “terrorist” 
Maoist leadership led India to engage them; 3) Myanmar 2007and Sri Lanka 
2009, where attempts to deny Chinese presence were seen to be ineffectual or 
counterproductive, thus prompting counterbalancing efforts through engagement 
and a necessary divergence with the United States. 
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c) Change by learning from experience 
While the broad patterns of assessments and objectives remain unaltered across time, 
there are indications that Indian officials have learned from experience, influenced by the 
success or failure of past crises postures. This is more significant than the strategic 
flexibility they demonstrate during specific crises because it reflects memory transmission 
and indicates that they possess strategic faculty to draw historical lessons for current crisis.  
India’s calibrated postures in the 2000s, for example, suggest that decision-makers have 
absorbed two converse lessons from the past: that a short-term focus on engagement with 
illiberal regimes (dominant in the 1950s-60s) may have unexpected long-term costs, in 
terms of their degenerating capacity to provide order and deliver to Indian security 
interests; and, on the other hand, that the temptations of a coercive strategy to support 
liberal regime changes (dominant in the 1980s) may occult unexpected risks and costs 
through over-involvement and micromanagement.  
The negative outcome of India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987-1990) seems to 
have had a particularly traumatic effect, reducing India’s incentives to pursue similar 
strategies of coercive involvement during the 2000s. Similarly, the failed transition in 
Burma (1988) and the subsequent costs of India’s coercive posture there, reinforced New 
Delhi’s posture of firm engagement towards Myanmar’s military regime in 2007. On the 
other hand, the relative success of Nepal’s regime change in 1990 emboldened India to 
draw positive lessons that underlined the benefits of coercion, thus incentivizing even 
greater involvement during the subsequent crisis there, in 2005-06.  
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d) Ideological differences are overrated  
Despite vocal attempts to emphasize their differences, especially when in the opposition, 
Indian political parties have hardly affected Indian foreign policy in the neighborhood. 
The case studies in the 1980s and in the 2000s reflect policy continuity despite changes in 
government. In 1990, replying to a question on why he was not implementing the radical 
diplomatic reorientation he had promised during the electoral campaign, V. P. Singh, the 
second non-INC Prime Minister in more than forty years, thus noted that “foreign policy 
is not a bush shirt that you change every day [because] the geopolitical factors [will] 
continue to dominate.”967  
Similarly, in the 2000s, the continuity in policies towards Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar 
disprove political narratives about stark differences between the (center-right) Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), in power until 2004, and the (center-left) Indian National Congress 
(INC), in power after 2004. As highlighted in the case studies of Chapter 4, it was 
therefore under the allegedly “nationalist” BJP-led government that India began to 
normalize relations with the Nepalese Maoist insurgents, and under the allegedly 
“liberal” INC-led government that India extended crucial military and intelligence 
support for Sri Lanka to defeat the Tamil insurgency.  
Rather than blunt or pervasive, the few significant ideological differences between political 
parties are thus often on mere procedural issues, e.g. on how best to achieve consensual 
objectives. Both the INC and BJP have their respective moralist wings, which are readily 
activated whenever political circumstances require it, especially when in parliamentary 
opposition; but such drama rarely influences the practice behind the scenes. 
                                                
967 Quoted in Inder K. Gujral, Matters of Discretion: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Hay House, 2011), 249. 
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e) Organizational cultures 
India’s crisis response and involvement in the neighborhood is occasionally influenced 
(but never determined) by different organizational cultures in the state apparatus. While 
the case studies examined indicate occasional clashes, decision-making power is almost 
exclusively concentrated in the Prime Minister and his office, especially after the post for 
National Security Adviser was created in 1998. 
While more specific study is required on their specific cultures of regional involvement, 
the case studies suggest that there are significant differences between the diplomatic, 
military and internal and external intelligence cadres. The intensity of India’s 
involvement, and the consequent chances of its success, will therefore tend to increase 
when the approaches of these four organizations align. 
• The Ministry of External Affairs: India’s Foreign Service tends to adopt the most 
liberal posture, most clearly identifying regime liberalization in neighboring 
countries as being in India’s interest. This leads to an interesting paradox: Indian 
diplomats are frequently accused of being enamored with Nehru’s exceptionalism, 
and “idealist” principles of non-interference, and of thus being unable or 
uncomfortable with the exigencies of power. In practice, however, as 
demonstrated in the cases of Nepal and Sri Lanka, Foreign Service officers have 
developed the most sophisticated instruments of involvement in the 
neighborhood, and have generally played the leading role in facilitating or even 
coercing regime changes. In their assessments, Indian diplomats will tend to err 
on the side of over-involvement to support regime liberalization, minority rights, or 
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pro-democracy forces across the region and, conversely, underrate the short-term 
benefits of illiberal rule by autocratic forces.  
• The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Army: In stark contrast to the diplomats, India’s 
domestic intelligence and its Army officials tend to adopt the most illiberal 
posture, and are the least concerned about the effects of regime type. This is not 
surprising, given their focus on combating insurgencies and other cross-border 
security threats, which requires immediate order and stability in the neighboring 
country. The IB and Army’s consequent conservative and introvert orientation 
therefore emphasizes the short-term benefits of autocratic rule in the periphery on 
Indian domestic security. In this view, India’s default posture should be to engage 
any prevailing regime that can deliver most swiftly and efficiently on improving 
the neighboring country’s state cohesion, stability and order.  
• c) The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW): the approach of India’s external 
intelligence organization is situated between that of the diplomats and the 
IB/Army officials. The RAW’s strategic and extrovert outlook on external 
security, which is seen to depend on Indian capacity to influence neighboring 
counties internal affairs, suggests an extraordinary continuity of the Raj’s strategic 
legacy. RAW officers thus tend to see Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar through 
the prism of great power politics and geopolitical balancing, seeking to deny or 
deter any extra-regional influence. At times, this will lead to assessments 
privileging engagement of autocracies, siding with the IB and Army (the case of 
Burma, in 1988). In other contexts, however, for example Nepal in the 2000s, 
RAW officials will align with the liberal and interventionist approach of the 
diplomats, as they recognize that a pluralist and democratic regime in 
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Kathmandu will lead to greater Indian leverage. Other cases not studied in this 
dissertation (for example Bangladesh, Sikkim, and the Maldives) further suggest 
that RAW’s position often weds the liberal, political and extrovert proclivity of 
diplomats with the illiberal, security-oriented and introvert proclivity of 
intelligence and military officials.  
f) Linkages between economic interdependence and political liberalization 
After India liberalized its economy in the 1990s, its officials started to identify regional 
economic cooperation as a key security interest for their country. J. Prasad, who served as 
ambassador to Nepal, thus underlined that “increasing sub-regional and regional 
cooperation and integration, entailing interweaving positive interactions and 
interdependence, will increase trust, reduce tensions, augment India’s leverage vis-à-vis 
the great powers, and stabilize the region by raising the costs of non-cooperative 
behaviour.” 968  Despite this recognition, South Asia continues to be affected by 
abnormally low levels of intra-regional trade and multilateral cooperation.969  
But does political liberalization in neighboring states increase economic interdependence 
with India? And vice-verse, does growing economic interdependence with India drive 
political liberalization in neighboring countries? The case studies examined in this 
dissertation during the late 1980s, particularly on Nepal and Burma, indicate that Indian 
                                                
968 Prasad, "India’s neighbours." Similarly, Foreign Secretary S. Saran, in 2005: “We must give our 
neighbours a stake in our own economic prosperity. This would impart a certain stability in our relations,” 
Bhasin, IFR 2005, 675. For an earlier view, in 1989, diplomat J. Mehta noted that “the interdependence 
between India and Nepal is permanent … geography can be optimized, but not altered.” Mehta, Rescuing, 
237. 
969 E.g. in just 15 years, 1991-2006, the percentage share of intra-regional trade in total trade of South 
Asian countries rose from just 3.1 to 4.7%. Compiled from Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?, 107. 
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officials trace such a causal link between political and economic liberalization.970 This link 
between economic and political regimes deserves further study, especially given that it is a 
widely held assumption in liberal theories of regional integration and inter-democratic 
peace. 
 
3. Contribution and further research avenues 
The introduction to this dissertation set out the various disciplinary schools and debates in 
International Relations Theory to which this study seeks to contribute. While adopting 
the approach of strategic culture, the case studies debunked the narratives and literature 
on India’s alleged strategic incapacity and idealist “deficiencies,” and instead unearthed 
an Indian strategic culture of regional crisis response and involvement.  
The three strategic assessments identified in the case studies (dispensation, order and 
geopolitics) denote a pragmatic priority to pursue the foundational security interests of the 
Indian state in the region. This trumps popular narratives about India’s behavior being 
driven by ideals such as non-interference, reputation or an impulsive ideological 
preference for democratic regimes.  
If by strategy one means allocating limited resources to take and implement decisions in 
pursuit of specific objectives, based on a pragmatic assessment of the context as its is (and 
not as one wish it was), Indian policymakers denote a rather high strategic ability. While 
looking back to emphasize India’s resilience in surviving in a hostile region “as a 
democracy subjected to contradictory pulls and pressures of a pluralistic society 
                                                
970 For a similar argument, see Srinath Raghavan, "Regional integration: from pipe dream to possibility," 
Seminar 629, no. January (2012).  
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characterized by enormous diversities,” former Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit thus refers to 
India’s foreign policy since 1947 as a “remarkable achievement, far beyond even what 
Europeans have achieved.”971 
This may not always be apparent in public, because policymakers tend to veil their 
strategic assessments and actions, in order not to clash with the popular narratives about 
India’s idealism and exceptionalism (as discussed in detail in Chapter 1). In practice, 
however, the nine case studies demonstrate that India has not refrained from adopting 
every possible posture, from inaction to military intervention, and from engagement to 
coercion, in pursuit of its fundamental internal and external security interests.  
This Indian strategic culture of crisis response and involvement can thus be characterized 
as a manifestation of realpolitik at its best, seeking to preserve and maximize democratic 
India’s security in the region. The “Indian way” of foreign policy is an expression of a 
distinct Indian realism, which is based on the particular colonial history, democratic 
identity, limited capability, and geographic location of its state.  
Reflecting such pragmatism, diplomat K. S. Bajpai recalls his father G. S. Bajpai’s 
approach to international relations while serving the colonial Raj, and which also 
cogently defines independent India’s realist regional policy since 1947:  
We should never make the mistake of assuming that the righteousness of a cause can even 
eventually ensure its success. We live in a world of power. Power exercised without regard to 
morality is a crime against humanity; but morality cannot prevail without the backing of 
power.972 
                                                
971 Dixit, Neighbours, 48-9. 
972 Bajpai, "Engaging," 85. 
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While this moral, liberal or democratic realism has always guided Indian strategic 
practice, the public narratives, scholarship and official rhetoric have instead emphasized 
an allegedly Indian idealism and exceptionalism, as laid out in Chapter 1.  
Over recent years, however, with the accelerating historiographical turn in India’s foreign 
policy, security and strategic studies, a rising number of voices have expressed the need to 
recover and publicize this realist tradition.973 Former National Security Adviser S. S. 
Menon, for example, referred to one of India’s foremost strategic thinkers, K. 
Subrahmanyam, as having been driven by a distinctively Indian “realism plus” school, 
which “combined a strong commitment to the basic values of the Indian Republic (of 
secularism, democracy and pluralism) with his realist pursuit of national interest.”974 
Strategic analyst Dhruva Jaishankar, in turn, cautioned that “Indian realism may not 
adhere exactly to the theories of Carr, Morgenthau or Waltz,” but that “this does not 
mean that a framework for how the Indian polity views its place in the world is 
completely absent.”975 
Similarly, in his work on India’s strategic practice in the 1950s, scholar S. Raghavan 
refers to Nehru as a “liberal realist” and stresses that scholarship plays an important 
revisionist function to correct exceptionalist foreign policy narratives, as well as to expose 
contemporary policymakers to the lessons, tools and concepts of the past: 
                                                
973 The Takshashila Foundation, based in Bangalore under the leadership of Nitin Pai, has played a 
particularly important role in this regard. Their publication, Pragati – The Indian National Interest Review, has 
collected several contributions, since 2007, to encourage a realist reading of Indian foreign and security 
policies among younger Indians: http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/.  
974 He therefore saw “no real contradiction between the promotion of democracy and the pursuit of India’s 
interests in our neighbourhood.” Menon, "K. Subrahmanyam and India’s Strategic Culture," 25. 
975 Dhruva Jaishankar, "A uniquely Indian Realism," Pragati, no. 38 (2010): 8. 
	  
	   379	  
At a time when India was weaker and poorer, Nehru realized that preserving India’s interests and 
fulfilling its international ambitions would require a dexterous amalgam of material and 
ideational resources. As a rising India navigates its way through a fraught world order, it would 
be an irony and a pity if it neglects his fundamental insight.976 
Does this mean that India merely needs to stay course and hope for the best? Has its 
realist strategic culture always succeeded in the region? It certainly has not, in the same 
measure that no other realist foreign policy has always succeeded. Such rationalist 
assumptions of optimality and perfection are fallacious. Instead, one should ask: can it 
improve? 
On the one hand, it certainly can. For example, India can improve its capabilities to 
assess and intervene in regional crises. It can also improve decision-making processes, 
inter-organizational coordination, and its capacity to deliver on regional connectivity and 
crucial economic investments in neighboring countries. These and many other concrete 
future challenges for India’s regional strategy are laid out in the following section. 
On the other hand, however, there are also limits to what can be achieved through 
improvement. Unlike the natural sciences, politics, diplomacy and strategy have an 
inextricable element of chance and contingency – Clausewitz’s famous “fog of war.” To 
expect an “optimal” Indian neighborhood policy is, therefore, impossible and this is 
particularly apparent in terms of its capacity of involvement. Whenever acting beyond 
borders, India will keep trying, improving and failing in its chimerical quest to get all its 
regional ducks in a row. As this dissertation emphasizes, the fact that Indian decision-
makers are deeply conscious of their own limits and recognize the Sisyphean nature of 
this game is, in itself, the best example of their pragmatic and realist outlook. 
                                                
976 Raghavan, War and Peace, 320-21. 
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This dissertation thus also contributes to the growing body of research that is shedding 
more light on this Indian realist way, and in particular on how its foreign policy reflects its 
liberal and democratic identity. Three possible avenues to build on this include: 1) 
Expand and test the dissertation’s framework with more regional crises, for example in 
the Maldives, Bangladesh, or Afghanistan; 2) Apply the dissertation’s framework on the 
strategic practice/rhetoric gap to other issue areas, and thus further question the alleged 
idealist nature of Indian foreign and security policies; and 3) Compare the Indian 
approach to that of its peers, most notably other democratic great powers, and thus 
mitigate righteous narratives about India’s alleged exceptionalism. 
 
4. Challenges for India’s neighborhood policy and regional strategy 
For many decades, India’s strategic debate about the neighborhood was marked by 
defensiveness and a deep lack in self-confidence. Writing in the 1980s, for example, even 
the otherwise hawkish strategist K. Subrahmanyam reflected this inferiority complex 
while lamenting that “white nations (USA and USSR) and a yellow nation (China) being 
great powers can be accepted [by India’s neighbours] but not one of themselves – the 
brown India.”977  
Today, a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, with many in the United 
States and the liberal West celebrating India as a “rising power” in a multilateral order, a 
“natural ally” to contain China, or a “beacon of hope” for democracy in Asia, the 
principal challenge for India is the exact obverse.978 India will now have to tame its 
                                                
977 Subrahmanyam, "Neighbourhood," 125-6. 
978 See, for example, Blackwill, "Why is India America’s Natural Ally?." 
	  
	   381	  
increasingly inflated self-confidence and reject the temptation to revel in adulation, which 
is bound to lead to perilous complacency. Instead, India will have to explore a narrow 
window of opportunity to maximize and leverage its new capabilities.  
Such a strategic re-evaluation is particularly important in its immediate neighborhood, as 
argued in this dissertation. On the role of liberal democracy in its foreign policy, D. 
Jaishankar thus notes that India “has so far been limited to a considerable degree by 
resources and power projection capabilities in promoting these values more aggressively,” 
suggesting that this will change as both the country’s clout and demand to operate 
beyond borders increase.979 Based on the findings of this dissertation, the following 
eighteen concrete challenges seek to contribute to the ongoing strategic exercise on how 
India can make more efficient use of its new capabilities in the region. In many ways, 
these are policy challenges that India has successfully dealt with in the past, but which will 
require even greater strategic acumen in future. 
1. “Neighborhood first,” always and forever: Every incoming Indian government 
ritualistically classifies the region as its first priority, but will then gradually shift its 
attention to farther horizons. India must resist the temptation to overrate the importance 
of distant Brazil, Canada, France, Nigeria, or Australia, and instead – as PM Nehru 
constantly beckoned his diplomats – “look at the map” to remind itself of its geographical 
location.980 Foreign Secretary S. Saran thus emphasized that “in defining one’s vital 
national and security interests, a country’s neighbourhood enjoys a place of unquestioned 
primacy.” 981  Proximity and cultural similarities can, however, be deceptive, as 
                                                
979 Jaishankar, "A uniquely Indian Realism," 4. 
980 Quoted in Bajpai, "Engaging," 81. 
981 Avtar S. Bhasin, ed. India's Foreign Relations - Documents 2005 (New Delhi: Geetika, 2005), 331. 
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neighboring countries’ complex internal dynamics often require far more time, resources 
and expertise than expected. To combat complacency, the Indian government will have 
to expand its investment in diplomatic, military and intelligence resources that are 
specifically trained to deal with, and be deployed to the neighboring countries, from the 
Maldives to Myanmar. By promoting scholarly research on declassified materials and by 
tapping into the experienced pool of retired officials, such preparation should expose 
trainees to their country’s rich albeit neglected history of strategic practice in the region.  
2. From “right of first refusal” to “capacity of first delivery:” As the geostrategic context 
changes with the rise of China, India can no longer afford to persist on its archaic “right 
of first refusal” when neighbors seek weapons, investments or any other assistance from 
beyond the region.982 This remains as one of the most pernicious irritants in bilateral 
relations, as neighbors often prefer India as a supplier, but are chagrined by its chronic 
delays.983 From such a negative approach, New Delhi will have to proactively focus on 
ensuring a “capacity of first delivery.” As neighbors face increasing alternatives and 
choice, they are exploring the competitive “first-come, first-served” principle, which 
requires India to explore opportunities with greater celerity and to provide high-quality 
products and services, whether military platforms or infrastructure projects.  
3. Privilege connectivity over security: For almost half a century, India’s geostrategic 
insulation transformed its borders into barriers against foreign influence. Despite 
economic reforms since 1990, defensive security concerns continue to hold up these walls, 
                                                
982 As noted by former diplomat U. S. Bajpai, India’s ambition “to be recognised and certified as the prime 
power in the region … is legitimate, but it has to be earned,” in U. S. Bajpai, ed. India and its Neighbourhood 
(New Delhi: Lancer, 1986), 11. 
983 E.g. Army Chief, Gen. V. K. Singh, while visiting Myanmar, in the late 2000s: “No wonder that none of 
our neighbours trust us. If we are so stymied by the ‘system’ [incapable of delivering], then why bother to 
make the offer in the first place? … We should be building bridges, but here we are constantly shooting 
ourselves in the foot,” Singh, Courage, 278. 
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hindering cross-border connectivity, cooperation, and integration with the neighbors. To 
paraphrase King Mahendra’s adage of the 1960s on Indian concerns about Nepal’s first 
road link to China, “Communism won’t arrive in a taxi;” nor will today’s spies or 
terrorists require a high-speed train to infiltrate from Bangladesh or Myanmar.984 Roads 
and railways go both ways across borders and should therefore no longer be seen as a 
threat, but instead leveraged as a link to export people, goods and services, and thus 
increase Indian influence in the periphery. As Foreign Secretary S. Saran presciently 
noted, in 2006, this requires a “mindset change” because “India must start looking at 
national boundaries not as impenetrable walls which somehow protect us from the 
outside world, but as ‘connectors’, bringing India closer to its neighbours.”985 
4. Inter-organizational cooperation and coordination: India’s foreign policy-making is 
becoming more complex, involving a rising number of governmental organizations 
besides the Ministry of External Affairs. 986  This poses particular challenges in the 
neighborhood, where political, diplomatic, intelligence and military structures have access 
to different sources and frequently pursue parallel policies, which delays implementation, 
sends mixed signals, and strains bilateral relations.987 Encouraging officials to be cross-
posted and circulate among different organizations will increase their exposure, 
streamline efforts, and increase synergies. The Indian Armed Forces, and its Army in 
particular, offer an extraordinary untapped potential of military-to-military resources, 
                                                
984 Garver, Protracted Contest, 147. 
985 “Another mindset change, linked to the one mentioned above is to stop looking at our border areas as 
being on the periphery or serving as ‘buffer zones’ preventing ingress into the heartland. We must rid 
ourselves of this “outpost” mentality” [and border regions must] become the bridges linking countries,” 
Bhasin, IFR 2006, 673-4. 
986 Tanvi Madan, "Officialdom: South Block and Beyond," in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, ed. 
David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
987 Indian intelligence, military, customs and other administrative officials posted on the Indian side of the 
border are thus often better informed than diplomats at the Indian missions in the neighbouring country.  
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expertise and contacts on the neighbors that must be leveraged into a more proactive 
defence diplomacy.988 
5. Diplomacy’s didactic domestic mission: Indian public awareness of the neighboring 
countries oscillates between default oblivion and spurts of hysteria.989 The public debate 
consequently swings between the extreme narratives of “bully” or “benign” India. As 
political parties, civil society and lobbies play an increasing influence on foreign policy-
making, the internal outreach capacity of public diplomacy will be key to educate civil 
society about how India’s domestic development often depends on the capacity of its 
foreign policy to shape events in neighboring countries. This pedagogical mission must 
shed exceptionalist myths about India’s regional policy being driven by sovereign 
equality, non-interference, or altruism and, instead, raise popular comfort levels with the 
crude concept of coercive power and the link between security and democracy. 
6. Regional states from spoilers to stakeholders: India’s regional states and their political 
parties have in recent years attained an unprecedented influence, and even veto-power on 
foreign policy towards neighboring state, especially in the cases of Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. As scholar A. Appadorai presciently noted in 1981, while inevitable in a 
federal structure, such tensions can be mitigated by “systematic procedures for 
consultations with state governments before decisions on foreign affairs are taken.”990 
                                                
988 On the “compartmentalization of the military and civilian establishments,” see J. N. Dixit, Role of the 
armed forces in the formulation of India's foreign policy (New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2002). 
989 As described by a former Indian diplomat: “India’s neighbors have perfected the art of extracting 
concessions from New Delhi. Mass hysteria is created. The media is pressed into service to whip up the 
anti-Indian feeling. This is enough to scare New Delhi. The public opinion in India takes it as a proof of the 
failure of its neighbourhood policy. (…) Long-term perspective becomes the casualty,”Bhasin, Nepal-India 
v.1, li. 
990  Appadorai, The domestic roots of India's foreign policy, 1947-1972, 209-10. Nitin Pai has also called for a 
“Subcontinental Relations Council” with the Indian Prime Minister and Chief Ministers from border states: 
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Given the political nature of these consultations, negotiations should be driven by high-
level cabinet members, with the assistance of expert diplomats. The key objective will be 
to rope in regional state governments and parties as stakeholders that are invested in 
rising cross-border cooperation and interdependency. This will, in turn, contribute to 
insulate bilateral relations from political change in governments.  
7. Take the long view: Technical and other minor disputes frequently bog down India’s 
relations with its neighbors. As regional economic cooperation and interdependence 
become paramount, India’s strategic objectives will require more tactical steps backwards, 
or “making short-term sacrifices for long-term goals.” 991  This entails a continued 
emphasis on providing non-reciprocal, unilateral, and preferential benefits to the 
neighbors, thus raising their trust and tying them to India in the long run, even if that 
hurts domestic constituencies in the short run.992 Commonly known as the “Gujral 
doctrine,” this approach is often portrayed as reflecting India’s altruism and generosity 
when, in fact, it is a farsighted expression of realism. Recalling “the logic behind” the 
doctrine he announced in 1996, former External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral thus 
recalled that “we had to be at ‘total peace’ with all other immediate neighbours in order 
to contain Pakistan’s and China’s influence in the region.”993 
8. Improve signaling and draw red lines: Ambiguous communication is the principal 
cause for bilateral crises between India and its neighbors. For example, India will often 
assume that the Nepalese government is deliberately acting against its advice when, in 
                                                                                                                                            
“States are stakeholders, not spoilsports,” Business Standard, Aug. 18, 2013: http://www.business-
standard.com/article/opinion/states-are-stakeholders-not-spoilsports-113081800638_1.html 
991 Dubey, India's Foreign Policy, xx. 
992 Even while not forgetting that “big countries also have interests, with limits to what they can concede,” 
Bajpai, "Engaging," 86. 
993 Gujral, Matters, 406. 
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fact, New Delhi never expressed concerns in the first place, or did not articulate them 
forcefully enough. K. Subrahmanyam thus noted that “it must be made clear to our 
neighbors what kind of concessions they can legitimately expect from their big neighbor 
and what they cannot.”994 Similarly, former Foreign Secretary M. Dubey emphasized the 
importance of drawing explicit red lines: “Safeguarding basic interests [means we will 
have to] set out some of the Lakshman Rekhas (absolute limits) which India would not 
expect its neighbours to cross”.995 Beyond diplomatic signaling, clear and categorical 
messages will also tend to be received with greater respect when privately conveyed by 
high-level, political and personal representatives of the Indian Prime Minister. 
9. Grow a thick skin: While it may hurt its popular sense of exceptionalism, India’s 
hegemonic role, colossal size and geopolitical centrality will perpetually attract animosity, 
resentment and resistance from its peripheral states.996 Whatever India does, the cultural, 
economic and geopolitical expressions of “anti-Indianism” will therefore continue to 
thrive across the region. Former National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan thus 
cautions that even “while [India] doesn’t exercise its big brother approach, our neighbors 
often approach us like that, by standing up and telling their own people ‘I’m not 
subservient to India]’.”997 While most of this competitive nationalism is ineffective, a thick 
skin is required to persistently ignore such provocations and stay on track. Beckoning 
India not to be distracted, and to preserve its diplomacy’s dogged quality, K. 
                                                
994 K. Subrahmanyam (1981) Subcontinental Security, Strategic Analysis, 253 
995 Dubey, India's Foreign Policy, xx. 
996 One of India’s senior-most diplomats thus observes that “it is not easy to be by far the largest state in any 
region: one inherently arouses fear, resentments, extreme touchiness among adjacent peoples” Bajpai, 
"Engaging," 86. 
997 Interview 077. 
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Subrahmanyam thus stressed that “an elephant trying to behave like a rabbit or a deer 
will not get accepted as such.”998  
A thick skin should not, however, lead to autism or arrogance in bilateral relations. The 
following three challenges illustrate this. 
10. Manners matter – protocol and public diplomacy: Neighboring country officials 
commonly characterize their Indian counterparts’ posture as condescending, patronizing 
and arrogant. This is known as the “big brother approach,” or according to Sri Lankan 
diplomat S. Jayaweera, the “Cassius Clay attitude” of India, “regarding herself as the 
greatest.”999 Former external affairs minister K. N. Singh thus cautioned India to be 
“extra careful” in its relations with small neighbours: “their political egos and sensitivities 
must be born in mind all the time.”1000 This can be facilitated by: 1) a protocolar 
“sensitivity to psychological factors,” for example by treating and hosting neighbors with 
full honors, at pair with those conceded to great powers;1001 2) avoiding emphasis on 
cultural commonalities with India and, instead, recognize differences and respect the 
neighbor’s distinct identity; 3) abstaining from references to any form of Indian 
exceptionalism, which is bound to be interpreted as an expression of superiority; and 4) 
                                                
998 Subrahmanyam, "Subcontinental Security," 261. 
999 Quoted in Shelton U. Kodikara, ed. Dilemmas of Indo-Sri Lankan relations (Colombo: Bandaranaike Centre 
for International Studies, 1991), 53. Nehru would refer to India as the older or brig brother to neighbouring 
countries but with the opposite objective to fend off domestic pressure to intervene in their domestic affairs. 
See e.g his 1952, May 1 speech: “We have always considered Ceylon as our younger brother (…). So with a 
younger brother no compulsion should be used.” Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka v.2, 599. 
1000 Singh, Walking, 120. 
1001 Dubey, India's Foreign Policy, xx. 
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leveraging public diplomacy to cultivate and win over traditionally “anti-India” 
constituencies in neighboring countries, instead of ignoring or undermining them.1002 
11. Keep looking into the mirror: However exceptional in its capacity to ensure territorial 
integrity and development through a pluralist, liberal and democratic political system, 
India should never underestimate the extent to which crises in neighboring countries may 
also originate on its own side of the border. Whether intentionally or not, Indian domestic 
policies and regional politics have thus often contributed to crisis escalation across the 
border, further destabilizing the neighbor, for example in Sri Lanka, in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. A continuously self-critical and introspective perspective will facilitate 
bilateral relations, and can be fostered by thought exercises that encourage Indian 
officials to put themselves into the shoes of their counterparts in Kathmandu, Colombo or 
Dhaka. 
12. Avoid inaction, assume the initiative: No scenario is more harmful to Indian relations 
with its neighbors than stagnation. Inertia hinders the timely identification and solution of 
problems and it also raises incentives for neighbors to adopt a balancing strategy, for 
example via China, to regain Indian attention. Paradoxically, even periods of crisis and 
conflict are thus more productive, as they demand New Delhi’s focus and can pave the 
way for a significant improvement in relations. To combat torpor, the Indian government 
must constantly strive to be the first-mover, pressing on to expand bilateral dialogue and 
cooperation. Unlike at the global level, in South Asia the onus of initiative will always rest 
on New Delhi’s shoulders, however heavy or uncomfortable. 
                                                
1002 This includes, for example, the Sinhala nationalists in Sri Lanka (particularly the JVP) and the Leftist 
parties in Nepal (particularly the CPN-UML and CPN-M).  
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13. To engage, or not to engage? As this dissertation demonstrates, there is no ready-
made solution to the question whether New Delhi should engage a neighboring country’s 
regime or support its change. This issue thus poses the most difficult challenge, and often 
assumes the form of a decision-making dilemma: 1) a shortsighted focus on engagement 
and quick-fix solutions earns immediate dividends but may prove unsustainable and 
costly in the long-term to Indian interests; and 2) a farsighted option for coercion may 
promise long-term dividends but, if not successful, risks a total breakdown in bilateral 
relations. Furthermore, while India’s posture depends on cost-benefit and short/long-
term assessments, these must be constantly updated, or else a lag can rapidly emerge. 
Historian A. G. Noorani consequently refers to the danger of India overcompensating or 
persisting with an outdated policy, for example by “sinning without pleasure” (engaging 
an autocracy without benefits), of which the opposite would be “virtuosity with pain” 
(engaging a democracy despite hurting its interests).1003 Scenario-based and prospective 
policy studies on the neighborhood can assist in keeping Indian cost-benefit assessments 
up to speed in face of changing circumstances.1004 
14. Don’t neglect, nor overreact to Chinese influence: China’s rising influence across 
South Asia often leads to a challenging paradox between two extreme responses that must 
be avoided at all cost, for example in regard to Nepal: 1) Incentives to counter Chinese 
influence increase whenever Nepal undergoes a regime crisis, often leading New Delhi to 
overreact precisely when its interests most closely align with those of Beijing and should 
                                                
1003 Noorani only refers to the first expression, adapted from Hindustani (gunah be lazzat): “Very 
Unrealpolitik,” The Hindustan Times, Oct. 23, 2007: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/very-
unrealpolitik/story-M5bsmOAPKeWhwCPtiQQQ1H.html. A Sanskrit-based interpretation of the second 
expression could be to insist in punya despite dukkha. 
1004 For example: Rumel Dahiya and Behuria K Ashok, eds., India’s Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two 
Decades (New Delhi: Pentagon 2012). 
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therefore lead to restraint; 2) Conversely, incentives to counter Chinese influence decrease 
during periods of “normalcy” in Nepal, often leading New Delhi to lose focus and neglect 
the insidiousness of Beijing’s incremental influence in the neighboring state.  
As K. Subrahmanyam emphasized, while it is natural that the “Indian attitude will 
harden” at the immediate prospect of rising Chinese influence, New Delhi must take a 
long-term and “relaxed view,” because: a) External powers will escalate very rarely 
during crises, only when “the costs of annoying India are outweighed by the benefits [of] 
providing countervailing power and influence;” and b) “In the longer run the imperatives 
of geography, cultural affinities, international politics … will bring home to our neighbors 
the facts of life and of realpolitik.”1005 Even in Nepal and in Sri Lanka, where China has 
had the most leverage to encroach on Indian influence, the historical record examined in 
this dissertation suggests that Beijing remains largely deferential to New Delhi, 
particularly during crises.1006 While this should temper future overreaction, it should not, 
however, lead to complacency. 
15. Playing the global game in the region: India’s regional primacy will increasingly hinge 
on its dexterity to play the extra-regional balancing game. It can no longer afford the 
policy of denying access, nor the myth that it can work alone to keep the region to itself. 
In the 1970s, this meant aligning with the Soviet Union to countervail Chinese and 
                                                
1005 Subrahmanyam, "Neighbourhood," 136-7. For a similar argument, see Vinod C Khanna, "Stability 
through cooperation," Seminar 584, no. April (2008). 
1006 Chapters 2, 3 and 4 detail such guarded Chinese behaviour whenever Nepalese officials approached 
them for support to countervail Indian influence during times of bilateral crisis. For example, during 
Nepalese PM Prachanda’s 2008 visit there, he was reportedly told off with resource to a typical aphorism: 
“please remember that there are two sides to a mountain, and you should always know on which side you 
are on,” (Interview 056). Similarly, when Sri Lanka tried to rope in Beijing to balance Indian pressure in 
the 1980s, a Sri Lankan diplomat recalls that the Chinese “framed their advice [to Sri Lanka] in a 
cautionary aphorism: ‘distant waters don’t help put out a fire on your doorstep.’” Gooneratne, A Decade, 
126. 
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American influence in the region. Today, as the threat assessments concentrate on China, 
this will require an even more complex task of crafting flexible partnerships with the 
United States, the European Union, Japan and other powers to pool efforts, coordinate 
policies and cooperate in third countries across South Asia. However, even if only to 
diversify its options and to increase its bargaining power with such “like-minded” 
partners, New Delhi should also consider working with, and not exclusively against 
Beijing in its neighborhood, particularly in targeted sectors where Sino-Indian synergies 
can be maximized for mutual benefit. 
16. Explore and widen the range of coercive instruments: As this dissertation sets out, 
India has a rich tradition of exploring a wide spectrum of modes of involvement in the 
neighborhood, from inaction to intervention. A trade blockade on Nepal may have been 
a tempting solution in the past, but may no longer be an appropriate response today – it 
rarely takes a sledgehammer to crack a nut. In order to make even more efficient use of 
this diplomatic armory during future crises, Indian decision-makers will have to a) seek to 
expand its range, adding on new instruments based on their country’s increasing 
financial, diplomatic, intelligence, and military capabilities; and, even more importantly 
b) make more sophisticated use of such tools by adapting them to particular 
circumstances, and develop strategies of combination or sequencing. By exploring and 
adding on to this range of coercive tools, India will be able to target each problem with a 
commensurate response and also reduce the risk of escalation with its neighbors.  
17. Avoid entanglement, invest in prevention: One of the greatest challenges in India’s 
regional policy is to resist the temptation to micromanage the neighboring country’s 
internal affairs unless it is critically necessary. The likelihood of such involvement 
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spiraling out of control and leading to disastrous effects, especially in terms of 
overextension and weakening institutions, are well known to India and were reinforced by 
the experience in Sri Lanka, in the 1980s. This should not, however, preclude India from 
investing in preventive support, and continue to expand its rising “democracy assistance” 
programs to neighboring countries struggling with infant liberal regimes and difficult 
transitions. This will require a significant investment in Indian institutions that can 
provide specialized training and technical expertise, and also a public diplomacy effort to 
rope in civil society, research organizations, and political parties to publicize the Indian 
democratic model abroad. 
18. Prepare for the worst: While India may not wish to intervene again in the region, it 
cannot rule it out, and must therefore be prepared to do so. Given that India’s internal 
security, political order and economic growth increasingly rely on the stability of its 
extended neighborhood, New Delhi will be forced to respond to a variety of contingencies 
in and beyond South Asia, including devastating humanitarian and political crises.1007 
This will require a renewed focus on the region, as well as on out-of-area operations in 
theaters that are more distant and hostile. As scholar S. D. Muni presciently pointed out 
in 1991, just one year after the Indian Armed Forces withdrew in defeat from Sri Lanka, 
New Delhi “needs to do a great deal of homework to prepare itself – in terms of doctrines, 
command structure, equipment, training and intelligence – before agreeing to undertake 
                                                
1007 Sunil Khilnani thus emphasizes that “India will be the default steward for such [natural or man-made] 
crises, and a likely destination for flows of refugees. Making assessments of human catastrophes, and 
judgments about interventions to alleviate them, will therefore remain an important responsibility for 
Indian policymakers,” https://newrepublic.com/article/115435/gary-basss-blood-telegram-reviewed-
sunil-khilnani. See also Bajpai, "The Global Commons and India’s National Security Strategy " 54; 
Khilnani et al., Non-Alignment 2.0, 37.  
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[more] military adventures [abroad].”1008 25 years later, such efforts have to be urgently 
revived, accelerated, and expanded, based on continuously updated threat assessments 
and scenarios, and an expanding regional security environment. 
  
                                                
1008 Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 182-3. 
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